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Post by fred on Nov 16, 2018 18:44:36 GMT -6
Highly capable in general or in certain scenarios? "In certain scenarios." Best wishes, Fred.
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ray
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Post by ray on Nov 16, 2018 18:47:16 GMT -6
To understand why Custer wasn't a good field grade commander, just look at his promotion history. He had a small amount of time as a company grade officer before being promoted to brevet brigadier general. He never served as a field grade officer during the civil war. It was only after the civil war that his permanent rank was set at lieutenant colonel. He never had the chance to learn his trade by spending years in the lower ranks. He was good at doing the things generals did, so long as a senior general was providing overwatch on his activities, as was the case in the civil war. After the war, he had less upper level supervision and so was on his own hook most of the time. Sadly, he had very little experience to fall back on as a regimental commander. At LBH he was still thinking like a general would with lots of troops under his command instead of as a regimental commander with limited resources. Again, Custer's Trials does a great job of illustrating this. Good points all, except that he reverted to his RA (permanent) grade of captain until appointed lieutenant colonel of the newly formed 7th Cavalry.
Much of his company-grade time in the Civil War was spent as a junior staffer or aide-de-camp, which meant if anything that he had even less low level supervisory experience that you suggest above. The way his career unfolded he had almost no experience in roles of lieutenant, captain or major at all. Whereas I'm sure that the world would have been improved if each of us had been direct commissioned as a George Patton or Rommel (both of whom "paid their dues in full"), it would have been a steep learning curve for us, if we chose to try to learn. Witness the relative paucity of competent political generals (i.e., direct appointments) in the Civil War. (Mumbles: or for that matter, look at the way US Army field and general grade officers of our era could easily be sorted into military and political.)
Blessings,
Ray
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Post by fred on Nov 16, 2018 19:18:01 GMT -6
Ray, you are a breath of fresh air and I have not enjoyed this site like this for a while. You seem to have rejuvenated old friends like Colt45 as well as reawakening the guys who keep this thing going: Tom, Noggy, and a couple others. Where besides Benteen's statement do we find evidence for Benteen's claim that Cooke's note transferred the pack train under his authority? Nowhere. Yet no one ever disputed the claim. Also, from the moment Benteen received that note he seemed to take charge of everything, everywhere... rank be damned. You need to disabuse yourself of any notion regarding tardiness by Benteen. The Strategy book will point that out in minute detail. No, no, no, no. Occam's Razor means "bring packs." Period. Adding "extra ammunition" eliminates Occam's Razor as a qualitative tool. I think you are reading the wrong stuff here, Ray. The packs were never stationary. McDougall had to stop to pull some mules from the morass, but Mathey-- experienced at this sort of thing-- never halted that train. Ah-h-h-h, this is one of the great issues attached to the note and its meaning. Quite possibly, the most important aspect in understanding this battle is the myriad "context of events." Each action or event is a context within itself and while they may begin separately, eventually they all interact and each needs to be looked at by itself and then by that interaction. The context of the note includes the context of its meaning and the time it was written, plus where it was written. Each of those aspects leads into something else. For example, the note-- based on the earliest testimonies-- was written near the head of Cedar Coulee, not way down the coulee (as Martini claimed years later) or 600 yards from the river (as Martini claimed even later). When the note was written, Custer had not fired a shot; Reno was advancing, albeit on foot; and Custer was hooray-ing (lending some credence to the orders not mentioning Reno attacking the village). Standing atop 3,411 and looking up-valley, Custer also realized he had the whole kit and caboodle right there, right in front of him. Notice the wording of the note: "Come on"; " be quick." There is a difference in emphasis here. If the note read, "come quick," the implication is there appears to be some trouble; but with "be quick," it simply implies haste. Haste, because there is no reason to be anywhere else. That note was meant for one thing: to re-unite the regiment and absolutely nothing else. The diverse interpretations accorded the note all these years are only meant to enforce someone's opinion of what Custer wanted. Occam's Razor: "Benteen, re-unite." Ray, let me explain something about The Strategy of Defeat at the Little Big Horn. And maybe some here will express their opinions versus mine. The book is very difficult reading unless one has a good background with this battle. The book destroys old beliefs and therefore is highly controversial. It has been embraced by younger and newer students of