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Post by herosrest on Mar 24, 2018 3:48:35 GMT -6
A plan where you divide your force, knowing you are meeting a numerically superior force, and sending two of them (including the strongest of the three) into unknown terrain letting the maybe weakest with the perhaps lest competent commanding officer as the only one advance at the enemy is a faulty one. I never did more than lead a squad, stepping in to take over as platoon leader a couple of weeks, but the entire approach of the 7th is something even I`d understand would be flawed/too risky. It gives way to chance and reduces the advantages one has. Tactics in them self can never be wrong, but they can be used wrong or at the wrong scenarios. Custer did just that. At least I think so. All the best, Noggy I don't disagree. Surviving company commanders felt the division of battalions to have been unfortunate and responsible for the setback. This tactic was however straight out of the manual, was recommended practice and failed for reasons unknown. The failure to communicate with the Reno battalion was unusual given the Major's expressed concern for enemy strength. Custer did react to what he found in the valley in bringing on both the Benteen battalion and reserve of ammunition and manpower escorting the supply column. Obviously, Custer trusted Reno to hold out until Benteen could advance across ford A and must have felt that there was no need to provide reassurance. The retreat from the valley jeopardised the companies downriver and the hostile Sioux and Cheyenne were able to capitalize on this by placing themselves between the two forces. The movement which Custer undertook along the eastern flank of the river should have brought the five companies commited to it, into battle in the valley. There is no reasonable explanation for this not taking place and we therefore get suppositional theory such as that by Gray as why the attack was delayed. Everything that is understood and popular about Custer indicates headlong charge across the river. Capturing hordes of women and childrren of the various tribes was a concern of the Sioux and Cheyennes but in the reality of that attack, is now as it would have been then, ridiculous. Custer dispersed his command and the enemy took advantage of this. Terry did the same thing and so did Sheridan. There were significant intelligence failures and particularly so, given both the length of time for communication and its arduous nature. It must have been truly 'gall'ing to Terry to receive despatches from Sheridan advising of the risk of what had actually happened. It isn't recognised that the Sioux leadership would have expected a military victory in 1876 to yield political compromises such as had been earnt before. I'm thinking here of the favourable outcome for the Sioux after the Fetterman fight and belligerence of Red Cloud's War. This aspect of Sioux psychology was, as far as I can discern, not contemplated let alone considered other than that the three columns should 'each' have been able to handle any situation which arose and support one another. It wasn't just Custer who got it wrong and yet his decision to attack once discovered was fully supported by Sheridan. That is, once in close proximity to the village and discovered - there was nothing else to do but launch an attack or see the village flee. The idea that marching further along the Rosebud on the 25th and almost certainly discovering Crook's battlefield, would have perfected Terry's plan is specious because the regiment had been detected in Davis Creek and would have been also in continuing along the Rosebud. There was no way to win. Crook found that out. So did Reno whose letter of July 4th, 1876 was highly critical of Terry and Gibbon for allowing the Sioux to escape and Custer for dividing the regiment and attacking at midday.
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Post by herosrest on Mar 24, 2018 4:01:17 GMT -6
The GtH instruction was concentrate on the packtrain and rearguard. The Ree scouts told of this to Libby in their narratives. In defeat, they were to retire on the supply depot although they may have misunderstood this.
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Post by montrose on Mar 24, 2018 4:05:04 GMT -6
Yan wrote, "Montrose, I agree with what you are saying, but would it be standard practice then for a regimental commander to separate his battalion into two smaller units in a combat zone? If Custer decided on his move north to change his formation enroute, would that be thinking out of the box by Custer? If he did separate his battalion into two and give one to Yates and the other to Keogh, would this be keeping with a commander who was thinking on the hoof? I suppose any commander could formulate any number of types of formation to deal with the mission or any threat that he came in contact with as you know well enough, that when in action things can dramatically change in a short period of time." Read more: lbha.proboards.com/thread/5351/mission-essential-task-list?page=5#ixzz5Aeq2n6MoOne of the challenges here is the term Battalion now means a permanent organization manned, trained and equipped to conduct multi company missions. The term in 1876 meant any combination of 2 or more companies to perform a specified task. This element could exist for one hour, or the length of a campaign. 1. Campaign. My point is that large expeditions of this era knew they needed intermediate command and control between the company and the expedition commander. The smart workaround was to form and train BNs in the prep phase, and maintain these BNs throughout the campaign. So instead of managing 20 separate companies, the commander manages 5 battalions, making command and control much easier. a. Battalions meant forming sub elements of 2 or more companies. Regiment affiliation and branch were irrelevant. BNs of this era routinely mixed companies form different regiments, and all three branches, infantry, cavalry and artillery. b. My main point is a battalion formed and trained in the prep phase; which is Jan 1976; will perform better than one created an hour ago, in enemy territory, in contact. 2. Tactics. You are addressing specific adjustments in contact with an enemy. AT this stage a commander can and will make micro adjustments based on local battlefield awareness. Of course these adjustments on battalions formed an hour ago means that the battalion commanders authority is zero, and ability to make independent decisions is zero. The battalion structure at LBH gets way too much attention. LTC Custer commanded the companies at LBH directly, it was regiment commander to 12 companies, and scouts, and trains. Then he placed himself out of command and control of all but one company. Weir should have been relieved of command and court martialed based on his performance at LBH. He was grossly insubordinate and ignored order after order after order. But he knew he could ignore any orders from battalion and regiment officers, since Custer ignored them. The command climate of the 7th was bad, very bad, unusual even in this army. Weir killed himself out of a sense of justice; too little, too late, I have actually seen a chicken running around with its head cut off, in SERE school. I didn't realize I was watching a reenactment of 7th Cav.
