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Post by montrose on Oct 17, 2019 11:18:16 GMT -6
Shan,
I look at history from the perspective of empiricism, how do we know what we know. This week the US Marine Corps announced that they misidentified a flag raiser on Iwo Jima, they got it wrong for 70 plus years. Now, there are numerous videos and photos of this event, highly documented, highly researched. And they got it wrong.
I have posted videos of combat in the current war on terror that prove beyond any doubt that the official histories are false, and known to be false by all involved. Please understand that one service has prevented many other videotapes that prove they lie from being released. This corrupt service has a school in Maryland.
So for LBH we do not have video or photos to prove what happened. But the overall evidence is overwhelming.
MAJ Reno was the advance element of a regimental attack. LTC Custer decided not to follow the attack he ordered, and failed to enter the valley fight. He did not tell his advance guard that he had abandoned them. He did send messengers to his 2 trailing battalions to make sure they followed him, and also not support the advance guard. We have no idea what he intended to d after abandoning his advance guard to certain defeat. He scattered his force all over the prairie, 5 companies died in 5 positions, not a single one in supporting distance of any other.
I do not think LBH that hard to figure out. The soldiers were good enough, did their duty. The officers were a disgrace. The two worst officers in this battle were LTC Custer and CPT Keough.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Oct 17, 2019 13:37:41 GMT -6
Hi Shan, there is some things in your post which have left me bemused for years now, and I must say that it doesn’t take much to bemuse me ‘LOL’.
One, is the idea of Keogh and around 120 soldiers left on Blummer Ridge, over a mile away from Ford B whilst Custer and Yates move to the ford, now as we know, the cavalry carbine is no good over 400 yards, so Keogh couldn’t do supporting from there. Plus, we have a trail of cavalry cartridge which stretch from Luce to Blummer, which looks like the cavalry were in a fight even before they reach Calhoun hill.
Then we have the idea that a firebrand like Custer would leave the same 120 men out of the fight and go on a recon mission whilst the rest of his regiment were fighting the same enemy which he too was supposed to be fighting.
Custer went towards the north at speed, and the reason for this must have been to catch the Indians from behind before they caught on to them. So, to stop his momentum and Pratt about on the high ground doesn’t sound like Custer to me.
Plus, our man in the field AZ, has told us that the ground that Benteen had to cover was very hard going, and I we guess it was too rough for a pack train, so, Benteen wouldn’t have travelled to Calhoun hill with the packs in tow and I think Custer wouldn’t expect him to. He just wanted Benteen in the fight along with the reserve ammo.
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Post by shan on Oct 18, 2019 4:26:37 GMT -6
Morning Yan,
Yan, it's always a pleasure to bemuse those that are up for it, and doubly pleasurable to be able to do it over a number of posts. I do my best with the addled head I've got, and that's all I can do. LOL.
Now my thinned version of what may have happened after Custer was last seen moving along the bluffs is based the few so called facts that we can muster. So, if more than one witness reports seeing the same thing, then I'm more than happy to accept what they say, and incorporate it into my model of the battle.
Just to take the case you raised, that of Luce and Nye Cartwright ridges. Now I don't doubt that there was firing activity up there, and like you, I doubt that much of it was directed down towards the river. Likewise, I don't doubt that the men up there were moving North towards the Calhoun area. All I was saying was that a number of Indians reported seeing troops up there as well as troops close to the river. In other words, two different groups of men.
Likewise, the reports we have: again from the Indians, of where the battle ended. For me, there are enough Indian reports to say that the battle ended in and around L.S.H. with the last of the action probably occurring in and around Deep Ravine, for me to feel comfortable with their observations. Now I know that there are those that favour that old theory that comes up now and again, the one that talks about a North South flow to the battle, but for me that just goes against the bulk of the Indian evidence. When we read through the evidence, we have to strike a balance, and as you can see from your own experience of these boards, one can take the so called facts and then twist them any way you wish, and quite often they seem to make some sense.
