|
Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 4, 2022 2:58:41 GMT -6
Theo, (I hope I have your name correct).
Tom will know that we have worked this theory over before, why troopers from IL&C where found on LSH. One of the theories is that these three companies held skirmish lines at one point on BRE, these troopers could have lost their mounts in the process of retrograding. Another thought was, a couple of men from each company stayed to delay the Indians whilst their company got away, but this is too fancyful for me. They could just be the lucky few who still had their mounts and managed to delay the inevitable and reached LSH.
Ian
|
|
|
Post by Nape Sintekiya Mani on Jul 4, 2022 3:28:28 GMT -6
Hello "theoldguy" which is odd me saying that since I am probably around your age I doubt it; hardly anyone is my age The point I was trying to make is that there were some Keogh people from each of his companies, which to me begs the question of how they got there if Keogh separated and retreated. In any event, IMHO, if the five companies (plus HQ) were pressed, they it's hard for me to understand why they'd have separated at that point. If they were attacked in the Last Stand Hill vicinity as a unit, I think they'd have stayed together. If Keogh split off, then my presumption would have to be that they were not significantly pressed, in which case why did he split off and retreat? Do we think that Keogh led a general retreat? If that's the case then there should have been no Keogh troopers on Last Stand Hill. OK, maybe I'm delusional but I think that Custer was doing what might have been expected, which was to presume that the warriors were a mob and that he could assume that they'd be just reacting. Thus, he was acting. He didn't believe he was under threat at all. Neither did Keogh. They believed they were in control of the situation, which they were until their complacency led them to underestimate what the warriors (two to four thousand depending on who you believe) could do even if they weren't coordinated at a tactical level. A mass of charging people, even if they outnumber you by only 2 or 3 to one, presents a defensive challenge when the dominant weapon on the defense is single-shot. You shoot. You have maybe ten seconds before you can shoot again. A bunch of people who want to kill YOU (from your perspective) are charging. Your life depends on someone else shooting them because you're not ready to shoot again. Run? Seems logical. I've been to the battlefield, both Custer's and Isandhlwana (and Rourke's Drift). I don't claim to be a military strategist (I was in the Navy and there were no oceans near to Little Big Horn), nor a historical expert, but I'm a researcher by trade. I've read all the primary material and that's what's shaped my views, along with looking at the ground from a limited perspective of three weeks of Marine indoctrination. I think that there's a tendency to see the warriors at Little Big Horn as pseudo-military, and all accounts including their own say that's not the case. The warriors were all following those who they respected, without any military discipline. To say that Custer's people were retreating begs the question of who was advancing against them. No organized formation, no battle line. Where was there to retreat to? Custer made the same mistake Crook made, and that the Brits made at Isandhlwana. On one hand, he assumed an organized foe. On the other hand, he assume that his problem would be to get them to battle at all. You can't win a fight by assuming the enemy is following your script When Custer went down to Ford D and aborted the action maybe as you say he saw a mob of warriors running towards Ford on the other side of the river. The Little Bighorn, despite being little more than a stream, cannot be crossed as in John Ford's westerns in a column, it must be crossed as in a skirmish line. For that you need a lot of clear space. Custer for whatever reason called off the action and the only thing he could do was go back and rejoin the rest of the Regiment. He wasn't going to wait for Benteen because 120 more soldiers weren't going to make a difference. I believe that of all the actions Custer took on that fateful day, the withdrawal leaving two Companies for the indian mob was the most successful thing he did. The problem is that he did not know that another mob was also arriving from the south, this one made up of Sioux warriors who were returning from the fight on the cliffs to face the new threat. Running in front of irregulars is a mistake, they become emboldened. The only way is to stand firm like the British did at Rourke's Drift. That is the only chance to live, turn your back and run is to invite them to chase and knock them down without difficulty. hahahahaha, great sense of humor, I like it: "I doubt it; hardly anyone is my age"
|
|
|
Post by tubman13 on Jul 4, 2022 4:19:04 GMT -6
Ian, I really am getting old, read yours quickly, as in scan. I will leave the mistake, as that's what it was.
Regards, Tom
|
|
|
Post by tubman13 on Jul 4, 2022 5:38:00 GMT -6
This battle, to me played out as an example of Custer's tunnel vision, which was displayed throughout his career. Often he was rewarded in an excellent victory, on other occasions maybe we see what is often called Custer's Luck. There were, as I am sure you all know, two other battles that could have become Custer's Last Stand. They were Trevillian Station and The Washita, and maybe even, to a lesser extent, a battle with these same Indians on the Yellowstone Expedition.
The tunnel vision here was a case of hyper-tunnel vision. He knew that his storied reputation was more important than ever. A bit of self promotion and a solid victory were required to restore him to what he felt was his rightful place in the eyes of military management, after his problems in Washington. Self promotion is certainly not unheard of, we have seen it with other military luminaries such as MacArthur and Montgomery.
