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Post by herosrest on Jan 27, 2021 15:12:54 GMT -6
I link to McClernand's report of Montana Column's marches at 2dn Cavalry's 7 day scout started 24th April, 1876; Annual report of the Secretary of War. 1877/78 v.2:2.. It isn't everyone's cup of cocoa but gives a feel for the way of it then. As things turned out, these were two charmed companies wandering around the enemies back yard. Gibbon's report of matters - linkFort Shaw, Montana, October 17, 1876.
On the 18th Major Reno, with a force of cavalry, arrived opposite our camp after a scout on Powder, Tongue, and Rosebud Rivers, during which he reported he had seen no Indians, and the next day he proceeded down the river, A cavalry scout up the river having reported the side streams almost impassable, by reason of floods from recent rains, I started Captain Freeman with three counpanies of infantry on the 21st, up the road to build bridges. General Terry reaching the camp by steamer shortly afterward, the whole command was started up the river.
I, at his request, accompanied him on the Far West, for the purpose of conferring with Lieutenant-Colonel Custer, who reached a point on the opposite side of the river with the whole of the Seventh Cavalry that afternoon.That evening the plan of operations was agreed upon. Lieutenant-Colonel Custer, with the Seventh Cavalry, was to proceed up the Rosebud till he struck an Indian trail, discovered during Major Reno's scout. As my scouts had recently reported smoke on the Little Big Horn, the presence of an Indian camp some distance up that stream was inferred.
Lieutenant-Colonel Custer was instructed to keep constantly feeling toward his left, well up toward the mountains, so as to prevent the Indians escaping in that direction, and to strike the Little Big Horn, if possible, above (south of) the supposed location of the camp, while my command was to march up the Yellowstone to the mouth of the Big Horn, there to be ferried across by the steamer, then to move up the Big Horn to the mouth of the Little Big Horn, and up that stream, with the hope of getting the camp between the two forces.
As it would take my command three days to reach the mouth of the Big Horn, and probably a day to cross it over the Yellowstone, besides two more to reach the mouth of the Little Big Horn, and Lieutenant Colonel Custer had the shorter line over which to operate, the department commander strongly impressed upon him the propriety of not pressing his march too rapidly.
He got of with his regiment at 12 o'clock the next day, (22d,) three Gatling guns, under ieutenant Low, Twentieth Infantry, being detached from his regiment and sent to join my command. The steamer got away at 4 o'clock that day, and reached Fort Pease early on the morning of the 24th. My command, except the train and Captain Kirtland's company, (B, Seventh Infantry,) being at once ferried across, was, that evening, moved out to the crossing of Tullock's Fork. I did not accompany it, and General Terry took command of the troops in person. The next day the steamer entered the mouth of the Big Horn and proceeded up that stream.[/font]
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Post by mikerobel on Jan 28, 2021 14:29:08 GMT -6
Decision Point | Who | Timeline | Location | Local Time | Clock Time | Event | 2 | Custer | B | Busby Bend
DD: -106.965 45.541 MGRS: 13TCL46594490 | 2028 | 2125 | Godfrey and Hare settle in when Custer calls his officers together and informs them of his intention to move at 2300. The meeting was short and sweet.
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Custer halted in the vicinity of the Busby Bend for the night, short of the Rosebud-Davis Creek intersection. The scouts have informed him they could reach the Crows nest by morning, confirming the trail and possibly detecting the village location since they appear to be gaining on the Indians. Notably, had Custer continued down the Rosebud, he more than likely would have discovered the Battle of the Rosebud sight. This may have altered Custer's thinking, but of course has no role in making his decision, thus it was not included as in any COA proposed because there definitely would have been no knowledge of the battle prior to finding it. There are at least three possible courses of action. COA 1 | ***COA 2*** | COA 3 | Send only the Scouts to the Crows Nest | Send Scouts to Crow's Nest and follow with the Regiment | Continue Down the Rosebud | Advantages | Advantages | Advantages | Can confirm the current location of the Indian Camp. | Can confirm the current location of the Indian Camp. | Follows Terry's orders and intent. | Does not commit me from following with the Regiment | Object of Reconnaissance is to gain and maintain contact with the enemy | | Object of Reconnaissance is to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. |
| Can divert to follow enemy trail in morning | Can divert to follow enemy trail in the morning |
| Very small chance of Regiment's detection | What's not forbidden (Not sending scouts) is permitted.
