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Post by fred on Jan 7, 2020 18:28:39 GMT -6
Dave,
Got it. I edited my post.
FCW
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Post by fred on Jan 7, 2020 18:37:44 GMT -6
Hi Fred... All the best for 2020 Ian Happy New Year, Ian... hope you and Susan are doing well... and your boys, too. My memory has slipped a bit: you have two sons and no daughters, correct? You are onto something here, all addressed in the new book. Good work. I must tell you, Ian. You have done a damn fine job over these years. I remember when you first came on these boards, a young man admitting you knew very little, pilloried at times by our favorite curmudgeon, old Dark Cloud, yet you hung in there, read, asked questions, learned, developed your own ideas, listened, changed, and here you are. To me, you are the poster-boy example of someone with an interest, who has listened, learned, and decided all on your own. It does not get any better than that. I wish every "newbie" were like you. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by montrose on Jan 7, 2020 23:45:55 GMT -6
My observations on MAJ Reno's decision making, starting from Ford A.
1. He was too aggressive, he kept pushing when the tactical situation clearly said pull back. In LBH LTC Custer was timid and cautious to the point of cowardice, Reno over bold and aggressive. This is the truth of LBH. The only offensive action by US forces was by MAJ Reno. (Even the advance to Weir in small pieces was reckless).
2. Initial decisions. Reno started in a classic 2 companies out, one back, standard stuff. But his force was too small to cover the valley from river to bluffs. He decided to hug the river, leaving his left flank open. As indicators of enemy forces gathering to his left grew, he deployed his reserve into line, which still left his flank open. He sent a message to main body for support. After a time Fred probably knows and I do not, he sent another messenger to main body for support.
3. M Co detachment. M Company was the right flank, Since the river curves, there are times the right flank had a sizable gap. A detachment from M Company was sent into this gap, which ended up totally separated from their company until Reno Hill. Not sure if this was M Company commander decision or MAJ Reno. But it means the battalion was too small for its mission, had issues with a linear line with both flanks exposed.
4. The halt decision. The halt decision was too late and too far down the valley. The Indians launched a massive counterattack with an estimated 900 warriors not into the Reno battalion flank, but past them into their rear. They cut the advanced guard off from Ford A and any possible support. This was a brilliant act to counter a tactical error, that the Indians do not get credit for. They were not going force on force, like boxing, they were going force on vacuum, like judo.
5. The pivot. The pivot from facing the village to facing west is critical. It is a recognition that they are surrounded and cut off. I am sure Fred will go over how they flipped their line, and actually attacked, moving forward. This shows Reno as very brave and reckless, the complete opposite of Custer (on this day).
6. The decision to retreat. There was a time gap between this decision and its execution. Why? Because MAJ Reno could only organize M and A Companies. G Company and the M Company detachment didn't form up. The decision to go with what he had was a bold choice, get some of the battalion out or die in place. This is a hard decision for any commander to make.
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Post by montrose on Jan 8, 2020 0:02:48 GMT -6
Fred The more I think about this, the more excited I get. For most of us novices, the Valley fight at first seems most straight forward: Reno goes in, doesn`t get the promised support, is outnumbered and outmaneuvered, doesn`t organize a proper breakthrough/retreat/whatever, looses many men on his way to the bluffs, end of story. That`s pretty much how I saw it at first and concentrated more on Battle Ridge/Last Stand Hill. I have a feeling that to many, the Valley fight in some way is not a "proper part" of the battle; only the Custer part seems to interest them. I was guilty of that myself early on, and it was a mistake (just like deciding to have a alcohol free January) which I have been rectifying. But even in much of the literature about the battle written by real or "real" historians, I get sort of the same feeling. Might be wrong. I often am regarding the battle. But either way, a book dedicated to this part of the battle surely will be a needed addition to the bibliography (we`d say it like this over here, might be wrong in English but hope it makes sense). All the best, Geir Geir, What if LTC Custer recalled his advanced guard when he decided to ignore the valley? Leave a detachment to hold Ford A until the 2 trailing battalions caught up, massed forces to the north. This is not unusual in this era, hell BG Crook did this at Rosebud. The decision to abandon the regimental advanced guard was done in a grossly incompetent manner. MAJ Reno should have been informed of the change in mission, tactics, commandres intent and the dreaded correlation of forces and means (COFM). Respectfully, William
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Post by noggy on Jan 8, 2020 4:10:37 GMT -6
