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Post by herosrest on Oct 7, 2019 2:50:11 GMT -6
It isn't Christmas quite yet but I will however inject a sanity clause, here. John Stands in Timber, respected Northern Cheyenne elder - knew diddly squat and less about events of the 25/27th June 1876 and that's a truth. He had not been born. Here he is, photographed by Marquis, in 1926 which was the battle's famous 50th Anniversary when thousands of Sioux and Cheyennes including many, many battle participants; refought the battle on the battleground with the 7th Cavalry present too. So, why didn't Marquis, the doctor for reservation Siox and Cheyennes who published a number of battle books after considerable research and access to participants whom he treated; know what Timber knew? The answer is rather simple. When you consider this, and the fact that 7th Cavalry in 1926, rode onto the battlefield across the western fords around Willy Bends place, (there is video and photographs of it taking place) it is impossible to accept Timber's information as reliable. It is just another story developed once all those involved with the fighting had died. The Western Fords - This is a theory which relies upon complete acceptance of a basic tenet which is a misunderstanding. That is the size of the village. Discussion of the size of the camps and their location is another of contentious issues which divides opinion and interests. You are fully aware of this so I'll not banf on about it but what I will say is that the history of the history is in play here through the interests of various groups and parties with interest in the land at Little Bighorn valley and monument. I'll make the point this way - Early photographers brought confusion through unscrupulous cataloguing of images to turn a living. The proof positive with this is the image of Mitch Bouyer that everyone accepts as being him because it says so in books so it must be right. It isn't Bouyer and that is a solid reality. The same is true of the village size and location. There were as many as six tribal circles and variations within the six such as the Cheyenne camped in a single 'circle' whilst the Minnieconjou camped in four circles along the river, one for each band and its headman. A contributing factor in understanding the layout of tipi's (tepees) on the ground. There are then historians and authors, Godfrey was an author, so was Charles King, Curtis was a photographer whose pinions and understanding of the Camp of the Buffalo Hunters was and is as divided and bipolar as the factional disagreements about Custer, and Benteen and Reno - the entire issue is politics of the battle. John Stands in Timber is entirely unreliable despite his acceptance by the likes of Peter Powell, Liberty and Rickey. The basic concept was first properly aired by Brininstool and Kuhlman from the mid 1930's onwards and found a more modern acceptance with Don Rickey and then Cliff Nelson. NPS seem very entusiastic about the theory today with Hoffert and Adelson buffing into a rather good video - www.youtube.com/watch?v=10NzGS1bZewIt isn't what happened though. Cheyennes who returned to Indian Territory from the battle, toldt their Indian Agent Maj. John D. Miles, exactly how the battle was fought and what happened. Miles published straight away. I August 1876 together with a map. So there ya go! Here ya go, 7th Cavalry, on film, riding up to Battle Ridge across Cemetery Ridge from the Bends fords after disembarking from trains at Garryowen. This was in 1926 and is what John Stands in Timber infused into the modern understanding of events. It's truth Jim but not as we know it for 1876. At 1 minute in - Please click here for Enlightenment and entertainment. The Liberty files. What I will concede is that no-one todate, since 05/25/1876, has come up with a valid reason for why the five companies of 7th Cavalry, with Custer, fought and died where they did. The western fords theory does not solve the matter but does add significantly to broad misunderstanding. One rare testimony from a tribal participant indicates that the bodies were moved. Wow! Which explains why no one can explain. How! or is it Howna!
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Post by noggy on Oct 10, 2019 1:23:33 GMT -6
It isn't what happened though. Cheyennes who returned to Indian Territory from the battle, toldt their Indian Agent Maj. John D. Miles, exactly how the battle was fought and what happened. Miles published straight away. I August 1876 together with a map. So there ya go! Hi HR We all can agree none of the two were there during the battle, regardless of birth Did Miles manage to visit the battlefield as early late July 1876? JSIT we do know visited it, with veterans from the battle. Do you believe that JSIT`s informants lied to him when on the battlefield, or do you believe he himself lied? In case of the first, why would they lie so many years after, and to one of their own who also was a relative of some of them, and not to their white "friend"? All the best, Noggy
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Post by herosrest on Oct 11, 2019 8:14:49 GMT -6
Miles joined his regiment with Terry on the Rosebud before that command united with Crook's march north from the Goose.
