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Post by montrose on Feb 27, 2018 7:37:53 GMT -6
1. Background Apply Battle Focused Analysis (BFA) of LBH to determine the mission essential task list for the campaign. This allows insight into the preparation and training status of the 7th for this campaign. It will be compared to other campaigns of this era, to see how the 7th compared to the rest of the 1876 Army.
2. Battle Focused Analysis. I am not going to put you through the modern BFA; it can be painful. I am simply going to summarize it allow us to get to the essential tasks the 7th would need to perform.
3. The campaign plan. The Dakota Department would launch 2 columns from opposite ends of the Yellowstone River. When they met a depot would be constructed as a base and a mobile column would use this base to launch an attack on any elements identified during this phase.
The 7th would use a wagon train for the movement to the depot, then a mule train for the strike phase. Companies on reconstruction duty would return for the campaign. Each column was responsible for recruiting civilian and Indian auxiliaries.
The 7th clearly intended to be the main effort. Their template for tactical operations envisioned a converging attack by several battalions, separating during the approach phase and meeting on the objective, used at Washita and by many other units of this era.
4. What essential tasks must the 7th Cavalry Regiment perform?
a. Operate a wagon train during the approach phase.
b. Operate a mule train during the strike phase.
c. Conduct an independent movement to contact in the strike phase, then attack and defeat any enemy found.
d. Organize and command auxiliaries for scouting, interpreting, guides and combat operations.
e. Organize and train Battalions for the tasks of movement to contact.
e (1) Reminder. The term Battalion has a different meaning to modern forces than the 1876 Army. It is a permanent, standing organization with a battalion commander selected by a board to find the best and brightest of that year group. The headquarters and headquarters company for a battalion is as large or larger than the maneuver companies.
e(2) The 1876 battalion was a task force. It was any combination of 2 or more companies to accomplish any task. This combination of companies was not limited to units in same regiment, you could link any branch and regiment. The general rule used throughout this era was to form the battalions for a given campaign during the preparation phase, and maintain these entities for the entire campaign. The 7ths failure to do this is very unusual. I can't think of a single campaign that didn't do this, unless it was forced by companies being added or subtracted during the campaign.
f. Organize and train Battalions for the task of operating as an independent element in a converging attack.
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Post by montrose on Feb 27, 2018 19:30:02 GMT -6
Waiting for folks to comprehend intent, ready to make this interesting.
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 28, 2018 6:38:40 GMT -6
Montrose, it is already interesting, my comprehension may be lacking. I will, however throw some stuff and see what sticks
Your list above belies what was done by the management team/command structure of the 7th Cavalry accomplished. Mules/horses Sturgis. Training, Custer missing in action NY then DC. What was Reno Doing, Tilford as well? When was I company returned from reconstruction duty?
Officers on either detached duty or leave: Lt. Bell D Lt Braden L Lt Craycroft B Lt Eckerson L Lt Garlington H Capt. Hale K Capt. Isley E Lt Jackson F Lt Larned F Maj. Merrill Staff Lt Nave I Lt Nowland QM Capt. Sheridan L Col. Sturgis Staff Maj. Tilford Staff Capt.Tourtellotte G
I understand the staff, the others not so much. There were an equal number of NCO's elsewhere.
You know that a team needs to practice together before the games start to count.
Incompetence and collusion conspired to make not only the 7th and Montana Column to fail and Crook as well. Intelligence was poor and best case communication did not exist.
The incompetence went above Custer, Crook, and Gibbon.
Grant should have stuck to his guns, regarding Custer. Loose cannon rule. You have seen it at work.
There is much here and it could be studied in depth.
After the battle there was no proper debrief.
Regards, Tom
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 28, 2018 6:47:05 GMT -6
By the way, I know you never say it in your time in the Military, but there were many self serving interests at work here,
Regards, Tom
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Post by herosrest on Feb 28, 2018 9:52:16 GMT -6
Much of what there was to learn, was, and fully reported before years end for inclusion to reports of the Cheif of Engineers and Secretary of War for Congress and PoTUS.
1. I'll borrow from official record, with the caveat that miltary forces in the field against hostiles during the summer of 1876, were staffed and led by some of the most experienced and able officers on the planet at that time with all of whom were far beyond novice status in combat. Despite this there existed a universal dread of falling into enemy hands and this psychology of Indian fighting is little considered.