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Post by herosrest on Mar 24, 2018 4:10:23 GMT -6
Yan wrote, "Montrose, I agree with what you are saying, but would it be standard practice then for a regimental commander to separate his battalion into two smaller units in a combat zone? If Custer decided on his move north to change his formation enroute, would that be thinking out of the box by Custer? If he did separate his battalion into two and give one to Yates and the other to Keogh, would this be keeping with a commander who was thinking on the hoof? I suppose any commander could formulate any number of types of formation to deal with the mission or any threat that he came in contact with as you know well enough, that when in action things can dramatically change in a short period of time." Read more: lbha.proboards.com/thread/5351/mission-essential-task-list?page=5#ixzz5Aeq2n6MoOne of the challenges here is the term Battalion now means a permanent organization manned, trained and equipped to conduct multi company missions. The term in 1876 meant any combination of 2 or more companies to perform a specified task. This element could exist for one hour, or the length of a campaign. 1. Campaign. My point is that large expeditions of this era knew they needed intermediate command and control between the company and the expedition commander. The smart workaround was to form and train BNs in the prep phase, and maintain these BNs throughout the campaign. So instead of managing 20 separate companies, the commander manages 5 battalions, making command and control much easier. a. Battalions meant forming sub elements of 2 or more companies. Regiment affiliation and branch were irrelevant. BNs of this era routinely mixed companies form different regiments, and all three branches, infantry, cavalry and artillery. b. My main point is a battalion formed and trained in the prep phase; which is Jan 1976; will perform better than one created an hour ago, in enemy territory, in contact. 2. Tactics. You are addressing specific adjustments in contact with an enemy. AT this stage a commander can and will make micro adjustments based on local battlefield awareness. Of course these adjustments on battalions formed an hour ago means that the battalion commanders authority is zero, and ability to make independent decisions is zero. The battalion structure at LBH gets way too much attention. LTC Custer commanded the companies at LBH directly, it was regiment commander to 12 companies, and scouts, and trains. Then he placed himself out of command and control of all but one company. Weir should have been relieved of command and court martialed based on his performance at LBH. He was grossly insubordinate and ignored order after order after order. But he knew he could ignore any orders from battalion and regiment officers, since Custer ignored them. The command climate of the 7th was bad, very bad, unusual even in this army. Weir killed himself out of a sense of justice; too little, too late, I have actually seen a chicken running around with its head cut off, in SERE school. I didn't realize I was watching a reenactment of 7th Cav.
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Post by montrose on Mar 24, 2018 4:17:37 GMT -6
Hero wrote, "The movement which Custer undertook along the eastern flank of the river should have brought the five companies committed to it, into battle in the valley." Read more: lbha.proboards.com/posts/recent#ixzz5AexldrsAWow. I really mean wow. This is the most bat crap crazy post I have seen on these boards, which is mind boggling. LTC Custer ordered MAJ Reno to conduct an attack, as regiment advance guard, across Ford A and up the valley. The Regiment attack would have 3 companies up and 5 in support. Then without telling the advanced guard, the amateur and incompetent Custer did not support his main effort. Your claim that the Custer element supported the advanced guard is false, utterly untrue, and shows contempt for every fact, every account, every hint of evidence of this battle. Your devotion to the Custer Myth has overwhelmed any common sense, any rational thought, that can be applied to these boards.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 24, 2018 5:16:32 GMT -6
We have talked before about how the 7th were split up into company sized penny packets and spread out all over the shop serving in a constabulary role, but this would be counter productive when they are formed back together like they were before this campaign.
