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Post by Nape Sintekiya Mani on Jul 5, 2022 11:26:12 GMT -6
Ooh, this conversation has just took a dark and macabre twist. I don't think GAC finished up as a company commander, as three company captains where in his group on that hill. Custer simply was caught in a trap with most of the brass in his battalion which was probably in chaos by this time. Ian Although there were three captains on the hill he was the highest ranking, therefore he was the commander of those who fell there with him. Whether he was dead or seriously incapacitated when he arrived at Custer Hill is another thing.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 5, 2022 13:03:06 GMT -6
He was the regimental commander so yes he was in over all command, but technically he was not a company commander, by the looks of it, not enough get there to assemble a company as we know it, adhoc bits from five companies with a few others detached and placed with the RHQ.
I don't know if it is any use to anyone, but I have tried to find the names of as many men as possible who's bodies may have been identified on that part of the field, so far I have found 40;
COL George Custer (HQ) LT Cooke (HQ) Dr. Lord (HQ) TMP Voss (HQ) SGM William Sharrow (HQ) SGT Robert Hughes (K) CPL John J. Callahan (K) Boston Custer (QM) Autie Reed Mitch Bouyer
CAPT Algernon Smith (E) 1SG Frederick Hohmeyer (E) SGT John S. Ogden (E) CPL George C. Brown (E) CPL Albert H. Meyer (E) PVT Richard Farrell (E) PVT William Huber (E) PVT Andy Knecht (E) PVT William H. Rees (E)
CAPT George Yates (F) LIEU William Van W. Reily (F) 1SG Michael Kenney (F) SGT John Vickory (F) CPL John Briody (F) PVT Tim Donnelly (F) PVT Anton Dohman (F) PVT Gustav Klein (F) PVT William H. Lerock (F) PVT Werner L. Liemann (F)
CAPT Tom Custer (C) PVT Ygnatz Stungewitz (C) PVT Willis B. Wright (C)
PVT Edward C. Driscoll (I) PVT Archibald McIlhargey (I) PVT John E. Mitchell (I) PVT John Parker (I)
PVT Francis T. Hughes (L) PVT Charles McCarthy (L) PVT Oscar F. Pardee (aka, John Burke) (L) PVT Thomas S. Tweed (L)
Ian
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Post by noggy on Jul 6, 2022 4:29:32 GMT -6
He was the regimental commander so yes he was in over all command, but technically he was not a company commander, by the looks of it, not enough get there to assemble a company as we know it, adhoc bits from five companies with a few others detached and placed with the RHQ. Agreed. With Yates, Smith and even his brother (I'll just for the record say I don't feel 100% percent satisfied with explanations for him ending up there, regardless of "theory"), I doubt GAC would have been in charge of anything but the overall fight/troops, since there was a surplus of Company commanders on LSH. But as alwasy; tons on unknowns and factors we can only speculate in. Geir
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Post by noggy on Jul 6, 2022 4:56:29 GMT -6
Theoldguy (it feels so wrong to call someone that!) mentioned members of CIL ending up on LSH, and I was thinking about how this came to be according to the two main theories budding heads here. "Traditional" theory, the 3+2 Compaies: A couple of survivors managed to flee North after CIL was ran over. They reached LSH, and were killed there with E+F+HQ. As for the 5 Companies/North-South theory, I would appreciated the input from those who actually know the stuff better than me Was a handfull of members from all three companies (including C's commander) killed in the LSH area/on top of LSH some time post-Ford D? Indicating some pressure, to put it kindly. And then the three Companies moved on towards the South in a somewhat orderly fashion with E+F+HQ staying behind? L reached CH as a coherrent unit and put up a fight, at least, so they didn't just bolt it. How do you guys view this part of the battle? All the best, Noggy
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Post by Nape Sintekiya Mani on Jul 6, 2022 5:12:53 GMT -6
Was a handfull of members from all three companies (including C's commander) killed in the LSH area/on top of LSH some time post-Ford D? Indicating some pressure, to put it kindly. And then the three Companies moved on towards the South in a somewhat orderly fashion with E+F+HQ staying behind? L reached CH as a coherrent unit and put up a fight, at least, so they didn't just bolt it. How do you guys view this part of the battle? All the best, Noggy Yes, I think so. F, E and HQ stayed behind covering CIL's retreat. Company L (I) think was leading the retreat. He got to CH and went down the slope. At that moment Calhoun saw some warriors coming from the south. He formed a skirmish line because he'd think a couple of volleys would scatter them and he could get past them. Realizing that it was not possible because the indians offered much more resistance than he could pass, he turned around and climbed to the top of CH thinking that with the help of I and C they could stop them.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 6, 2022 7:21:31 GMT -6
Some may think that any troopers from I-L-C that were found on LSH couldn’t have got there via Keogh Sector-Calhoun Hill-FFR, and that all these troopers where either left behind or was with the HQ unit, but I have data here from Fred I think, listing troopers from I-L-C found in the Keogh sector; The Keogh Sector: 62 bodies; 25 x L Company - 30 x I Company - 7 x C Company. We know that 1st Sgt Bobo (C Coy) was found near the body of Capt. Keogh, so did Bobo go from the debacle on FFR, up to Calhoun Hill, then onto Keogh’s position? If so then it shows that panic can get you anywhere.