the battle, but has been ignored or shunted aside by "The Old Guard," the older people who were brought up on tales the book throws out the window. For example: wherever you think the lone tepee was located is wrong. If you think Custer viewed Reno's valley actions from Weir Point, you are wrong. If you think Custer stood still in MTC for 45 minutes, you are wrong. If you think Reno spent only 10 minutes fighting on the valley floor, you are wrong. If you think all Reno's horses were kept in the timber, you are wrong. And there is more... then you get to the Custer fight and "the gap." The gap that destroyed Keogh... or certainly made his destruction quicker. It is not an easy read and it is very controversial. And if you do not follow every single event with those time charts, you lose the entire perspective of how and when events unfolded. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Nov 16, 2018 19:19:38 GMT -6
To understand why Custer wasn't a good field grade commander, just look at his promotion history. He had a small amount of time as a company grade officer before being promoted to brevet brigadier general. He never served as a field grade officer during the civil war. It was only after the civil war that his permanent rank was set at lieutenant colonel. He never had the chance to learn his trade by spending years in the lower ranks. He was good at doing the things generals did, so long as a senior general was providing overwatch on his activities, as was the case in the civil war. After the war, he had less upper level supervision and so was on his own hook most of the time. Sadly, he had very little experience to fall back on as a regimental commander. At LBH he was still thinking like a general would with lots of troops under his command instead of as a regimental commander with limited resources. Again, Custer's Trials does a great job of illustrating this. Superb!Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by noggy on Nov 16, 2018 19:43:31 GMT -6
Hi Geir, Might one say that Custer SANK to his level of incompetence? (CAUTION: hideous paraphrase of the immortal "Peter Principle," IMHO one of the greatest management books (alongside the "One Minute Manager" and the Bible) ever penned. I especially like how the last third of the "Peter Principle" merely parroted the first part, which actually demonstrated Dr. Peter's point. Err, having said that, it might be said that the last third of the Bible parrots (explains) the first part. oops.) Blessings, Ray P.S. The days when my football teams (of whatever code) reigned supreme on the field seem long past... much like me. You have no idea how the "Peter Principle" (yes, we know stuff too!!) resonates with me after the last couple of weeks at my work place. I don`t feel he SANK to his level of incompetence, but rather that his rank pulled him toward some job he shouln`t have. He was sent to fight a kind of war he did not understand, due to his hype and rank. To use a football (soccer) analogy; don`t hire Pep Guardiola to run a long ball based team, or rather ... a different type of sport. Custer was not made for Plains hunting. MacKenzie and Crook were by all means different kind of folks. Can anyone imagine GAC leading the 7th into the Sierra Madres looking for Cochise, Geronimo, Mangas Colorados etc? I have a couple of years in the army myself. As in football I knew my limits when proposed with too far stuff. All the best, Noggy
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ray
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Post by ray on Nov 16, 2018 19:45:35 GMT -6
Ray, Do not make the mistake so many others make by reading into things something that was not there. Examples: Custer wanted the ammo from the packs and that is why he ordered Benteen to “bring packs.” “Ammo” is an assumption and that assumption can change the entire meaning of the note and affect the entire tenor of the battle.
Hi Fred, point well taken. Cooke COULD have written, "Bring ammo" (although the contraction "ammo" is a modern term that didn't come into use until 1917 per the dictionary).
Given that they were apparently restricted to 25 rounds per pistol and 100 rounds per rifle with 50 rounds on their horses which would have seemed ample before sighting the enemy strength, what else was in the pack train that Custer, in that situation pending combat against a large number of Indians, could have wanted?
It seems illogical to ASSUME that Custer meant "pack train" at that moment, unless he thought that it might be in danger. It seems logical that Benteen was being disingenuous to suggest that his only option to obey the order was to go (or send) back to the pack train, advise of the change of command, and WAIT for them to link up before coming quickly (at pack train pace) to join Custer in obedience to the written order.
I'm not sure that I'm the one(s) trying to read anything into things: what do YOU think the order meant?
Let's also consider one other known; Reno's survivors were almost out of ammunition when they arrived on Reno Hill (hence Hare's expedition). So, bottom line, Custer's men were in trouble. Some Indian accounts stated that Custer's men fought well until they ran out of ammunition (if one can believe those conflicting and often self-serving accounts which I personally choose to believe reflect more truth than fiction).