Geir, I do not think you are wrong about the valley fight. Every narrative I have read regurgitates essentially the same thing, just as you so eloquently and briefly described. I am either terribly confused or am a rogue when it comes to this stuff, but even with the Facebook sites and the apparent popularity of the Strategy book, there is constant pushback. There are so many things that are apparent, yet never questioned with either event, and I do not know if one in twenty understands what "context" means. People claim they have read what participants had to say... but have they? How do they explain some of these comments? Or do they? Articles appear and are remarked upon-- or maybe not?-- then filed away as though they were never even written? I guess people are too involved with their own theories, 95% of which are simply wrong. Hi Fred (I hope what I wrote here was understood to be my very first and early views about the valley fight, I have gotten further than that with the years!) I understand where you are coming from, we have a saying over here when it comes to interpreting things out of context; "Reading like the Devil reads the Bible". Not sure it makes sense in English, but oh well. I`m not on Facebook so I haven`t see any of these discussions, but apart from terrorizing yo lot here I do read on two other LBH related forums (not as a member), so I know how different people can read the same text regarding LBH stuff. From the top of my head, I don`t know of too many other battles where this is so prominent. Now I have never written a book myself, just a number of articles and my master thesis some ten years ago. I remember being very proud of it, and I did get a fantastic grade. BUT, what almost shocked me was how different the...eh...professor who "interrogates" you about your work during the oral master defense concluded compared to what I had argued for over 80-100 pages. In short, the whole thing was about what let the Germans remain undefeated in East Africa throughout WW1. I felt I had made a strong case for German maneuvering capabilities (mobility in general) and a way more sound logistical system suited to warfare in the jungles and wilderness were key in making the overall strategy work despite the odds. He had however concluded that it primarily was the Allies who botched it up for themselves. But as I was about to rip out my hair, said professor mentioned how he never really had known about the campaign, had become really interested in it due to my thesis and asked me about tips on books. That actually made me really happy and somewhat proud, since I at the time was rather consumed by the topic, having read and written about it two years straight. At least. My poorly made point here is that if people read your book and appreciate it, maybe with it igniting more interest in the battle, that in itself is a good thing even if they might get things wrong or come to another conclusion than the point you want to get across. Making people think is underappreciated nowadays, I feel... All the best, and I hope the New Year has started of good, Geir PS: Sorry for misspellings, I`m writing this listening to a one-way Skype monologue from some better paid big shot with a fancy title at work.
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Post by noggy on Jan 8, 2020 4:21:37 GMT -6
Geir, What if LTC Custer recalled his advanced guard when he decided to ignore the valley? Leave a detachment to hold Ford A until the 2 trailing battalions caught up, massed forces to the north. This is not unusual in this era, hell BG Crook did this at Rosebud. The decision to abandon the regimental advanced guard was done in a grossly incompetent manner. MAJ Reno should have been informed of the change in mission, tactics, commandres intent and the dreaded correlation of forces and means (COFM). Respectfully, William Hi William Absolutely an option. Of course, I have no idea if the NAs could have crossed the river other places and encircled a rearguard, or if they would have discovered the two battalions moving North and then move to block a crossing, but these worst case scenarios are much better than how things turned out. GAC leaving Reno and not sending a message (Reno could send mestsagers, so it was doable) was borderline criminal. It really bugs me to see ardent fanboys defend this or even blame Reno for it. And I`m probably more open to LBH things than people who have studied the battle for decades. I`m not sure how the military justice system worked in the 1870s, but if Reynolds was court-martialed for his role in attacking the Powder River camp in March, I`d think GAC would be in hot water had he survived. All the best ad happy new year, Geir
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 8, 2020 4:36:32 GMT -6
William, we have discussed at length many, many times that Reno was supposed to be the ‘Advanced Guard’, now I am not the best on understanding battalion movement and its terms, but would one of the roles of an advanced guard be, if its gets involved in a meeting engagement [which this was], and is forced to halt [which Reno did], then would Reno’s battalion become the fixing unit for the main body [Custer], to use company M as a pivot and swing around in a left hook and hit the enemy line and role it up?, this tactic would force the enemy to pull back and give the initiative back to the cavalry. Reno could then mount up and continue his advance.
The idea behind this is that Reno must have had thoughts of seeing Custer again that afternoon, even if he couldn’t make visual with his column, he must have known that his gun fire would bring in support. Then Reno’s battalion would then be the platform for any advance forward, with the enemy fix and a wide-open flank for any support to exploit.