The Indians do say that once the soldiers moved away from ford D, they reached the high ground (BRE & Cemetery Hill), and paused there for a while, was this to allow for the pull back south? Could this be to treat a wounded officer?
The Indians did scatter horse holders from one company and another which soldier’s held their own mounts and attempted to fire their carbines, which made their horses rear up and pull free. Don’t know if this was the same company or two different ones, so maybe at least two companies made a stand. So, if two stood on this point and another two stood on FFR & Calhoun Hill, then we could say that at four points they defended to some degree. I also think that Keogh tried to defend, his company was split into two distinct groups, one containing him and the other one Lieutenant Porter. So “I” could have arrived too late to deploy and was caught excepting survivors containing men from both C & L. And I guess hordes of Indians in their wake, oh and maybe Crazy Horse too.
Ian
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Post by Deleted on Jul 6, 2022 8:45:43 GMT -6
Theoldguy (it feels so wrong to call someone that!) mentioned members of CIL ending up on LSH, and I was thinking about how this came to be according to the two main theories budding heads here. "Traditional" theory, the 3+2 Compaies: A couple of survivors managed to flee North after CIL was ran over. They reached LSH, and were killed there with E+F+HQ. As for the 5 Companies/North-South theory, I would appreciated the input from those who actually know the stuff better than me Was a handfull of members from all three companies (including C's commander) killed in the LSH area/on top of LSH some time post-Ford D? Indicating some pressure, to put it kindly. And then the three Companies moved on towards the South in a somewhat orderly fashion with E+F+HQ staying behind? L reached CH as a coherrent unit and put up a fight, at least, so they didn't just bolt it. How do you guys view this part of the battle? All the best, Noggy I gave myself the handle, which is appropriate, so I have no problem with you using it (or admitting that it IS appropriate!) But thanks. I think that the Fox/Scott archaeology documented in their works also suggests that there was very little firing associated with the bodies in the Keogh sector, meaning few cases were found. That's another factor that I think supports the "traditional" 3+2 theory. If all five companies were on the move together then why did so many die in a spot with minimal firing, and why were they clustered around Keogh? That could only be done if they had dismounted, which would normally have been a prelude to fighting on foot. It's difficult for me to understand how a five-company retreat can be reconciled with the indian accounts and archaeology that shows there was at a time at least two wings operating, the 3+2. I can see that if they were hard-pressed they might reunite and then try to retreat, but if you're cavalry and retreating, I'd think you'd ride hell-for-leather. Then you can't shoot much. If they were riding out as a column, then you'd have to assume that CIL was leading and that they at some point dismounted to fight. The E/F/HQ following, should have been closer and should have combined with them, I'd think.
