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Post by mikerobel on Jan 14, 2021 15:18:55 GMT -6
I somewhat hate to start this being new. The site is huge and has lots of informed discussion and pointing toward facts. Nonetheless, I feel compelled to post rather than activating a long inactive thread (of which there are several.) lbha.proboards.com/thread/1138/orderslbha.proboards.com/thread/447/terrys-orderslbha.proboards.com/thread/386/custers-orders-terrylbha.proboards.com/thread/216/terrys-orders-interpretive-viewslbha.proboards.com/thread/653/custers-ordersI plan to do a few things with this thread. Some will take longer than others. There is probably not much new ground here, but as I am deep in analysis of the orders and terrain in prepartion for my postponed trip, I thought it would be fun to post this and perhaps get input for a reasoned discussion. I have maps of different scales (running from 1:12500 to 1:500,000), two war games ( www.boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/20774/battle-little-bighorn and www.boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/268221/custers-last-stand), about three feet of physical books and more than a few electronic books, but probably not as many as Fred Wagner, and I do not claim to have done a tenth of the research he, or many others, on the board have done. I am a retired Army LTC with an MOS of 12A92 - Armor-Cavalry Officer/Quartermaster. Armor-Cavalry is because I was the last class to be graduated with both. After that they were either 12B (Armor) or 12C (Cavalry). I served in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) as a tank platoon leader, cavalry platoon leader, and troop executive officer. I also served in all three brigades and the division operations section (twice) of the 1st Infantry Division (Mech) as Battalion Maintenance Officer, Battalion S-4), tank company commander (in all three brigades), Division Armor Training Officer (and was the nighttime battle captain of the Division Tactical Command Post) and in the Division Main Command Post during Desert Storm, and finished my active career as the S-4 of the 2nd Brigade. After that I was a defense contractor for simulations and was the database manager for the 87th Exercise Division, Birmingham, AL, and the 2nd ACR, Fort Polk site manager. I then got into simulation development. Here's the plan: First: Examine Terry's orders. Second: Explain the difference between a Letter of Instruction (LOI) and an Operations Order (OPORD) Third: Rephrase Terry's orders into an Modern OPORD. Fourth: Analyze the order as if I was leading the staff in planning using the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). Fifth: Determine decision points and propose available course of action and comparisons for each one. (Hint: one will always be what Custer, Reno, or Benteen did historically.) If the moderators would prefer I place this in an established thread, please let me know which one and I will do so and graft this stuff into one of them. --------------------------- Headquarters of the Department of Dakota (In the Field) Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River, Montana Territory June 22nd, 1876 Lieutenant-Colonel Custer, 7th Cavalry Colonel: The Brigadier-General Commanding directs that, as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days since. It is, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement and were it not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them. He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little Bighorn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the escape of the Indians passing around your left flank. The column of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Horns. Of course its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they arise, but it is hoped that the Indians, if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly inclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible. The Department Commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullock's Creek, and that you should endeavor to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon's command The supply-steamer will be pushed up the Big Horn as far as the forks of the river is found to be navigable for that distance, and the Department Commander, who will accompany the column of Colonel Gibbon, desires you to report to him there not later than the expiration of the time for which your troops are rationed, unless in the meantime you receive further orders. Very respectfully, Your obedient servant, E. W. Smith, Captain, 18th Infantry A. A. J. G. The bolded letters, regardless of how they are phrased, are merely a polite way to tell him what the general wants him to do. In my Officers Guide, I got way back in 1976, it says words to the effect of "a superior's I wish or I desire are the same as I order." I learned over my career that if a senior officer is using other words instead of I order, he means I order and that is what he expects you to do. Now, when you are in conversation with him and you disagree, a simple "can we talk about this" will enable you to discuss it further. Regardless of how it comes out, you can always get the last word by saying "Yes, sir." I also learned that when my Platoon, First Sergeant, or my Chief NCO and/or for whatever reason I was conferring with the Battalion, Brigade, Regimental, or Division Command Sergeant Major that I should consider his words very carefully. (Sometimes, when deciding to do the task my way to my PSG or 1SG, I'd say you are probably right, but I'd like to try it anyway. Sometimes it worked and sometimes it didn't." Now then, people point to the phrase " impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy" means Custer can do what he wants. That's not quite so. When custer decided to follow the trail, he was not yet " nearly in contact with the enemy." That modifies the next part and places limits on when he is free to diverge from the order, such as " unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them". So if he bumped into the enemy before reaching the headwaters of the Rosebud, then he could attack. And of course Terry specifically states " you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue..." as well as sending a scout down Tullock's Creek, which is why Herrenden was attached to him. Fred says this very clearly in his book and the task was to confirm to Terry Tullock's Creek was clear of the enemy. Conjecture: Had Custer continued south, he would have most likely come across the scene of Crooks fight of the 17th. He then would have been free to follow the trail to where the Indians were. But had he continued, the Sioux camp may have moved, probably further south because they knew that Crook was far away and that Gibbon was to the North and they would have likely missed making contact with the Sioux. OK. That's part I. Onto Part II. Be Kind. Trim your posts so the thread does not become terribly long.
