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Post by battledetective on May 28, 2018 11:48:35 GMT -6
Hello! I know it has already been discussed elsewhere but I still find it very confusing. One of the most popular theories is that after the remnant of Custer battalion regrouped on or near Last Stand Hill (companies E, F and some 20 survivors from the right wing) a big party of soldiers, maybe 40 or so, mostly from E company, made a break to the river. They ended up in Deep Ravine, where they were killed. According to Fox in Battlefield Detectives they were the last soldiers of Custer battalion to fall. According to Burns they ran there because 'Given the choice to flee danger, these men chose to move down toward the Indian village, the source of the warriors who were overrunning them. This was because there was nowhere else to run.' This group would have mostly been on foot, as many horses had been scattered, either as a distraction according to some sources/commenters, or by the Indians themselves. There is also some evidence that a second small group, right before the end on LSH tried to make a run to join them. I have many problems with this. If there were some 100 or so soldiers on or around LSH, which according to theories and native testimonials were reorganizing during a short pause in the battle, why would those soldiers run towards the village, instead of making a stand with their comrades? Surely a concentrated defense with a still sizeable force would give better chances that an escape towards the enemy base. It also runs against the instinct of soldiers to bunch together in presence of danger. Moreover if there was a pause in the battle the soldiers were probably under desultory fire, but not in immediate danger. So why such an irrational decision, or outright panic move, to run towards the river and the village? And why most of the soldiers belonged to E company? If it had been a panic flight, you would imagine that soldiers from the different companies bunched together would have fled all mixed up. Another theory is that when the left wing under Custer returned from the foray to the northernmost ford E company was detached and deployed near Deep Ravine to cover the rest of the force. But this theory doesn't explain why the commander of E company was found on LSH.
Could it be that the left wing first regrouped near LSH with the survivors of the right wing, and then E company was ordered to deploy back near Deep Ravine, maybe to enfilade fire warriors who were firing from some position SW of the battalion? Maybe at this point A. Smith had already been hit, and so couldn't lead E company to this new position and his body remained on LSH. And maybe before the end on LSH another small group of soldiers tried to make a desperate run to join E company, and were quickly killed. However I cannot make sense that the troopers would have a chased away their own horses to provide a distraction for the move towards the river. They would have deprived themselves of the only means of escape, it seems a very strange decision to me.
What do you guys think? What's the most common opinion about this issue among the forum veterans?
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 28, 2018 13:40:54 GMT -6
Hello BD.
What if E Company never even reached LSH and after being deployed on cemetery hill, they got chased into deep ravine. Just a few pointers; How many E Company men where found dead of LSH. They never gave up their horses because they and the horse holders got hit by attacks coming from behind.
Yan.
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Post by brahms4 on May 28, 2018 14:35:11 GMT -6
Custer Apollo, in part 35 of his series on YouTube,believes that Smith was badly wounded and Sturgis took over as commander of Company E and sent these soldiers down to open a corridor to reach several soldiers that still had live horses.Those horses would be used to be ridden to go get Reno and Benteen.These soldiers of Company E were eventually overwhelmed and scattered for what safety they could find in vain!
