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Post by alquedahunter on Nov 14, 2017 12:57:13 GMT -6
I've had a blown up Camp map on my wall in the shop for about 5 years. It's one of his that were displayed in Drawing Battle Lines. I wanted to see it often and think.I have arrived at a conclusion and wondered what you fellers may think. It is one of the maps that has also the spot where he thought Butler was killed and also the rectangular layout of the other burials and or death spots. Then it came to me. That was whats bothered me this whole time, the rectangular/squarish layout of those spots.Just something doesn't feel or look right if that is the way the battle was fought . When covering that much area and prolly having known they were outnumbered would rational thought be to spread like that? And I do realize they were prolly initially feeling and checking but at some point , I would have said we have to pull in our men and, quickly! What you pros say?
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Post by tubman13 on Nov 14, 2017 13:10:55 GMT -6
Conventional theory says GAC was a buffoon, feeding his companies to the NA's a bite or so at a time. Some others might feel that he took his 5 and HQ towards Ford D. That they were caught on the way back, attempting to leapfrog back south towards support. This is discussed elsewhere on the board and others.
Regards, Tom
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Post by cayusewarrior on Nov 14, 2018 18:32:52 GMT -6
Custer’s plan. A failure of execution Reno Bateen
//battleoflittlebighorn1876.weebly.com/seventh-regiment.html
800 Troops and Officers
The following is the written orders Brig. General Alfred E. Terry ordered to be written on the morning of June 22, 1876. Since the diastrous defeat of George Custer at the Little Big Horn, these instructions have been at the center of an ongoing debate as to whether or not Custer disobeyed Terry's orders. In a not so confidential letter to Generals Sherman and Sheridan after the battle, Terry inferred that Custer had indeed disobeyed his orders. These orders were written hours before Gen. Custer departed on his last campaign. The previous evening there had been a meeting of General Terry, Colonel John Gibbon, Major James Brisbin, and Custer on the steamboat, Far West. The purpose of the meeting was to develop a plan of attack against hostile Sioux known to be in the Rosebud - Little Big Horn Region. The following text is reproduced from page 462 of the Annual Report of the Secretary of War for 1876, which is House Executive Document 1 for the second session of the Forty-fourth Congress (Serial volume 1742). -------------------------------------------------------------- Headquarters of the Department of Dakota (In the Field) Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River, Montana Territory June 22nd, 1876 Lieutenant-Colonel Custer, 7th Calvary Colonel: The Brigadier-General Commanding directs that, as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days since. It is, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them. He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little Bighorn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the escape of the Indians passing around your left flank. The column of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Horns. Of course its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they arise, but it is hoped that the Indians, if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly inclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible. The Department Commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullock's Creek, and that you should endeavor to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon's command. The supply-steamer will be pushed up the Big Horn as far as the forks of the river is found to be navigable for that distance, and the Department Commander, who will accompany the column of Colonel Gibbon, desires you to report to him there not later than the expiration of the time for which your troops are rationed, unless in the mean time you receive further orders.
Cutter Followed orders from Terry Go down the Rose Bud as fast as he could, engage any NA. Custer Did. He planned to surround the Villiage.
You All can speculate from there. Other Custer Orders 1. Benteen was ordered to proceed south of Reno. He returned to Reno Position 2. Reno was supposed to continue along the south 1st Position or further. Reno Forged the River to Custer Side instead of engaging the South of the Village. 3. Custer also Order both to SEND PACKS. Scout Currly says Custer was winning at Ford at Medicine Tail Cooley, until he ran out of Ammo. Questions: 1? Both sides engaged would have confused and created a larger Battle Field to NA Defend. There we Women and Children to defend in the Village, drawing from Custer 2? I think RENO and Benteen did not follow ORDER. Keep NA from escaping to the South and Counter Attack no run and hide. Custer did with a good plan following Terry’s Orders Fast as you CAN ENGAGE NA. No Order to Run and Hide. Who would think Custer would run from a fight he was Order to do. A Brave and Wreckless Leader of the Civil War. Benteen and Reno when to the safety of a cliff Behind them, defensive position and not the order of Custer or Terry. Protected to the south. Only 1 attack Front and all the AMMO Custer did not HAVE.
