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Post by noggy on Feb 3, 2020 2:34:12 GMT -6
I assume all members here will get a free copy of the book . . . I can dream can't I? Congratulations. I expect a free and signed copy, and take for granted that any preface is dedicated to me alone. Congratulations, Fred! All the best, Geir
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 3, 2020 10:52:25 GMT -6
Looking forward to Fred's valley book.
See you in June Fred
Regards
Steve
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 3, 2020 11:16:20 GMT -6
I want to run this by this group.
Benteen's order. For years I have been thinking SFRC was Benteen's destination. Herendeen was familiar with it and fought against 600 of these same Indians. The site is on private property and requires permission. From the site you can see Weibert house before they moved to Reno Creek. It explains to me how Donny got to the site as a youth.
It has a lot more water than Reno Creek an it is scattered. Crazy Horse used it to go to Rosebud. Again Herendeen knows it but he traveled down it to Reno Creek.
So from the divide you see numerous bluffs defining drainages but none are distinctive enough to exclude all but South Fork Reno Creek. So if a camp was near the mouth of SFRC it could be an escape travel corridor. To cut it off sending troops miles up stream would facilitate the effort. Benteen was given that line and the identified Gibson site is around 5 miles upstream SFRC. Benteen did not go with Gibson to look into SFRC. I took pictures horseback from there and you can for sure see Reno Creek an clear SFRC.
Then recently I thought about the order given Benteen. If the goal was the LBH river valley then even a Marine could travel and a line and find the river valley and move north. So that order would be easy. Go to the river and turn north up the valley.
But his order was valley hunting. Herendeen would know the approximate location but could not point out the valley containing SFRC. If it was close to line of bluffs in the distance that is as close as they could guess. As Benteen stated no Indian would travel the route they went and neither did the 1874 Expedition. Putting that together I think valley hunting was looking for the SFRC valley. After riding it I can see why someone would think it was ad infinitum.
Bottom line if the river was the goal then that would have been the order. As you travel it you would know whether you reached the river. So easy even a Marine could do it. But if your looking for a valley without the LBH river in it and you cross many drainages it wears on you mentally and do you ever know that you reached it.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 3, 2020 11:20:32 GMT -6
A second thought. From 3411 and even Weir you cannot see what is tucked on the valley near Deep Ravine. I think the Cheyennes that came around from the north were a surprise and stopped Custer from getting into the river valley with a fighting force. This is a work in progress for me and it gives me something to do when I get there.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by montrose on Feb 4, 2020 9:07:30 GMT -6
I want to run this by this group. Benteen's order. For years I have been thinking SFRC was Benteen's destination. Herendeen was familiar with it and fought against 600 of these same Indians. The site is on private property and requires permission. From the site you can see Weibert house before they moved to Reno Creek. It explains to me how Donny got to the site as a youth. It has a lot more water than Reno Creek an it is scattered. Crazy Horse used it to go to Rosebud. Again Herendeen knows it but he traveled down it to Reno Creek. So from the divide you see numerous bluffs defining drainages but none are distinctive enough to exclude all but South Fork Reno Creek. So if a camp was near the mouth of SFRC it could be an escape travel corridor. To cut it off sending troops miles up stream would facilitate the effort. Benteen was given that line and the identified Gibson site is around 5 miles upstream SFRC. Benteen did not go with Gibson to look into SFRC. I took pictures horseback from there and you can for sure see Reno Creek an clear SFRC. Then recently I thought about the order given Benteen. If the goal was the LBH river valley then even a Marine could travel and a line and find the river valley and move north. So that order would be easy. Go to the river and turn north up the valley. But his order was valley hunting. Herendeen would know the approximate location but could not point out the valley containing SFRC. If it was close to line of bluffs in the distance that is as close as they could guess. As Benteen stated no Indian would travel the route they went and neither did the 1874 Expedition. Putting that together I think valley hunting was looking for the SFRC valley. After riding it I can see why someone would think it was ad infinitum. Bottom line if the river was the goal then that would have been the order. As you travel it you would know whether you reached the river. So easy even a Marine could do it. But if your looking for a valley without the LBH river in it and you cross many drainages it wears on you mentally and do you ever know that you reached it. Regards AZ Ranger This has been my view for many years. The initial template for village location was the junction of Reno Creek and South Fork Reno Creek The orders to Benteen clearly reflect this, and precludes any possibility of any action in LBH valley. He may have expected a Washita situation, with an exposed village at SFRC, and others in LBH, GAC did not then or ever explain his intent to subordinates. The fragmentary orders he kept sending Benteen prove he was looking for an enemy in close proximity. It was not a bad analysis (IPB). The village had been there, during the Rosebud fight. Understanding the moving template of the village is crucial to understanding LBH. LTC Custer kept subdividing forces to attack false village locations again and again and again, and never waited for units sent to false locations to return to supporting distance. I see decisions based on 3 false estimates until true location was found, and at that point he only had 2 companies.