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Post by mikerobel on Jan 14, 2021 15:50:12 GMT -6
Letter of Instruction versus Operations Order.
Definitions (from google).
Instruction.
1. a direction or order.
"he issued instructions to the sheriff"
Similar: order, command, directive, direction. decree, edict, injunction, mandate, dictate, commandment, diktat
2. detailed information telling how something should be done, operated, or assembled. "always study the instructions supplied"
Similar: directions, key, guide, specification
Order.
noun
1. the arrangement or disposition of people or things in relation to each other according to a particular sequence, pattern, or method.
"I filed the cards in alphabetical order" (Mike: Clearly this definition does not apply to our discussion.)
2. an authoritative command, direction, or instruction. "he was not going to take orders from a mere administrator"
Similar: command, instruction, directive, direction
verb
1. give an authoritative direction or instruction to do something. "she ordered me to leave"
Similar:
instruct, command, direct, tell, require
2. request (something) to be made, supplied, or served. "my friend ordered the tickets last week"
Similar: request, apply for, send away/off for, write off for, put in an order for.
As an illustration, if you said to the waiter "I think I'd like filet mignon." and he delivered pork chops, you would send the meal back because he has not complied with your desire.
Even when something is an order, you can argue or suggest alternatives to the task right up until you are told to execute. Again, it is always possible to get the last word in by saluting and saying “yessir”.
In the modern Army, Letters of Instruction are used for most things when the unit is in garrison. But there is no doubt about what you are supposed to do. How can you tell?
LOIs are signed by the Adjutant. The format used today is:
FOR THE COMMANDER:
Michael K. Robel LTC, GS G-1 (Adjutant)
Only the Adjutant is allowed to sign like that. Sometimes, an assistant adjutant is assigned so the command can function when the appointed one is unavailable. Or the commander can sign it.
Operations Orders are used in the field. They are formatted like this:
ACKNOWLEDGE:
Terry Major General
Official: Robel S-3
Annexes or Appendices requiring a signature are signed by the appropriate staff officer, for example the Logistics Annex would be signed:
Official: Robel S-4
Now, note who signed the LOI from Terry to Custer:
Very respectfully, Your obedient servant, E. W. Smith, Captain, 18th Infantry A. A. J. G.
Who was Terry's Adjutant. I confess I am not sure what AAJG stands for, but I am pretty sure the AA means Acting Adjutant.
Also note Reno appointed a new Adjutant after Hogsden was killed, because that who is authorized to give orders in the commander's place.
No military officer today would think just because he was told to something in an LOI that he could ignore the wishes of his Commander just because they promulgated with the Adjutant's signature.
This is not to prohibit the following:
During the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, a Prussian officer defended himself from reprimand by arguing that he was simply following orders. His commander, Prince Frederick Charles, reportedly replied: “His Majesty made you a Major because he believed you would know when not to obey his orders.” But this course of action should only be selected when the subordinate is very clear he is still accomplishing his commanders intent. For example the actions taken to seize the Remagen Bridge.
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Post by mikerobel on Jan 14, 2021 19:14:18 GMT -6
This is the reworked order in modern format using the original order as a base. I believe it portrays Terry's intent as based on the order, his journal, proceedings of the RCOI, and other historical documents/books. It would be nice if the original map with the "Blue Line" marked on it on the Far West had been preserved.
