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Post by noggy on Aug 26, 2017 3:45:01 GMT -6
All 5 companies moving to Ford D is a new one for me, actually. Then forget it: you will be better off. It is an utterly ridiculous theory and those who believe it simply have no idea what they are talking about. Best wishes, Fred. I`ve changed my mind a number of times regarding this part of the battle and may well do so again later on, but not to the above mentioned (probably the wrong wording) theory.
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Post by mac on Aug 26, 2017 4:57:03 GMT -6
Fred I have nothing but the greatest respect for you and I am not about to resile from that position. I will note that your responses are long on insult and devoid of argument or evidence.
Montrose you make some points worthy of discussion. I will get to them as time permits.
First let us consider the theory you are both endorsing. In your theory after leaving Reno Custer decides that he should go down Ford B to the river and announce his presence, fire off some rounds. Then he withdraws and leaves L and C on Calhoun Hill and deposits I in a swale with strict orders not to move or deploy (there is zero evidence that they ever did either of those things). Next he heads off with the balance of his command to scout Ford D.
OK…how do we know he ever went to the river at Ford B?
The most compelling thing about the archaeology there is the surprising lack of evidence of any major action (other than making a movie). The people who were actually in/viewing MTC when Custer was moving north say in their accounts that he never came near the river, that he came down and turned off at a hill (Calhoun Hill then behind Battle Ridge). Just as the JSIT account says.
Who says he came down to Ford B?
I republish this from elsewhere.
One problem with participant accounts is discerning what was actually seen and what is a description based on having been told by someone else. In my view all humans tend to do this and the problem is accentuated by the difficulties of translation. This makes me skeptical of many accounts of the approach to Ford B. Some warriors tell their stories as if they were everywhere on the field. I think we can be sure Custer left some men on higher ground while a portion of his force approached the river and then withdrew up a ridge or watercourse to higher ground. I am not sure this happened at Ford B. Originally I was happy with the conventional theory but there were always things that seemed to me to not quite make sense and the more I learned the greater this feeling. I am a scientist and as such as new evidence is presented to me I am prepared to alter my theories; this is the scientific method. I have read the article Fred posted and it is in my view a very well written and referenced piece. Personally I am hugely indebted to Fred for his research. I have said before that the timeline is crucial here so let me use these time points; they are Command's Watch Time as used in the article.
3:06 Smith begins moving away from Ford B
2:50 Crazy Horse begins to gather his warriors at the Reno fight
3:02 Indians still in full force in the valley estimates of 600 to 1000.
3:27 Compny L take up skirmish line positions
3:38 Crazy Horse and his band reach Ford B.
These are the warriors listed in the article as giving accounts of the retreat from Ford B. I have referenced them from Fred's great Participants in the Battle of the Little Big Horn.
Lone Bear was a follower of Crazy Horse ..arrival at Ford B 32 minutes after Smith left. Two Moon (a man who was everywhere) fought Reno...arrival probably after Crazy Horse as Crazy Horse was an early leaver in the Reno/valley fight. Foolish Elk with Crazy Horse ....arrival as above. Two Eagles fought Reno...arrival after Crazy Horse Lights fought Reno....as above Hollow Horn Bear fought Reno ... as above.
It is entirely probable that none of these men saw anything at Ford B other than Calhoun's skirmish line up on the slope of Calhoun Hill. After the battle they were told that "Custer" came down to the river and then retreated to higher ground and constructed a memory around Ford B. The idea is that the move to the river was by 5 companies at Ford D and has been wrongly interpreted as happening at Ford B. The timeline is correct but the time allocated to the Ford B excursion was in fact the window when the Ford D action was taking place as Custer went on the attack all the way to Ford D as in the John Stands in Timber account.
How about someone gives me some evidence for the approach to Ford B? Cheers
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Post by fred on Aug 26, 2017 6:00:37 GMT -6
My arguments and evidence regarding the correct flow of battle and events at fords B and D are contained in the Strategy book and an article titled, "A Deadly Delay...or Was It?" I have absolutely no intention of re-visiting the entire argument... here or elsewhere. If you bothered to take the time and place Indian accounts in their proper sequence and timing, arrange them according to terrain and event description, then compare all that to body placements, you would find the so-called "north-south" battle flow has as many fatal leaks and flaws as the riveting of the "Titanic." I hold my point that it is an absolutely ludicrous theory.
If that offends people, well, too bad. My remorse is lacking.
Just to let everyone know, I am in the process of putting together a total of four new books about this whole event. Because of everything else in my life and my inability to concentrate on just one thing at a time, I do not know the sequence of how or even when all of this will be complete. One book-- a recent brainstorm of sorts-- has evolved from several dozen-- maybe even hundreds-- of positive comments I received on a presentation I did on Facebook where I posted a day-by-day depiction of the entire campaign, starting in October 1875. I was literally stunned by the reception on three different FB sites (including my own personal site) and because of the response I have decided to try to put it all in a narrative form, loaded with photos and maps, and see if my publisher is willing to give it a shot.