Having said the above I can't see GAC leaving roughly 3/5 of his combat strength behind. I also don't see continuing to distance yourself from requested support. Unless, he felt time was running against him. If that's the case he needed all of his combat strength in the north. JSIT and others indicate fighting in the flats, the flats were never considered Ford B. There are the testimonies of troops remaining on the ridge/bluffs, as an advance to the river took place. CR or BRE are examples of that.
Time for a small commercial. If you haven't checked out the American Tribes site that Diane helped to get going, you can find it in the banner line on the home page here. Ian also has a site, that is worth the visit.
Time for more coffee.
Regards, Tom
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Jul 4, 2022 5:52:48 GMT -6
I doubt it; hardly anyone is my age The point I was trying to make is that there were some Keogh people from each of his companies, which to me begs the question of how they got there if Keogh separated and retreated. In any event, IMHO, if the five companies (plus HQ) were pressed, they it's hard for me to understand why they'd have separated at that point. If they were attacked in the Last Stand Hill vicinity as a unit, I think they'd have stayed together. If Keogh split off, then my presumption would have to be that they were not significantly pressed, in which case why did he split off and retreat? Do we think that Keogh led a general retreat? If that's the case then there should have been no Keogh troopers on Last Stand Hill. OK, maybe I'm delusional but I think that Custer was doing what might have been expected, which was to presume that the warriors were a mob and that he could assume that they'd be just reacting. Thus, he was acting. He didn't believe he was under threat at all. Neither did Keogh. They believed they were in control of the situation, which they were until their complacency led them to underestimate what the warriors (two to four thousand depending on who you believe) could do even if they weren't coordinated at a tactical level. A mass of charging people, even if they outnumber you by only 2 or 3 to one, presents a defensive challenge when the dominant weapon on the defense is single-shot. You shoot. You have maybe ten seconds before you can shoot again. A bunch of people who want to kill YOU (from your perspective) are charging. Your life depends on someone else shooting them because you're not ready to shoot again. Run? Seems logical. I've been to the battlefield, both Custer's and Isandhlwana (and Rourke's Drift). I don't claim to be a military strategist (I was in the Navy and there were no oceans near to Little Big Horn), nor a historical expert, but I'm a researcher by trade. I've read all the primary material and that's what's shaped my views, along with looking at the ground from a limited perspective of three weeks of Marine indoctrination. I think that there's a tendency to see the warriors at Little Big Horn as pseudo-military, and all accounts including their own say that's not the case. The warriors were all following those who they respected, without any military discipline. To say that Custer's people were retreating begs the question of who was advancing against them. No organized formation, no battle line. Where was there to retreat to? Custer made the same mistake Crook made, and that the Brits made at Isandhlwana. On one hand, he assumed an organized foe. On the other hand, he assume that his problem would be to get them to battle at all. You can't win a fight by assuming the enemy is following your script When Custer went down to Ford D and aborted the action maybe as you say he saw a mob of warriors running towards Ford on the other side of the river. The Little Bighorn, despite being little more than a stream, cannot be crossed as in John Ford's westerns in a column, it must be crossed as in a skirmish line. For that you need a lot of clear space. Custer for whatever reason called off the action and the only thing he could do was go back and rejoin the rest of the Regiment. He wasn't going to wait for Benteen because 120 more soldiers weren't going to make a difference. I believe that of all the actions Custer took on that fateful day, the withdrawal leaving two Companies for the indian mob was the most successful thing he did. The problem is that he did not know that another mob was also arriving from the south, this one made up of Sioux warriors who were returning from the fight on the cliffs to face the new threat. Running in front of irregulars is a mistake, they become emboldened. The only way is to stand firm like the British did at Rourke's Drift. That is the only chance to live, turn your back and run is to invite them to chase and knock them down without difficulty. hahahahaha, great sense of humor, I like it: "I doubt it; hardly anyone is my age" One can only laugh in the face of aging! I don't think Custer intended to cross at Ford D. I think he believed what he was told earlier, which is that the indians were running. That's where your ultra-tunnel-vision point comes in. He thought he was in control just because he heard what he expected. I don't believe that he was under pressure at the time he split the 5 companies; Reno was still attracting the majority of warriors. I think he felt there was no need rush, the village was running and he would be able to simply ride over with the whole force (less Reno) and corral them. The archaeology and accounts suggest to me that the 2-company Yates wing didn't even come under pressure until the very end. They took position in the flats and near the current cemetery, again IMHO, waiting for Benteen. When the Keogh wing collapsed, I think Custer moved the other two companies to Last Stand Hill to provide support and the survivors of Keogh's companies fled there. By that time, more warriors were collecting near Last Stand Hill and the rest (as they say) is history. Even at Isandhlwana, the regulars held off an enormous Zulu wave for as long as they maintained fire discipline. When Durnford's people fell back on the right because they were out of ammo, the Zulu left were able to curl around. The two other columns that Chelmsford had sent both encountered significant Zulu forces and held them off. In the subsequent action (after Chelmsford was reinforced) near Ulundi, a British square formation held off a larger Zulu army with minimal casualties. As you say, standing firm is the only answer, but to do that you have to recognize that you're actually under attack. I think Custer died because he thought he was in control...until he wasn't.