But the US Army had only twelve regiments of cavalry and such a large area to police, so I guess they had no alternative and had to play the hand they were dealt with, I would have thought that it would have been in the countries interest to have a larger ratio of cavalry to Infantry and train them all as dragoons.
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Post by herosrest on Mar 24, 2018 6:01:25 GMT -6
Hero wrote, "The movement which Custer undertook along the eastern flank of the river should have brought the five companies committed to it, into battle in the valley." Read more: lbha.proboards.com/posts/recent#ixzz5AexldrsAWow. I really mean wow. This is the most bat crap crazy post I have seen on these boards, which is mind boggling. LTC Custer ordered MAJ Reno to conduct an attack, as regiment advance guard, across Ford A and up the valley. The Regiment attack would have 3 companies up and 5 in support. Then without telling the advanced guard, the amateur and incompetent Custer did not support his main effort. Your claim that the Custer element supported the advanced guard is false, utterly untrue, and shows contempt for every fact, every account, every hint of evidence of this battle. Your devotion to the Custer Myth has overwhelmed any common sense, any rational thought, that can be applied to these boards. "The movement which Custer undertook along the eastern flank of the river should have brought the five companies committed to it, into battle in the valley." Very straight forward. Custer did not advise Reno that 5 companies would support him from the rear. This was clearly a failure to communicate in terms of what we know today. I understand that Custer had actually been a good communictor. Obviously he had a bad day. I don'y believe that the amateur and incompetent Custer was actually that in respect his role as Regimental CO in the field. He'd been doing it quite a long time. I didn't claim anything about actual support, it was found wanting on several occaisions that day. I'm sure that Keogh and Yates would have been grateful of support and knowing where the rest of the regiment was. They were obviously having the same difficulties with Custer as Reno and Benteen. I stated (not claimed) that the five companies were intended to attack across the river into the valley. You don't seem to realise this. I assume that you believe tat the five companies were sight seeing. The Custer Myth is not a bad read although Graham, like Hughes, both advocates, seems a li'l whacky and obsessed.
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Post by herosrest on Mar 24, 2018 6:22:22 GMT -6
FAL provided barracks for 6 companies of Cavalry persuant to policy at the time of its construction. Thus it wasn't ideal for reconstituting a fighting regiment on recombination and it doesn't seem that much actually happened in this respect until Custer returned in the April, I think it was. I believe that this was touched upon by others.
Custer would certainly have been frustrated at being called away to become involved in scandals and undermining PotUS and it is as likely as not that his senior subordinates might have expected him not to return after being arrested. It was perhaps unfortunate that Terry did not discuss his appeal for the return of Custer with Reno. I'm sure that things would have gone very much better with Reno at the helm.
Custer had, with Merritt rising to Colonel of 5th Cavalry, become the army's senior Lt. Col. and was thus bound for his own regiment as soon as the next regimental commander retired or expired. Of course, at the precise time of the battle, up to one third of the cavalry and certainly two of its regiments were authorised to be disbanded with the mandated force restucturing. I'm sure that Grant would have found something for Custer - off the Barabary Coast perhaps.
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Post by tubman13 on Mar 24, 2018 6:40:11 GMT -6
HR, a couple of things. Custer was called before the house predicated upon the information he was feeding his friends in the press and his very solid relationships with Democrat members of the House. He wanted this. He had been partying in New York and looking for patronage(money and opportunities).
Ft Rice built in the 1860's became a sub fort to FAL and was administered by a Major, I think Tilford, who was the regiments senior Major. Although the fort was designed for four companies of infantry, it was later modified to accommodate several companies of the 7th US Cavalry. While the average garrison was 235 men, troops ranged from a high of 357 in 1874 to a low of 61 in 1878. Throughout the history of the fort, the soldiers guarded against Indian attacks. From time to time companies were detached for Reconstruction duties and Boundary support duties.
Regards, Tom
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Post by herosrest on Mar 24, 2018 6:57:27 GMT -6
I believe that there was a presence also at Abercrombie. I seem to have stirred hatreds of Custer which is unfortunate and odd to me, since the guy was a hero who gave his life for his flag but this battle is as devisive today as was ACW 150 years ago. General. I was hoping to hunt up an online source for Judge Advocate Graham's Custer Myth which 'M' referred to but no luck. I have got his (WAG) battle story (1926) with intro by Charles King and foreward by Edgerley. Custer's last fight". I quote Edgerley, on Graham. "In saying, "The chief cause of disaster was unquestionably the lack of correct information as to the numbers, the organization, and the equipment of the Indians," he hit the nail squarely on the head; for if these things had been known, General Terry would not have divided his command at the mouth of the Rosebud, nor would General Custer have made two divisions of his regiment, one fifteen miles from the village and the other when the village was about two miles away. The idea that the Indians would try to escape was general in the Seventh Cavalry on the morning of June 25, and the first division was made in order to catch them in whatever direction they might run. General Custer undoubtedly believed they were running away when he decided to move down the right flank of the river and attack on the flank instead of following in Reno's rear."] It's an important book for the unfortunate timeline which Graham introduced and much else such as the map indicating where Varnum saw the Gray Horse troops. Enjoy. The map given at page 40 perpetuates the myth that that map was Maguire's when in fact it was not and was nothing to do with Maguire. I attach copy of Maguire's battle map date July 2nd 1876 and sent with his report dated July 10th, 1876 to St. Paul and traced there by Maj. Gillespie.