The other three will form a trilogy I intend calling something like "The LBH Trail Series," and will concentrate on three trails: Reno's, Benteen's, and Custer's. These were all inspired, primarily by Will "Montrose" Bender, Tom Tubman, Steve Andrews, Beth Collins, "jodak," "Colt 45," and Gerry Schultz. Every one of those people posed intelligent, interesting, and thoughtful questions needing to be answered. My only hope is that I am up to it and worthy of their confidence. They all posed situations regarding the Reno fight and Reno's actions and that is my first area of concentration: I am already 62,000 words, plus or minus, into it. My problem is I have so many other interests that interfere, I am easily side-tracked. One of those interests is Vietnam and what it did to me, especially since the VA is now tracing every malady I seem to have back to the issue of Agent Orange... at the time, a "good friend" because it made it easier for us to fight. Payback is a bitch!!! With my penchant for note-taking, that takes an even more inordinate time than large volumes... i.e., Prochnau, Sheehan (twice), Karnow, Lansdale, Gole, Halberstam (twice), and now McNamara (surprisingly good and rather contrite). After that it is on to Ellsberg and Isaacson/Thomas.
As for here-- this site-- I would like to be more active, but quite honestly, my ideas, theories, and evidence are clearly outlined on various threads and I have no intention of re-hashing old arguments. The Strategy of Defeat has stood up remarkably well and its timelines even better than its interpretations. I think the "Crow's Nest" review by Gary Leonard is quite fair and extremely well presented, and I need not apologize or re-think anything, especially the timelines. If I live long enough to complete "Volume 3"-- the Custer trail, it will etch my thoughts, opinions, and evidence in carbon stone.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by tubman13 on Aug 26, 2017 6:09:31 GMT -6
Nice work Mac, and you have never said that all 5 arrived at D did you. Maybe 3 Companies cover 2 plus HQ at a different ford from a different location on the ridge.
Godfrey, who later became a General Officer stated. " On the battle field, in 1886, Chief Gall indicated Custer’s route to me, and it then flashed upon me that I myself had seen Custer’s trail. On June 28, while we were burying the dead, I asked Major Reno’s permission to go on the high ridge east or back of the field to look for tracks of shod horses to ascertain if some of the command might not have escaped. When I reached the ridge I saw this trail, and wondered who could have made it, but dismissed the thought that it had been made by Custer’s column, because it did not accord with the theory with which we were then filled, that Custer had attempted to cross at the ford, and this trail was too far back, and showed no indication of leading toward the ford. Trumpeter Penwell was my orderly and accompanied me. It was a singular coincidence that in 1886 Penwell was stationed at Fort Custer, and was my orderly when visiting the battle field. Penwell corroborated my recollection of the trail. The ford theory arose from the fact that we found there numerous tracks of shod horses, but they evidently had been made after the Indians had possessed themselves of the cavalry horses, for they rode them after capturing them. No bodies of men or horses were found anywhere near the ford, and these facts are conclusive to my mind that Custer did not go to the ford with any body of men."
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Post by tubman13 on Aug 26, 2017 6:18:03 GMT -6
Fred, none have said you have defend your work. The folks that have been exploring this theory are the same ones that supported you on the lunatic forum and Amazon.
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Post by tubman13 on Aug 26, 2017 6:46:37 GMT -6
We have respectable, decent posters who believe in the north to south theory. So I want to limit an emotion based response, using value laden terms. So I recommend we not disagree with ridiculous, but improbable. Any one with experience with other LBH boards are familiar with emotional, value laden arguments. We all know a poster who is an expert on cherry picking data. Cherry picking means only using data that supports your theory while ignoring data that disproves it. One poster famously used a quote to support an extreme view, and ended it midsentence. Steve provided the rest of the sentence, which completely disproved the theory. The original poster knew his theory was false, and used distorted evidence in an effort to deceive and fool fellow posters. Despicable. Then there are cherry picker superstars. These are the true liars. They provide quotes that are fake. They claim authors support a view, when said authors wrote the opposite. They claim artifacts found west of the river were really found east of the river. They lie, again, and again, and again. I get difference of opinions. But lying about facts to prove an emotional based theory is beyond the pale. If you are a member of LBHA or their official message board, you approve of and accept this behavior. I am willing to discuss the north to south theory, as long as any adherent can explain any evidence of US forces on south end of battle ridge. No has been able to do this in last seven years. The problem is inconvenient things get in the way, like empiricism and facts, and rational analysis. This is like asking for a valid theory that the sun revolves around the earth. But give me a theory that has some relationship with known facts, and I will put emotion aside and analyze it. It is like fishing in a goldfish bowl. By the way, I went through this many years ago with Gordon Harper. We maintained a decent relationship, but from our conversations and emails, I not only believe he knew the theory thin on data, but he knew it was false. His intent was to raise the discussion. I miss him, he taught me a lot, not about LBH, but about life. William, thank you for your beneficence in condescending to have discourse on the topic with the unwashed such as me. All Hmm's and Sigh's aside, I await your proof that this is impossible. Would you start please with Godfrey's statement, I don't need Fred's commentary, I need yours. By the way I just got out of the hospital too, so be patient with me if you will.