From the few witness statements we have, I'm afraid I can't be sure whether Custer moved North with his whole command after they reached Calhoun, but it seems to me, from both the body placement, and the fact that a large number of the dead were identified as belonging to L company, plus the fact that there were so few members of that company identified around the L.S.H. area, it only seems logical to me that once again, he choose to split his command at that point. Now I'm not putting forward any theory as to why he did this, and I would tend to agree with the observation that Benteen would have found it hard using that route if he were to bring the packs with him, all I'm saying is that appears to be what happened.
There is one other factor that I've taken into consideration with regards to the action around Calhoun, and that's the fact that a number of Indians talk about driving the soldiers North along the ridge towards L.S.H. and once again the body placement of the various companies seem to bear this out.
Finally, as I said elsewhere, over recent years, what do I mean by that? I suppose it could be over twenty years by now, there has been this theory that Custer took his force to the two Northern fords D, now he may well have done, but the evidence seems very thin to me, so I'll just wait that one out until further evidence comes to light. Incidentally, now I know that I've been banging on for years now about the visual evidence that the Indians left concerning the battle, evidence that generally gets ignored, but Standing Bear, who left three large pieces of work detailing many of the key moments during the Custer part of the battle, makes no reference to a move towards those fords.
Montrose, I think your succinct summoning up of the battle left mine looking like a first draft of "War and Peace," when I had hoped to compress it down to a couple of lines, can't really argue with what you had to say.
Shan
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Post by herosrest on Oct 18, 2019 6:11:51 GMT -6
I will chip into this pot of succinct brevity with the following. Custer sent the bulk of his scouts in advance to raid the hostile pony herds and those scouts wavered and halted at the Lone Tepee. Eye witness record of Custer's intentions after viewing the camps from the bluffs, exists. One account of the early Custer fight gives troops nearing the river, halting and dismounting. Another tells of a crossing attempt which sustained casualties. It is disingenious to accept, let alone believe that the '5 companies died in 5 positions' as given by Montrose. That is patently not so. Finally, it was a very brief and brutal chaos which had completed when Weir made his advance from Reno Hill. It wasn't just LTC Custer and CPT Keough who had a bad day. Reno and Benteen are equally up their. The eight to nine hundred hostiles seen by Benteen moved from the Reno fight to engage Custer and a half of them, at least, did this by climbing the bluffs downriver of Reno Hill and crossing Medicine Tail's Coulee. That is why soldiers near the river, near the B fords, if they were there, pulled back towards where they died and they were closely pursued and destroyed making the movement. Modern day confusion about where Reno halted his advance to battle is solved. New York NY Daily Graphic 1877 Grayscale - ....pdf (784.89 KB) The Daily Graphic, August 13, 1877 published sketch of the valley shows Sheridan, Nolan, and command, parked and camped all over the Reno battleground. Relics found on that ground are attributable to 1877. Lovely.
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Post by montrose on Oct 18, 2019 7:03:33 GMT -6
Hero,
Many people face a dilemma when a theory is contradicted by facts. The proper choice is to change the theory. The improper choice is to deny the facts, or use invented, false facts.
There are 5 distinct clusters of bodies vicinity Battle Ridge. C Company at Finley-Finkle ridge and the adjacent draw. L Company on Calhoun Hill. I Company at Keough Swale. F Company at Last Stand Hill. E Company at Deep Ravine. 5 distinct company clusters, none within supporting range of any other.
The clusters show good behavior by NCOs and enlisted personnel. They were operating under the commands of company commanders and above until they were overrun. The 5 separate clusters show a degree of incompetence on the part of the officers.
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Post by montrose on Oct 18, 2019 8:18:36 GMT -6
Shan and Yan,
I believe LTC Custer intended to establish an assembly area to link up with the trailing Benteen and McDougal battalions. The LCN ridge is not the best way to head to the northern fords, but it doe make sense as a defendable linkup point. The firing in this area can only be against stray Indians in the area, like Wolf Tooth. There are no known casualties from this fire, maybe just Martini's horse. Indian scouts were also under intermittent fire in this area, that was likely friendly fire.