|
|
|
Post by noggy on Jul 4, 2022 6:01:08 GMT -6
Having said the above I can't see GAC leaving roughly 3/5 of his combat strength behind. I also don't see continuing to distance yourself from requested support. To be fair, he pretty much had been reducing his combat strength all day long, step by step (pack train guards, Benteen, leaving Reno on his own) All the best, Geir
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 4, 2022 7:28:03 GMT -6
Yeah he did just that Geir, why I don't know, because if Reno got stopped (which he did), it would leave him with only 200 to take on this huge village.
Ian
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 4, 2022 7:35:28 GMT -6
When Custer went down to Ford D and aborted the action maybe as you say he saw a mob of warriors running towards Ford on the other side of the river. The Little Bighorn, despite being little more than a stream, cannot be crossed as in John Ford's westerns in a column, it must be crossed as in a skirmish line. For that you need a lot of clear space. Custer for whatever reason called off the action and the only thing he could do was go back and rejoin the rest of the Regiment. He wasn't going to wait for Benteen because 120 more soldiers weren't going to make a difference. I believe that of all the actions Custer took on that fateful day, the withdrawal leaving two Companies for the indian mob was the most successful thing he did. The problem is that he did not know that another mob was also arriving from the south, this one made up of Sioux warriors who were returning from the fight on the cliffs to face the new threat. Running in front of irregulars is a mistake, they become emboldened. The only way is to stand firm like the British did at Rourke's Drift. That is the only chance to live, turn your back and run is to invite them to chase and knock them down without difficulty. hahahahaha, great sense of humor, I like it: "I doubt it; hardly anyone is my age" One can only laugh in the face of aging! I don't think Custer intended to cross at Ford D. I think he believed what he was told earlier, which is that the indians were running. That's where your ultra-tunnel-vision point comes in. He thought he was in control just because he heard what he expected. I don't believe that he was under pressure at the time he split the 5 companies; Reno was still attracting the majority of warriors. I think he felt there was no need rush, the village was running and he would be able to simply ride over with the whole force (less Reno) and corral them. The archaeology and accounts suggest to me that the 2-company Yates wing didn't even come under pressure until the very end. They took position in the flats and near the current cemetery, again IMHO, waiting for Benteen. When the Keogh wing collapsed, I think Custer moved the other two companies to Last Stand Hill to provide support and the survivors of Keogh's companies fled there. By that time, more warriors were collecting near Last Stand Hill and the rest (as they say) is history. Even at Isandhlwana, the regulars held off an enormous Zulu wave for as long as they maintained fire discipline. When Durnford's people fell back on the right because they were out of ammo, the Zulu left were able to curl around. The two other columns that Chelmsford had sent both encountered significant Zulu forces and held them off. In the subsequent action (after Chelmsford was reinforced) near Ulundi, a British square formation held off a larger Zulu army with minimal casualties. As you say, standing firm is the only answer, but to do that you have to recognize that you're actually under attack. I think Custer died because he thought he was in control...until he wasn't. Well Theo, the British army took pride in their musketry, which they used right up until WW2 and beyond, the Germans at Mons 1914 would testify. The US Cavalry circa 1876 did not train in musketry as nearly as it should, I remember reading that they were issued a mire seven rounds per trooper per month to practice. But I suppose Cavalry were not supposed to hold a line like Infantry, but still GAC treated his men like Dragoons, which they were not. Ian
|
|
|
Post by Nape Sintekiya Mani on Jul 4, 2022 8:14:20 GMT -6
Having said the above I can't see GAC leaving roughly 3/5 of his combat strength behind. I also don't see continuing to distance yourself from requested support. To be fair, he pretty much had been reducing his combat strength all day long, step by step (pack train guards, Benteen, leaving Reno on his own) All the best, Geir Very correct comment. But you can go a little further still: He started his day as a Regimental Commander, then became a Battalion Commander, and ended his life and military career as a Company Commander (if he was alive when he reached Custer Hill).
