|
Post by benteen on Feb 28, 2018 18:52:13 GMT -6
The regiment were sufficiently competent to close undetected, on the largest gathering of Sioux which ever took place on the Great Plains. They were confident enough in their officers to follow their orders and attack that almighty host. What have I missed? HR, I believe the Indians knew where these soldiers were from the time they left the PRD. What they didn't know is what the soldiers were going to do. When Reno attacked they were ready for him, and rode out to attack him. The soldiers were in no way undetected. Be Well Dan
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Feb 28, 2018 19:33:47 GMT -6
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Mar 1, 2018 0:26:37 GMT -6
The regiment were sufficiently competent to close undetected, on the largest gathering of Sioux which ever took place on the Great Plains. They were confident enough in their officers to follow their orders and attack that almighty host. What have I missed? Nonsense. The Indian command and control was a train wreck. The Indians lack of knowledge of enemy activity was because they had no scout organization, nor any C4ISR. HR, based on your previous posts, you know better: or you should. Respectfully, William
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Mar 1, 2018 9:07:25 GMT -6
The proximity/location and rough size of military units on Tongue, Yellowstone, Bighorn and Rosebud were known by Elders and they were not worried on tthe 25th. So, there was obviously some element of C & C at play.There was a decision on the morning of the 25th, not to move downriver. That changed later in the day but the move was only for the couple of miles which gave rise to the 5 mile camp signature on the ground. The hostiles were sufficiently aware of Terry's column to avoid it because of the guns which spoke twice; having mistaken machine guns for shell lobbers. The Sioux were not keen to face artillery and disliked tangling with infantry units and left Terry and Gibbon alone, although the 2nd Cavalry were baited during the advance to Camp Buffalo (as I refer to it). The Sioux and Cheyenne were not worried about the troops on the morning of the 25th because there had been no dawn attack on the 25th.
That was what was expected and was in fact what was intended before 7th Cavalry's discovery of discovery. Custer's decision to attack at once, as Reno put it - with the hostiles on the qui vive, took Camp Buffalo by surprise. The Sioux response was basic and simple... Ugh! One Bull was sent out to parley and Reno greeted him with lead. Some of the Chiefs stated later, that they were ready to surrender before the firing started. Sitting Bulls fave horse was killed, you know. There is some confusion about whether he was there or not but that is easily explained. A daylight or lunchtime attack was not expected by the Sioux and brought about panic, confusion and lots of dust as the pony herds ahead of Reno's advance were run into the camp.
You are quite right that tribal organisation was chaotic. They were warlike people but were not militaristic - if that makes sense.
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Mar 1, 2018 13:12:04 GMT -6
Re: Braden's "report": He stated "every man an old soldier . . . filled by men . . . who had served in the South."
That's not quite like serving in the Indian War Zone and/or had experience fighting Indians.
Custer had experienced fighting Indians and that didn't quite work out for him, so I assume those "every man an old soldier" would have done even worse!
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Mar 1, 2018 13:18:58 GMT -6
>You are quite right that tribal organisation was chaotic. They were warlike people but were not militaristic - if that makes sense>
I think the soldiers at the LBH weren't exactly warlike but also were not militaristic either(the US has never been a warlike country)That proved true at the LBH.
It looked like the warlike people (Indians) actually were more warlike!
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Mar 1, 2018 13:34:55 GMT -6
I'm glad we've cleared this up.
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Mar 1, 2018 16:47:57 GMT -6
I'm glad we've cleared this up. What did we clear up? The military was lacking in experienced manpower, especially enlisted men and the Indians had enough warriors with loads of experience in all kinds of combat, man-to-man, long-distance sniping, with wild melees as their choice of operation, which for some reason the 7th obliged them!
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Mar 2, 2018 6:25:38 GMT -6
I'm glad we've cleared this up. What did we clear up? The military was lacking in experienced manpower, especially enlisted men and the Indians had enough warriors with loads of experience in all kinds of combat, man-to-man, long-distance sniping, with wild melees as their choice of operation, which for some reason the 7th obliged them! Well, the hostiles were aggressive uncivilised baby killers and the soldiers were peace loving virgins who were cruelly used and horribly done in for no good reason.
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Mar 2, 2018 6:59:26 GMT -6
Hero,
Your last comment is out of line. Please delete it. Crazy asked a serious question, treat him with dignity and respect.
Not sure what is going on with proboards, I have 3 posts on this thread that sem to have disappeared. Hopefully, this one shows up.
Sigh one MIA was a 3 page essay, need to learn to save these things before I post. Lol, and I spent 2 days wondering why no one answered.