Another example: “village” was not mentioned in Custer’s orders to Reno. Including Reno, there were thirteen eye-witness accounts of the order-giving by Cooke. You cite what Reno said at the RCOI, but others at the separation also heard the orders and who is to say Reno was more accurate than Davern… or Wallace? In Reno’s after action report, he wrote, “As we approached a deserted village, and in which was standing one tepee, about 11 AM [sic; circa 1 PM], Custer motioned me to cross to him, which I did, and moved nearer to his column until about 12:30 AM (sic; 1:03 PM) when Lieutenant Cook, adjutant, came to me and said the village was only two miles above, and running away; to move forward at as rapid a gait as prudent, and to charge afterward, and that the whole outfit would support me. I think those were his exact words.” Yet at the RCOI, Reno never mentioned “village,” and neither did others when asked Reno’s orders. As for Martini, he spoke of hearing Custer tell Cooke to order Reno forward. Martini used the word “village,” but never specifically when referring to the precise orders. The way Martini couched his comments, it appears he simply assumed the “village” was the objective, yet when he spoke of the phrasing, he never used the word. Plus, Martini’s recollections were more than 40 years after the battle. One minor matter here is that whereas "village" could have been a euphemism for "tribe" or "collection of Indians" or whatever, there was an Indian village that was the proximate objective of both Reno's and Custer's military activities, and they both knew it (as did everyone else there). Custer's expressions like "We've got them now" and "don't let them get away" and "fleeing" all imply (not assume) village. What was Reno to move towards if not a "village"? What was Custer going to assault/approach/(verb of choice) from the flank if not a "village"?
While all this may seem nothing more than a tempest in a teapot, it emphasizes the importance of being specific and not assuming meanings when we really do not know what really was meant. Reno gets pilloried for stopping before getting into the village, thereby failing to obey orders. If however, no one mentioned attacking the village proper, why blame Reno for not doing something never intended? We can apply this same logic to Reno’s orders several days earlier when he led his scout to the Rosebud. Those orders were—apparently—quite specific—though never written—and he was severely chastised for disobeying them, regardless of the value of intelligence he brought back.
A lot of this is correctly termed "fog of war." We weren't in a precision business when in uniform (as those of us who are engineers in real life may appreciate), despite Zero Defects careerism. Two small points:
Reno likely stopped his attack because of what he saw before him that his training, experience, orders, SOPs, etc., had him form a dismounted skirmish line to address (that's not an assumption on my part whereas some ASSUME that Reno should be pilloried for mindlessly and futilely charging ahead; and Reno apparently DID disobey specific geographical orders on his independent patrol as you noted, but in a completely different military situation and set of circumstances which no one would conflate EXCEPT by making unfounded assumptions.
I respectfully submit that the same logic does not apply (and note, Fred, that YOU did not apply it, merely used it as a straw man).
In short then, it is a poor habit of inserting one’s own meanings into instructions, notes, orders, etc., making assumptions that lead to opposite intentions.
Truly meaning no disrespect, Fred, but isn't that what every historian does in some way? Especially these days?
Please don't make the assumption that I'm making assumptions. It doesn't serve either of us at all. I'm simply trying to understand what happened to the best of my ability through discussion and debate, and through application of whatever skills and tools I have.
If I note that something doesn't make sense to me, then it doesn't (yet) make sense to me.... nothing more. It certainly doesn't mean that I'm jumping to unfounded conclusions by assuming all kinds of wild and woolly things. For example, your arguments on packs/pack train and village and attack don't (yet) make sense to me because I can't see any logic in them given what I presently know... they seem to me to assume things that aren't logical. Of course, we'll never know for sure (that's an assumption), but isn't the quest for knowledge (biblically I should say "wisdom") what life is about?
Thanks for taking (wasting) your time on me. If I can be of any assistance, please ask.
Blessings,
Ray
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ray
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Post by ray on Nov 16, 2018 20:34:18 GMT -6
Hi Geir, Might one say that Custer SANK to his level of incompetence? (CAUTION: hideous paraphrase of the immortal "Peter Principle," IMHO one of the greatest management books (alongside the "One Minute Manager" and the Bible) ever penned. I especially like how the last third of the "Peter Principle" merely parroted the first part, which actually demonstrated Dr. Peter's point. Err, having said that, it might be said that the last third of the Bible parrots (explains) the first part. oops.) Blessings, Ray P.S. The days when my football teams (of whatever code) reigned supreme on the field seem long past... much like me. You have no idea how the "Peter Principle" (yes, we know stuff too!!) resonates with me after the last couple of weeks at my work place. I don`t feel he SANK to his level of incompetence, but rather that his rank pulled him toward some job he shouln`t have. He was sent to fight a kind of war he did not understand, due to his hype and rank. To use a football (soccer) analogy; don`t hire Pep Guardiola to run a long ball based team, or rather ... a different type of sport. Custer was not made for Plains hunting. MacKenzie and Crook were by all means different kind of folks. Can anyone imagine GAC leading the 7th into the Sierra Madres looking for Cochise, Geronimo, Mangas Colorados etc? Hi Noggy,
After some 10 years of experience, wouldn't it be reasonable to assume that Custer might have developed some sort of clue? While he had a dearth of personal big Indian battles (other than Washita), NO ONE had any experience of what he faced at LBH. Still, he would have known of both successful and unsuccessful battles such as Wagon Box, Fetterman, Hay Fields, Dead Buffalo Lake, Killdeer Mountain, etc., not to mention those farther away. He may have lived in his own bubble, but presumably knowledgeable associates didn't think he was Billy Connolly or Rodney Dangerfield every time he uttered anything.