3? The Custer Scout Currly said the first and real battle was at the Ford at the bottom of Medicine Trail. Currly said custer was winning until he ran out of bullets. The recognized battlefield and the end was escaping because Custer did not
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Post by Colt45 on Nov 15, 2018 8:07:26 GMT -6
First of all, there is no archeological evidence of a battle at the ford in MTC. Quite the contrary. There was lots of firing on the Luce and Nigh/Cartright ridges, well away from the ford. Custer sent the Martini note to Benteen prior to his firing a shot, so he had all his ammo at that time.
Reno followed his orders to attack from the south, up the valley. Hostile resistance was more than enough to prevent Reno from reaching the southern end of the village. HIs breakout from the timber saved his command from complete annihilation.
The order to Benteen was a very poorly written, ambiguous order. His initial order at the point he was sent left on the scout was to continue until he reached the LBH river. Upon seeing no hostiles anywhere along his scout route, he used his judgement to break off the scout and return to the main trail. He received the order to bring packs after returning to the main trail. That order was contradictory in that it wanted him to come quick and to also bring the packs. You can't move quickly and bring along slow moving mules at the same time. It must be one or the other.
Custer told Reno that he would be supported by the whole regiment. Reno was to function as the advance guard and develop the situation. If Custer had followed through, he would have been able to engage the Indians on Reno's left flank. Instead, he deviated up the bluffs and essentially left Reno hanging out to dry. When Custer's support never showed up, Reno did the only thing he could do to save his command. Benteen's arrival on the bluffs prevented Reno's badly mauled battalion from being wiped out.
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Post by fred on Nov 15, 2018 9:12:33 GMT -6
First of all, there is no archeological evidence of a battle at the ford in MTC. Quite the contrary. There was lots of firing on the Luce and Nigh/Cartright ridges, well away from the ford. Custer sent the Martini note to Benteen prior to his firing a shot, so he had all his ammo at that time. Reno followed his orders to attack from the south, up the valley. Hostile resistance was more than enough to prevent Reno from reaching the southern end of the village. HIs breakout from the timber saved his command from complete annihilation. The order to Benteen was a very poorly written, ambiguous order. His initial order at the point he was sent left on the scout was to continue until he reached the LBH river. Upon seeing no hostiles anywhere along his scout route, he used his judgement to break off the scout and return to the main trail. He received the order to bring packs after returning to the main trail. That order was contradictory in that it wanted him to come quick and to also bring the packs. You can't move quickly and bring along slow moving mules at the same time. It must be one or the other. Custer told Reno that he would be supported by the whole regiment. Reno was to function as the advance guard and develop the situation. If Custer had followed through, he would have been able to engage the Indians on Reno's left flank. Instead, he deviated up the bluffs and essentially left Reno hanging out to dry. When Custer's support never showed up, Reno did the only thing he could do to save his command. Benteen's arrival on the bluffs prevented Reno's badly mauled battalion from being wiped out. We do not always agree on everything, but that is about as good a four paragraph summation of the main points of this event as I have ever read. Without hyperbole, simply excellent !!Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by alquedahunter on Nov 15, 2018 11:30:37 GMT -6
"To wish to impose precise" and "unless you see sufficient reason" covers a lot of ground Cayusewarrior. In that situation and knowing what he did, I would have used discretion but with those words in the order, well, it's really really open ended. And I believe GAC took those words and used them to the maximum effect and of course, lost. But they are there yet because of interpretation.
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ray
New Member
Once a FNG, always a FNG. It's a glorious status because ignorance is bliss.