The nearest I can figure it out, to date, the nearest Miles came to the battlefield, before undertaking his investigations during '78; was the march to Big Muddy and the Lame Deer fight. 7th Cavalry camped near there at end of the days march on the 24th June 1876 and discovered sign and abandoned large camps. That area was a crossroads of tribal routes along the Rosebud and across it using the Tullock's eastern fork from Yellostone to Tongue Rivers.
During the following two years a significant amount of information would have been given to Miles by members of 7th Cavalry and particularly his own battalion commanders such as Simon Snyder, who for example, believed that Porter was decapitated. This can be related into Cheyenne tradition and it took place with the officer alive and pinned to ground.
Miles was an effective intelligence gather who protected his sources. He knew much and his support of Custer has done much to blemish his own posterity. That is the nature of the inane droll which has been manufactured for more than a century to defend Reno who disobeyed orders and Benteen who did the same. Terry divided his forces without criticism whilst Custer did the same and was crucified for it.
Anysways, waffling on, Miles was very astute and he realised the missing part of the tactical puzzle. Custer expected the camp to be where it was on the day of the 24th June 1876 but it moved to where he found it. Custer deployed to attack the camp of the 24th, whether it was running or not.
Miles was trusted by the Cheyenne and then Sioux who surrendered to him. They told him how the battle was fought. This was two years on. John Stands in Timber was nowhere near the battlefield until the 1920's and when he was there and living near the Big Muddy, amongst other places, he said nothing of the information given to Rickey in 1956; to Marquis in the 1920's. Marquis interviewed the survivors in preparing to write his books. One of which only published one hundred years after the battle - which says very much in regards the Cheyenne pledge of 100 years silence.
Why was JSiT wandering around the valley and reservations in the 1920's and interviewing participants? He wasn't. The Wooden Leg book tells clearly who held influence at that time and Timber wasn't it.
Yates and Keogh's battalions were wiped out because they were cut off from Reno and Benteen who then failed to support Custer. Miles told that story in 1878 and requested to chair the Inquiry into Reno's conduct. Had that happened then the history would have been rather different. Miles official report from 1878 remains absent without leave.
John Stands in Timber was a minor tribal figure of little importance until he figured out what the white man wanted and gave it to Rickey after having been around Brininstool, Kuhlman and a few other Custer detractors during the 1930's and 1940's after the myth of the western fords emerged from confusions over when which events took place. The point of the Cheyennes and John Stands in Timber was to have their dead honored on the battlefield. It was and still is a political fight to change prevailing attitudes. Little Bighorn's history is one of their tools to do this. A Cheyenne marker has just been placed in the valley. I believe they intend for another to sit in the Oval Office one day.
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Post by herosrest on Oct 12, 2019 5:14:00 GMT -6
Hi Geir, have a look at the Wolftooth/John Stands In Timber map, which was drawn on the battlefield itself by a warrior who was there, it is easy to follow asthe new road system is also added to the map and you can see how Custer left Blummer ridge, across deep coulee, up to Calhoun hill and along the east side of battle ridge. View AttachmentIt was given that this map was the product of a participant in the the battle. Someone involved in what is shown. This is not so. The sketch is the work of John Stands in Timber to relate what he understood of events. This work raises a number of considerations of how what is shown is indicated and how the knowledge came about. JSiT John Stands In Timber was born in Birney, Montana in 1882 (1884 - Hardorff) being the eldest son of Stands Different and Buffalo Cow. He educated at the reservation Mission School and then Haskell Institute in Lawrence, Kansas. In 1908 he helped build the Mission at Birney. He returned to Montana and worked as a maintenance man at a school in Busby and as a cowboy. He became active in tribal governance at the Northern Cheyenne reservation and eventually became a historian of the tribe. According to My Sniffing Around and based mainly upon Liberty's complete interviews, John left in 1910, aged either 38 or 36, and he went somewhere or other. It is stated in the 1956 interview with Don Rickey, that Lame White Man's widow, Twin Woman, and her brother Tall Bull provided information about the battle to John. Wolftooth, a grandfather, took John over the ground 'about forty years' previously, which if about 40 years is exact which it probably wasn't - then can and probably does relate to the 1916 Anniversary which, oddly or funnily depending upon your bent was the battles 40th anniversary. I'm quite comfortable with this interpretation of dating oral tradition since 40 + 40 is 80 and John's age was given as 70 years old according to Vaughn and Rickey in 1956. He was in fact 72 or 74 years old, which somewhat diminishes the quality of research. However, a signifcant portion (lovely word) of modern researchers have difficulty with Jesse