It appears Custer set his assembly area with 3 companies, then continued scouting with the remainder. He then decided to move linkup north to Battle Ridge. He then again set 3 companies in a linkup position at south end of the ridge, and continued scouting with the remainder.
The farther north he sets the linkup point, the longer it will take the trailing units to catch up. And any linkup past LCN will be in plain view of Indian camp, and exposed to flank attacks from Ford B avenue of approach.
The scouting party should have been a patrol, it was too big. If the local threat demanded 40% of force, then he should have waited until after linkup. The decision making after the lone tepee shows a downward spiral of bad decisions causing worse decisions at next decision point.
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Post by herosrest on Oct 18, 2019 9:46:59 GMT -6
Hero, Many people face a dilemma when a theory is contradicted by facts. The proper choice is to change the theory. The improper choice is to deny the facts, or use invented, false facts. There are 5 distinct clusters of bodies vicinity Battle Ridge. C Company at Finley-Finkle ridge and the adjacent draw. L Company on Calhoun Hill. I Company at Keough Swale. F Company at Last Stand Hill. E Company at Deep Ravine. 5 distinct company clusters, none within supporting range of any other. The clusters show good behavior by NCOs and enlisted personnel. They were operating under the commands of company commanders and above until they were overrun. The 5 separate clusters show a degree of incompetence on the part of the officers. Cowboy to Colonel. HOMER. W. Wheeler left Vermont to became a part of the wild life in marching, scouting, fighting, raising cattle, riding to the rescue of Sandy Forsythe in the Arickaree fight, known and trusted by Sheridan, Merritt, Crook and Mackenzie. For his volunteer part in the desperate fight on Sappa Creek, Kansas, in April, 1875, he was offered a commission in the Fifth Cavalry, and accepting, marched, fought and bivouacked with that famous regiment, retiring as a Colonel in September, 1911. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2019 with funding from Brigham Young University 'We went over the Custer battlefield pretty thoroughly and located the spot where Captain Keogh and several of his men of Company I had followed him. Here was a slight depression in the ground. Evidently at one time it had been a buffalo wallow, and the wind had blown out the dirt, form ing a semi-circular depression covering several yards. The graves were around this depression. The men were buried where they fell, which clearly showed that their position had been taken for defense. This was the only position we found where it looked as if a defense had been made, for the men had fallen all over the battlefield, here and there.' I disagree the concrete nature of your assertion due to the opinion of th Cavalry participants that it was a running fight. The Finley Finckle area dead numbered 16-18 from various sources within a couple of years of it, which is not a company. Company C is likely to have been there due to theories having them route from Ford B/Greasy Grass HilL environs, to marching there from Cemetery Ridge. The company did not die there. one third its strength did. It's horses were almost certainly run off down Calhoun Coulee. When the burials were made, for whatever reason, the graves were marked by stakes driven into the ground at the head and foot of each. The desd were buried in situ where they fell because attempts to gather the remains caused dismemberment and so bodies were initially relocated. We know that bodies were removed from a ravine by 7th Infantry who assisted with burial. No-one to this day can say what happened to Company E. It is reasonable to think that some considerable part of Company F fell on Custer's Hill and that also is true of Company I. It was a small percentage of the enlisted men who were identified for burial since so few of the five companies remained for the task. It's must be a very sad task as I'm sure you appreciate. The point I take issue with is the idea that five clusters equals five companies. It does not and you should re-visit thinking on this. Bodies were relocated by Roe when the monument was erected and then 14 years after the fighting and 9 years after Roe moved the bodies, Sweet came along and placed 246 markers. Yyou could perhaps be a little more circumspect since there is nothing to show that what happened to Reno's retograde didn't happen to Custer's. Theory developed upon the markers, which is what the five cluster idea is, is the work of O.J. Sweet's interpretation (theory) of the battle and it simply was a theory. He theorised the Battle with twice as many markers placed in 1876, as there were dead. Bodies were found on the Luce Blummer Nye Cartwright terrain. Your idea, if I may be so bold, entertains a cluster shambles.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Oct 18, 2019 13:49:17 GMT -6