Copy _ of __ copies
Headquarters of the Department of Dakota (In the Field)
Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River, Montana Territory
June 22nd, 1876
(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: Chicago Time (?)PLAN/OPORD:
(U) Task Organization:
Custer Column 7th Cavalry (- detachments) Gibbon Column 7th Infantry Battalion CO A/7th Infantry CO B/7th Infantry CO E/7th Infantry CO H/7th Infantry CO I/7th Infantry CO K/7th Infantry 17th Infantry Battalion CO B/6th Infantry CO C/17th Infantry CO G/17th Infantry 2nd Cavalry Detachment CO F/2nd Cavalry CO G/2nd Cavalry CO H/2nd Cavalry CO L/2nd Cavalry Artillery Detachment CO C/20th Infantry (-) (Gatling Gun) Powder River Depot 6th Infantry Detachment CO C/6th Infantry CO D/6th Infantry CO I/6th Infantry 7th Cavalry Detachment Band 7th Cavalry Dismounted Troops/7th Cavalry 1. Situation.
a. Enemy Forces. A large gathering of Sioux Indians is thought to be along the Little Bighorn river, numbering perhaps 4500 tribesmen with 1500 warriors. Their most probable course of action upon contact with US forces will be to scatter to evade capture and cover the flight with their warriors.
b. Friendly Forces.
(1) Division of the Missouri: Conducts Operations within the Black Hills Region to drive the Hostile Indian Tribes back to their Reservation.
(2) Department of the Platte: Advance North from Fort Fetterman and drive Hostile Indian Tribes back to their Reservations. (Note: We have had no contact with the Department of the Platte.)
c. Attachments and Detachments. See Task Organization
.
2. Mission. The Department of Dakota conducts a movement to contact on 221200June1876 (Chicago Time) within the region of the area bounded by the Yellowstone River from our current location west to the Big Horn/Little Bighorn junction, south along the Little Bighorn – the general line of the headwaters of the Little Bighorn and Rosebud rivers, north up the Rosebud to the Yellowstone River in two columns with the intent to locate and trap the Sioux between the two columns along the lower Little Bighorn River and drive them to their reservation. I expect the two columns to combine on 26 June.
3. Execution.
a. Concept of Operations. The Department of Dakota conducts a movement to contact in two separate columns commencing 22 June. The 7th Cavalry Regiment shall proceed up the Rosebud until the definite direction in which the Indian Trail leads, once the trail is discovered continue south as far as the headwaters of the Tongue River, and then west to the headwaters of the Little Bighorn, then turn North along the Little Bighorn to meet the Gibbon column vicinity the Bighorn-Little Bighorn junction. The Gibbon Column shall move along the Yellowstone River to the mouth of the Bighorn River and move South to the junction of the Bighorn and Little Bighorn Rivers. I aim to trap/contain the Indians between the two troop columns and prevent their escape to the north, south or east.
b. Tasks to Subordinate Units.
(1) 7th Cavalry
(a) Conduct Movement to Contact South along the Rosebud River
(b) Conduct reconnaissance to your left to ensure the Indians do not pass your command undetected.
(c) Determine the location and direction of the Indian trail.
(d) Continue up the Rosebud to the headwaters of the Tongue River
(e) Upon reaching Tullock’s Creek, send a reconnaissance party up the river to report to the Department Commander if Indians are found and inform me of your progress.
(f) Continue the Movement to Contact to the headwaters of the Little Bighorn, then North toward the junction of the Big Horn/Little Bighorn River than 7 July Turn to make contact with the Indian camp and/or myself.
(g) Report to the Department Commander No Later than 7 July at the junction of the Bighorn and Little Bighorn rivers aboard the supply-steamer Far West no later than when your rations are consumed.
(2) Gibbon Column
(a) Conduct Reconnaissance along the Yellowstone River until meeting Tullocks Creek.
(b) Scout Tullock’s Creek south to the Yellowstone River
(c) Continue to the junction of the Bighorn river and move south as far up as the junction of the Bighorn and Little Bighorn Rivers.
c. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) Order effective upon receipt.
(2) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements.
(a) Are Sioux forces along Tullock’s Creek?
(b) Where does the SiouxTrail depart from the Rosebud River?
(c) What is the location of the Sioux Village?
(d) What is the strength of the Sioux Village?
(e) What is the strength of the Sioux Warrior force? 4. Sustainment.
a. (Logistics.
(1) 7th Cavalry: Carry provisions for 15 days of operations for men and 20 pounds of oats per horse.
(2) Gibbon Column: Provision for 6 days of operations.
5. Command and Signal.
(1) Location of Commander and Key Leaders. Commander will locate with the Gibbon Column and/or on the supply-steamer Far West
(2) Succession of Command. SOP.
ACKNOWLEDGE:
.
TERRY
Major General
OFFICIAL:
SMITH, CPT
Adjutant
Next to come will be a Mission Analysis. As a start and as an exercise for the Student, I ask some brave souls to examine the order above and determine:
Specified Tasks. Implied Tasks. Critical Tasks. Critical tasks may be specified and/or implied. They are critical to mission success.