Quote - This expedition (of March - J.J. Reynolds fight) was not conclusive or satisfactory.* Therefore, General Sheridan determined to proceed more systematically by concentric movements, similar to those which in 1874-'75 had proved so successful at the south against the hostile Comanches, Kiowas, and Cheyennes. He ordered three distinct columns to be prepared to move to a common center, where the hostiles were supposed to be, from Montana, from Dakota, and from the Platte. The two former fell under the command of the department commander, General Terry, and the latter under General Crook. These movements were to be simultaneous, so that Indians avoiding one column might be encountered by another, but up to that date the military authorities were bound to assume that the peaceful or treaty Indians were at the agencies, and that either of these three columns could not encounter more than the hostiles, estimated by the Indian Bureau at 500 warriors, or by anybody at the time at more than 800 warriors.
General Crook started from Fort Fetterman on the 29th of May with two battalions of the Second and Third Cavalry, under Lt. Col. W.B.Royall, Third Cavalry, and a battalion of five companies of the Fourth and Ninth Infantry, under Major Alex. Chambers of the Fourth Infantry, (now lieutenant-colonel Twenty-first,) with a train of wagons, pack-mules, and Indian scouts, all amounting to 47 officers and 1.002 men present for duty.
This expedition marched by the same route as the preceding one, to a point on Goose Creek, which is the head of Tongue River, a tributary of the Yellowstone.
Here General Crook parked his trains, mounted his infantry on mules, and, June 16, started on a scout to the head of Rosebud, also a tributary of the Yellowstone. In descending the Rosebud early on the day of June 17 he encountered a large force of warriors perfectly prepared for battle. He was aiming for their village, supposed to be about 8 miles down the Rosebud, but these Indians had not awaited the attack at their village, but had come out boldly and had attacked General Crook's command. The fight was on both banks of the Rosebud, and lasted into the night, when the Indians withdrew, leaving thirteen dead warriors. General Crook's loss was nine dead and twenty-one wounded—one of these, Captain Guy V. Henry, Third Cavalry, was shot through the face. The ground where this fight took place was so roughly covered with rocks, trees, and bushes—that it was impossible to estimate approximately the force of the enemy; but General Crook was satisfied that the numbers and quality of his enemy required more men than he had, and, being already encumbered with wounded, he concluded to return to his train on Goose Creek, which he reached on the 19th, and sent back for re-enforcement.
Meantime Col. John Gibbon, Seventh Infantry, with a force of about 450 men, composed of the Second Cavalry and Seventh Infantry, had marched from Fort Ellis, in Montana, down the valley of the Yellowstone, to meet General Terry, who, at the same time, was substantially ascending the same valley. The latter, (General Terry,) with the Seventh Cavalry, under its lieutenant-colonel, Custer, containing 600 men and horses and about 400 infantry, had started from Fort Abraham Lincoln on the 17th of May, following westward the route passed over by the Seventh Cavalry the previous summer, reached the Yellowstone, at the mouth of Powder River, on the 9th of June, where, by appointment, he met steamboats, (the river being navigable,) and here he established a supply camp. Resuming his march along the south bank, he reached the mouth of Rosebud on the 21st, having steamboats in the river accompanying his march. Near this point he came in communication with Colonel Gibbon, whose command was left at the mouth of the Big Horn, and determined in person to continue on to the same place, but to detach the Seventh Cavalry by a circuit to the Upper Rosebud and a tributary of the Big Horn, where all his command, embracing that of Colonel Gibbon, was to meet on a day appointed. Now, up to this moment, there was nothing official or private to justify an officer to expect that any detachment could encounter more than 500, or, at the maximum, 800 hostile warriors.
The terrible calamity that befell Lieutenant-Colonel Custer's column makes it important to adopt exact official language, and I give General Terry's exact words, under date of June 27: 'It is my painful duty to report, that day before yesterday, the 25th instant a great disaster overtook General Custer and the troops under his command. At 12 o'clock of the 21st instant he started with his sleeper's regiment and a strong detachment of scouts and guides from the mouth of the Rosebud. Proceeding up that river about twenty miles he struck a very heavy Indian trail, which had previously been discovered, and pursuing it, found that it led, as it was supposed it would lead, to the Little Big Horn River. Here he found a village of almost unlimited extent, and at once attacked it with that portion of his command which was immediately at hand. Major Reuo, with three companies (A, G, and M) of the regiment, was sent into the valley of the stream at the point where the trail struck it. General Custer, with five companies. (C, E, F, I, and L,) attempted to enter about three miles lower down. Reuo forded the river, charged down its left bank, and fought on foot until finally, completely overwhelmed by numbers, he was compelled to mount and recross the river, and seek a refuge on the high bluffs which overlook its right bank. Just as he recrossed, Captain Canteen, who, with three companies, (D, H, and K,) was some two miles to the left of Reuo when the action commenced, but who had been ordered by General Custer to return, came to the river, and rightly concluding that it was useless for his force to renew the fight in the valley, he joined Reuo on the bluffs. Captain McDougall, with his company, (B,) was, at first, some distance in the rear with a train of pack-mules; he also came up to Reuo.