Posts: 38
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Post by ray on Nov 15, 2018 18:19:11 GMT -6
First of all, there is no archeological evidence of a battle at the ford in MTC. Quite the contrary. There was lots of firing on the Luce and Nigh/Cartright ridges, well away from the ford. Custer sent the Martini note to Benteen prior to his firing a shot, so he had all his ammo at that time. Reno followed his orders to attack from the south, up the valley. Hostile resistance was more than enough to prevent Reno from reaching the southern end of the village. HIs breakout from the timber saved his command from complete annihilation. The order to Benteen was a very poorly written, ambiguous order. His initial order at the point he was sent left on the scout was to continue until he reached the LBH river. Upon seeing no hostiles anywhere along his scout route, he used his judgement to break off the scout and return to the main trail. He received the order to bring packs after returning to the main trail. That order was contradictory in that it wanted him to come quick and to also bring the packs. You can't move quickly and bring along slow moving mules at the same time. It must be one or the other. Custer told Reno that he would be supported by the whole regiment. Reno was to function as the advance guard and develop the situation. If Custer had followed through, he would have been able to engage the Indians on Reno's left flank. Instead, he deviated up the bluffs and essentially left Reno hanging out to dry. When Custer's support never showed up, Reno did the only thing he could do to save his command. Benteen's arrival on the bluffs prevented Reno's badly mauled battalion from being wiped out. From my limited understanding, I agree with Fred that this is a cogent summary. However, may we discuss several points:
1. Cooke's note via Martini was, IMHO, a suitable battlefield communication (they didn't use 5 paragraph field orders at the time) that clearly conveyed Custer's orders, especially given that they were delivered by a messenger who could fill in blanks from his personal observations and any verbal clarifications that he had been given to accompany the written order. A film suggested that the written order was to offset Martini's poor English, but more likely reflected SOP of Civil War and immediate post-Civil War battlefield communication. In other words, Custer's order and intent were conveyed by two means, a brief written order and a live person who could answer questions to the best of his ability. Therefore, I do not find it ambiguous: in fact, it's more clear than some of the "orders" I received via radio from the lurking C&C chopper overhead in Nam. In Benteen's shoes, I would have understood Custer's intent.
2. "Bring pac(k)s" did not mean to bring the pack train: that was McDougall's responsibility, not Benteen's. It meant to bring some of what the pack train was carrying, viz. ammunition. Witness that Hare galloped down to the pack train from Reno Hill and galloped back with several mules laden with ammo ahead of the pack train's arrival on Reno Hill. Therefore, upon receipt of Cooke's order (after questioning Martini), Benteen would have likely ordered someone to go back to the pack train then watering at the Morass a few kilometres further upstream along Reno Creek and get some extra ammo.
3. "Come quick" and "bring packs" are not mutually exclusive or contradictory. The order clearly directed Benteen to load his battalion with extra ammo and come quickly along Custer's trail to link up. The order was written in ignorance of Reno's retreat, so it was logical given what was known at the time.
4. Custer could have THOUGHT that he was giving support to Reno's valley fight by moving to attack the village down Cedar Coulee (Draw) and Medicine Trail Coulee to relieve pressure on Reno. In fact, that very thing happened when the first firing from the Custer battlefield drew off the Indians who were poised to annihilate Reno's survivors scrambling across the LBH River and up the bluffs.
5. Similarly, Custer could have THOUGHT that leaving Keogh on Luce would enable him to spot Benteen's battalion early so as to link up in Medicine Trail Coulee and follow Custer (yes, a logical decision tree can be drawn showing how the catastrophe developed piece by piece).