The more I study, the more I think that the US Army wasn't made for Plains hunting; sure they got their act somewhat together later but they didn't defeat the Indians as such. I know that this website is about LBH, but by jeez, Crook found the Indians twice and regretted both times (thank God for the scouts at Rosebud or this site would focus on that battle) and Gibbon located their camp once and ended up placing it in the too hard basket because he couldn't cross the Yellowstone (although the Indians did to harass him). And that was just Sheridan's 1876 Centennial Campaign.
Well, who am I to talk? At least one of the two wars I was personally involved in ended okay.
Wishing you success in football... and life.
Blessings,
Ray
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Post by noggy on Nov 16, 2018 21:28:19 GMT -6
Hi Noggy,
After some 10 years of experience, wouldn't it be reasonable to assume that Custer might have developed some sort of clue? While he had a dearth of personal big Indian battles (other than Washita), NO ONE had any experience of what he faced at LBH. Still, he would have known of both successful and unsuccessful battles such as Wagon Box, Fetterman, Hay Fields, Dead Buffalo Lake, Killdeer Mountain, etc., not to mention those farther away. He may have lived in his own bubble, but presumably knowledgeable associates didn't think he was Billy Connolly or Rodney Dangerfield every time he uttered anything.
The more I study, the more I think that the US Army wasn't made for Plains hunting; sure they got their act somewhat together later but they didn't defeat the Indians as such. I know that this website is about LBH, but by jeez, Crook found the Indians twice and regretted both times (thank God for the scouts at Rosebud or this site would focus on that battle) and Gibbon located their camp once and ended up placing it in the too hard basket because he couldn't cross the Yellowstone (although the Indians did to harass him). And that was just Sheridan's 1876 Centennial Campaign.
Well, who am I to talk? At least one of the two wars I was personally involved in ended okay.
Wishing you success in football... and life.
Blessings,
Ray
Hello, Ray Custer did not have 10 years of experience with Indian fighting. He had 10 years experience as a field commander of the 7th, but look at the time the regiment was in action and he himself being on leave or otherwise not being around. Look at what the 7th did between 1866 and 1876 and the soldiers in it. It`s a not a stable core of soldiers, here. This was not a professional standing army where people learned from previous engagements. The battles mentioned include defensive actions and planned ambushes (a lesson from Fetterman would have to keep units united, right?). As the planning goes, I know Montrose could go on about it. GACs situation 25,June was unlike any what any other US officer ever was in And he "blew it" by a number of decisions. All the best; Noggy
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ray
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Post by ray on Nov 17, 2018 7:11:03 GMT -6
Hi Noggy,
After some 10 years of experience, wouldn't it be reasonable to assume that Custer might have developed some sort of clue? While he had a dearth of personal big Indian battles (other than Washita), NO ONE had any experience of what he faced at LBH. Still, he would have known of both successful and unsuccessful battles such as Wagon Box, Fetterman, Hay Fields, Dead Buffalo Lake, Killdeer Mountain, etc., not to mention those farther away. He may have lived in his own bubble, but presumably knowledgeable associates didn't think he was Billy Connolly or Rodney Dangerfield every time he uttered anything.
….
