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Post by benteen on Mar 26, 2018 12:29:34 GMT -6
Colonel Montrose,
I would like to ask you a question as a field grade Officer. The question is moot in present times as a commander is able to communicate with all his companies by radio. However, in Custers day commanders had to send runners to communicate with his company commanders (one of the worst was the message sent with Martini). So, would it not make sense for Custer to have given Keogh and Yates command of a battalion where rather than having to send 5 runners to each company he would only have to send 2. One to Keogh and the other to Yates and let them confer his orders to their commands. In fact Yates was probably close enough to him that he could tell him directly what he wanted from his 2 companies.
It would seem to me that it would be more efficient and less chance of a mix up. Certainly Custer would still be in overall command.
What do you think on this.
Be Well Dan
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Post by tubman13 on Mar 27, 2018 5:57:52 GMT -6
Dan,
Will has applied modern terminology to regimental preparedness in 1876, I think it confuses some. It should not as there is really nothing new here. The analytical eye and critical thinking would be the the same for the tasks required in that day. Slipshod management is slipshod management.
We can even move above the regimental level to attach planning flaws/blame, as Custer's managers new they were dealing with an absentee commander/manager. The military had several replacement parts available and did not act on their problem.
Regards, Tom
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Post by herosrest on Mar 27, 2018 6:18:23 GMT -6
Dan, Will has applied modern terminology to regimental preparedness in 1876, I think it confuses some. It should not as there is really nothing new here. The analytical eye and critical thinking would be the the same for the tasks required in that day. Slipshod management is slipshod management. We can even move above the regimental level to attach planning flaws/blame, as Custer's managers new they were dealing with an absentee commander/manager. The military had several replacement parts available and did not act on their problem. Regards, Tom This is an interesting aspect of the situation which Custer found himself embroiled in with the politics of the Administration which is somewhere and something that those serving definately should avoid. Had Terry not intervened on Custer's behalf, how would that then work with a replacement or sticking with senior subordinates in place. Merritt was given command of 5th Cavaley, promoted Colonel out of 9th Cavalry at the time of the battle and could have stepped in for Custer although I suspect that Crook might have had some thoughts on that. Reno and Benteen seem to have been reasonably comfortable with responsibility in Custer's absense.
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Post by montrose on Mar 29, 2018 7:43:45 GMT -6
Colonel Montrose, I would like to ask you a question as a field grade Officer. The question is moot in present times as a commander is able to communicate with all his companies by radio. However, in Custers day commanders had to send runners to communicate with his company commanders (one of the worst was the message sent with Martini). So, would it not make sense for Custer to have given Keogh and Yates command of a battalion where rather than having to send 5 runners to each company he would only have to send 2. One to Keogh and the other to Yates and let them confer his orders to their commands. In fact Yates was probably close enough to him that he could tell him directly what he wanted from his 2 companies. It would seem to me that it would be more efficient and less chance of a mix up. Certainly Custer would still be in overall command. What do you think on this. Be Well Dan A few years ago I wrote some essays on command and control using runners. At least when I went through, Fort Benning taught this, for when under radio silence or jamming. If I can find them, will repost. You have limited numbers of runners, and they take time to get to target and return. Remember, runners are not electrons, messengers can gather situational awareness at target, and bring that back. So the use of CSM Sharrow as a messenger was not just the message, but to get data to bring back. Martini was a carrier pigeon, clueless and gormless, who could deliver a message, but provide no useful data. Guy didn't even know his horse was shot, or that he was under fire, or who was shooting. Oh, and it was most likely friendly fire anyway, from LCN. You start with a plan, an operations order. The order minimizes need for runners. The more you change a plan, or never issue one as happened here, the more need for runners. The more you spread elements out, the more you need runners; and the longer it takes for them to deliver messages and return. And the more you scatter elements, the need for runners goes up exponentially. The 7th scattered into the 5 companies in the north, the Reno Bn, Benteen BN, McDougal Bn and scouts; a minimum of 9 moving parts. Without radio, you must plan ahead. Your plan must predict decision points, and predict when you need to send runners. Compare command and control at Rosebud to LBH. Custer ended up only able to command and control one company, E. He lost any ability to command and control his regiment. Crook showed how a competent officer acts. Bottom line: If you want to wing it, meaning little planning, maximum react to the situation; keep all elements close. This allows them to provide data to the decision making environment and receive fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) to react to this data. The worst thing to do is to scatter elements where data they obtain, you can not receive, and you can not send Fragos to anyone, anyway; even based on your faulty battlefield awareness. The US advantage in the Indian wars was our organizational ability between above individual level. Indians had individual and the mob. US has individual, company, battalion, regiment. So we had an organizational advantage, with a corresponding command and control at these levels. LTC Custer threw that away by incompetence. If you throw out organizational and C2 advantages, now you have individuals and a mob, where battle is a numbers fight. I can find no example where a US force did this 1866-1898 except this battle. Am I making sense here? Respectfully, William