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Post by herosrest on Jul 6, 2022 9:41:37 GMT -6
Hi JI, tubman. The markers at or near the Stonehouse is at best false and probably very much worse. It was a long term topic linked here with quite a bit to consider. The markers were wooden and sat in the valley leaning on a fence or barn.......... nothing to do with 1876. I got into a discussion elsewhere with a authority on the battle who point blank discoursed on various bodies north of 212 as gospel but in spite of reassuring me it is true, that's it. If there is evidence, it was never published or placed in the public domain. The story is broader than 1876, since owners of the various parcels of land had interest in promoting the land and despite, for example, Park Ranger Donahue's obsession with Custer hunting for women and children miles downriver which may be a homage to Cliff Nelson's prior work on the Custer Battalion north of Last Stand Hill. Link to item on the trading post owner. There are versions of this beyond 212 thing. Bodies found there, or markers placed there. In terms of markers, none were officially placed in those areas. We know this from the Officer who did the work and R.B. Marshall who mapped the markers in 1890 or 1891. Here's the report www.welchdakotapapers.com/2012/02/col-welch-notes-on-custer/#captain-sweets- Marshall's maps are well known. I think that a horse skeleton was found on the d**e Ranch and he wanted to build a museum there. Very much more going on than the 1876 battle, i'm affraid. very much more. In one of three accounts of the battle given by Gall at the 10th Anniversary, he told of 14 soldiers who escaped the Custer fight, crossed the river came back up the valley and were then killed. So, horses for courses but unfortunately, this compares well with the troops left behind in the valley fighting. No way to soet that one out. The six markers told of at the Stone House were in fact wooden markers laying around on the farm in the valley where the Reno Museum stood and where Fort Custer now Stands and where CBHMA undertake tours of the Wagner version of the valley skirmish. It's a mishmashof hearsay and various intentions and goodwill, Elizabeth Custer's collection of historical records and artifacts is housed at Garryowen, where the unknown soldier was buried in 1926, at the 50th Annieversary. It's a complete mess of speculation and re-speculations. Some is very good, here's Cliff Nelson on the valley fight - link - stood on the brow of the road and railwayimmediately upriver of Garryowen on the roadside. You can see the famous phone poles in the background and the area of the truncated riverloop below it. Nelson was a ranger at the battlefield when Donahue began his summer seasons there away from lecturing in Texas. Nelson was interested in Custer's movements north of LSH and this formed the basis of his little known thesis. RiPDreams and History and what it brings. Thanks much, Herosrest, not least for the link to the old thread on this topic. As I said, I was most interested in the possibility of bodies north of 212. I've been to the field many times, and never heard it. I hadn't read it either - appreciate the links to that material, as well as your observations, Tubman. Bodies north of 212 would really change my thinking if it there was evidence (the Cemetery area wouldn't surprise me either way). I still wouldn't mind checking Michael Donohue, if someone has an e-mail address. I looked a bit and couldn't find it. Thanks again, Rob The good professor undertakes his day job at Austin Texas and his calling, at Temple Temple Here link is the Duck on the hunt. Regards.
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Post by herosrest on Jul 6, 2022 10:45:11 GMT -6
Theoldguy (it feels so wrong to call someone that!) mentioned members of CIL ending up on LSH, and I was thinking about how this came to be according to the two main theories budding heads here. "Traditional" theory, the 3+2 Compaies: A couple of survivors managed to flee North after CIL was ran over. They reached LSH, and were killed there with E+F+HQ. As for the 5 Companies/North-South theory, I would appreciated the input from those who actually know the stuff better than me Was a handfull of members from all three companies (including C's commander) killed in the LSH area/on top of LSH some time post-Ford D? Indicating some pressure, to put it kindly. And then the three Companies moved on towards the South in a somewhat orderly fashion with E+F+HQ staying behind? L reached CH as a coherrent unit and put up a fight, at least, so they didn't just bolt it. How do you guys view this part of the battle? All the best, Noggy I gave myself the handle, which is appropriate, so I have no problem with you using it (or admitting that it IS appropriate!) But thanks. I think that the Fox/Scott archaeology documented in their works also suggests that there was very little firing associated with the bodies in the Keogh sector, meaning few cases were found. That's another factor that I think supports the "traditional" 3+2 theory. If all five companies were on the move together then why did so many die in a spot with minimal firing, and why were they clustered around Keogh? That could only be done if they had dismounted, which would normally have been a prelude to fighting on foot. It's difficult for me to understand how a five-company retreat can be reconciled with the indian accounts and archaeology that shows there was at a time at least two wings operating, the 3+2. I can see that if they were hard-pressed they might reunite and then try to retreat, but if you're cavalry and retreating, I'd think you'd ride hell-for-leather. Then you can't shoot much. If they were riding out as a column, then you'd have to assume that CIL was leading and that they at some point dismounted to fight. The E/F/HQ following, should have been closer and should have combined with them, I'd think. Regards. What was wrong with 'The Good Old Boy', This battle is a battle of its history since the fighting ended and recrimination began. With that given, I found that after considerable aversion - all there is to do is put yourself in Custer's boots in a realistic scenario. Afraid the camp would scatter and run, he closed rapidly to attack. Whatever his intention, Reno's orders to separate into the valley and open a fight, put the underlying tenet upon rock solid ground. I believe the advance down Reno Ck. was prudently rapid. The only logical conclusion for me, is that Custer understood the camp was not fleeing but was stood in the valley unaware of a rapid daytime approach by 7th Cavalry. All this is solid in the record. We come then to mounting a rapid strike after closing rapidly. Custer repeated his tactics at Washita. At this point, all further reasonable consideration of this battle is impossible.