EDIT: I Forget to include identifying Limitations; those items which restrict a commander's planning.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 15, 2021 9:43:29 GMT -6
Welcome aboard Sir
I think this will be a good endeavor, and I like it here on this thread. This past June, I sat with a Dog Soldier close to where the Regiment turned to go up Davis Creek. Looking forward to this discussion.
Regards
Steve Andrews
Cpl USMC, Vietnam 1969-70
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Post by mikerobel on Jan 15, 2021 10:20:16 GMT -6
Thanks Steve!
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Post by noggy on Jan 17, 2021 4:30:26 GMT -6
Steve Andrews Cpl USMC, Vietnam 1969-70 Hm, maybe the casino spamming here from Vietnamese web sites is some sort of revenge?? Noggy
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Post by noggy on Jan 17, 2021 4:38:45 GMT -6
Mikerobel: This looks like great work, I`ll have to give it a really close read when I have a couple of hours. I think this will be perfect for board member Montrose. Think I`ll print it out and add it to my "collection" of smart things other people have written here Noggy
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Post by mikerobel on Jan 17, 2021 13:28:36 GMT -6
Sadly, no one has responded with a list of tasks they believed to be Specified, Implied, or Critical for the 7th Cavalry. Here is my list. It is not difficult to figure out. EDIT: I forgot, as I said in updating the third post, to list Limitations.Critical | Specified | Implied | Task
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| S |
| Conduct movement to contact South along the Rosebud River |
| S |
| Conduct reconnaissance to left (East) |
| S |
| Determine location and direction of the Indian Trail |
| S |
| Continue up the Rosebud to the headwaters of the Tongue River | C | S |
| Send a scout down Tullocks Creek and have him report to CG the presence of Sioux along the creek | C | S |
| Continue to the headwaters of the Little Bighorn, then move north to find the Sioux camp | C | S |
| Make contact with the CG NLT 7 July. | C | S |
| Determine Location and strength of the Sioux village | C | I |
| Locate and engage Sioux along the route of march and report location and strength to the CG
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| I |
| If the Crook Column is located inform the CG and provide General Crook any information gathered |
LIMITATIONS: We should not, when we find the Indian Trail, turn to follow it to the LBH, but continue South to the LBH headwaters, then turn toward the Tongue and move to the LBH Headwaters, then turn North up the river, toward the Big Horn/Little Bighorn river junction.
(From this statement in the order: He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little Bighorn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn...)The next step for a modern staff would be to develop a mission statement for the Regiment. This specifies what is to be accomplished including Who, What, When, Where, and Why. Here is mine: The 7th Cavalry conducts route reconnaissance NLT 221200June1876 along the route defined by the river courses of the Rosebud to its headwaters, west to the headwaters of the Tongue, then North along the Little Bighorn, dispatch a scouting party North along Tullock's Creek to locate the Sioux Village somewhere along the Little Bighorn, while screening to the East to ensure the enemy has not left the area.I specify route reconnaissance as opposed to zone reconnaissance because the Sioux usually located their villages along Rivers. Route reconnaissance requires the unit to examine the area along the route to at least the effective range of the enemy's weapons and/or to areas that provide line of sight to the route. The unit will normally seek to clear the area of the enemy out to the limits of their boundaries. The Reconnaissance Objective is not the ground which may be specified by a phase line or objective, in this case the link up point with Gibbon, but finding and/or destroying or fixing the enemy when they are contacted. In some ways, the 7th Cavalry's mission reminds me a little of the Hammelburg Raid conducted by TF Baum with C/37th Armor, A/10th Armored Infantry, a platoon of D/37th Armor, and other supporting elements, totalling 11 officers, 303 men, 57 tanks, halftracks, and other vehicles to liberate the US prisoners, among them LTG Patton's Son in Law. It was destroyed, but not wiped out. Ironically, Hammelburg was the site of the German Army's Anti-Tank Training School and in its final position, they occupied an area on the range and the Germans knew the exact ranges from various firing points to where the TF was located. The short description is here: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Task_Force_Baum
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Post by mikerobel on Jan 18, 2021 10:52:18 GMT -6
The first decision point I will discuss is when Custer decided to follow the trail toward the enemy village. Does anyone have coordinates for where they think this decision was made? EDIT: This is actually the 3RD Decision Point. DPs 1 and 2 will be discussed after I get my ducks in line again.This is the appropriate entry from Fred's Timelines. Decision Point | Location | Timeline | Date | Local Time | Clock Time | Event | 2 3 | Vicinity Junction Rosebud River and Davis Creek | E | 24 June
| 0943 | 1020
| Officer's call ends. Custer has decided to attack the village immediately