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Post by montrose on Feb 4, 2020 9:30:25 GMT -6
Let us go theoretical.
Let us extend Fred's timeline to see when LTC Custer would launch an attack. We start from the Ford D leader's reconnaissance. GAC has 2 companies. The first step is to return to Calhoun Hill and link up with 3 companies there. This is not just work out how fast you can move on a tired horse. He has been in contact with Indians on LCN ridge first, then at Ford B, and again at Ford D. This will be a tactical movement which will be slower.
I think the separation of E and F at CR/LSH looks like the start of bounding overwatch; which is even slower. One company moves and creates a base of fire for the other, and they leapfrog. This was a normal tactic for this era. Godfrey using bounding overwatch within his company at Washita and at LBH.
SO now we have 5 companies at Calhoun Hill. His previous orders were for Benteen to bring up the pack train. Because of Indian village and warriors vicinity Ford B, Benteen would have to wait vicinity Weir point, since a natural avenue of approach is between there and south end Battle Ridge. There would have to be a battle here before linkup. Given the time it took trains to get to Reno, now add the time to get to Weir, fight a battle and get to Calhoun. You can not assume away a battle here. He saw the village, its true size, the horse herds, the valley fight. Indians would move towards the Keogh detachment like moths to a flame, just as they did at Washita from the other villages down the valley.
After all this is done, now you can give orders and organize an attack. I don't see any way this happens before nightfall. Time is a resource and GAC threw it away. The only thing he should have done at 3411 is attack as fast as possible. Instead he got indecisive and timid, and timidity kills. He emulated his hero and mentor MacClellan.
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Post by shan on Feb 18, 2020 10:19:38 GMT -6
Montrose,
I'm assuming from the scenario you've presented that you tend to lean towards the theory that Custer pushed on after they arrived at Calhoun hill towards the various fords D. I myself waver back and forth with this one, sometimes I can be persuaded that it actually happened, whilst at other times I feel it goes against all the evidence.
As far as I'm concerned, the evidence seems very slender, being based largely on the testimony of John Stands in Timber. Now I'm not saying he's a liar, I mean why would he lie? But then I do find it strange that so many of those who argue that most of the Indian testimony is unreliable, choose to make an exception when it comes to him.
After having gone back and read through most of the Indian testimony with relation to several different posts that we've been debating on both boards, I find myself coming away with the same feeling that I have whenever I do this, which is that if you take the accounts as a whole, they tend to tell the same story, which is of the soldiers moving North away from the river up onto the ridge, where, after some long range fighting, something happens to cause them to panic and retreat along the ridge, where their hunted down piecemeal until the last of them is destroyed either on LSH, or else in Deep ravine. In other words, a South North flow to the battle.
Now as far as I can see, apart from JSIT's account, no other Indian mentions the movement to Ford D or the fighting around there, so, apart from some spent cartridge evidence, which in itself seems very thin to me, why has everyone now taken this movement to ford D as a given?