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Post by Deleted on Jul 6, 2022 16:10:27 GMT -6
Regards. What was wrong with 'The Good Old Boy', This battle is a battle of its history since the fighting ended and recrimination began. With that given, I found that after considerable aversion - all there is to do is put yourself in Custer's boots in a realistic scenario. Afraid the camp would scatter and run, he closed rapidly to attack. Whatever his intention, Reno's orders to separate into the valley and open a fight, put the underlying tenet upon rock solid ground. I believe the advance down Reno Ck. was prudently rapid. The only logical conclusion for me, is that Custer understood the camp was not fleeing but was stood in the valley unaware of a rapid daytime approach by 7th Cavalry. All this is solid in the record. We come then to mounting a rapid strike after closing rapidly. Custer repeated his tactics at Washita. At this point, all further reasonable consideration of this battle is impossible. Nothing other than that wasn't what I picked. I'm not one for euphemisms I agree that Reno's move was reasonable. I don't think it was reasonable for him (or anyone later) to believe that Custer would support him by following him in. If that had been Custer's intentions, he could have gone in with his 5 companies. I think he intended to see if he could block the escape of the women and children. His excursion to Medicine Tree Coulee was an attempt to find the end of the village. When that failed, I think he sent for Benteen, left Keogh's wing in reserve, and scouted to find the end of the village. All reasonable steps, based on his style and past history. The problem IMHO was that he assumed he was in control of the situation, meaning that the indians were simply trying to escape. That had been his fear from the first, and I think it gave him tunnel vision. I also think that the proximate cause of his death was the collapse of the Calhoun Hill Keogh sector. I believe he had established E/F in a static position awaiting Benteen, and when Keogh's wing collapsed he tried to establish a defensive position to which the survivors could retreat. That didn't work. As one of my favorite poets (Sir Thomas Gray) said "The paths of glory lead but to the grave". Reasonable consideration is never impossible, IMHO. It may not always be accurate, but analysis of history has to be based on intelligent consensus on what isn't hard fact, or you're not a historian, you're a librarian If you prefer, Tom
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Post by Nape Sintekiya Mani on Jul 6, 2022 16:19:03 GMT -6
Regards. What was wrong with 'The Good Old Boy', This battle is a battle of its history since the fighting ended and recrimination began. With that given, I found that after considerable aversion - all there is to do is put yourself in Custer's boots in a realistic scenario. Afraid the camp would scatter and run, he closed rapidly to attack. Whatever his intention, Reno's orders to separate into the valley and open a fight, put the underlying tenet upon rock solid ground. I believe the advance down Reno Ck. was prudently rapid. The only logical conclusion for me, is that Custer understood the camp was not fleeing but was stood in the valley unaware of a rapid daytime approach by 7th Cavalry. All this is solid in the record. We come then to mounting a rapid strike after closing rapidly. Custer repeated his tactics at Washita. At this point, all further reasonable consideration of this battle is impossible. When that failed, I think he sent for Benteen, left Keogh's wing in reserve, and scouted to find the end of the village. I want to ask you a question. Why did he leave Keogh in reserve and he went scouting with 90 soldiers, don't you think the same scouting job could be done exactly the same by a small detachment?
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Post by herosrest on Jul 6, 2022 17:19:26 GMT -6
When that failed, I think he sent for Benteen, left Keogh's wing in reserve, and scouted to find the end of the village. I want to ask you a question. Why did he leave Keogh in reserve and he went scouting with 90 soldiers, don't you think the same scouting job could be done exactly the same by a small detachment? Regards, I can only respond with a question as to what on Earth makes you feel that Custer was on a scout. Where does that idea come from?