|
|
|
Post by justinterested on Jul 4, 2022 10:03:10 GMT -6
Rob, no questions are ever out of bounds. Private Tweed and Kellogg's bodies are buried on Last Stand Hill, far from where they were found. There were also 4 or 5 bodies under what is now the Visitor Center. I look forward to your 200th post. Regards, Tom Hi JI, tubman. The markers at or near the Stonehouse is at best false and probably very much worse. It was a long term topic linked here with quite a bit to consider. The markers were wooden and sat in the valley leaning on a fence or barn.......... nothing to do with 1876. I got into a discussion elsewhere with a authority on the battle who point blank discoursed on various bodies north of 212 as gospel but in spite of reassuring me it is true, that's it. If there is evidence, it was never published or placed in the public domain. The story is broader than 1876, since owners of the various parcels of land had interest in promoting the land and despite, for example, Park Ranger Donahue's obsession with Custer hunting for women and children miles downriver which may be a homage to Cliff Nelson's prior work on the Custer Battalion north of Last Stand Hill. Link to item on the trading post owner. There are versions of this beyond 212 thing. Bodies found there, or markers placed there. In terms of markers, none were officially placed in those areas. We know this from the Officer who did the work and R.B. Marshall who mapped the markers in 1890 or 1891. Here's the report www.welchdakotapapers.com/2012/02/col-welch-notes-on-custer/#captain-sweets- Marshall's maps are well known. I think that a horse skeleton was found on the d**e Ranch and he wanted to build a museum there. Very much more going on than the 1876 battle, i'm affraid. very much more. In one of three accounts of the battle given by Gall at the 10th Anniversary, he told of 14 soldiers who escaped the Custer fight, crossed the river came back up the valley and were then killed. So, horses for courses but unfortunately, this compares well with the troops left behind in the valley fighting. No way to soet that one out. The six markers told of at the Stone House were in fact wooden markers laying around on the farm in the valley where the Reno Museum stood and where Fort Custer now Stands and where CBHMA undertake tours of the Wagner version of the valley skirmish. It's a mishmashof hearsay and various intentions and goodwill, Elizabeth Custer's collection of historical records and artifacts is housed at Garryowen, where the unknown soldier was buried in 1926, at the 50th Annieversary. It's a complete mess of speculation and re-speculations. Some is very good, here's Cliff Nelson on the valley fight - link - stood on the brow of the road and railwayimmediately upriver of Garryowen on the roadside. You can see the famous phone poles in the background and the area of the truncated riverloop below it. Nelson was a ranger at the battlefield when Donahue began his summer seasons there away from lecturing in Texas. Nelson was interested in Custer's movements north of LSH and this formed the basis of his little known thesis. RiPDreams and History and what it brings. Thanks much, Herosrest, not least for the link to the old thread on this topic. As I said, I was most interested in the possibility of bodies north of 212. I've been to the field many times, and never heard it. I hadn't read it either - appreciate the links to that material, as well as your observations, Tubman. Bodies north of 212 would really change my thinking if it there was evidence (the Cemetery area wouldn't surprise me either way). I still wouldn't mind checking Michael Donohue, if someone has an e-mail address. I looked a bit and couldn't find it. Thanks again, Rob
|
|
|
Post by tubman13 on Jul 4, 2022 10:53:32 GMT -6
Mike is at the battefield as we write, you my be able t catch him there, or leave a message.
Regards, Tom
|
|
|
Post by noggy on Jul 5, 2022 1:49:45 GMT -6
To be fair, he pretty much had been reducing his combat strength all day long, step by step (pack train guards, Benteen, leaving Reno on his own) All the best, Geir Very correct comment. But you can go a little further still: He started his day as a Regimental Commander, then became a Battalion Commander, and ended his life and military career as a Company Commander (if he was alive when he reached Custer Hill). Oh, you can go even further; he started off the day as a living human being and ended up as a stripped corpse. All the best, Geir
|
|
|
Post by Nape Sintekiya Mani on Jul 5, 2022 4:33:54 GMT -6
Very correct comment. But you can go a little further still: He started his day as a Regimental Commander, then became a Battalion Commander, and ended his life and military career as a Company Commander (if he was alive when he reached Custer Hill). Oh, you can go even further; he started off the day as a living human being and ended up as a stripped corpse. All the best, Geir The last thing you say is going to happen to all of us; we'll start one day alive and end it dead.
|
|
|
Post by noggy on Jul 5, 2022 7:11:41 GMT -6
Oh, you can go even further; he started off the day as a living human being and ended up as a stripped corpse. All the best, Geir The last thing you say is going to happen to all of us; we'll start one day alive and end it dead. Yep, but I feel pretty sure the circumstances will be very different. Geir
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 5, 2022 7:17:58 GMT -6
Ooh, this conversation has just took a dark and macabre twist.
I don't think GAC finished up as a company commander, as three company captains where in his group on that hill. Custer simply was caught in a trap with most of the brass in his battalion which was probably in chaos by this time.
Ian
|
|