Vaughn's research and his take on the battle which places Reno's valley skirmish line at the Garryowen river loop rather than the Kuhlman Ford. To be continued...... Cheyenne places linkSome Liberty linkOrientations. Indicated H8 is the road to Busby (US212), the Two Moons monument, Lame Deer, Big Muddy and Rosebud valley near Reno and Davis Creeks. Rotate the map to a south to north axis and it is reasonably accurate. Timber understood the terrain when he made the sketch. Therefore, the indication of Custer's route is flawed (whether correct or not) since ALL theory other than that shown here, is at odds with the idea that Medicine Tail's Creek played no part in Custer's approach. There are a number of timing ploys which can explain this matter or explain it away but it is significat and relevant. All record left by Cheyenne participants involves the use of Medicine Tail's Creek whether troops were close to the river or not and at Ford B or Ford D's or Ford C. The bottom left quadrant indicating Custer's route, contains a small red box which is taken as the escaping soldier killed by Low Dog at the end of the fight. There is a marker in place for this soldier. The killing is detailed by Marquis in the Wooden Leg book and in interview given by Big Beaver to Joe Blummer in 1928. It was Blummer who had begun finding spent cartridges on outlying eastern ridges during the 1920's which Marquis noted. This was the beginning of new theory although Walter M. Camp had identified the eastern ridges to be of interest and undertook investigation with his interviews. Marquis's understanding of movement broadly and loosely agrees with the later work of Stands in Timber and the Cheyenne battle generation aside from interpretation of the Medicine Tail errata and the village size/location. Charles Kuhlman had access to this information which was obviously central to the theory and timeline he developed and shown on map here. Kuhlman accepted the participant record of the village ending with the Cheyenne circle laying opposite Deep Coulee, where it was when 7th Cavalry attacked - rather than where it subsequently moved to as shown in confusion by Timber. Note. John Stands in Timber produced several battle maps which variously agree and disagree the theory which emeged to Rickey and Vaughn in 1956. The glaring banana skin and flaw relates to the village location but before fiddling these strings, here is a 1956 Map by Timber, Rickey and Vaughn which shows where the famous six cartridges were found. TVR 1956 Many consider this document to be the battle's Holy Grail but in truth it is very wobbly wishful thinking. The Cheyenne were camped opposite the mouth of the union of Deep and Medicine Tail's coulees and no-one there whether on guard or in panic or in flight, saw anything of the 7th Cavalry east of the river and headed towards the lower fords. This is for several reasons but primarily it is a matter of simple physics. Custer is shown marching west, east of the blacktop road route to reach the lower fords. Whilst the Wolf Tooth accounts hold together with this premise, those developing the Roan Beer, White Shield, and other accounts of Cheyennes in the village at the same time, cannot explain those people knowing there were soldiers headed towards lower fords OUT OF SIGHT and hidden behind the horizon presented to anyone looking north and wet towards the bluffs from the valley. Cheyennes in the valley could not respond to what they did NOT know. They could not possibly have known that cavalry were following the route indicated by Timber, Kuhlman, Marquis, and others. They could not see soldiers who did or didn't do it. Therefore they did not ride on down to the lower fords to fight Custer's command. The idea is preposterous. It was also impossible to spot cavalry at and near the lower fords through the river brush and timber which spreaad across the valley at Deep Ravine as it does and did at Garryowen. The entire concoction fails on the basic line of sight test. The Cheyenne are perhaps the greatest warriors on Earth when they are up for it but that does not mean that they can see through rock or read minds. White Shield saw the soldiers across the river whilst he was at his tipi.
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Post by herosrest on Oct 12, 2019 8:07:39 GMT -6
Besides the battles line of sight issues is the complications which a succesion of growing annual tributes and re-enactments at the battlefield, introduced and played upon, the minds of those with recollections of events decades earlier. The term re-enactment is particularly unhelpful in imposing practical ceremonies upon the exigencies of memeory. Yes Chief, it's a re-enactment of the battle. Chief thinks, 'Hmmmmm..... that is not what I remember! Fantastic battle re-enactment images from 1921 - enjoy.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Oct 12, 2019 10:44:02 GMT -6
Hello HR, if Wolftooth took JSIT on a grand tour of the battlefield, they why are we disputing stuff written by him. If you were taken on a tour of the field by one of your relatives who took part in the battle, and presented to us lot years after the event, just what he had told you, then we on these boards would treat your words with the greatest respect. We would also take the word of your source too, because he had seen parts of the battle and told you about what he saw with your own tongue, without a translator. I also guess that he would be truthful with you, which goes along way with history topics like this.