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Post by herosrest on Jul 6, 2022 17:36:54 GMT -6
Regards. What was wrong with 'The Good Old Boy', This battle is a battle of its history since the fighting ended and recrimination began. With that given, I found that after considerable aversion - all there is to do is put yourself in Custer's boots in a realistic scenario. Afraid the camp would scatter and run, he closed rapidly to attack. Whatever his intention, Reno's orders to separate into the valley and open a fight, put the underlying tenet upon rock solid ground. I believe the advance down Reno Ck. was prudently rapid. The only logical conclusion for me, is that Custer understood the camp was not fleeing but was stood in the valley unaware of a rapid daytime approach by 7th Cavalry. All this is solid in the record. We come then to mounting a rapid strike after closing rapidly. Custer repeated his tactics at Washita. At this point, all further reasonable consideration of this battle is impossible. Nothing other than that wasn't what I picked. I'm not one for euphemisms I agree that Reno's move was reasonable. I don't think it was reasonable for him (or anyone later) to believe that Custer would support him by following him in. If that had been Custer's intentions, he could have gone in with his 5 companies. I think he intended to see if he could block the escape of the women and children. His excursion to Medicine Tree Coulee was an attempt to find the end of the village. When that failed, I think he sent for Benteen, left Keogh's wing in reserve, and scouted to find the end of the village. All reasonable steps, based on his style and past history. The problem IMHO was that he assumed he was in control of the situation, meaning that the indians were simply trying to escape. That had been his fear from the first, and I think it gave him tunnel vision. I also think that the proximate cause of his death was the collapse of the Calhoun Hill Keogh sector. I believe he had established E/F in a static position awaiting Benteen, and when Keogh's wing collapsed he tried to establish a defensive position to which the survivors could retreat. That didn't work. As one of my favorite poets (Sir Thomas Gray) said "The paths of glory lead but to the grave". Reasonable consideration is never impossible, IMHO. It may not always be accurate, but analysis of history has to be based on intelligent consensus on what isn't hard fact, or you're not a historian, you're a librarian If you prefer, Tom I think Reno disgreed with Custer's intentions for for him. He said as much at the inquiry. There were some witnesses who left record of the move onto and over the bluffs and I am very comfortable these days in relying upon Martini and Kanipe in particular. Certainly Indians were fleeing and others organising mounts but Custer observed the camp (what was visible) from the bluffs and it was not running or even stirred up. That was 10 minutes maximum from riding into Medicine Tail Coulee. He arrived there as Reno opened his fight in the valley as far as i'm concerned and Reno's stand was of a considerably brief duration. As Reno reached the bluffs so a large force of the Indians, put at one half those present in the valley by DeRudio who saw them; rode up the bluffs below Weir's Peak and attacked across MTC. There wasno way back for the five companies and that is why they were to north and downriver. Seeing a large enemy force approaching over their backtrail, there was no reason to expect help from that quarter. For a number of reasons to do with the timing, it is obvious that Benteen was sent to join Reno in the valley across Ford A and actually did that but Reno was on his way out and across the river up a sheer cliff. An urgent 'Come on', puts Benteen to Ford A and had Reno Managed to reach it in his retreat, the hostile force had a headache and could not disengage. Of course, they turned Reno into the river and the game was up. Benteen chose not to attack into the valley and told Terry this - it's noted in the report of 27th June, 1876. Terry's first report. I doubt we'll agree but that is this battle. There is an idea of Custer scouting about for hostages and fords and elk tooth dresses which has quite some popular weight behind it these days. An ardent proponent is Michael Donahue who discusses the battle HERE. I was struck by his physical resemblance of Maj. Reno. He is of course entirely pro-Custer who in his estimation was game to the end and incredibly unlucky.
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Post by noggy on Jul 7, 2022 1:27:37 GMT -6
Was a handfull of members from all three companies (including C's commander) killed in the LSH area/on top of LSH some time post-Ford D? Indicating some pressure, to put it kindly. And then the three Companies moved on towards the South in a somewhat orderly fashion with E+F+HQ staying behind? L reached CH as a coherrent unit and put up a fight, at least, so they didn't just bolt it. How do you guys view this part of the battle? All the best, Noggy Yes, I think so. F, E and HQ stayed behind covering CIL's retreat. Company L (I) think was leading the retreat. He got to CH and went down the slope. At that moment Calhoun saw some warriors coming from the south. He formed a skirmish line because he'd think a couple of volleys would scatter them and he could get past them. Realizing that it was not possible because the indians offered much more resistance than he could pass, he turned around and climbed to the top of CH thinking that with the help of I and C they could stop them. While under attack, and suffering casualties, sending away 60% percent of your combat strength one company at the time (with L heading off in front of the two others, while they all were suffering casulaties) strikes me as strange. But okay, to each his own, I have as I have said many times before no "emotional investment" in the battle and genuinly like hearing others' opinion, so I will ofc respect yours as I always do and will continue to Geir
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Post by Nape Sintekiya Mani on Jul 7, 2022 4:37:00 GMT -6
I want to ask you a question. Why did he leave Keogh in reserve and he went scouting with 90 soldiers, don't you think the same scouting job could be done exactly the same by a small detachment? Regards, I can only respond with a question as to what on Earth makes you feel that Custer was on a scout. Where does that idea come from? It's not my idea, it's theoldguy's idea. I just ask why Custer would go scouting with 90 men when he could do it with 10 or 12. I don't get the idea of scouting either. I´m convinced that Custer was in attack mode until he got close to Ford D. There, for whatever reason he was, he understood that he had to retreat, because he did not have enough strength to cross to the other side of the river, and hold on over there.
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