I always thought that the company fell here theory, came from the fact that they located the company commanders along with some of their men, so naturally many thought that they fell in these clusters, but these two maps try to tell us that C Company fell over near deep ravine and maybe even the Keogh sector rather than FFR. But who knows, they never located any officer bodies from C were they think they found C, TWC was up on LSH and Harrington was never located. We have been working on the north south theory and I remember an Indian account which stated that a column of soldier came riding back from the north which a lone rider taking point, now could this be L Company with maybe 1SGT Butler riding ahead? If I can locate who written that account, I will post it up. Yan
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Post by herosrest on Oct 19, 2019 9:09:36 GMT -6
Hero, Many people face a dilemma when a theory is contradicted by facts. The proper choice is to change the theory. The improper choice is to deny the facts, or use invented, false facts. There are 5 distinct clusters of bodies vicinity Battle Ridge. C Company at Finley-Finkle ridge and the adjacent draw. L Company on Calhoun Hill. I Company at Keough Swale. F Company at Last Stand Hill. E Company at Deep Ravine. 5 distinct company clusters, none within supporting range of any other. The clusters show good behavior by NCOs and enlisted personnel. They were operating under the commands of company commanders and above until they were overrun. The 5 separate clusters show a degree of incompetence on the part of the officers. Cowboy to Colonel. HOMER. W. Wheeler left Vermont to became a part of the wild life in marching, scouting, fighting, raising cattle, riding to the rescue of Sandy Forsythe in the Arickaree fight, known and trusted by Sheridan, Merritt, Crook and Mackenzie. For his volunteer part in the desperate fight on Sappa Creek, Kansas, in April, 1875, he was offered a commission in the Fifth Cavalry, and accepting, marched, fought and bivouacked with that famous regiment, retiring as a Colonel in September, 1911. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2019 with funding from Brigham Young University 'We went over the Custer battlefield pretty thoroughly and located the spot where Captain Keogh and several of his men of Company I had followed him. Here was a slight depression in the ground. Evidently at one time it had been a buffalo wallow, and the wind had blown out the dirt, form ing a semi-circular depression covering several yards. The graves were around this depression. The men were buried where they fell, which clearly showed that their position had been taken for defense. This was the only position we found where it looked as if a defense had been made, for the men had fallen all over the battlefield, here and there.' I disagree the concrete nature of your assertion due to the opinion of th Cavalry participants that it was a running fight. The Finley Finckle area dead numbered 16-18 from various sources within a couple of years of it, which is not a company. Company C is likely to have been there due to theories having them route from Ford B/Greasy Grass HilL environs, to marching there from Cemetery Ridge. The company did not die there. one third its strength did. It's horses were almost certainly run off down Calhoun Coulee. When the burials were made, for whatever reason, the graves were marked by stakes driven into the ground at the head and foot of each. The desd were buried in situ where they fell because attempts to gather the remains caused dismemberment and so bodies were initially relocated. We know that bodies were removed from a ravine by 7th Infantry who assisted with burial. No-one to this day can say what happened to Company E. It is reasonable to think that some considerable part of Company F fell on Custer's Hill and that also is true of Company I. It was a small percentage of the enlisted men who were identified for burial since so few of the five companies remained for the task. It's must be a very sad task as I'm sure you appreciate. The point I take issue with is the idea that five clusters equals five companies. It does not and you should re-visit thinking on this. Bodies were relocated by Roe when the monument was erected and then 14 years after the fighting and 9 years after Roe moved the bodies, Sweet came along and placed 246 markers. Yyou could perhaps be a little more circumspect since there is nothing to show that what happened to Reno's retograde didn't happen to Custer's. Theory developed upon the markers, which is what the five cluster idea is, is the work of O.J. Sweet's interpretation (theory) of the battle and it simply was a theory. He theorised the Battle with twice as many markers placed in 1876, as there were dead. Bodies were found on the Luce Blummer Nye Cartwright terrain. Your idea, if I may be so bold, entertains a cluster shambles. My link to Wheeler's book at Archive.org ,' Cowboy to Colonel' seems to squiffy (unreliable) so here it is to read online at Hathi - link Nice chapter on his mission (5th Cav) to escort of Sheridan to Little Bighorn in 1977. Reburials, etc,, A good read book.