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Post by crzhrs on Mar 24, 2018 8:00:57 GMT -6
<"The chief cause of disaster was unquestionably the lack of correct information as to the numbers, the organization, and the equipment of the Indians . . .>
That was stated in hindsight.
The fact of the matter was Custer (and most of the military) didn't care about any of that. Their concern was that the Indians would escape before being found.
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Post by crzhrs on Mar 24, 2018 13:51:44 GMT -6
<He did have a plan and it failed>
It was a plan in name only. It was more plan as you go.
Custer's "plans" for Benteen was to go to one valley after another and engage Indians. The plan didn't indicate how soon or later Benteen was to find Indians but to keep on going until he did.
Custer's "plans" for Reno was to charge fleeing Indians and bring them to battle and he would be supported.. The plans didn't indicate just where the Indians were or what direction they were running.
Since Custer changed his "plans" to support Reno we have no idea what his next "plans" were.
Sometimes the "the best-laid plans of mice and men often go awry" . . . and Custer's "plan" turned out to be more than just going awry.
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Post by herosrest on Mar 24, 2018 17:06:48 GMT -6
I don't believe that an established opinion exists with regard to why Custer moved ⅝ of his available strength to Ford B. But we do know from participants that he did this after viewing the village in the valley from the bluffs through binoculars borrowed from Lt. DeRudio with Trumpeter Martin beside him before Reno's companies began their advance in the valley. We know precisely where Custer, with Martin beside him, looked into the valley from the bluffs. The are several investigations which offer this same information but the best of it was from Benteen which was obtained from Trumpeter Martin. Benteen marked this as 'G' on his map of the battle. Custer rode back to the five companies and held a discussion with the officers present. These companies then progressed along the bluffs to be sighted by Varnum as he dismounted in the valley. As the five companies moved along the bluffs, Sgt. Kanipe was sent back with instructions for the pack train and McDougall leading the rearguard company. Sgt. Kanipe was sent back to McDougall before Varnum dismounted in the valley and saw the grey horse troopers on the bluffs. At that stage of events Custer had seen the village and this was told of by his orderley trumpeter. At that stage of events Custer decided to march east of the river and make a crossing into the valley from lower up the river. The point from which Custer viewed the river was marked 'G' on Benteen's map and when he was there the village was quiet and undisturbed. When Varnum looked up and saw the Company E horses on the bluffs, the village was in alarm, Reno had discovered the whole Sioux nation waiting to entertain him and the pack train and its attendants were at and closing on the watering place which the Benteen battalion had just departed. Sgt. Kanipe spotted Benteen's battalion at this time and rode to meet them and on the way he was passed by some Ree scouts driving stolen Sioux ponies. Trumpeter Martin would have been well on his way to find Benteen by the time Kanipe met Benteen. There were a series of decisions by Custer which we know led to disaster for the troops riding with him. From what we actually know rather than have to surmise, five companies were taken north and a message sent to the pack train and rearguard. A message was then sent to Benteen from Medicine Tail Coulee. In MTC Custer understood that Benteen was urgently required urgently. From there on, the mystery exists as to why the five companies did not cross the Little Bighorn river and fight in the valley. No one has ever explained this.