6. In NO circumstance that I can conceive would Custer's battalion have supported Reno on his LEFT flank. For one thing, Custer would have had to move through very real obstacles of (a)(1) a horse herd numbering in the tens of thousands, (2) up a plateau cut across by three large ravines while (3) giving Reno the glory of the cavalry charge, something just not congruent with Custer's personality or other actions as at the Washita where he led the central column OR. (b) alternatively, swallow Reno's dust as the camp was charged with 3 companies abreast (Reno's) followed by 5 (Custer's) in reserve (which doesn't make military sense or conform to Cavalry Rules of 1874, which they tried to follow). Plus, the formation to the point of dispatching Reno into the valley had Custer on the right flank and Reno on the left
7. Had Custer seen Reno's battalion's collapse and retreat, he would have likely turned around and come to Reno's rescue somehow (we could speculate how (e.g., by splash and dash or fire and maneuver or supporting fire only) but that's meaningless. No, the PROBABLE timeline is that Custer saw Reno's skirmish line engage and fire and that prompted him to move on swiftly to SUPPORT Reno's attack by sweeping in on the village from the east BEFORE Two Moons turned Reno's left flank.
Just a few thoughts.
Blessings,
Ray
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Post by fred on Nov 15, 2018 21:30:02 GMT -6
If I may interject my two cents into this before Colt responds... I do not necessarily agree a written note was correct procedure or established procedure. Custer used two previous messengers, neither with written notes; and Reno used two, neither with written instructions. In all four of those cases, the messenger, i.e., Voss, Sharrow, Mitchell, and McIlhargey, spoke perfect or reasonable English (Voss was from Germany, but was the regimental chief trumpeter). I disagree. When the note was written, Custer's 5 companies had not fired a single shot, and Custer had just viewed what seemed to be a successfully conducted operation in the valley from his perch on 3,411. Benton's actions in sending back Hare were driven by the expenditure of ammunition in the valley by Reno's three companies. Benton himself claimed the note placed him in charge of the pack train, vice McDougall. I disagree again. The note was written solely to re-unite the entire command. When written, Custer had viewed the upper valley and realized there was no threat there, thereby obviating the need for Benteen to search further. The inclusion of the packs was merely emphasis. If anything, I would submit Custer would have been more interested in the additional men than he was in the ammo. Custer realized this would turn into a running battle: ammo for single-shot carbines at that time was hardly an issue. Any support Custer rendered Reno was totally incidental and unintended. There was almost universal agreement that the proffered "support" would have come from the rear. Custer was interested in one thing, and one thing only... and believe me, it wasn't supporting Reno... at least not at that point. Yes... and no. Custer had been over that route and with Boston's report Benteen was already on his way, knew-- within reason-- how long he would probably take to get there. Leaving Keogh on Luce Ridge meant too much separation, something that ultimately bedeviled Custer, but not something he intended. Leaving Keogh on Calhoun Hill rather than Luce/Nye-Cartwright was a better option, and despite terrain, would have caught Indians in a Benteen-Keogh vice. I agree. Totally. I am not so sure I agree here. Both Cooke and Keogh went to the LBH River prior to Custer turning to the right. That was designed to find a crossing. I believe Custer sent Reno-- I will accept the term, advance guard, since its definition can be deemed valid providing Custer followed-- as the first punch of a one-two assault. When that order was given, no dust was rising in the valley, and as you well know this was going to be a very rapid action. I would caution you about this "support" for Reno business. I constantly try to make the point that this fight was not about Reno, not about supporting him, not about caring for Reno or his command. George Custer was no altruist and had only one thing in mind: the subjugation of that village, and Reno would only be a pawn to that end. In fact, it is conceivable that when Custer heard Reno was in some trouble and moving back up the valley, Custer may have actually been buoyed: Reno would be drawing warriors away from the village proper, making it easier for Custer's command to attack the "refugees" fleeing downriver. Your turn, Colt. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Colt45 on Nov 15, 2018 22:16:41 GMT -6
Thanks Fred, You pretty much read my mind in your response, so I won't repeat the parts I agree with. Ray is making a lot of assumptions about the Custer part of the fight that no one has a clue to, since no one survived after Martini left. Boston may or may not have advised his brother of the situation on the back trail, for example; that is impossible to know for sure.
If Custer had followed Reno across ford A, he could have exploited what Reno kicked up, which is what the advance guard does and what the main body is supposed to do. Going around Reno's left would have been far easier than dragging tired horses up and down the bluffs, and would have allowed for 8 companies in the valley instead of 3. This would also have removed Benteen's dilemma. He would have crossed at ford A after making sure the pack train was safe on the east side, and would have functioned as a reserve, going where he was needed most. This also would have driven the Indians to the north toward Terry.