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Post by herosrest on May 28, 2018 16:40:27 GMT -6
There is quite some history to the mystery of that Company of men and nothing other than devoutly pragmatic confusion about them to this day. There were grey horses in every company with Custer. Cooke rode a white horse and so did Yates although we know that Pvt. Pickard was sent back to the pack train with it, shortly before the fight. Trumpeters with Custer rode greys supposedly although it is wrong to assume that Trumpeter Martin was on one. If memory serves me well, another of the trumpeters with Custer rode a dark grey. Three days after the fight, E Company were found in the ravine named 'H' by Maguire on his sketch map. H on the map indicates the ravine and not bodies. There have been a number of versions of the map. A sketch map by Benteen tends to corroborate Maguire's data. Lt. Bradley and Lt. Patterson Hughes stated that more than thirty horses lay dead with the cluster of men who died around Custer. RCoI testimomy by those who should have known, placed the bodies within a hundred yards of the river. It is apparent to me that from very early there has been confusion between Keogh's and Smith's clusters of dead and therefore the locations are further confused. Like it or not, Benteen and Reno both indicated a moving fight or rout and a number of other 7th Cavalry observers felt that it was a running or moving affair. In modern day, the Fox theory built upon this idea as disintegrations. Theree is record from hostiles that and a scout that the grey Company went to or near the river. Where that was is moot and the idea that these troops did not try to cross the river at Maguire's B or the lower Ford B remains a flavour which appeals to many because of relics and archaeology placing soldiers on ridges a mile away from the river at MTC and Deep Coulee. Sorry for a discourse that should go on and on, through, Sanderson, Gall and Godfrey, Roe, Sweet, Godfrey again, Curtis, Camp, Marquis, Kuhlman, Luce, Utley, Powell, Hutchins, Rickey, Green and numerous more contributions who know as little at the end as when they each rekindled debate. The serious fighting began with mounted attacks across Deep Coulee when hostiles pursued retreating soldiers. Amongst the warriors involved was Little Hawk and this action brought about the deaths of Lame White Man and Noisy Walking. This fighting ceased when the cavalry reined in and launched a fusilade of aimed gunfire at their assailants. There was a movement onto and along th e battle ridge by troops which was closely pursued and at its close the soldiers went out of sight. The best of the interviews done with hostile participants are those left by Grinnell. He spoke Cheyenne which was virtually unique, only matched to lesser degree by James McLaughlin with a Sioux wife and bi-lingual son. The few interviews which we have are consistent, for example Little Hawk and John (Young) Two Moons which tell the same story and underpin the later generations history which came from Stands in Timber and Peter Powell (Stone Forehead). The Grinnell stuff tempers and measures the Don Rickey take on Little Bighorn which has become so fashionable. Grinnell's work helps considerably to make sense of Two Moon's accounts of what went on. The Cheyennes won that fight with Custer and working that out will teach as much as can ever be understood. What happened to Company E? They were wiped out fighting a battle. It is impossible to understand how because the Sioux (Gall & Godfrey) accounts do not tally with the Cheyennes unless the grey horses ran away down Calhoun Coulee into Deep Ravine. Have fun.
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Post by herosrest on May 29, 2018 0:26:07 GMT -6
Since the Sweet Report of May 15th,1890; there has been penchant amongst visitors to the field of battle to speculate events of the victoriously Godawful 25th June 1876 by speculation with the grave markers. This form of study is feckless and fruitless but has produced some quite incredible theory with the crown of excellence going to Charles Kuhlman initially and passed along as succesive authors and historians' imaginations have left the nest of sanity. The basic premise underlying this inane form of developing the tacical fight is, this. Quote - ' On the lines held by Troop L, Calhoun and Crittenden, 38 men fell. On the West line, marched over by Troop E, Smith and Sturgis and T. Yates and Van Reily, either in column of fours, or from the left flank of the skirmish line, from near the extreme right of Calhoun’s line, which at that time was covering Custer’s rear, to near the Bug-Deep-Cut Ravine, and near where the final left flank of Troop E rested in said Ravine, only 13 men fell. From the head of Big-Deep-Cut Ravine and the extreme left of Smith’s line, as his body was found in the Custer group, probably 200 yards from his troop, it is probable that Lieut. Sturgis was left in command and there killed on his part of the field, and his body, with others, mutilated beyond the possibility of human recognition. From the top of the ridge, Smith’s center, to within about 200 yards of the Custer Group, the right of Smith’s line, 26 men fell, some of whom were from the left of Flank of Troop F. In the center group and at, and in the immediate, vicinity of the monument, 56 men fell, General Custer, Boston Custer and A.R.Reid, inclusive. This number includes the balance of Yates troop and several men of Troop C, Capt. Tom Custer and Lieutenant Harrington. This excerpt is taken from O.J. Sweet's report of decisive theory of the tactical fight which he outlined on the ground for service, nation and posterity. Absolutely no (none) markers were placed on ground upon which the later 'Stone House' Superintendents quarters were erected. The report is fundemental to understanding the Soldier marker placements and was lost to historians and students of the battle. When it was recovered is an interesting matter but one which to date has eluded the WSM and everyone else, to date. The Sweet Report's history is an important missing link in understanding subsequent historical review of the Custer fight. When did historians know what Sweet knew and did? Which historian's knew what he did and which didn't. It is a question of truly intellectual import and intrinsic to all study derived from or developedusing the soldier markers. Was there a South Skirmish Line and if there was, did it face West, East, North or South? Capt. Owen J. Sweet. 25th Infantry. Arguably, the modern students most important account of the battle.