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Post by herosrest on Oct 19, 2019 9:35:27 GMT -6
I always thought that the company fell here theory, came from the fact that they located the company commanders along with some of their men, so naturally many thought that they fell in these clusters, but these two maps try to tell us that C Company fell over near deep ravine and maybe even the Keogh sector rather than FFR. But who knows, they never located any officer bodies from C were they think they found C, TWC was up on LSH and Harrington was never located. View AttachmentView AttachmentWe have been working on the north south theory and I remember an Indian account which stated that a column of soldier came riding back from the north which a lone rider taking point, now could this be L Company with maybe 1SGT Butler riding ahead? If I can locate who written that account, I will post it up. Yan There are significant problems with understanding what happened and as the military input here, indicate, why bother with the myriad accounts when it is impossible to relate them to the terrain. The counterpoint to this TACAMO approach is worthwhile because things otherwise become so simplied that five clusters of dead are pushed forth and rapid fire conclusions then delivered ridiculously in criticism based upon snap decision. The reason for the cluster shambles death sceanario is units being engaged in detail. destroyed one after the other in any order which you prefer. Why did that happen? Well, you have the nonsense which Donahue is symptomatic of and reality - which is a command dispersed in manoeuvre, which was exposed by the retreat from the valley and cut off from Benteen and Reno by the hundreds of warriors released from the valley fight. If there were the 8-900 in the valley which Benteen stated, and the 1500-1800 total that was initially stated after the battle - then Reno eventually faced 6 to 1 odds, whilst Custer at first had 2.5 to 3 to 1 against him, which evolved into 7 or 8 to 1. That is at the lowest number of opposition (1500-1800). Custer's command was cut off from Reno Hill and overwhelmed in detail. That the companies were not supporting one another tells that they were in manoeuvre and destroyed in detail. Very simple straight forward battle analysis as simple as grinding an axe. The participant accounts are worthwhile and very useful in understanding important points which tell us what took place. That was 7th Cavalry getting its butt buffed because Reno pulled out of the valley as Benteen arrived to support him and Custer's flanking attacks stalled for unknown reason. An exercise in logic. In preparation for the Rugby Union World Cup 2019, Russia were beaten 22 - 35 by Jersey Reds. This afternoon Ealing Trailfinders did Jersey Reds by 52 to 38 being 33 - 0 at half time. England should have sent Ealing Trailfinders to the World Cup Finals. Ireland should have sent London Irish. The first of your maps dates to 1891 shortly after the markers were placed and is broadly and specifically the scenario and battle theory of Capt. Owen J. Sweet, 25th Infantry; who was in charge of the mission to place markers. Here's his report - linkDespite all the theorising by many people since the markers were placed, the only correct interpretation is given in Sweet's report which explains what he did and why - warts and all. Basic battle study. If you base theory on the markers then your conclusion must be equal to what Sweet did. The second map is an interpretation of Stand's in Timber's Rickey and Vaughn interview. It is at complete odds with all other Cheyenne record from participants. It incorporates and develops a study by Charles Kuhlman which was based upon the markers without reading Sweet's report of why the markers are the way they are.