Great photos, by the way.
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Post by herosrest on Oct 13, 2019 13:02:51 GMT -6
Hi Yan, Because neither of us can talk to Wolftooth and he did not leave a written account, we have the problems inherent to human communication. John Stands in Timber spoke with him and for all we know, Marquis did also. He photographed him and John. In 1956, Timber staated the visit took place 40 years earlier. That would be around 1916 which was the 40th year on. Wolftooth then was at least 60 and more years of age. He was a participant at the Fetterman fight before Little Bighorn. There has been a recent discussion about who which Wolf Tooth was which helps illustrate the difficulties with 19th Century plains records and knowledge. The land of the valley became Crow land and it was alloted. Cheyennes rarely visited the valley or battleground for fear of retribution. Cheyennes who scouted for Miles did go there with him in 1878 and told him how the fighting went. Wolftooth returned to a battlefield forty years after he was shooting at the soldiers. The land had been settled and monument and markers put in place besides the Stonehouse complex and various trails over the ground. Forty years after he was dodging around avoiding volleys of carbine fire and trying not to get killed. He was not a suicide boy. We'll leave it there. Timber was 70+ when interviwed by Rickey and Vaughan. Crow tribal historian[/div] link
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Post by shan on Oct 14, 2019 8:22:17 GMT -6
Yan,
your post was spot on about why we should a be grateful that we have Wolf Tooth's testimony as a man who actually fought there, and B, that he told it to John Stands in Timber using their own language, who then passed it onto us. Now I'm not 100% sure about this, but this maybe the only Indian account we have that wasn't mediated through an interpreter with all the problems that implies, in which case it's even more important.
Herorest, I get what your saying about memory, but we just have to accept that some of us will have a good memory and some won't. I had a friend staying with me recently, who I've know now for more than 50 years now, and here's the thing, unfortunately for me, or maybe fortunately, who knows? he's the one who has the memory, and I don't. Oh I remember what I want to remember but this man is an artist when it comes to detail.
We all have our skills, I'm good at seeing things and he isn't, so I have the eyes and he hasn't. But my point is this, when we read through the reams of stuff that's been written about this battle, we just have to use our witts. More often than not, we can pick up on a bias say, concerning Reno as a man, or Custer as a personality, so that some will read the evidence and pick and choose what they want, and who knows, maybe I'm doing this with Wolf Tooth.
But when it comes to memory itself, I'm afraid at this distance in time, and without us being able to have them sat here in front of us, when it comes to having to read, and try and make sense of their written testimony, its almost impossible to tell whether someone is making it up to suit their purpose, or just plain making it up on the hoof to please the interviewer.
Shan
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Post by herosrest on Oct 14, 2019 11:36:29 GMT -6
Hi Shan, long time. Wise words. May I say that i'm not debunking Wolf Tooth or his information but rather cautioning its interpretations. 1. Timber was shown over the battlefield by Wolf Tooth, 40 years after the fighting. Timber related that information to Rickey, forty years on again. That is, the information in Rickey & Vaughn's interview is second hand eighty years after the battle. 2. When Wolf Tooth explained events to Timber, let's say in 1916, then the monument and markers were in place as was the National Cemetery, stone house and out buildings and various trails onto the site. 3. This was terrain which the Cheyennes knew of in passing - they were NOT intimately aquainted with every blade of greasy grass or the hills, ridges and ravines which undulate the land. Such cautions are important, worthwhile and valid. One reason why is the account of the battle given by Cheyenne Big Beaver to Joe Blummer in 1928 as Blummer was discovering artifacts and casings on the ridges later named for Luce, Nye and Cartwright. The written interview tells us what Blummer understood. In 1930, Big Beaver drew a battle map and illustrated the presumption inherent to Blummer's words and a confusion. No one in the valley camps or on the flats and ridges east of the river at the mouth of Deep and Medicine Tail coulees could see soldiers to the north on the east side of Battle Ridge. So why would Sioux and Cheyenne ride down to the lower fords leaving Realbird and Maguire's B crossings undefended. Timber' route for Custer's march towards the western fords disguises the movement. It is reasonable to assume that Custer would do that and move rapidly. The first time troops might have been noticed by anyone in the valley was when they arrived on the Cemetery Ridge terrain which was a return (supposedly) from the fords and towards Finley Hill. That is what Timber showed on the map we have been consifering. We can go on and on about it to no real end so let's not. However, there is some opinion about sic cavalry cartridges found on the Battle Ridge Extension and shown on