Soon this united force was nearly surrounded by Indians, many of whom, armed with rifles, occupied positions which commanded the ground held by the cavalry — ground from which there was no escape. Rifle-pits were dug, and the fight was maintained, though with heavy loss, from about half past 2 o'clock of the 25th till 6 o'clock of the 26th, when the Indians withdrew from the valley, taking with them th»ir village.
* It was this action which brought about the concentration of hostile forces who fought the US Army that summer.
2. e(2) maintains the misnomer of wing anullment 'no division of the regiment had been made since the order had been issued on the Yellowstone annulling wing and battalion organizations, but Custer informed me that he would assign commands on the march'. This was done on the 25th June and retained the regiments formal (practiced) structure and its constituent components.
The anullment matter was a personnel issue revolving around Custer's absense from FAL as the regiment concentrated and was administered by Reno and Benteen. I suspect that neither officer anticipated or welcomed Custer's return under Terry's auspices. There was a difficulty of loyalties and respect for Custer which heightened with his having involved in the embarrassments which befell the Grant administration.
3. 7th Cavalry and the expedition operated well enough to arrive at the Sioux and Cheyenne camp with surprise and arguably, undetected. Little, if anything went wrong or failed, until the crossing undertaken at Ford A, to initiate the fighting.
4. Attack or be attacked? Custer should have stood his regiment off but could not have known this until it was too late to avoid what took place.
5. A shortcoming with the carbines was only discovered in contact as was vulnerability of led mounts during deployment to fight on foot.
6. Nothing went wrong until the fighting had commenced.
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 28, 2018 10:57:56 GMT -6
HR, that is way to late for a debrief.
Regards, Tom
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 28, 2018 11:31:26 GMT -6
So from my background we call things skills for those things you must know before being a ready officer. So a similar battle ready soldier would need to have basic skills that we are about to look at I hope.
For example for our weapon systems (SIG p320, S&W AR-15 , Remington 870) we have specific AZPOST demonstration of the skills for each weapon system. For handgun you must make 84% hits with ranges from 25 yards to 3 yards. For our transportation we have courses on 4x4 truck, 2 week watercraft school, and a ATV course. We have horses and I attended the Arizona Mounted Officers course.
So a few for a trooper
Horsemanship - ride at all speeds and have an independent seat freeing the use of hands
Carbine - function, load fire reload in a determined amount of time, 100% hits out to 100 yards, use of sights for various range
Revolver - Use from horse
Saber - For CQB when revolver is empty
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Post by herosrest on Feb 28, 2018 12:08:47 GMT -6
HR, that is way to late for a debrief. Regards, Tom Reports were available within weeks and assessments up the chain being made and written up by the September with Congress calling for review and change. There was plenty of scrutiny but it was a different age and pushing buttons wasn't how things worked. Hindsight is our gift but I reckon Custer at some point realised that artillery would have changed the game.
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 28, 2018 12:22:14 GMT -6
HR, You are absolutely correct about with hindsight. The pre-fighting flaws were evident prior the to the fighting beginning. They were just ignored. The debriefs should have been completed prior to the Far West getting back to FAL. Discussions between officers and NCO's should not have been allowed about the battle until all were debriefed.
Custer should have sent Herendeen through to Terry. The command should have never crossed the Divide, on the 25th. Eyeballs should have been kept on the village from Crows Nest to protect against the break up of the village or an advance upon their position by the NA's. A better understanding of the future space should have been scouted. Lastly following the letter of the orders rather than the spirit of them, as GAC perceived them. The Crook Battlefield would have been found.