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Post by battledetective on May 29, 2018 9:49:57 GMT -6
Thank you Herosrest. I have to digest this information. It seems indeed that there were many errors and confusion in the placements of grave markers. It seems also that the idea of the 29 missing bodies in Deep Ravine comes from a mistaken assumption by Lt Burkhardt in 1890, who confused the numbers of men who died in the overall battle with those who died on the Custer battlefield. The more I read about this battle the more confused I feel... Of course the confusion is mainly about the tactical details on the Custer battlefield, not the overall picture of the battle.
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Post by battledetective on May 29, 2018 10:02:04 GMT -6
Hello BD. What if E Company never even reached LSH and after being deployed on cemetery hill, they got chased into deep ravine. Just a few pointers; How many E Company men where found dead of LSH. They never gave up their horses because they and the horse holders got hit by attacks coming from behind. Yan. Yes, this is an obvious explanation. They could have been chased after being deployed to a position near Deep Ravine to suppress enemy fire, or could have made a desperate attempt to find cover in the ravine when it was clear that all was lost. The problem is then why A. Smith was found on LSH. Maybe he was wounded and was carried along with the HQ to be treated by the surgeon.
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Post by herosrest on May 29, 2018 10:42:42 GMT -6
Hi BatD What I put forth is a part of a part. Here's the rest. This is a chain from Benteen's decision in early 1879 that Custer did not approach the river to support Reno, to Godfrey & Gall in 1886; to Godfrey's 1892 account and map, on to Kuhlman's undertaking. Kuhlman synthesis based on his reasoning. Kuhlman's Research Map which helps make sense of his notes. Basically, this is a cummulative theory which incorporates what Sweet did in 1890, into a coherent book which stands up well to John S. Gray's later tombe based around Bouyer. Getting into this, is, never ending. Be well. Don't worry about John Stands in Timber yet.
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Post by battledetective on May 29, 2018 12:36:44 GMT -6
Kuhlman synthesis based on his reasoning.
Thanks, it will be an interesting reading!
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 29, 2018 13:37:50 GMT -6
BD, I would suspect that Custer ordering E Company to hold the cemetery position would be a logical choice at first, the position covers the river well and troops on this location could cover any withdrawal back south.
The problem with this position is that it is wide open and too large for a small company to hold for any length of time. I agree that the danger came from their flank or rear [or both], are you familiar with the story of the suicide boys? Apparently there were five or six markers on that location, which were moved when the built the cemetery plot.
I believe that these men were E Company horse holders who got attacked and were forced to let go of the company horses. That would have had a devastating effect on the rest of the company in skirmish order as pressure was beginning to mount all around them. Basically this company had only one way to run as Indians soon filled the void between them and F Company.
I have read some theories that say, that E Company could have been still active in their ravine position ** after LSH became unhealthy, and some of the survivors on LSH tried to join them, but this is all circumstantial.
** some say deep ravine and some say cemetery ravine, you can take you choice.
Yan.
