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Post by bchboy1206 on Jan 1, 2021 14:11:49 GMT -6
Hello everyone and thank you for the accepting me. I participate in cowboy action shooting and I was researching the cavalry uniform of the Indian Wars and now I just want to learn more. I am pretty fascinated by the Custer story and try to imagine how he felt when he realized he was up against odds he could not overcome. Such a tragic ending for many and beginning of the downfall of a great nation of Native Americans. Anyway thanks for the add and I hope to learn lot from you all.
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Post by montrose on Jan 5, 2021 8:31:01 GMT -6
Welcome.
I think we can also learn from you. One of the issues of LBH is the very poor state of training of the 7th Cavalry in individual and collective marksmanship. This battle would have had a better outcome if this unit had trained properly, like the 4th Cav and many infantry units.
The 1873 carbine has strengths and weaknesses. But the 7th lacked training in individual, NCO and officer on the skills, knowledge and ability to use this weapon.
The individuals did not know the weapon. They did not know trajectory, windage, point of aim, just basics BRM. They repeatedly fired at targets 800-1000 meters away. I assume you understand BRM. I will bet 1000 dollars that if I place a balloon at 1000 meters from you with an 1873 carbine, and give you one shot with iron sights, you will miss.
At collective level, group fire allows area fire. This increases odds of a hit, and causes suppression, where enemies in that area hide, snap shot, become ineffective.
The most critical failure was officer and NCO fire control. The cartridge box contained 20 rounds. The 7th did issue additional ammo stored in the saddle bags. This becomes an issue when dismounted firing lines are deliberately kept far away from mounts. Given the lack of training, the carbine in the 7th was only effective out to 200 yards. The 7th was firing at impossible ranges, so they had no ammunition when enemy entered effective range. In infantry we call this the closing the gap range. Note majority of Indian casualties occurred in this area.
Based on your experience, how could they have done better?
v/r
William
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Post by pegasus on Jan 16, 2021 14:40:23 GMT -6
From the little reading I have done so far, for the amount of shots being fired didn’t equate to anything near the amount of Indian casualties. Very a bad fire control and fire discipline seems to play a big part of this. I know next to nothing about the 1873 carbine, but as an infantry soldier we kept to a 300 mtr. individual shoot and anything above that was in squad firing, where possible of course. What I did find odd was the habit of keeping spare ammo on the horses which if separated meant it was lost.
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Post by mikerobel on Jan 16, 2021 18:13:48 GMT -6
It might have helped a little bit if Reno, in Custer's absence before the campaing started, had ordered some target practice. I know training might be a hard thing to think about. But there you are.
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Post by noggy on Jan 17, 2021 4:55:23 GMT -6
It might have helped a little bit if Reno, in Custer's absence before the campaing started, had ordered some target practice. I know training might be a hard thing to think about. But there you are. If memory serves me correct, not only was firing practice (is this the right term in English) both individually and as a unit lackluster, I`m pretty sure the amount of rounds available for such practice was reduced in 1876, reducing marksmanship qualities even worse with all the raw recruits and others with no combat experience. Combine this with generally poor horsemanship and lack of combat experience + NCOs, you have a cavalry unit not quite up to the task. All the best, Noggy
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Post by pegasus on Jan 19, 2021 14:35:53 GMT -6
Seems that the 7th. Cavalry were not prepared for the fight. Lack of proper target practice, I’ll-discipline, contact drills and general horsemanship drills. Overall the big issue is the belief that the enemy was a push over.
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