Regards, Tom
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Post by benteen on Feb 28, 2018 15:31:04 GMT -6
Waiting for folks to comprehend intent, ready to make this interesting. Col Montrose, Perhaps before we can determine the compliance or non compliance of the 7th to these actions that you have laid out for us, we should examine just who these people were. From what I have read, yes there were some good soldiers, NCOs, and Officers, but there were far to many that were little more than a NYC street gang that were given blue uniforms. They were recruited like the French Foreign ,Legion, they didn't have to give their correct names. Many were running from the law or debtors, still others joined with the only thought to get a rifle a horse a few bucks and take the "Grand Bounce" The desertion rate was through the roof. In addition they had no basic training "Boot Camp" were assigned to different forts where they did civilian work like building walls, gathering wood etc but little military training. Certainly Custer couldn't care less as he was always hob-nobbing with his friends in NYC. I don't know if they ever trained together as a regiment. With that being said, even if they understood the Mission Essential Task List, I don't know if they had the ability to incorporate it. Be Well Dan
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Post by noggy on Feb 28, 2018 15:48:17 GMT -6
Many things my tired head needs some time to ponder on, but as a noggy the operating of the mule train system is something I`d like clarification on. Crook was "the man" when it came to using mules to carry packs, at least in the US Army (the Mexicans and Spaniards had done this for a couple of centuries, both in war and peace with the Natives in the mountains). When fighting Apaches in the Sierras and such no wagons could be used so there were hardly any choices. Mules had also been used even before the ACW by the US Army, not sure of the extent though. But was it perceived as a "must know" thing in the US Army in general? I`ll quote www.transportation.army.mil/historian/documents/pack%20mules.pdf: "By the end of the 1870s, the pack mule had become an integral part of the U. S. Army." A result of the Sioux and Nez Perce wars? What status did it have in education prior to LBH in the Army in general? Are we speaking West Point material? Crook had years of campaigning in the South to perfect this type of logistics. The 7th prior to LBH had just a couple of scraps between Washita and LBH to brag about, but could/should still have trained. I understand that none units belonging to the Dakota department had used pack trains prior to the 76 campaign, so the 7th was`t alone in not perfecting this. On the Northern Plains there hadn`t been any strategic operations for years, with the Army being more a heavily armed police force and not tasked with over long periods of time hunting down and subduing "hostiles". A new Winter campaign was also preferred in 1876, since it had worked for Sheridan previously. I know nothing of mules and cold condition, but they are not well suited to move in the snow. Could someone just have ditched to prepare using mules in anticipation of them not playing a role? That would of course not be an excuse and would still be neglect. Either way, after the 1874 Expedition into the Black Hills Custer should have recognized how useful mules were in rugged terrain. That alone, and especially combined with the well-known results its use had yielded against the Apaches and the fact that any up-coming operations would be in pretty much uncharted territory, should have done training in handling and packing mules effectively (is it that, or "efficently"?). It`s not like the 7th was too busy the entirety of 1875 to learn how to do this. Starting to do this/learn this in the middle of an operation or towards the climax of it, is something most Privates would have figured out would not be a good idea. Haven`t slept for two days, do not know why. I remember vaguely being at work most of the time, though. So the rambling should be somewhat excused. All the best, Noggy PS: While googling a little I found a book about US Army mules. Turns out that type of subject is where I start thinking "I don`t HAVE to own this book" when it comes to history books.
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Post by herosrest on Feb 28, 2018 16:40:18 GMT -6
John S. Gray, "The Pack Train on George Custer's Last Campaign," Nebraska History 57 (spring 1976). linkThere is a book or even several about US army mules, and at least one can be found at Hathi Trust Digital Library. It is an outstanding resource. Crook's resiliance was almost the undoing of his command during the horsemeat march into the Black Hills. I wonder if he advised his company commanders to carry extra salt. Ten company's of the 7th U.S. Cavalry regiment assembled and conducted a summer campaign in 1873 but otherwise were employed in reconstruction, garrison and Boundary surveys until the political crisis of 1875. An interesting but dated assessment along 'topic' lines was sponsored by Quantico in 2001, authored by J. T. Neumann. I just enjoyed revisiting it. link It is little known or read. I do not believe that the situation et al, which presented to Custer during 24th June, has ever been properly understood and particularly with respect to scouting Tulloch's Forks and the trail 'definately' leading to the Little Bighorn but that involves developing unreliable tribal participant's record and I haven't quite perfected nailing it to Sundance poles.
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Post by benteen on Feb 28, 2018 17:11:52 GMT -6
Ten company's of the 7th U.S. Cavalry regiment assembled and conducted a summer campaign in 1873 but otherwise were employed in reconstruction, garrison and Boundary surveys until the political crisis of 1875. HR, Thank you for confirming my thoughts on the training or lack of by the 7th Cavalry Be Well Dan
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Post by herosrest on Feb 28, 2018 18:17:38 GMT -6
The regiment were sufficiently competent to close undetected, on the largest gathering of Sioux which ever took place on the Great Plains. They were confident enough in their officers to follow their orders and attack that almighty host. What have I missed?
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