Hello, Ray Custer did not have 10 years of experience with Indian fighting. He had 10 years experience as a field commander of the 7th, but look at the time the regiment was in action and he himself being on leave or otherwise not being around. Look at what the 7th did between 1866 and 1876 and the soldiers in it. It`s a not a stable core of soldiers, here. This was not a professional standing army where people learned from previous engagements. The battles mentioned include defensive actions and planned ambushes (a lesson from Fetterman would have to keep units united, right?). As the planning goes, I know Montrose could go on about it. GACs situation 25,June was unlike any what any other US officer ever was in And he "blew it" by a number of decisions. All the best; Noggy Hi Noggy,
Point well taken. Please replace "experience with" to "exposure to". But while the understrength army continually had many people absent on special assignments including about 400 field grade officers in Washington, D.C., etc. (reminding me of my time with Aramco in Saudi Arabia where a third of management positions were being place held while the incumbents were doing something else) many of the soldiers at LBH were veterans of Washita eight years earlier (1868) and the majority would have been with Custer in the Black Hills two years earlier. That sounds like a "stable core" to me... but this is just terminology. In another post I read earlier, someone was commenting on how many troopers had fewer than 6 months to a year of service (which I recall reading somewhere myself) and Fred shot that theory down with facts and figures; I'm not keeping statistics (yet), but enlistments in those days were quite long (though not as long as in the old Roman legions with their 25 years) and officers tended to have many, many years in their Regiments, too.
Regarding the Fetterman Massacre, I don't think that one of the lessons that I would take away from THAT battle would be to keep troops together (not that that would normally be a bad lesson). Fetterman's patrol of 80 or so pretty much did stay together. It was more about getting sucked into a trap through wilful and arrogant disobedience of standing orders and instructions from a commander whom he didn't respect. If some of the troops HAD split off and stayed on the ridge they might have escaped (only to be court-martialled if Fetterman had survived) but by the time those who seemed reluctant to rush ahead (including I seem to recall NCOs in the "stable core") appreciated the situation, they had no choice but to find whatever shelter they could in the rocks and die. Anyway, I'm not an expert, that's just my recollection.
Otherwise I totally agree. On something completely unrelated, I recall discussing how someone didn't have ten years experience, but had one year's experience ten times. Could that possibly pertain to Major General (bvt) Custer?
Blessings,
Ray
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Post by tubman13 on Nov 17, 2018 9:11:43 GMT -6
Ray, Many folks don't know about Benteen's bad actions in Utah, later in his career or about his baseball team with the 7th. One of his players had a very short pro career, as I recall. An epilogue on what happened to the surviving participants in later life, aside from the suicides, would make an interesting read. One of the privates was even involved in NY city politics. I won't belabor.
Regards, Tom
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Post by AZ Ranger on Nov 17, 2018 9:31:02 GMT -6
You are making me spill the beans on my new book. By the time you guys are finished with me, I won't need a publisher!!!!! Here is one paragraph from an analysis of Reno's orders. You get the added bonus of the "support" business: "Custer’s orders therefore, were for Reno to, “Take as rapid a gait as you think prudent and charge afterwards; and the whole outfit will support you.” Colonel William A. Graham wrote these were the only orders Reno received, and after receiving no reply to two Reno messengers telling Custer the Indians were to Reno’s front and in strength, Reno had every right to expect the promised support in the manner he expected it: from behind. Graham’s correspondent, Captain Robert G. Carter—a severe critic of virtually all the 7th Cavalry officers—did say Reno would naturally expect Custer to follow him if Custer said Reno would be supported, and he believed both Cooke and Keogh accompanied Reno to Ford A." Do you notice anything significant in those orders? An omission, perhaps? Or better yet, something not there? The word, "village." There is absolutely no credible evidence, based on accounts of everyone who heard those orders, that the word "village" was ever uttered. Like so many other things with the Little Big Horn, assumptions lead to erroneous beliefs. Reno was never ordered to attack the village, per se. Yet that is one of the areas where some people condemn him, isn't it? Best wishes, Fred.
Hi Fred,
The specific words from Reno's testimony at the inquiry were "Lieutenant Cook, Adjutant, came to me and said the village was only two miles ahead and running away; to move forward at as rapid a gait as prudent and to charge afterwards, and that the whole outfit would support me. I think those were his exact words.” (Inquiry, p. 648)
Maybe it's just me, but "charge" seems in this case to be synonymous with "attack" and the object of the "charge" was "village".
And, yes, I noticed the use of the word "support".