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Post by herosrest on Oct 20, 2019 6:27:38 GMT -6
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Post by AZ Ranger on Oct 20, 2019 12:37:11 GMT -6
So what can we see from Custer's viewpoint before entering MTC. We can see two travel corridors toward the northern fords but not any part of the village tight to the river and north of MTC. I agree with Montrose that the most direct way would be the way Curley states he saw the gray horses move which was down MTC. Martin states he was within 600 yards of MTF when he was sent back. That means Custer and Cooke were there if Curley is correct.
We can also see that drainages run from Battle Ridge to the LBH. If anyone is fleeing up those drainages how would you head them off. Curley states other rode straight across. I rode two years ago with my Crow friend a Marine down to MTC and up the other side. It is an obvious egress and everyone I rode with used that egress. Most continued straight and end on NC. If your with the Real Birds you turn down the road west and back to their ranch. If you are with Chip Watts you continue on toward the Calhoun Area. My friend turned to the east as we exited and then up a drainage. We topped out on Luce and continued north running into NC. While on Luce it was observed we were on a ledge and it explains the shape on the artifacts map which is what I call a running W. So it may not be the exact route but it does address the artifacts. While there it easy to see at close range were numerous cover and concealment areas that could be used. The Indian artifacts are in those areas. It would be a disastrous to try and bring slow moving mules across that area.
Wolf tooth was not the only one harassing those troopers. There was a Cheyenne hunting parting returning from east and moving down MTC. There were also Sioux and Cheyenne mixed coming up MTC and they are not noted on the JSIT. In order for these companies to react they could use suppression fire or they had to move north in order to reach an area they could travel east or west. On the artifact map you will see both occurred so they were addressing Indian locations east and west of them. At the time there were apparently not enough Indians to fix them and the soldiers continued north and crossed Deep Coulée and moved along Custer Ridge. So the soldiers would be preventing escapes up the multiple drainages that can be observe before crossing MTC.
So why the movement down MTC with the gray horses. The western travel coridoor is also visible. If there was an expectation of mules to travel than it would be a better route. Any fleeing Indians could easily be caught withing the drainages with troopers coming from two directions.
I believe Custer did not know of the location of the Cheyennes who were camped in Warrior Circles rather than one large circle. There was a camp next to where Deep Ravine enters the river and directly across from it. There are drawings that show sacred items at that camp. That gives a reason for some of the Cheyennes delaying and also for them defending at the lower end of Deep Ravine.
Regards
Steve
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Post by herosrest on Oct 21, 2019 5:52:12 GMT -6
Good insight with the terrain and military deployments AZR but I'm going to counterpoint modern Cheyenne opinion with that of their participant relatives. That is, the record of those who were there. Woodenleg Marquis link to the book online as source. Chapter VIII p206/207 On the Little Bighorn. 'We crossed the Little Bighorn river to its west side and set off down the valley. Cheyennes ahead, Uncpapas behind, in the usual order of march. The journey that day was not a long one. After eight or nine miles of travel the Cheyennes stopped and began to form their camp circle. The tribes following us chose their ground, and their women began to set up the villages taken down that forenoon. The last tribe, the biggest one, the Uncpapas, placed themselves behind the others.
The Cheyenne location was about two miles north from the present railroad station at Garryowen, Montana. We were near the mouth of a small creek flowing from the southwestward into the river. Across the river east of us and a little upstream from us was a broad coulee, or little valley, having now the name Medicine Tail coulee.
The Uncpapas, at the southern end of the group and most distant from us, put their circle just northeast of the present Garryowen station. The other four circles were placed here and there between us and the Uncpapas.
Our trail during all of our movements throughout that summer could have been followed by a blind person. It was from a quarter to half a mile wide at all places where the form of the land allowed that width. Indians regularly made a broad trail when traveling in bands using travois. People behind often kept in the tracks of people in front, but when the party of travelers was a large one there were many of such tracks side by side.