- though he is still uncertain as to the location of the village
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Course of Action 1Continue down the RosebudADVANTAGES *Obeys commander's orders and intent
*IF plan works AND the enemy moves South, THEN the enemy should be trapped between the two columns.DISADVANTAGES *Do not know the enemy location *Do not know which way the enemy has moved , if he does not move North, then both columns may be behind the enemy. *If the enemy is moves faster then expected and moves North, he may attack the Gibbon column without the 7th being able to offer support. *Do not know the enemy strength *Enemy many break up as he moves Course of Action 2 Follow the Enemy Trail ADVANTAGES*If successful, all credit goes to 7th Cavalry *Regiment should be able to follow the enemy regardless of direction he takes. *If the Regiment is able to move fast enough to catch the enemy, then they may take him by surprise and/or may be able to provide support to Gibbon sooner than expected. DISADVANTAGES*Disobeys commander's orders and Intent *Do not know the enemy location *Do not know which way the enemy has moved , if he does not move North, then both columns may be behind the enemy. *Do not know the enemy strength *Enemy many break up as he moves Discussion.COA 1 has the advantage of following orders and having a good chance of catching the enemy between the two columns, IF the enemy moves as anticipated. (Note: The enemy never does what is expected, but if he does, you should be prepared to punish him most severely.) If the enemy does not moves as expected, then both columns may be behind the enemy. COA2 has the advantages that if successful, all credit goes to the 7th Cavalry. (Note: This would probably not be a consideration today, but because competition was intense for promotion and assignments in the frontier army, and because Custer was pretty much a glory hound, this may have been paramount in his thinking.) They also should be able to follow the enemy, regardless of the direction he takes, even if it requires splitting the regiment up to do so. Sticking to the plan may be the more prudent course (regardless of whether you think deviating from the plan does not violate the orders, it is a specified task from above.) Four of the disadvantages (location, enemy direction of movement, strength, and possibility of breaking up) are all shared as disadvantages. If Custer disobeys orders and wins, then he would most likely be forgiven. If not, well. We know what happened. If the enemy breaks up, Custer can always split the regiment into two wings, and send messengers to Terry, who could then cut loose the 2nd Cavalry detachment to provide support and follow with the infantry. We know Crook is somewhere to the South, but we have no idea what he is doing. (Of course, if Custer has followed orders, he would have probably discovered the battle area, and then may been able to follow the path the enemy took without having to go to the headwaters of the Tongue and save some time that way. But that possibility would not have probably been discussed.) This process does not take a long time, it can be done in minutes or seconds if you prepare for using this methodology. Being a cavalryman and knowing the purpose of reconnaissance is to gain and maintain contact with the enemy, the temptation to follow the trail may well be overwhelming, but it does risk blowing the whole plan apart if the enemy does not do what is expected. Colonel, what would you do?
Attachments:
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Post by noggy on Jan 19, 2021 11:49:37 GMT -6
This is probably best answered by your military peers, like Montrose etc; personally never led anything above a platoon and therefor can`t pass judgement with the same as authority as you guys. But I`ll chime in;
If we disregard hindsight, going after the enemy was as far as I can see it reasonable. He had a the troops to deal with the opposition he expected to meet, and suspected the village already was fragmenting. So, fair enough. The safest thing was of course to stick to the plan, but a cavalry commander who after 5 weeks of nothingness finally sees an opportunity was not likely to move away from the enemy. Especially not GAC.
I know many people think he was rash by attacking on the 25th, but what were the odds for a regiment staying concealed for a day in the enemy`s backyard? Scouts and hunting parties roamed around, and chances were they`d see either the troops or at the least find their tracks. When he attacked on the 25th, he managed to do so with the element of surprise still on his side. That`s where things really start go wrong, in my opinion. Or right, if you were an Indian. There was a series of blunders made by GAC, but as far as resulting in his defeat, not following the Terry-route isn`t necessarily one of them since he could/should have won still.
Not to say I thin everything was handled correctly up until that point! Does this make a little sense to people who actually have led larger units?
All the best, Noggy
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Post by mikerobel on Jan 19, 2021 15:49:15 GMT -6
Thanks Noggy. I don't think your thoughts are unreasonable. When I was a cavalryman, almost all of us from my troopers to the commanders were ultra aggressive. We wouldn't disobey orders, but we pushed things as far as we could. It was great fun and "ruined" me for life.