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Post by herosrest on Mar 26, 2018 8:27:10 GMT -6
HR, a couple of things. Custer was called before the house predicated upon the information he was feeding his friends in the press and his very solid relationships with Democrat members of the House. He wanted this. He had been partying in New York and looking for patronage(money and opportunities). Ft Rice built in the 1860's became a sub fort to FAL and was administered by a Major, I think Tilford, who was the regiments senior Major. Although the fort was designed for four companies of infantry, it was later modified to accommodate several companies of the 7th US Cavalry. While the average garrison was 235 men, troops ranged from a high of 357 in 1874 to a low of 61 in 1878. Throughout the history of the fort, the soldiers guarded against Indian attacks. From time to time companies were detached for Reconstruction duties and Boundary support duties. Regards, Tom Concern with Grant's Administration was broad and included significant Republicans afraid of exactly what happened, happening. The scandals undermined Grant and the Democrats his policy of reconstruction. Besides Custer's discovery of the grain scandal, Fort Rice was investigated by an undercover reporter put in place by the Bismarck Tribune with Custer's knowledge. There was serious impetus to basically demolish the Army and save the expense and that came to pass as the expeditions were in the field. 7th Cavalry's disaster turned that around in its tracks. So.... Custer the Martyr? Very bad things were going on. Passing along, I bring up the matter of impetus and the rashness of Custer in attacking the unknown. Camp Powder River June 8, 1876 My Dear Wife, I received your letter today and was glad to hear from you and them little children. I was a great deal troubled about it, that I didn’t get no letter from you. I am all right if I only know that you and them children are all well. We are 250 miles from Lincoln on the Powder River but we don’t see a sign of an Indian but we expecting every day to meet with them. We had terrible bad weather and a terrible snow storm the first and second June. The Command is stopping here on Powder River and resting two days. We are going to leave here in the morning 5 o’clock for the Yellowstone. The ration [sic] are running out very near, and so we have to hurry to get to the Yellowstone. Myself and Hageman and Weis got some antelopes[sic] meat from them Indian Scouts, but had to pay $2 for a quarter of it. I spended [sic] already $8 for eating. General Tarry [sic] said if we get Sitting Bull and his tribe soon, then we are going home, but if we don’t, we will stay three months and hunt for him. I wish for mine part we would meet him tomorrow. Serg Botzer and me came to the conclusion, it is better anyhow to be home and baking flapjacks, when we get home we will pay up for this and bake flapjacks all the time. Dear Lizze I cannot forget Harry. I don’t know how it is but he is in my min [sic] all the time, and sometime I worry a great deal about him. The best thing for you to do is to go to the carpenter and get him to make a fraling fenz rows (German) and don’t forget to send for that tombstone, for we don’t know [sic] if we got any time to spare after we get back again. Take good care of yourself and Hetty and Charly and don’t forget Your Husband And wrighth [sic] to me when [sic] ever you get a change, [sic] for I am lonely her [sic] to hear from You. Serg Botzer, Hagemann, Weis, Serg Fortny, others and very near the hole [sic] Camp Send their best regards to You and Hetty and Charly. I for myself send my love And a Kiss to You and one to Hetty and Charly. My best Regards to Mrs. Hughes And her Children and to Klein and Mrs Klein and Mrs James and to Serg Loyd, Lawler and Luther. I remain Your True and Loving Husband. Henry C. Dose Trumpeter Troop G 7 Cavalry. Note - Henry C. Dose, a Trumpeter in Company G, was killed with the Custer Battalion June 25, 1876 during the Battle of the Little Big Horn. Born in Holstein, Germany, his previous occupation was artificer. He enlisted for the second time on February 1, 1875 at age 25 in Shreveport, LA. He had gray eyes, brown hair, fair complexion, and was 5’6” tall. He left a widow Elizabeth, and his two children Hattie and Charles. Courtesy of John A. DoernerThe broad expectation amongst the military was that they would get the job ddone and the sooner the better if they could just hunt the Red Devil's down. That attitude was pervasive and is apparent right to the moment of deployment in Little Bighorn valley. Some doubts set in then. Esprit de corp and morale were good and high.
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Post by herosrest on Mar 26, 2018 9:00:06 GMT -6
Anysways......... lovely item here on the period frontier militaryness, Military organization is an evolving system. Lifted - On the occasion of all or most of a Regiment being in the field and a few companies were assigned some specific mission, the Regimental commander would designate the detachment as a BATTALION. The Battalion might operate for a few hours or a few weeks as a self-contained separate entity with its own staff, supply and support personnel. Lifted - The men who effectively ran the company size units were SERGEANTS. The sergeant with by far the greatest power in the unit was the FIRST SERGEANT. His survival instincts, military record, reputation and perhaps physical strength were prime criteria for this lofty and formidable designation. He was aided by as many as five regular sergeants, second, third etc. Most training, discipline, tradition and esprit de corps were these sergeant’s responsibilities, always under close guidance of the First Sergeant. Hmmmm....... I have a question about reprimand for indiscipline. One of the scout brothers with 7th Cavalry was punished for firing a revolver in camp, at snakes. That was Robert - I think. He missied the battle in being detailed to carry despatches and later stretched the truth about this somewhat. Now, he was made to stand on one leg upon a barrel and I wondered two things. How is it done? How long for?
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