Every one of the six separate camp circles had its open and unoccupied side toward the east. Every lodge in each of these camps was set up so that the entrance opening was at its east side. This was the arrangement at all of our campings in this entire summer of combined movement. This was the regular Indian way of putting up a lodge or arranging a camp.
* At the Northern Cheyenne fair at Lame Deer in 1927 I estimated the encampment at about 1,100. Wooden Leg and some other old men were asked to compare this camp with the one on the Little Bighorn. After a consultation, it was generally agreed that there must have been 1,600 or more Cheyennes in their camp when the Custer soldiers came. T.B.M. There were no Cheyenne tipis near or at the mouth of Deep Ravine when Reno and Custer attacked the camps. Little Wolf arrived after the Custer fight and set up west of the Cheyenne circle/horseshoe/cresent shaped camp. Wooden Leg and his brother slept under the trees for the night of 24/25 June and were asleep when the attack opened. It was not just WL who advised Marquis of the camp location and size - it was the many people named in the books forward. The Cheyenne campwas opposite MTC. Some or many of the young bucks slept in thhe open which may have been in the timber at and near Deep Ravine but we do not know that for a fact or even particpants opinion other surmising with Wooden Leg who did it. Maybe he slept in the timber down near the mouth of Deep Ravine but his family were in the Cheyenne Camp opposote MTC. Adding to the point I make, please be aware that 17 Cheyenne participants contributed to Marquis's research of the battle. Further, Marquis was taught Indian Sign Language by the Crow Tribe and by John Stands in Timber, the Cheyenne tribal historian and grandson of Lame White Man, a Cheyenne chief killed in the battle with Custer.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Oct 21, 2019 7:37:04 GMT -6
There were no Cheyenne tipis near or at the mouth of Deep Ravine when Reno and Custer attacked the camps. Little Wolf arrived after the Custer fight and set up west of the Cheyenne circle/horseshoe/cresent shaped camp. Wooden Leg and his brother slept under the trees for the night of 24/25 June and were asleep when the attack opened. It was not just WL who advised Marquis of the camp location and size - it was the many people named in the books forward. The Cheyenne campwas opposite MTC. Some or many of the young bucks slept in thhe open which may have been in the timber at and near Deep Ravine but we do not know that for a fact or even particpants opinion other surmising with Wooden Leg who did it. Maybe he slept in the timber down near the mouth of Deep Ravine but his family were in the Cheyenne Camp opposote MTC. Look at the Standing Bear drawing. I saw it at the Brinton Museum in Big Horn Wyoming. I think most of these accounts are accurate for what they know in person but they sometimes add what others tell them. There were Cheyennes at Deep Ravine look at the current battlefield markers on both sides of the Deep Gully in Deep Ravine. Can you identify Kit Fox and Dog Soldiers in the Standing Bear drawing? Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by herosrest on Oct 22, 2019 4:45:49 GMT -6
As I stated here, quite some many years back - Going by the detail given, Custer died on Calhoun Hhill. The Cheyenne camp cresent was opposite MTC. Read Marquis who was taught sign talk by John Stands in Timber. I don't doubt there were Cheyenne at Deep Ravine but their tipis were at Medicine Tail opposite the mouth of the north Fork. If we accept Curtis, then Custer was up on Greasy Grass Hill shooting into the camp. Cheyennes crossed the river there as the cosiderable artifact evidence indicates and then they rode over Greasy Grass Ridge upto the north side of Custer's Hill in a GO maneuvre. It was all over very quickly. Woodpecker Woman's manIf you give me Kit Fox and Dog Soldiers names, i'll hunt up any historical accounts left by them. Should be fun. Did you have any luck identifying the hunting party which attacked Custer's command? I did spend a time trying to get an angle on it but maybe it was rather those early to the fight like Yellow Nose, White Shield, Spotted Wolf and John Two Moons. Can you indicate where Kicking Bear indicated he killed Charlie Reynolds.
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