the 1956 Rickey map - thelbha.proboards.com/attachment/download/956 There is quite a bit of confusion about them which is no basis for any theory about what happened. The Rickey transcript of his interview with Timber has the fight ending on Calhoun Hill terrain which no-one has ever bothered with or explained and the ideas which modern research are throwing up were first put forward by Charles Kuhlma who had the five companies deployed dismounted from Last Stand Hill onto the Battle Ridge Extension, before retreating towards Weir when he arrived in view to the Southeast, and the five companies being destroyed in moving to return towards Weir, Benteen, Reno and McDougall. That had been published in 1951 together with ideas about the valley fight skirmish line which turned the lack of understanding of events upside just as Sitting Bull promised. We all love a good mystery... Note, in reading Blummers interview of Big Beaver, given at the Battlefield in 1928 and found in Hardorff's book 'Cheyenne Memories', p. 149-50; the impression of activity at the lower fords can be taken from the information. What Big Beaver and the Cheyennes actually did was cross the river where he showed on his 1930 map and move then over Greasy Grass ridge to Custer's Hill. Here is the 1928 text: ' He says that all the Indians from this end of the camp went north along the river, thence crossing the river to the right and came up towards Custer from the north side'. The map shows what he actually meant rather than what was interpretted. Big Beaver Map and detail.Big Beaver was an important contributor to Marquis who published the Wooden Leg book in 1931, without any reference to western fords. Below is the photograph of Big Beaver in the Wooden Leg book. Charles Kuhlman in his book from 1951, said nothing about western fords.
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Post by herosrest on Oct 14, 2019 12:51:33 GMT -6
These considerations and discussions are fraught with divergent opinions, resolute reticence and the considerable confusions of uncertainty which accompany all study of these events unless it is the product of a set mind. Whether or not Custer went 'towards' the lower western fords with all five companies or not, the Cheyennes who pinned troops to Last Stand Hill and demolished Keogh's battalion, crossed the river opposite Greasy Grass ridge and rode over and along that ridge to battle. The western fords, Sioux ford and Gibbons ford, were the escape route from the camps which was used by the Sioux and Cheyennes who evaded the camp guards on the night of 24/25 June 1876 and gathered together to ride out and fight. This was the Wolf Tooth party which then bumped Custer's companies. This is the confusion which has entered understanding and study. We were told this by Timber, Liberty and Uttley, in Cheyenne Memories. In 1967. Henala!
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Post by shan on Oct 14, 2019 13:58:35 GMT -6
Herosrest,
as you know yourself, one of the reasons it's almost impossible to come to grips with what happened during the battle ~~ this battle or any battle come to that ~~ is that the only method we have at our disposal to talk about it, i.e. writing, forces us into using a liner form to try and describe events, most of which were all happening at the same time.
As a for instance, if Custer was indeed on Cemetery ridge, thinking about beginning to make his move up towards LSH, over the ridge itself, what remained of I company, plus some refugees from the fight on both Findley and Calhoun hill, were all struggling to flee North towards the area where they perceived Custer to be. At the same time, the so called suicide boys were making their way up towards the museum area and would shortly be crashing into E company and running off most of their horses.
Meanwhile, there would have been yet other Indians still down at the Calhoun area busy looting and maybe finishing off the wounded, whilst yet others could have been checking out the arrival of troops up on Weir point, and that's only the half of it.
Now, had you been a warrior who was just making his way up Deep ravine when he spotted troops over on Cemetery Ridge, you would have seen one fight, and if I was a warrior, arriving in the Keogh area from say, the Calhoun area, I would have seen another, likewise, one of the suicide boys who chased after the grey horses because he was more interested in horse flesh than killing, saw something totally different compared to one of the others who stayed in the area and got involved in the fighting on LSH.
And this is the problem, here's you and me writing our respective books having to tie all this together and then write it down in a liner fashion, when everything I've been describing was all happening at the same time. Finally, here's you and me, tired old Indian warriors, being asked not what we did, or what we thought, but rather whether we saw Custer himself in the battle, and then to compound things, if we allow ourselves to be prompted into saying that maybe we did ~~ even though we hadn't the faintest idea who Custer was ~~ then the questioners all demand that we say how brave he was and that he went down fighting. But wait, I'm afraid it doesn't end there, for as if all that wasn't bad enough, for the next 50 or 60 years we're pestered by various white writers to describe the battle when we can't really much about it ourselves.