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| Can divert to follow enemy trail in the morning |
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| Disadvantages | Disadvantages
| Disadvantages | Have pushed the scouts hard today. | May commit me to attacking early | Enemy Camp may move in a manner that avoids detection. | If the situation is as I think it is, this delays my ability to attack. | Long march will tire troops and horses. | May cost me the opportunity to attack in favorable conditions. |
| Increases the Regiments chance of detection. | |
| Have pushed the scouts hard today.2
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Comparison of Courses of Action
--Sending Scouts to the Crows nests follows principles of reconnaissance which is to gain and maintain contact with the enemy and will confirm the direction the enemy has taken before we continue to the south, has a very small chance of detection, allows the troops to rest, and increases my flexibility as I can always follow the trail when we reach Davis Creek in the morning. --My orders do not prohibit me from sending Scouts to the Crows Nest to confirm the enemy direction of movement. Much has changed since Reno's Scout. --Following the scouts with the regiment forces me to do a long and difficult night march and will tire the troops and horses. My chance of detection is increased and I may be committed to the attack before I am ready and without any support from Terry. --COA 1 and 3 allow me to turn to follow the trail at Davis Creek. --COA 1 and 2 allow me to confirm the direction of the trail and possibly detect the village earlier than expected. --COA 2 increases my chance of detection and may commit me to an early attack. --COA 3 while following orders, increases the chance the enemy camp will move and be harder to find and ensures I am unable to attack at a time and place of my choosing. --COA 2 and 3 ensure the troops and horses get sufficient rest for what can be a long campaign. Recommendation:
COA 1 Send only the Scouts to the Crows Nest . To me, this appears to give Custer the most flexibility while still enabling him the flexibility to attack early if necessary. Since my information is much better, I may be prejudiced to this COA, but I actually gave it thought over three days, so I hope I have minimized that possibility. Nonetheless, it was open to him and he may or may not have considered it. He may have also committed himself to attacking, but as we see from his later conduct, he appeared to want to hide the Regiment in order to conduct reconnaissance attack the morning of the 26th. Please consider the COAs, propose additional advantages/disadvantages and vote, explaining your decision is desired.
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Post by mikerobel on Jan 28, 2021 14:36:01 GMT -6
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Post by mikerobel on Jan 28, 2021 14:46:35 GMT -6
Until the 23rd, the hostile camp was planning to move to Lodgegrass and would have been there on 25th/26th until the change of mind on 23/24th and move to the Custer Battleground. Gibbon had two companies of Cavalry scout along the Bighorn and across to Lodgegrass, Littlebighorn valley and Tulloch's Creek iback to the Yellowstone at the end of April, into May. They discovered a huge 'old campsite at Lodgegrass and I would assume, evidence of the fighting there in 1874. This had to factor into Terry's thinking. Distance, time, enemy movement in LBH valley. Terry's orders commited Gibbon and Montana Column to the mouth of the LBH on the 22nd. Lodgegrass is 30 miles along from the mouth of LBH. It wasn't fullproof, was it? Thanks for pointing out the move to Lodgegrass Creek to me. It's more relevant to Decision Point 2. I couldn't remember where I saw that, so I elected not to include it. If Custer had turned at Davis Creek, then he would have been North of the village and between Terry and the Indians. Not a good turn of events. On the other hand, had Custer been able to follow them, then they might have broken up. Thus avoiding most of the historical events.
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Post by herosrest on Jan 29, 2021 4:53:10 GMT -6
According to Gibbon, smoke had been sighted in LBH valley area before the meeting on Far West, which explains Terry's confidence the camp was on that river but of course it would move and that was certainty given 3-4 days to reach LBH valley by way of Rosebud and Bighorn. There was nothing to offer Custer other than flexibility. The only caution which Terry issued was - 'Don't let them escape'. This is what you guys get paid for. Feeling to the left was in worry for movement or flight towards the headwaters of LBH and Tongue. Tongue was a pre-occupation for Terry because of the fighting there in 1865. Terry would certainly have been aware of Connor's expeditions and related travel corridors. Terry trusted to luck and also hoped Crook would materialise along the way and had no choice beyond reconnaissance in force. Sheridan believed (hoped) each of the three columns would be able to do the job alone, and cut the odds for locating Sitting Bull with the three forces *. The overall scheme was broader than Custer, Gibbon and Terry. Scouting Tulloch's Creek has become problematic because it was not undertaken. The question is why? It could have been accomplished during afternoon/evening of the 24th. * This set up what took place. Enemy operating on interior lines and defeating the army in detail. There were too many Indians.
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Post by herosrest on Jan 29, 2021 6:17:28 GMT -6
Thanks. I'm guessing elevation assists calling indirect fire?
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Post by noggy on Jan 29, 2021 7:02:48 GMT -6
Ah, Hell`s second circle. Or did Dante start with 7 and gp towards 1? Either way, straight of more complicated imo than the previous, will have to give this some thought post-work. Again, just great work. Really would have liked for Montrose to drop by and give hiss thoughts, as well as all other past and present military people here.
All the best, Noggy
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Post by mikerobel on Jan 29, 2021 8:04:18 GMT -6
Thanks. I'm guessing elevation assists calling indirect fire? Only in that you might be able to see better, but indirect fire is more dependent on communications from the observer to the firing unit. Airplanes and now satellites can provide a great platform for it, but they still have to have line of sight to the target.