As to Custer wanting to take care of Reno, I totally agree with Fred. He couldn't care less. All that mattered was rounding up the non-coms if possible and making the victory an exclusive 7th Cav affair. As Fred said, Reno was a pawn to that effort.
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Post by fred on Nov 15, 2018 22:24:54 GMT -6
Going around Reno's left would have been far easier than dragging tired horses up and down the bluffs, and would have allowed for 8 companies in the valley instead of 3. This would also have removed Benteen's dilemma. He would have crossed at ford A after making sure the pack train was safe on the east side, and would have functioned as a reserve, going where he was needed most. This also would have driven the Indians to the north toward Terry. You make a good point there, and the valley was wide enough to accommodate the additional troops. It probably would not have worked-- the old canard: too many Indians-- but it was certainly better than exhausting everyone and everything with some dumbass end-run. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Colt45 on Nov 15, 2018 22:27:22 GMT -6
Additionally, If Custer and Reno were both in the valley, and the assault failed and Custer was forced to withdraw, there was decent defensible terrain to the west of Ford A on the benches that 8 companies could defend quite nicely. Being far enough away from the village, the Indians might have not wanted to take excessive casualties given the village was out of immediate danger and would have fought more of a screening action as opposed to a full out assault.
Since it didn't play out the way described above, all this is a big what-if, but I believe that is a better choice than putting no-go terrain between the advance guard and the main body, as that prevents supporting the advance guard. Also, going the bluff route allowed the Indians to use internal lines of movement, which made it easy for them to move forces from the Reno field to the Custer field. With 8 companies in the valley, those internal lines don't exist.
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Post by fred on Nov 15, 2018 22:35:21 GMT -6
Additionally, If Custer and Reno were both in the valley, and the assault failed and Custer was forced to withdraw, there was decent defensible terrain to the west of Ford A on the benches that 8 companies could defend quite nicely. Being far enough away from the village, the Indians might have not wanted to take excessive casualties given the village was out of immediate danger and would have fought more of a screening action as opposed to a full out assault. Since it didn't play out the way described above, all this is a big what-if, but I believe that is a better choice than putting no-go terrain between the advance guard and the main body, as that prevents supporting the advance guard. Also, going the bluff route allowed the Indians to use internal lines of movement, which made it easy for them to move forces from the Reno field to the Custer field. With 8 companies in the valley, those internal lines don't exist. Again, very well stated and I agree 100% with what you are saying here. Well thought out. Great job. Best wishes, Fred.
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ray
New Member
Once a FNG, always a FNG. It's a glorious status because ignorance is bliss.
Posts: 38
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Post by ray on Nov 16, 2018 2:41:58 GMT -6
Thanks Fred, You pretty much read my mind in your response, so I won't repeat the parts I agree with. Ray is making a lot of assumptions about the Custer part of the fight that no one has a clue to, since no one survived after Martini left. Boston may or may not have advised his brother of the situation on the back trail, for example; that is impossible to know for sure. If Custer had followed Reno across ford A, he could have exploited what Reno kicked up, which is what the advance guard does and what the main body is supposed to do. Going around Reno's left would have been far easier than dragging tired horses up and down the bluffs, and would have allowed for 8 companies in the valley instead of 3. This would also have removed Benteen's dilemma. He would have crossed at ford A after making sure the pack train was safe on the east side, and would have functioned as a reserve, going where he was needed most. This also would have driven the Indians to the north toward Terry. As to Custer wanting to take care of Reno, I totally agree with Fred. He couldn't care less. All that mattered was rounding up the non-coms if possible and making the victory an exclusive 7th Cav affair. As Fred said, Reno was a pawn to that effort. Hi Colt and Fred, Thanks for considering my comments. Regarding making "assumptions about the Custer part of the fight that no one has a clue to" that's certainly true, but in fact that was the point of my exercise - not making assumptions per se, but offering plausible scenarios based upon assumptions from such evidence as one may be aware of. That said, I feel that many posters about Custer ASSUME that he was a totally self-obsessed idiot. He may have been, but he was a West Point (accelerated) idiot, a bona fide hero of the Civil War (because he was a self-obsessed idiot?) about whom few had anything bad to say, had ten years experience on the Frontier (not excluding his court-martial time out), and some equivalent experience fighting a large number of Indians at Washita (at which he lost control of part (all) of his force leading to a minor massacre and nearly lost the whole gamut). Putting that all together he wasn't the most admirable example of manhood to wear a uniform in the day, but he may well have had some competence. We don't know, precisely because the whole thing blew up politically (and he died).