Reno went on to give his (possibly self-serving) impressions after viewing the overall battlefield after Terry arrived (emphasis mine): "After travelling over his trail it is evident to me that Custer intended to support me by moving further down the stream* and attacking the village in flank. That he found the distance greater to the ford than he anticipated, that he did charge, but his march had taken so long, altho’ his trail above showed he had moved rapidly, that they were ready for him. That Co.’s C and I and perhaps E had crossed to the village or attempted it, at the charge were met by a staggering fire and that they fell back to find a position from which to defend themselves but they were too closely followed by the Indians to permit time to form any kind of line. I think had the regiment gone in as a body and from the woods from which I fought advanced upon the village, its destruction was certain. But he was fully confident they were running away or he would not have turned from me.**" (Inquiry, p. 652) NOTES: * to Medicine Trail Ford; ** at Ford A.
Blessings,
Ray
Are you talking about the small village in Reno Creek? In my opinion a village is a physical location including standing infrastructure. Once completely packed up and moving it is no longer a village. The fleeing Indians can and did in the past move in many directions which happened to cavalry on many occasion. Those observed were fleeing and they crossed the LBH. They continued fleeing to the Big Village which was not the subject of Reno's orders. Reno was not ordered to attack a standing village. He was after a few Indians where he could a reasonable opportunity of success. As most things in combat things change. Fleeing Indians ran to a true standing village which Cooke described in his note later to Benteen as the "Big Village". Wivh version of RCOI are you referencing? I have Nichols and the online version at digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx?id=History.RenoI believe what you are quoting is not Reno's testimony at the RCOI. I believe it is an exhibit at the RCOI. Specifically Exhibit #4 which is Reno's written report. Since it was done in a more timely manner it may have more detail than what Reno recalled at RCOI. Regards AZ Ranger
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ray
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Post by ray on Nov 17, 2018 12:10:10 GMT -6
Are you talking about the small village in Reno Creek? Hi AZ Ranger No. Reno could ONLY be describing the "Big Village". Because (1) Reno's charge took it by surprise (per the statements of many Indians) and (2) Cooke wrote "big village" it was not "completely packed up and moving," and per other testimony did not do so until the following day. Agree. Disagree. In his written report quoted from, Reno was not referring to the Indians fleeing from the vicinity of the Lone Tepee but rather to his tour of Custer's portion of the battlefield that he (Reno) made after the Indians had moved on, Terry/Gibbon's column had arrived, and the situation was stable. There was only one village in question - that which you refer to as the "Big Village" based upon Cooke's note - and everyone in question would have been aware of it even if they didn't know its precise location or size. (1) The lone tepee village was no longer a village per se, but abandoned and (2) in Cooke's note "big village" would in my opinion best be described as descriptive (as you noted above by stating "Cooke described") and not comparative (as in "that (Lone Tepee) was a little village but this is a big one) or as a proper noun (the name of this village is Big Village). In his note, Cooke properly capitalized "Big" as it followed a period. While it could be interpreted either way, it appears to me that he used a lower case "v" for village. The person who wrote over the note to clarify the writing, whom I believe was Benteen, wrote the "v" as a capital letter (which he also did with the lower case "p" on "packs" that Cooke wrote, twice), but this has no bearing on Custer's/Cooke's intent or state of mind.
Sorry to be so pedantic. But from my reading of all this there is only one village in play, and that (Roamer) "village" was the strategic object of the Centennial Campaign (e.g., finding it and forcing its inhabitants to go to the reservation(s) set aside for them) as well as the tactical object of that day's offensive operations (including but not limited to Reno's "charge").
Furthermore, Custer had been told of it and had himself seen evidence of it (viz. the horse herd and rising smoke) from the Crow's Nest.
You are correct. I erroneously called it Reno's "testimony" because it was attached to the Court of Inquiry record as Exhibit 4. I should have called it his "written report" or more precisely "a true copy of Reno's official written report of 5 July 1876 that was typed on January 9th, 1879 at Headquarters Department of Dakota and appended to the transcript of the Court of Inquiry as Exhibit 4". To me it does not seem to be a "version", but rather a PDF copy of the actual typed (or printed) report prepared for/at the Court of Inquiry. INTERESTING ASIDE: The first US typewriters, named the Remington after the manufacturer, were marketed in 1874. The first shift-key typewriter (Remington Model 2), which would have been used here (if the whole report was not, in fact, typeset) had only appeared on the market in 1878.