Shan
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 18, 2020 10:52:33 GMT -6
Shan, from what I have gathered over the years Montrose has absolutely no use for any movement to Ford D. So I will throw this out here.
This clip is from "The Fighting Cheyennes" by George Bird Grinnell and wanted to share this quote with you.
"The different groups of soldiers moved about a little on the higher ground, some going toward the river and some away from it, and when the Indians charged from all sides the soldiers drew a little together. By this time three of the troop shad lost their horses, but four still had theirs. One company that had lost its horses was near where the road goes now, and the men, all on foot, were trying to work their way toward the gray-horse company on the hill half a mile from them. About half the men were without guns. They fought with six-shooters, close fighting — almost hand to hand — as they went up the hill."
For those who don't know the road referred to is the old road, as this book was published in 1915. The old road comes up from the ford D area, through the current housing area, continues past the "Old Stone House", and the cemetery to Last Stand Hill. The information above was given to Grinnell by White Shield, a Southern Cheyenne participant of the battle. Source# 2, maybe. There are others.
Any questions regarding the above I will endeavor to answer. There is one obvious one.
This post has absolutely nothing to do with Fred's new book, which I look forward to
Regards. Tom
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Post by shan on Feb 20, 2020 9:44:54 GMT -6
tubman13
thanks for your input, I suppose the obvious question would be, could White Shield's observation "One company that had lost its horses was near where the road goes now, and the men, all on foot, were trying to work their way toward the gray-horse company on the hill half a mile from them," be referring to the dirt road that was built along the spine of the ridge from South to North?
Now I'm not trying to hang onto my theories like a dog with a bone, for I'm more than happy to change my mind if the evidence is persuasive, but I suppose one could say that by Indian standards, they might refer to a dirt track or dirt road as a road. Now I don't know when that piece of road was built, maybe someone can come in here and help, but I'm guessing that it may have been there by 1914 ~ 1915 when Grinnell interviewed him. Like I say, it's just a question.
One thing is sure though, if we accept the Indians accounts of a South to North flow of the battle, then Custer and his 2 companies can't have been located up on LSH around the time that the other 3 companies collapsed and were driven North, for if he had, then one assumes that he would have tried to move to their aid, and had that happened, then we would expect to find men from both E and F companies amongst the dead, not to mention some of the members of his staff, and there are no reports of that.
In which case he must have been elsewhere, and as such, was unaware of just how bad things were becoming to his South until it was too late to help. Now this in turn gives some credence to the argument that he went to ford D and by doing so, stirred up yet another ants nest up there. So, as you can see, in spite of me wanting to resist it, logic leaves me no alternative but to accept that something of the sort must have happened.
Shan
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Post by montrose on Feb 20, 2020 10:51:57 GMT -6
Shan, from what I have gathered over the years Montrose has absolutely no use for any movement to Ford D. So I will throw this out here. Regards. Tom I believe the ford D reconnaissance happened. I also believe all of LTC Custer's decisions after 3411 were badly flawed. The decision to launch a regimental attack was based on an intelligence estimate of the Indian village being in LBH valley, north of but close to Ford A. It is my hypothesis that the decision to have the main body of this attack not follow the advance guard was based on a new estimate of the situation. LTC Custer now believed that he could move east of the river to a templated ford behind the village. There is no possible way his own regimental intelligence assets could know of ford locations north of Ford A. But he had Gibbon's scouts who had been in this area back in May, and many had years of experience in this area, knowing both fords, nogo/slowgo terrain and former camp locations. He had to have been taking advice from the Crows. At 3411 this estimate proved false. The village was not between Ford A and B, it was at Ford B, and the northern extent could not be seen from 3411. The massive size of the village means that 3 companies at south end and 5 at north end had no chance of success. The distance between Reno's line, which he saw, meant no possibility of any mutual support from any effort on the north side of the village. There are time and space issues, by the time he got there it would be too late. Sidebar: Time and space is a constant Custer