Speaking of pivots, why didn’t Reno, use G Company as a pivot for the M Company to pull back to the timber, seems like a good choice to me, and during the advance down the valley, why didn’t Reno give the job of securing the timber line to G Company, as this was the weakest of his three companies [35 all ranks]. Both A and M [41 & 46? Respectively], would have given him a good base for a smaller, more compact skirmish which would allow for more command and control, something which in my view, the original one didn’t have.
Ian
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 8, 2020 4:50:33 GMT -6
Thanks Fred, yes you are correct my friend, two lads, with two wives and two grand kids [boys]. Its one of their birthdays this weekend, so they are all pilling over and we are going out for a family meal.
Did you and Lisa actually move house? I am sure you did and taken you mother in law with you.
Hope it all worked out well and look forward to the new book.
Ian.
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Post by montrose on Jan 9, 2020 8:56:07 GMT -6
Fred wrote: The funny apart about this-- for me, anyway-- is I look back many, many years to when I was an officer commanding troops in combat. My situation was different because I was no longer commanding infantry soldiers, but my training as an infantry officer stood me well. In the few situations I was in where I had to react under enemy fire, I did precisely what I wrote above. Was that because I was a "brilliant" tactician? No, not at all; it was because I was trained superbly by an Army that knew how to fight and how to train and what good leadership was. I become smug when I think of that... and not just a little bit proud, because I feel friends like Bender reacted and were trained in the same way. After reading General Smith's work, I suspect the British Army is similar. Read more: lbha.proboards.com/posts/recent#ixzz6AXp8LI6nThe concept you are addressing is the Army is not focused on what to do. This means a standard response to all situations. The Army focus is how to think. The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is based on how to make a decision. The classic COL Boyd Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act (OODA) loop is how to think. A key part of this is obtaining battlefield awareness, massive discussion of this in military literature. The civilian term is situational awareness, but they are decades behind military in understanding this. This means understanding what is going on around you, IN TIME to make a decision. Perfect information too late is useless. The use of scouts in LBH and the location of the command and control elements are crucial to understanding LBH. LTC Custer's decisions on use of recon elements, location of himself, and location of maneuver elements are the key to LBH. Even if he had perfect information his locations after 311 made it impossible for any command and control of the regiment. There was no brain, no decision making element that could evaluate information gained on the battle, and tell any element what to do based on this data. LTC Custer died with a single company, one of twelve. The other 11 were on their own. I have never seen the command and control problems addressed in any work on LBH. Fred, please give it a shot.
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Post by montrose on Jan 9, 2020 9:10:52 GMT -6
William, we have discussed at length many, many times that Reno was supposed to be the ‘Advanced Guard’, now I am not the best on understanding battalion movement and its terms, but would one of the roles of an advanced guard be, if its gets involved in a meeting engagement [which this was], and is forced to halt [which Reno did], then would Reno’s battalion become the fixing unit for the main body [Custer], to use company M as a pivot and swing around in a left hook and hit the enemy line and role it up?, this tactic would force the enemy to pull back and give the initiative back to the cavalry. Reno could then mount up and continue his advance. The idea behind this is that Reno must have had thoughts of seeing Custer again that afternoon, even if he couldn’t make visual with his column, he must have known that his gun fire would bring in support. Then Reno’s battalion would then be the platform for any advance forward, with the enemy fix and a wide-open flank for any support to exploit. Speaking of pivots, why didn’t Reno, use G Company as a pivot for the M Company to pull back to the timber, seems like a good choice to me, and during the advance down the valley, why didn’t Reno give the job of securing the timber line to G Company, as this was the weakest of his three companies [35 all ranks]. Both A and M [41 & 46? Respectively], would have given him a good base for a smaller, more compact skirmish which would allow for more command and control, something which in my view, the original one didn’t have. Ian The main body is two tactical bounds behind the lead element. You need to be close enough to react to what they discover, far enough behind to not get involved in their tactical engagement. For simplicity for an 1876 US Army Cavalry regiment, this is about 800 meters. The concept is let the advance guard develop information, so you can make a decision and have time to carry it out. In this case, advance guard is finding massive enemy numbers, and they are too small to cover the valley. LTC Custer can send one battalion to cover the flank, or 2 battalions. He can send one to extend, and one to refuse. (One extends line, other forms behind it, facing west to block the incoming flank attack). He can stop the advance. He can withdraw. There are many options here. The craziest, most idiotic one is ignore the enemy, let the advanced guard go forward alone, and keep the rest of the regiment out of the fight for several hours. There are ZERO enemy objectives east of the river. Any activity in this area is useless, gross negligence.