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Post by herosrest on May 29, 2018 18:18:47 GMT -6
A general point following the strand of the history's history which I cobbled together. How did Sweet do what he did in 1890? There were a number of theories existing amongst the military which are defined today as clock and anti-clockwise movements, and combination of both. There were theories from Reno and Benteen and Patterson Hughes had a stab at it as well. Maguire indicated only the single line of march (B,D,E) by shod horses on his original map. How did Sweet arrive at his 'account' of the battle, which Godfrey accepted and which then became extant until Curtis made his investigations and the whole can of worms was variously re-opened. The blaming of Terry never went away although it was never front page and this kept the blame game alive whilst Patterson Hughes and Custer's widow drew breath. Doesn't help much with Sweet's medicine though. Terry died in 1890, I believe and it all kicked off again big time in national press by Patterson Hughes (then Colonel in the Advocates Office.... think W.A. Graham - later), after Terry's funeral service. At this point in time, Charles King got in on things with a quite brilliant assessment of the tactical fight and Cyrus Townend Brady provided a literary battleground for armchair generalship of the massacre and its blames. Still not on the money with Sweet though. Well, Nelson A. Miles conducted a quite thorough investigation of the battle in 1878, shortly before the RCoI and it is there for all to read in two chapters of his memoirs. He also produced a written report of his findings which is the 'Holy Grail'; together with his written request to sit upon any board of inquiry into the events of the battle. The report never saw light of day. linkRemember that Miles guarded Jefferson Davis at the end of ACW, and boy what a job he did. Quite a story that is.
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Post by noggy on May 31, 2018 7:11:30 GMT -6
In my mind, the easy way is to think E company maybe fought in two "platoons" with one being wiped out around LSH (on Cemetery Ridge and at the mouth of DR etc), and the second one retreating to LSH and then being the one mentioned by a lot of Indians as running down from the hill towards the end of the fighting and killed around the DR.
I wasn`t there, mind you, so I may be totally off.
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Post by herosrest on Jun 1, 2018 13:40:37 GMT -6
A lot of thought goes into this unit's fight. The neatly taken image here shows battle ridge at Little Bighorn - looking NNW at the monument, across the bendy windy 'wobbly' road which undulates across the apex surface of the good number of ravines and small hills which it transects. Here is a look at relic hunting in 2004. It would not have been simple or easy to grade that terrain to provide that road surface and it is a remarkable 'bit' of practical engineering. That aside, the image is particularly useful in showing that a number of small hills existed and the road was engineered to pass over them. Recent study of the terrain and new thinking about how 7th Cavalry's fight there went down, has brought about theory of the 'gap in Battle Ridge' through which Crazy Horse galloped to eliminate all hope for Keogh’s command. No disintegration but rather an immense collision of blunting forces. This is somewhat original, insightful, hopefully unique but quite basically doing a horse up a tree in ignoring particpant tradition. Not just any tradition either but the military one. There is a profound difficulty in reconciling the Sioux and Cheyenne participant accounts of the Custer fight. The issue centres, front, left and right at this supposed gap. It wasn't a gap. It was a dominating small hill. The army held it. We know this from Gall who imparted the information to Godfrey. Godfrey included the information to his map of the battle and told us also, where and what the soldiers on that hill - did. This has been a matter of record since 1892 and is perhaps the most difficult aspect of the fight to comprehend. E Company held and fought for 'Smith's Hill according to Godfrey and Gall. Detail from Godfrey's map. 1892. Some of the engineering to accomodate the road down near the river in MTC - linkLast Battle account
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Post by fred on Jun 2, 2018 9:08:53 GMT -6
I wasn`t there, mind you, so I may be totally off. ... you are. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by noggy on Jun 2, 2018 20:19:36 GMT -6
I wasn`t there, mind you, so I may be totally off. ... you are. Best wishes, Fred. I know I am. That`s why I`m here. All the best, Geir
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