In other news, in going back and looking at three things, I combined elements of three different DPs into the one above. I have to go back and revise it and add the ones that should have preceded it. Embarressing.
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Post by noggy on Jan 20, 2021 2:00:32 GMT -6
Thanks Noggy. I don't think your thoughts are unreasonable. When I was a cavalryman, almost all of us from my troopers to the commanders were ultra aggressive. We wouldn't disobey orders, but we pushed things as far as we could. It was great fun and "ruined" me for life. In other news, in going back and looking at three things, I combined elements of three different DPs into the one above. I have to go back and revise it and add the ones that should have preceded it. Embarressing. I`m from Norway and we don`t really have any tradition for either large armies or horse cavalry as a "real" weapong branch. From horses were first mentioned as a somewhat significant part of warfare in texts from the 1200s, they were for the most part used for transportation and recon. With our geography, we had mostly dragoon style soldiers up until mechanization (is this a word, haha?). At least they were good marksmen. But your type of cavalry was a very active branch, designed for movement and aggressiveness. I think you and cavalry commanders from the mid 1800s would have been in the same mould, I assume it was the same type of guys who signed up to be fighter pilots during WW1 in search for some pace and action. I like your set-up, it reminded me on a half-assed post I was going to do about possible results a full scale regimental sized attack in the valley could get. Lost in pc-destruction but I should look at my notes. Fred`s writing a book about the valley fight so I would probably get shot down really fast All the best, Noggy
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Post by mikerobel on Jan 20, 2021 9:19:20 GMT -6
Noggy,
My wife is from Norway. Born in Oslo. Her family is distributed from Oslo - Bergan - Trondheim - Bodo. We were supposed to go there this summer (2021) but with the epidemic, that is off the table. It remains to be seen if we will get to the LBH this summer instead. We didn't go last summer.
Actually, when we get to the Valley fight, one course of action is to attack with the Regiment instead of just three battalions.
In games I've attacked with the whole regiment, the Custer and Reno battalions, with the 2nd CAV detachment attached, and pincered between the Gibbon Column and the 7th. Hard fights all.
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Post by noggy on Jan 21, 2021 2:22:28 GMT -6
Noggy, My wife is from Norway. Born in Oslo. Her family is distributed from Oslo - Bergan - Trondheim - Bodo. We were supposed to go there this summer (2021) but with the epidemic, that is off the table. It remains to be seen if we will get to the LBH this summer instead. We didn't go last summer. Actually, when we get to the Valley fight, one course of action is to attack with the Regiment instead of just three battalions. In games I've attacked with the whole regiment, the Custer and Reno battalions, with the 2nd CAV detachment attached, and pincered between the Gibbon Column and the 7th. Hard fights all. I`m from a small city about 1 hour outside of Oslo, your wife will most likely know of it (Skien). But I live in Trondheim. If you do make the trip here one day and need a break from your in-laws, I can show you the military museum and where to get the best beer. Trondheim and Bergen are worth a visit regardless of family, but personally not a big fan of Oslo (at least some parts) and Bodø. However, the people up North are great. Unless you count Risk and Axis & Allies, I`ve not played war games. I`m more of a closet nerd, palying my console on mye free time. In the war games you take part in, do they take height for combat experience/capability, leadership and terrain, for example? I believe a regimental or even a GAC/Reno 8 company attack would have succeeded, but that is on paper. With the 7th, I feel there could have been room for big mistakes. Both on individual and unit level. (Not to derail this excellent thread) Noggy
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Post by mikerobel on Jan 21, 2021 7:49:38 GMT -6
I am embarrassed to report I failed to consider limitations in my Mission Analysis. Limitations may be specified in the order and include things that may limit a commander's options such as not moving before a specified time. Graphic control measures such as boundaries, no fire zones and Rules of Engagement are limiting, but in my experience, are not usually listed as a limitation.
I have annotated the third post above (Jan 14, 2021 at 8:14pm) and the eighth (Jan 17, 2021 at 2:28pm) in red text.
The limitation I identified is:
LIMITATIONS: We should not, when we find the Indian Trail, turn to follow it to the LBH, but continue South to the LBH headwaters, then turn toward the Tongue and move to the LBH Headwaters, then turn North up the river, toward the Big Horn/Little Bighorn river junction.
(From this statement in the order: He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little Bighorn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn...)
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