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Post by herosrest on Jan 29, 2021 17:47:24 GMT -6
Thanks. I downloaded ADP 5-0 TOP, and will take my time. Not exactly quick reference is it rather more fundemental. Nelson A. Miles reviewed Custer's orders in an unpublished paper more than 120 years back with reasonable insight although he was devotedly pro Custer. I can link it to you if you are interested.
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Post by mikerobel on Jan 29, 2021 17:50:49 GMT -6
Thanks. I downloaded ADP 5-0 TOP, and will take my time. Not exactly quick reference is it rather more fundemental. Nelson A. Miles reviewed Custer's orders in an unpublished paper more than 120 years back with reasonable insight although he was devotedly pro Custer. I can link it to you if you are interested. I very much would like that link, please!
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Post by herosrest on Jan 29, 2021 18:23:39 GMT -6
It runs over several posts on THIS Topic about Miles. Starting with the two at bottom of page 5 across to page 6. The yellow text is addition by the post author. At the time, Gen. Miles headed the board editing and publishing the 'Journal of the Military Institute'. Robert Patterson Hughes, as Alfred H. Terry's brother in Law, life long held Custer responsible for the defeat at LBH and published considerable articles to that effect. Miles allowed the article and drafted a response, which was never published. It was a devil to locate (dig out) and was by the poster. Hughes was on Terry's staff as LT, with Montana column and is an important part of the post battle history. His defences of Terry provoked Mrs. Custer into what is 'generally' understood as her devotion. It was however provoked by defence of Terry by Hughes. It may be that Nelson Miles intended to take up her part, and his letter is an open attack on Hughes; however she spared Miles that situation - Mrs. Custer's respnse to R.P. Hughes It was unfortunate stuff and an undercurrent which flows through the battle and time.
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Post by mikerobel on Jan 29, 2021 18:43:19 GMT -6
Thanks. Rather than wading through the thread, I bought the $0.99 Kindle version of the book (edit) and then waded through the thread anway.
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Post by herosrest on Jan 29, 2021 18:45:41 GMT -6
OK, the letter is an interesting insight into the armchair battles which took place. As I said, it was unpublished and is rarer than Goldfish with gold teeth. Be well.
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Post by mikerobel on Jan 29, 2021 19:03:57 GMT -6
OK, the letter is an interesting insight into the armchair battles which took place. As I said, it was unpublished and is rarer than Goldfish with gold teeth. Be well. After ordering the book, I waded through the book anyway, then copied and pasted it so I could digest it without distraction into word and printed it out. Thanks very much.
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Post by herosrest on Jan 30, 2021 11:45:02 GMT -6
MR,
I'll pull some stuff together.
1. Tullock's Ck is visible out to 15 miles from Crow's Nest. I have that on the best of authority (NAM)
2.Terry's orders to Custer were the result of what he both knew, hoped for, and wished covered and discovered. He expected to find the 'camp' on Little Bighorn but knew it was mobile. Gibbon's scouts had reported smoke on the LBH. 7th Cavalry had followed the camp's trail to the LameDeer locale. 2nd Cavalry had scouted the terrain and reported at the beginning of May. Lodgegrass was noted as an old camp site. The Tulloch was arid and difficult with limited brackish water supply. This actually became a significant difficulty for Terry on the morning of 25th June as his column moved down Tulloch.
Previous expeditions had located travel corridors along the east fork of Tulloch's Creek and fought on the Powder and Tongue, particularly at modern day Ranchester.
3. Terry's thinking evolved between 20th and 22nd June, with Sheridan advised (20th) the move along Rosebud would investigate headwaters of the Little Bighorn. That altered to Tongue by 22nd.
4. The favoured tactic was dawn attack on a sleeping camp.
5. In terms of scouting Tulloch's Ck, it is observable over 15 miles from Crow's Nest and thus ssending Herendeen on the 24th or before Custer saw the village himself on the morning of the 25th, is a straw man. The scout messenger had to be sent by Custer. The message had to be Custer's and not the scouts. So scout the creek and return to Custer and then move out to reach Terry/Gibbon on the Bighorn. The messenger would not be travelling along the Tulloch to Yellowstone to move into the Bighorn. The messenger, Herendeen or Charlie Reymolds or Crow Scouts or a couple of the frontiersmen signed on with the packtrain, would head west skirting LBH valley on either the 24th or 25th, as Terry moved south down the Bighorn.
With an attack on the camp intended for the 26th, there was time to get a messenger onto the Bighorn and find Terry and Gibbon. Once Custer jumped the gun it was pointless sending the messenger. Custer sent Terry a different message. He fired the Lone Tipi. Terry's scouts sighted the smoke and reported it.
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