In other words, the whole thing is a minefield not to mention a mind field.
Shan
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Post by herosrest on Oct 14, 2019 14:57:26 GMT -6
Thank you and I absolutely agree. Anyone and all can suppose, suppose, suppose, because the archaeology is inconconclusive and always will be at the level of scrutiny undertaken. There is stuff of which I am certain and comfortable with such as the route taken by Wolf Tooth, Big Foot and others to get clear of the camp although it was a filter rather than them all moving out together. It makes sense then that Wolf Tooth explained that route as the one he took and it became confused with the general movement towards the companies on the ridge. I don't accept that the 'Suicide Boys' hit any company per se but rather got in amongst horse holders. Nit picking perhaps but having dismissed them using the lower fords to reach the fight - they were not a part of Wolf Tooth's party; I can only go with Cheyenne Little Hawk's account of the fighting and he told us how they reached the fight. Across Deep Coulee moving west chasing cavalry until they were halted by gunfire. Noisy Walking was shot, Lame Whiteman and at least one other if I recall. So..... Stonehouse area..... I still don't buy it after all these years. Little Hawk was big medicine and the first to fight Crook way before Rosebud. I see him as a kind of headbanger and entirely fearless. It's ever interesting stuff with ever more to consider. Be well.
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Post by noggy on Oct 15, 2019 2:30:44 GMT -6
I ust say, some good and balanced thoughts here. Reminds me of the phrase We should read just about everything very critically, I agree. Noggy
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Post by herosrest on Oct 16, 2019 2:36:46 GMT -6
Cherry is a military term of some considerable insignificance. 'Say what?' OK...... What?' Thus Milspeak gives: 'Chief of Smoke - BOHICA - cherry'. In UK we might term simply as 'Cluster shambles' or 'pert'. Custer should have taken artillery.
P-link: Clink the pic image photo visual thing Be well.
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Post by shan on Oct 17, 2019 8:24:57 GMT -6
Here's a thought, I wonder if we stripped away all the constant bickering about who did what, and where and when, or if we just stopped worrying about who was lying and who got it wrong, or about who was making the whole dammed thing up, would we find ourselves satisfied and never bother to log in again?
No, of course we wouldn't, because its precisely those elements that keep us all here.
But seriously, what would the battle look like stripped of some of those elements? So let's try and see what happens.
The Army finally locates the hostile camp that it's been looking for and decides to attack, in spite of thinking that it has lost the element of surprise. As they near the camp itself, Custer sends Reno across the river to lead the attack, whilst he remains on the east bank hoping no doubt to find somewhere to make a flank attack.
Reno, finding himself confronted by Indians who, far from fleeing as had been suggested, were coming out in large numbers in order to bring the fight to him, decides to halt his attack and confront them in the hope that he will soon be joined by the remaining elements of the command.
Meanwhile, Custer, having spotted a usable ford, divides his command, leaving two thirds of it up on a high ridge to provide covering fire should he need it, while he takes the other third down towards the ford in order to explore his options. Once there, he find himself confronted by a few warriors who do their best to dissuade him crossing, but although they are few, and shouldn't be any real problem, off in the distance he can see increasing numbers of mounted warriors turning towards him rather than continuing on to confront Reno, and so, for reasons that remain unclear, he turns away and makes his way back up to higher ground where he then joins the rest of his command.
In the meantime, Reno, realising that there's no sign of any back up, and seeing that numbers of Indians are beginning to out flank him, decides that if he doesn't act, and act quickly, the will be surrounded, makes a snap decision to retreat back the way he came. Unfortunately, the manoeuvre turns out to be a shambles, one that results in him taking a large number of casualties before he can make it safely back across the river, where he is then joined by Benteen's command who help him secure a defensive position.
Back on Custer's potion of the field, once again divides his command, with him moving North with two companies, leaving the rest to ostensibly keep the way open for Benteen to join him. We know little of what happened next excepting that it was soon over. There is some evidence that he moved a little further North than where he himself and most of the officers were later found, but that apart, from the general tenure of what the Indians have to say, it seems that the command was overwhelmed piecemeal by increasing numbers of Indians coming at them from all directions.
Other than that. Reno and Benteen joint commands successfully managed to keep the Indians at bay throughout the rest of that day and the next, with the Indians, having felt that they had made their point, moving off the following morning.
I don't know if one could pare it back much more than that and feel that one had a sense of what happened, but that's about the bones of it as far as I'm concerned.
Shan
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