So ONE assumption that I feel compelled to make is that Custer knew something about cavalry tactics and that he wasn't a total moron despite his (many) personality flaws (no, I don't know his IQ, and it wouldn't matter if I did). Similarly I don't want to make blanket assumptions about Reno being a flaming drunkard who couldn't touch his finger to his nose or Benteen's hatred of Custer coloring his every waking thought. I would rather see these three men as flawed professional soldiers with individual strengths and weaknesses - and grudges; in other words, they were human. So that's my real assumption! It's one that perhaps we should make about everyone until they prove otherwise.
With that assumption posted, my desire is to speculate on how a reasonable, experienced commander might assess the situation that presents and how that situational awareness might influence decisions. Those decisions can be right or wrong, and Custer's were mostly compounding errors as I see it at this stage, but luck could also play a hand in that - not to mention several thousand Lakota and Cheyenne. So in that case, no matter how vainglorious Custer may have been, he would have known that losing Reno like he lost Elliott wouldn't look good on his record or help make either his military or political career. Some of my own commanders when on active duty (perhaps 50%) were IMHO lifer careerist jerks looking out for No. 1 and tickets to be punched, but NONE would have stood aside looking in the mirror as my Infantry company or battalion was about to get wiped out on their watch. Sorry, I see it as a bit simplistic to see Custer in any other way (or Reno or Benteen). But who knows. Maybe the syphilis Custer was treated for at West Point in 1857 was overcoming his good sense (I just figured that it had made him sterile at that point, Monaseetah notwithstanding), but there's no proof that it was.
Hey, you guys know far more than I do about the facts at LBH. I'm just a newbie. I signed up to learn so that I can more knowledgeably teach others.
BTW, "advance guard" had a specific military meaning in 1876. If Custer had intended for Reno to be an advance guard, wouldn't it have shown up in after-action reports and the court of inquiry? Instead, he was told to attack the camp, not the actions of an advance guard. Of course, this is just terminology. But if Custer saw Reno as an advance guard he wouldn't have hived off up the bluffs but trailed Reno across Ford A or the like some 200-250 yards behind like the rule book said to.
On my points 2, 3, 4 and 5, I made my case. They'll be in mind as I read Fred's Strategy, which awaits me on Kindle. Thanks in advance for the book, Fred.
Point 6 also speaks for itself, but as an FNG I shouldn't have used such strong language making it. My bad. I apologise. I sincerely regret if anyone took what I said as criticism. There was no wish to violate a safe space.
Point 7 also stands as reasonable conjecture based on what little I know now (see rationale above), but I am open minded on all of the above and will read Fred's book carefully.
One last minor point. Both of you seem to have a problem with me suggesting that Custer's guys might provide support to Reno's. To me, that's a military concept not a personal one; Reno's was the main attack (at that point) and any additional actions appertaining thereto would by definition be "support". But I'm happy to replace "support" with a more politically correct verb like "complement" or "strengthen" or even "supplant" even though they are not technical military terms.
I haven't yet taken the time to see how you guys navigate this blog with its many strands. I guess that'll wait until I see if I return, because I got what I came here for. Thanks again. Having said that, I'm open to communicating via email.