Blessings,
Ray
P.S. Thanks, AZ Ranger. I'm not used to being so precise any more in my expression and it is good practice for the financial settlement hearing of my divorce which will hopefully occur within the next 6 months or so.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Nov 17, 2018 17:03:01 GMT -6
Are you talking about the small village in Reno Creek? Hi AZ Ranger No. Reno could ONLY be describing the "Big Village". Because (1) Reno's charge took it by surprise (per the statements of many Indians) and (2) Cooke wrote "big village" it was not "completely packed up and moving," and per other testimony did not do so until the following day. The Big Village was not within 2 miles of where the Indians were observed running that was in Reno Creek. There had been a smaller village in Reno that did pack up and run. The Big Village did move after the battle began but it set up again in close proximity. It did not pack up to move until later. There is a difference between moving a short distance and moving out of range of the U.S. Army field forces. Agree. Custer did not see the tipis in the Big Village until he climbed to the bluffs.
Disagree. In his written report quoted from, Reno was not referring to the Indians fleeing from the vicinity of the Lone Tepee but rather to his tour of Custer's portion of the battlefield that he (Reno) made after the Indians had moved on, Terry/Gibbon's column had arrived, and the situation was stable. There was only one village in question - that which you refer to as the "Big Village" based upon Cooke's note - and everyone in question would have been aware of it even if they didn't know its precise location or size. (1) The lone tepee village was no longer a village per se, but abandoned and (2) in Cooke's note "big village" would in my opinion best be described as descriptive (as you noted above by stating "Cooke described") and not comparative (as in "that (Lone Tepee) was a little village but this is a big one) or as a proper noun (the name of this village is Big Village). In his note, Cooke properly capitalized "Big" as it followed a period. While it could be interpreted either way, it appears to me that he used a lower case "v" for village. The person who wrote over the note to clarify the writing, whom I believe was Benteen, wrote the "v" as a capital letter (which he also did with the lower case "p" on "packs" that Cooke wrote, twice), but this has no bearing on Custer's/Cooke's intent or state of mind.
Custer ordered Reno to bring them to battle. Well that worked since the Big Village was going to fight and not move.
Sorry to be so pedantic. But from my reading of all this there is only one village in play, and that (Roamer) "village" was the strategic object of the Centennial Campaign (e.g., finding it and forcing its inhabitants to go to the reservation(s) set aside for them) as well as the tactical object of that day's offensive operations (including but not limited to Reno's "charge").
There are few things that are fact. Reno Creek was full of previous village sites. One I believe was still occupied. Varnum reports running Indians in Reno Creek. For sure Reno was not within two miles of the Big Village and was likely 4 to 5 miles from it.
Here is what Michael Donahue writes:
"The eight companies were approximately 3 miles from the Little Bighorn River and could see dust rising over the small ridges to their front. Custer was still not aware of the huge village in the valley ahead. Shortly after leaving the lone tipi, the lieutenant colonel gave Reno orders that were similar to those presented to Benteen. In a typical Custer fashion, he planned to react to the situation as it developed : there was no master plan. While the exact location and wording of the order has been debated, the essence was to attack any Indians in front of him, and he would be supported by the bt the other troops. Some witnesses remembered that Reno received his orders at the Lone Tipi.98 Reno recounted the order as 'General Custer directs you take as rapid as gait as you think prudent abd the village afterwards, and you will be supported by the whole outfit."99
Furthermore, Custer had been told of it and had himself seen evidence of it (viz. the horse herd and rising smoke) from the Crow's Nest.
If Custer believed that there was more Indians then they could handle at the exact location near MTF then he would not have sent Benteen. The scouts knew and it seems common sense that over 10,000 horses indicates a big population nearby.
You are correct. I erroneously called it Reno's "testimony" because it was attached to the Court of Inquiry record as Exhibit 4. I should have called it his "written report" or more precisely "a true copy of Reno's official written report of 5 July 1876 that was typed on January 9th, 1879 at Headquarters Department of Dakota and appended to the transcript of the Court of Inquiry as Exhibit 4". To me it does not seem to be a "version", but rather a PDF copy of the actual typed (or printed) report prepared for/at the Court of Inquiry. INTERESTING ASIDE: The first US typewriters, named the Remington after the manufacturer, were marketed in 1874. The first shift-key typewriter (Remington Model 2), which would have been used here (if the whole report was not, in fact, typeset) had only appeared on the market in 1878.