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Mar 2, 2018 7:39:59 GMT -6
I do not accept that humour is 'out of line' or that it is not understood. The post was flagged humerous. Drop this criticism, please. I have no idea about absent posts. The reply 'create post' function should save a draft of comment which is interupted before 'create post' is pressed. It is offered in study of this battle that the troops were ill prepared, that is, inexperienced and poorly trained. That is not true. It is not true of officers, NCO's, or the ranks. The majority of recent recruits were unmounted and left behind. Deadwood, in the sense of shirkers, malingerers and those approaching discharge and married men, would be expected to be amongst those serving the compant pack trains. Like it or not, Thompson (and Watson with him) did their best to rejoin their companies. Indications which we have, for the march of the 25th, indicate good morale and confidence. There were problems with deployment and tactics in the valley fight. I believe this is an honest assessment and particularly with the insight available from testimony given during French's courtmartial. We do not know what took place east of the river and north of Weir. It is wrong to blame the consequences of overwhelming enemy strength 'and' firepower, on an idea that those five companies could not fight and were unprepared *. As long as the ranks followed orders, no fault or blame is due them. An early participant account by one of the hostile leaders indicated that the officers were singled out for early attention. Early participant record of the fighting indicates a failure to keep the Indians at bay - a failure of firepower, and destruction in hand to hand fighting. The odds may have been as high as 20 to 1 and the fighting was piecemeal. No one in the field with Terry expected to bump the numbers of fighting men which materialised. Crook had some idea of what was going on and this is an interesting read about one of his messengers linkThe long and short of the outcome at LBH, was a serious and urgent political review of Grant's policy and - change. Grant was history at this time and rightly so, imho, as the country put ACW behind it and moved on. He (PoTUS) was mired in controversy and the continuing risks of REBELLION. Source Annual reports of the War Department. 1976-1877 v.1. p 3-19 Quote - 'By the act of March 1, 1875, the President was authorized to make and publish regulations for the government of the Army, in accordance with existing laws. A set of regulations was drawn up under this act and was in course of consideration when, by resolution of August 15, 1876, the President was requested " to postpone all action in connection with the publication of said regulations until after the report of said commission shall have been received and acted on by Congress at its next session." In accordance with this resolution the draught of the regulations has been submitted to this commission for consideration in connection with other matters brought to its attention, and no further action has been taken for their promulgation.' * This is one criticism which can be studied with participant evidence, relating to the valley fight. Appendix - Link to Court Martial Case Files QQ-994,’‘ Captain Thomas Henry French,‘‘ 1879 (entry 15); Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Army), 1792-2010, Record Group 153; National Archives and Records Administration - (Washington, DC). Link to comment on hostile strength, by scout Girard.
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Mar 2, 2018 9:42:07 GMT -6
I took the "what did we clear up?" response as being facetious so I wasn't offended.
As far as what did we clear up . . . the military of 1876 was not the same military of the Civil War era with far less experienced officers/men with not a lot of experience fighting Indians, let alone wandering around in the West. They needed guides, scouts, lots of supplies to feed the men/horses, etc. Budgets were cut and so was military strength.
Many times the Indians won battles more often than the military could explain . . . in the end it wasn't so much that the military defeated the Indians . . . the fact of the matter was the White Race overwhelmed the Indians.
Man-for-man the Indian Warrior was far superior in combat than the average soldier . . . however, hand-to-hand combat may win you some battles but it won't win you wars.
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Mar 2, 2018 10:34:18 GMT -6
I hunted up Stanley Vestal's take on it which is the first couple of pages here. Broadly agreeing the inferiority of the military. Of course, lessons were learnt and strategy evolved. I will say over, that the 7th Cavalry troopers were not deficient or unfit for purpose. They were beaten and subsequent engagements showed the U.S. Army to be competent and able to fulfil its mission on the Plains. I quote from Greene *, 'It is as I have told Long Hair: this gathcring of the enemy tribes is too many for us. But he will not believe me. He is bound to lead us against them. They are not far away; just over this ridge, they are all encamped and waiting for us. Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull are not men-without-sense; they have their scouts out, and some of them surely have their eyes upon us. Well, tomorrow we are going to have a big fight, a losing fight. Myself, I know what is to happen to me; my sacred helper has given me warning that I am not to see the sunset of tomorrow's sun. Bloody Knife's prophecy prevails and he along with 260 other men were killed. Jackson's account is important because it sheds light on the military reaction to overwhelming odds and the consequences of Custer's miscalculation.' Nelson A. Miles successfully ended the conflict by systematically surprising the Indians while they slept, burning lodges and depriving them of food and shelter. The tribes were defeated by an overpowering military, willing to press the country's resolve to end the conflict and remove the Indians. There were too many Indian's at Little Bighorn. They did not run away. They were able to engage in detail. * Battles and Skirmishes of the Great Sioux War, 1876-1877: The Military View. J
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Mar 2, 2018 11:08:14 GMT -6
Because inferior numbers of US Troops were subsequently able to hold their own against numerically superior hostiles forces, it is perfectly reasonable to examine the tactical fight at Greasy Grass. This was done, by Sheridan in 1876. Perhaps the best ever description of events was provided by Godfrey who was often over the field and instrumental in the confusions which reign today. His unpublished MAP of the battle is instructive, as also the most excellent publication of his Field Diary. A full view (online) is here.
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Mar 2, 2018 12:42:06 GMT -6
<Of course, lessons were learnt and strategy evolved>
As late as 1876 when Indian warfare was in the mopping up stages, strategies should have evolved by then. Dividing forces without fully knowing how strong you opponent is showed the military, Custer anyway, didn't evolve.
Some of the military's greatest victories were when they could attack a sleeping village . . . doesn't take a lot of strategy to do that. Custer did catch the LBH village by surprise (unfortunately for him it was a mid-afternoon attack rather than a dawn attack) but the 7th failed to take advantage of that and the Indians were the ones to overcome their surprise and turn the tables on the 7th.
Most subsequent battles won by the military afterward was being able to hit Indian Villages at dawn, especially after the large LBH camp broke up into smaller camps per their usual way of life.
|
|