failure. See Trevilian Station. LTC Custer lacked maturity and judgment, in fact his rapid promotions were specifically based on this. He had excessive aggression in the Civil War, when the US Cavalry had excessive fear of the CSA cavalry, leading to weak, timid leaders. As ACW progressed, Union cavalry were better organized and better armed than the slaver cavalry. It was just a matter of applying overwhelming force, like an NFL team playing a high school team. The problem is that the Indian wars did not involve overwhelming force. Tactics mattered again, and Colonel Blimp could not adjust his methods. South to North. If 5 companies were at south end Battle Ridge in a major engagement, why would anyone retreat north? The only option is south or east. South is towards the rest of the regiment, only true option, unless enemy too strong. East is next option to get around enemy so you can go south. West is bat poop crazy, towards enemy strength. North is also irrational, who move parallel to enemy, in plain sight. I regard the north to south theory invalid if either is truth. Any body of cartridge located north or west of Calhoun Hill. The C Company evidence in the FF area must be planted or fabricated, as is any evidence of any fighting on the north end of Battle Ridge. Pay attention to Fred's timeline, and all evidence. It did not happen, because timing did not allow it. Probability is zero. Respectfully, William
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dgfred
Junior Member
Posts: 69
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Post by dgfred on Feb 20, 2020 15:08:09 GMT -6
Yes... to me the most likely thing is that he used tactics that had worked for him before. Send Benteen to surround or flush out, send Reno as advance attact to disrupt the village, send part of force to 1st ford to further disrupt the village and force them to flee, Custer's group heads to the north to cut off retreat of the village. Not one part worked as planned. Failure to recon and failure to adapt.
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Post by mac on Feb 21, 2020 6:31:54 GMT -6
The only thing he should have done at 3411 is attack as fast as possible.I believe that is exactly what he did. Leopards and spots! If you take Fred's timeline and omit the supposed trip to Ford B then the time available allows that there is indeed scope for this. The extensive new archaeology from the valley beyond Ford D indicates that a large scale action occurred there just as all the Cheyenne accounts say, including John Stands in Timber's work. Now add the archaeology around Calhoun Hill and FF ridge and understand that Gall was around Henryville when he saw Custer coming towards him. Then read Austin Red Hawks account (Drawing Battle Lines by Donahue page 170) he was with Gall and describes three groups of soldiers (C,I,L) coming down the ridge towards Gall. He describes how the three groups were forced together and killed. The evidence is real and it is compelling. Cheers
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Post by montrose on Feb 21, 2020 8:18:27 GMT -6
Mac,
An attack by the main body conducting an attack on enemy village, located west of river. How many US bodies were discovered west of village from the main body? A decapitated head, possibly one body. The main body conducted no attack, anywhere, ever. Wandering the empty prairie is not an attack. When did they cross the river, in what strength, and who did they attack?
The only attack conducted in this battle was conducted by the Reno detachment. A 3 company advance guard of an 8 company regimental attack. Why did the main body not support the regimental attack?
Respectfully,
William
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dgfred
Junior Member
Posts: 69
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Post by dgfred on Feb 21, 2020 10:30:39 GMT -6
A planned attack is sometimes much different than the actual attack. Another thought is how many bodies would the villagers leave lying in/around the village? Would they have moved them to the other side maybe? Or maybe even piling them up together. Just asking not trying to start an argument. Be gentle, haha.
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 21, 2020 14:40:08 GMT -6
Will, mentions no north to south battle flow, and he is right. And, there was no true south to north battle flow either, than Cut Belly's group and the hunters coming back from Tullock's that day and they did little more than harrie GAC's command on the way north. The fighting that took place north to south was Custer's retreat from the Ford D area. The Indians cut GAC's command off at numerous junctures and they whacked Keogh's company broadside.
Did the whole 5 companies go to Ford D, no, but I think that 3 were located in support above and behind(BRE). Not sitting in situ as most believe. They were cut off and hit as they attempted to return south. Could there have been a leaping & bounding from the north. Could be.
Regards, Tom
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