Blessings,
Ray
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Post by Colt45 on Nov 16, 2018 9:20:53 GMT -6
Ray, You made good points and am glad you are here contributing. When you read Strategy you will find that Fred believes Custer went up the bluffs because he received an erroneous report that the Indians were fleeing from Reno instead of standing and fighting. This could very well have led Custer to believe getting north as fast as possible was the only way to prevent them from fleeing. I agree with Fred on that assumption. It is a logical assumption.
Custer was looking out for his career on that day and that affected his decision-making. If you haven't read Custer's Trials, I suggest you read it. It is a look at his career from West Point onward, ending before the LBH battle. It is an excellent read on how Custer thought and acted. Then couple that with Fred's Strategy of Defeat and the whole thing makes a lot more sense.
I think the fatal mistake Custer made was deciding not to cross at ford A, but rather to go up the bluffs. From that point on, he carried out TPP for the most part correctly, but executing tactics correctly can't make up for a bad strategic decision. As you said, Custer was no idiot, but he made a series of bad decisions affecting correct employment of tactics. Using correct TPP can't help if you don't have enough firepower to overcome your enemy.
Like you and Fred, I was an officer during the Vietnam era. I was in armor/cavalry.
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Post by tubman13 on Nov 16, 2018 10:07:36 GMT -6
Ray, I don't wish to cross with former O-3(Fred) and former O-4(Colt) since I was a lowly E-7, so I have picked and chosen some quotes from you to address, please cut me some slack.
"With that assumption posted, my desire is to speculate on how a reasonable, experienced commander might assess the situation that presents and how that situational awareness might influence decisions. Those decisions can be right or wrong, and Custer's were mostly compounding errors as I see it at this stage, but luck could also play a hand in that - not to mention several thousand Lakota and Cheyenne. We and other boards have explored much. What is little discussed is the Custer portion of this battle was not about a valiant stand or stands. It is about lack of tactical integrity, disintegration of military cohesion, and outright fear and confusion. There are a number of reasons for this. You all remember the term "Shock and Awe" , how about the NA's getting off 5 shots to your one, once they have infiltrated to an area where your "longer range rifle" is nullified. Mini, silent mortar shots begin falling on you, arrows, and you can't stop it because you can't see where they are coming from. The rifle range thing is much like a boxer that has the reach advantage, allowing a brawler/fighter to get inside on him and he begins taking relentless short blows. Everybody has a plan until they get hit between the eyes. Management during and before the battle is one of my favorites. But, at least, first I want to address training or lack there of. Recruit training in the U.S. Army of 1876 as anything more than perfunctory, particularly compared with training today. Indeed, results of the Custer battle, and other botched campaigns of the time, stirred movements toward reform in the training of newly enlisted men. Additionally and lastly, people seem to consider NA's as hunter gathers with no knowledge of military tactics. The infiltration I mentioned above is part and parcel of an overall tactic. Custer and the other officers either did not notice it or did not react to it. This tactic made the end come quickly. The build up may have been somewhat slow but it was done both in the Keogh/Calhoun area as well as around Cemetery Ridge, neither of Custer's "Wings" could support the other. So in that case, no matter how vainglorious Custer may have been, he would have known that losing Reno like he lost Elliott wouldn't look good on his record or help make either his military or political career. He would not give a crap, they were expendable with regard to his overall mission. Some of my own commanders when on active duty (perhaps 50%) were IMHO lifer careerist jerks looking out for No. 1 and tickets to be punched, but NONE would have stood aside looking in the mirror as my Infantry company or battalion was about to get wiped out on their watch. Sorry, I see it as a bit simplistic to see Custer in any other way (or Reno or Benteen). But who knows. Maybe the syphilis Custer was treated for at West Point in 1857 was overcoming his good sense (I just figured that it had made him sterile at that point, Monaseetah notwithstanding), but there's no proof that it was."
I guess I could have addressed other points, but I do not wish to bore all.
Regards, Tom
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