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Post by wild on Jan 9, 2020 9:47:01 GMT -6
I would take issue with the good Colonel's description of Reno's role as that of an "advance guard". How did Reno's orders differ from Benteen's orders? Was Benteen an advance guard? Reno's unit was a detachment (as was Benteen's)with orders to seek out and attack the enemy. If we need a term for Reno's unit surely "recce in force " is more suitable. An advance guard requires that the advance and main forces be at least on the same sandtable. and that they be in tactical distance of each other. Do we not all agree that the blunder of the day was Custer's dispersion of his battalions? Custer might not have been more than 1km distance from Reno but by putting a river between the commands he effctively placed the commands in different tactical dimensions. Further; Reno did not configure his command as per an advance guard . After crossing the river he advanced rapidly in the direction of the suggested camp and then charged. By charging home he would cause the enemy to react . This is what Custer was hoping for ie to see what the fallout would be and act accordingly. Thus the manoeuvres of the two commands indicate a recce in force rather than an advance guard. Regards all Richard
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Post by Colt45 on Jan 9, 2020 15:33:02 GMT -6
Wild, Benteen was more of a recon in force, as he did not know if there were hostiles in the direction he was sent, but if he encountered them then attack. His primary objective was to see if hostiles were up river from the main camp. That is a recon action. Since he had 3 companies, which was a force large enough to initially engage, then he was to engage if hostiles were found. Since Custer had no plans to support Benteen, he could not have been an advance guard. If Benteen had found a large force, he most likely would have fallen back toward the main body. But Custer didn't expect him to find the main hostile body, only outliers such as what occurred at Washita.
Reno and Custer knew where the hostiles were, so per Reno's orders, he was an advance guard. Custer screwed the pooch by not following Reno with the main body. Reno was to start an attack on the village, and if Custer had followed, Custer was to observe the situation develop and then act accordingly. This he did not do, so Reno was hung out to dry. The overriding blame for LBH is Custer's, no one else. Once Reno realized he was out on a limb by himself, he made some mistakes in getting off that limb, but overall did manage to save most of his command.
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Post by crzhrs on Jan 9, 2020 16:32:26 GMT -6
Time to weight in here: No one was quite sure of the exact location of an Indian village. Benteen was ordered on a scout to determine if there were Indians or a village nearby or possibly to stop Indians from escaping. He was ordered to scout the area and to keep going to the next ridge if he found nothing. Two messengers were sent to Benteen from Custer to keep on going from ridge to ridge. Benteen could have ended up in Canada if he followed Custer's orders!
Custer and Reno kept going not quite sure exactly where any village was even though scouts indicated a large village sighted from the Crow's Nest.
It wasn't until Girard spotted Indians "running like the Devil" did Custer decide on an attack. He did not order Reno to be an advance guard . . . he ordered him to attack running Indians and/or a village and would be supported by the entire command.
Benteen, meanwhile was floundering around in rugged terrain with no Indians in sight. He was not notified by Custer about the separation of command nor any attack ordered against running Indians or a village. In fact Benteen had no scouts with him and no medical personal. Apparently Custer didn't expect him to find any Indians to fight!
It wasn't until Benteen determined he was on a "wild goose chase" that he decided to return and met up with Giovanni Martini who told him about Custer apparently ready to ride through the Indian village and gave him a note to "Come Quick" but not to any location.
Benteen was in the dark and only saved Reno by showing up by "disobeying" orders to keep going on his "scout"
Custer's failure to keep Benteen informed about the situation and failure to "support" Reno led to the disaster at the LBH.
Too many mistakes and assumptions by a supposedly "veteran" Indian Fighter cost the 7th a inglorious defeat.
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Post by wild on Jan 9, 2020 23:29:50 GMT -6
In actual fact Reno's mission could fit a number of tactics. For example ; if he was to clear the enemy from the line of advance of the main force he could be described as an advance guard. If he was to "pin" the enemy then he would have been the fire base for left or right flanking movement. Or as I think most likely he was a recon in force whose mission was to test enemy response.
The same applies to all of Custer's battalions. Was Keogh a reserve or rear guard? you can paint countless scenarios by assigning various missions to the units. A veritable military rubic cube. Best Richard
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Post by wild on Jan 9, 2020 23:34:47 GMT -6
Is it not accepted that Benteen's mission was to prevent the Indians escaping around Custer's left flank? a bit of insurance....he did think he had been discovered and expected the Indians to run.
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