Blessings,
Ray
P.S. Thanks, AZ Ranger. I'm not used to being so precise any more in my expression and it is good practice for the financial settlement hearing of my divorce which will hopefully occur within the next 6 months or so. Good luck with that my Friend
Regards
Steve Andrews
One thing that might be interesting to you is that not all the Indians moved from the Rosebud up Davis Creek and then down Reno Creek and crossed the LBH. In Gordon Harper's book "The Fight on the Little Horn" there are 10 Chapters. But that is not all. There are also 8 analysis. The second analysis is "How the Indian Bands Came Together At the Little Horn. " You will find that 2,500 roamers were on the Rosebud 10 miles south of Davis Creek. and not part of the group that Custer had followed up the Rosebud. Gordie states another 2.000 were on Lodge Grass Creek and were moving away from Crook.
Gordie states that the two groups met the ones Custer was following at the mouth of Long Otter Creek along the LBH. "The village remained in this location for six days and it was here the village and it was here the other two groups joined, from the east and from the south". That is 4,500 Indians that Custer was not following.
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ray
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Once a FNG, always a FNG. It's a glorious status because ignorance is bliss.
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Post by ray on Nov 17, 2018 22:23:24 GMT -6
A whole bunch of interesting stuff that disappeared with my incisive commentary when I pressed "ENTER." Hi Steve,
Thanks for your informative reply. This is good information and, yes, I did find your input from Donahue, Harper and Gordie interesting and useful. It sounds like if Custer had not deviated to follow the main Roamer camp's trail up Davis Creek that he might have had the outcome he wanted further south along the Rosebud on more favourable terms. Interesting, indeed!
(1) Information on multiple villages is certainly consistent with known history of the Plains Indians (e.g., Custer's attack on pacified Black Kettle's poor small band that were outliers to the main campS further along the river, etc.) It is also consistent with enabling better access to resources, as well as keeping feuding individuals and families separated (Crazy Horse and No Water come to mind). Heck, it's also consistent with practices where I come from, although reasons there are also agrarian. It's mostly Pueblos who band tightly together, and that's largely for defence as well as cultural reasons.
(2) Your observation of flushing a small band of Indians in Reno Creek is in almost all the literature, along with the hardtack experience and one or two other sightings. The conclusions usually drawn from these are that Custer (1) knew his stealthy approach had been seen, (2) the intel would get back to the main body and (3) they would break camp and flee (likely in different directions) if he didn't accelerate the advance. That has relevance to Custer's state of mind.
(3) There is a possible military rationale for Benteen's Patrol that I haven't seen discussed here (in addition to a recon in force type operation and Benteen's concern that he was wasting his time while Custer got all the glory, etc.) SOP would surely have dictated security of the vulnerable left flank while they were in the canyon. That vulnerability would have been obvious from the Crow's Nest as there were many (well, okay, several) places (Noname, for one) where Indians in quantity could be reasonably lurking. I operated dismounted in the Central Highlands in very rough terrain and, while the flank security I set out to run ridges might have engendered a few grumbles, we never got ambushed (well, except once and that was significantly different terrain), while a former classmate of mine commanding one of the troops of the 2/1 Cav patrolling a few valleys away on that joint operation was ambushed from the far ridgeline and killed along with several of his men. We had to try to rush to their aid.
(4) Really going far afield on that note, you've ridden horseback along Reno Creek a number of times. Was the terrain on the right bank (Custer's side) appreciably different from the left bank (Reno's)? If so, did Custer choose the easier side for his battalion? If not, could Reno have been on the left bank (i.e., towards the LBH river) to provide further left flank protection for Custer? Steve, I'm interested in knowing if the terrain is different, and only added the speculations to show why something like that could potentially be of interest.
It's a bummer to lose such a detailed post, but I think I detect a huge number of sighs of relief in the ether. Sigh!
Blessings,
Ray Rangers Lead the Way!
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ray
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Once a FNG, always a FNG. It's a glorious status because ignorance is bliss.
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Post by ray on Nov 17, 2018 23:11:57 GMT -6
Ray, Many folks don't know about Benteen's bad actions in Utah, later in his career or about his baseball team with the 7th. One of his players had a very short pro career, as I recall. An epilogue on what happened to the surviving participants in later life, aside from the suicides, would make an interesting read. One of the privates was even involved in NY city politics. I won't belabor. Regards, Tom Hi Tim,
I have seen a "where are they now" type website recently - might even have been on this board. (Of course, they'll all dead now, but you know what I mean.) It was an interesting read.
Because I'm not being particularly academic, I go a lot faster than I would if I were recording sources, and I fear that my poor little brain is reaching that point where my trainees in Saudi Arabia would say, "My brain hurts."
And, like they say, PTSD is hell.
Blessings,
Ray
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