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Post by wild on Apr 28, 2020 11:41:25 GMT -6
As per the above tactics......
The withdrawal of the Reno skirmish line was executed in a manner which could hardly be described as per the book. Maneuvering while in contact with the enemy should be avoided if at all possible because a unit attempting this is at it's most vunnerable. If it has to be attempted then it should be by a process of fire and movement. Reno failed to cover the withdrawal. The withdrawal should have been executed by companies ...one moving two firing. The manner in which Reno did withdraw his command introduced a touch of panic and disorder in the ranks while it handed the initiative to the enemy. Thus his flight from the timber just added to the now sense among the troops of disaster.
A tactical audit of the operations of the 7TH in the valley of the Little bighorn will show that at every level of command ,control and professionalism the Regiment is found wanting. The unit was unfit for purpose .It is one of the reasons why I don't go along with the more complex scenarios suggested leading to the destruction of the regiment. Cheers
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Post by wild on Apr 29, 2020 10:11:52 GMT -6
Custer's tactics could be described in a sentence to wit "maximum dispersion for no known purpose. I could add that the dispersion of his own command reflected the dispersion of the rest of the command. He contrived to arrive at the point of contact with the enemy with the least possible number of troops. There was no last stand . The only action resembling a stand was the Reno/Benteen seige. Without that seige no battle could be claimed to have occurred. I think Wounded Knee would stand a better chance of being described as a battle than that disgrace to arms. Cheers
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Post by wild on May 20, 2020 13:46:50 GMT -6
Just for the sake of talking to myself.
Custer's reserve or that unit to which we have applied the desigation "reserve" was not in fact the tactical reserve. Custer himself was actually the reserve. Benteen if he had continued his oblique march would have come up on Reno's left flank. If the timing had been a smigin more precise the Indians would have been facing 6 companies a much more formidable force to contend with. And thus allowing Custer to attack either through Benteen/Reno or from a flank. Of course the timing was way off , the terrain unknown, and there was no briefing of the unit commanders. And I must admit that this is just fitting up circumstances with a scenario. cheers
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Post by yarnnelg on Jun 8, 2020 20:49:49 GMT -6
In the pursuit of a "quick study", I found a reference explaining that this group of men held no battle distinction at all. They were, for the lack of description, untalented warriors. If memory serves correctly, it was a Sioux tactic. The Lakota and other tribes had to have the participation explained to them. When the signal was given, there was a pause, because of language barriers. Not a bad idea given the chaos and the arms of the Calvary. One shot, close enough, no time to reload. So, 40 men on last stand hill, in various stages dead, wounded or scared out your mind..it doesn't take a large group to see the advantage of the possibility of a great percentage of bad shots, hence, not much suicide at all.
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