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Post by benteen on Mar 30, 2018 15:48:14 GMT -6
Colonel Montrose, I would like to ask you a question as a field grade Officer. The question is moot in present times as a commander is able to communicate with all his companies by radio. However, in Custers day commanders had to send runners to communicate with his company commanders (one of the worst was the message sent with Martini). So, would it not make sense for Custer to have given Keogh and Yates command of a battalion where rather than having to send 5 runners to each company he would only have to send 2. One to Keogh and the other to Yates and let them confer his orders to their commands. In fact Yates was probably close enough to him that he could tell him directly what he wanted from his 2 companies. It would seem to me that it would be more efficient and less chance of a mix up. Certainly Custer would still be in overall command. What do you think on this. Be Well Dan A few years ago I wrote some essays on command and control using runners. At least when I went through, Fort Benning taught this, for when under radio silence or jamming. If I can find them, will repost. You have limited numbers of runners, and they take time to get to target and return. Remember, runners are not electrons, messengers can gather situational awareness at target, and bring that back. So the use of CSM Sharrow as a messenger was not just the message, but to get data to bring back. Martini was a carrier pigeon, clueless and gormless, who could deliver a message, but provide no useful data. Guy didn't even know his horse was shot, or that he was under fire, or who was shooting. Oh, and it was most likely friendly fire anyway, from LCN. You start with a plan, an operations order. The order minimizes need for runners. The more you change a plan, or never issue one as happened here, the more need for runners. The more you spread elements out, the more you need runners; and the longer it takes for them to deliver messages and return. And the more you scatter elements, the need for runners goes up exponentially. The 7th scattered into the 5 companies in the north, the Reno Bn, Benteen BN, McDougal Bn and scouts; a minimum of 9 moving parts. Without radio, you must plan ahead. Your plan must predict decision points, and predict when you need to send runners. Compare command and control at Rosebud to LBH. Custer ended up only able to command and control one company, E. He lost any ability to command and control his regiment. Crook showed how a competent officer acts. Bottom line: If you want to wing it, meaning little planning, maximum react to the situation; keep all elements close. This allows them to provide data to the decision making environment and receive fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) to react to this data. The worst thing to do is to scatter elements where data they obtain, you can not receive, and you can not send Fragos to anyone, anyway; even based on your faulty battlefield awareness. The US advantage in the Indian wars was our organizational ability between above individual level. Indians had individual and the mob. US has individual, company, battalion, regiment. So we had an organizational advantage, with a corresponding command and control at these levels. LTC Custer threw that away by incompetence. If you throw out organizational and C2 advantages, now you have individuals and a mob, where battle is a numbers fight. I can find no example where a US force did this 1866-1898 except this battle. Am I making sense here? Respectfully, William Colonel Montrose., Your response not only answered my question, but gave a lesson on military procedure. I appreciate it. By the way, your posts always make sense Be Well Dan
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 31, 2018 12:41:21 GMT -6
Hi Dan, Custer only had to contact his subordinate units in the shape of Reno's battalion, Benteen's battalion and the pack train, so really he only needed three couriers, and the battalion commanders had the means to deliver any new orders to their company commanders. The RHQ had a host of men under its wing including two trumpeters who acted as couriers, plus he used Sharrow at one point to get in touch with Benteen.
The five companies in his own battalion were in visual so they could respond to various signals or even verbal commands. The same could go for Reno and Benteen's battalions.
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Post by bosshawg on Apr 11, 2018 19:14:17 GMT -6
Grant’s orders to McClernand at Grand Gulf south of Vicksburg....”avoid separating your command so that it cannot support itself.” I have no military background but that seems like sound common sense advice. It is hard to understand why Custer did not follow what appears to be a basic rule.
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Post by herosrest on Apr 11, 2018 21:11:17 GMT -6
link to 1874 US Army Cavalry Tactics Manual. It seems that the tactical manual for cavalry was flawed.
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Post by herosrest on Apr 12, 2018 9:38:29 GMT -6
Here be a link to Infantry Tactics Double and Single Rank adapted to American Topography and Improved Fire-arms. 1874. I continue the hunt for an online offering (All pray - Amen ) of Uptons 1874 Cavalry tactics and it will come. Meanwhile - Behold
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Post by herosrest on Apr 12, 2018 9:59:28 GMT -6
I just thought to myself - Good Lord - when I realised that the disastrous tactics employed by 7th Cavalry at Little Bighorn in 1876, were still recommended and in use in....... 1944. Link to War Department Field Manual FM 2-30 - Cavalry Reconnaissance. It is, I feel, desperately important that the Pentagon check to be sure that such disastrous tactics have been banished from the modern military mindset. I'm guessing that it should be the Combined Arms Group, who should be alerted about this unfortunate matter, they have previously conducted thorough assessments of the attack undertaken by 7th Cavalry in the fight on Greasy Grass and have not red flagged the tactic of encirclements. Mind you, it did work for the Sioux and Cheyenne.
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Post by herosrest on Apr 12, 2018 10:23:07 GMT -6
Lessons in militaryness. Go figure!
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