Regards, Tom
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Post by fred on Aug 26, 2017 7:47:37 GMT -6
Fred, none have said you have defend your work. The folks that have been exploring this theory are the same ones that supported you on the lunatic forum and Amazon. I never said-- or implied-- I needed to be defended. I said, very simply, the "attack-across-Ford B" theory and the "north-south-battle-flow" theory are ludicrous. Every shred of evidence points to and supports that/those opinion(s). Those who disagree are free to wallow in their ignorance, just like they allow me the same luxury. My ideas/theories/determinations are all outlined and discussed in Strategy, pure and simple, and I have no intention-- or more importantly, interest-- in re-hashing them here or elsewhere. If you were to go on the Facebook site and look at the two main forums I post on, you will see exactly the same attitude and exactly how I have pulled away from similar discussions. I am simply tired of the re-hash. Everyone here-- and elsewhere-- is free to have their own opinion(s). As far as I am concerned, no one-- and I mean, no one-- has successfully refuted a single word of what I wrote in the book or either of the two articles I have written on the Custer/Keogh fight. No one has even come close to refuting a single minute of the timelines, and all I ever get is, Well, I do not agree with everything Fred wrote. And that is, again, fine. No problem with me. Yet I never get specifics; I never see a cogent argument; I never see an alternative using all-- and I mean all-- the accounts and all the contextual variants and incidents. It is never about a single or even multiple accounts alluding to something. Those accounts need to fit within the context of what, where, and when we think they belong. A simple case in point is the refusal of some to accept 3,411 as the place Custer watched the events in the valley. Every shred of evidence in favor of 3,411 is ignored in favor of something else ( and I am not implying the 3,411 business is relevant to this discussion). So please allow me to re-iterate: it is my opinion the "attack-across-Ford B" theory and the "north-south-battle-flow" theory are both ludicrous. If you prefer I be less judgmental, then I will say, the "attack-across-Ford B" theory and the "north-south-battle-flow" theory are both incorrect. Does that smooth the ruffled feathers? I posted my original comments because this is a forum of ideas and opinions and I saw fit to express mine. If they are not welcome, fine. I find it ironic, however, that they need to be dealt with. Like I said several years ago, they are controversial and they are conceived and expounded only after the utmost research. I also find it rather interesting that we have all this discussion about Keogh's dispositions, yet there is never any mention of the "gap," something no one, anywhere, ever dealt with before. Where are all these tactical geniuses when it comes to the gap and Keogh recognizing it and being forced to set up his dispositions accordingly? It is my opinion you cannot even begin to discuss Keogh without recognizing the importance of that gap. Interesting, don't you think? Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 26, 2017 11:28:43 GMT -6
Ok if we elevate the status of spent rounds and shells to hard evidence we can say that few of the Indians who defeated Custer then drove Reno back from Weir Point and threw lead at him on Reno hill. This throws up an interesting possibility ....,that the warriors who first defeated Reno and then joined in the attack on Custer did not return to engage Reno. Perhaps there were far more Indians then the suggested 1500 ? CHEERS I don't think you have access what is available for the artifacts if you think they are just spent rounds and cases. From Scott: Linthacum (Fox1993) Some of the artifacts found during old entrance road construction Cartridge Cases Colt SAA General Service Blouse Buttons Carbine snap hook Carbine Sling Tip Iron arrowhead Greene (1986) Weibert (1989) So here is BRE Weibert 33 .44 caliber Henry, 11 Spencer cases, three .50-70 Greene .45/70 cases, .50/70 cases , .44 Henry cases Cavalry spur Whip Iron arrowhead Possible human leg bone Regards Steve
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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 26, 2017 11:41:10 GMT -6
Fred
What I see in Scott and Bleed is the possibility that E and F moved through Keogh sector then north along BRE to Ford D and came back across CR. Is that what you think may have occurred?
So the problem with artifacts is they are subject to removal. If 4 troopers from E and F fired and reloaded at Calhoun Hill then rode out BRE and fired again that could explain the four carbines. I would eliminate the Indians only firing the carbines on BRE theory due the spur.
Scott has the E and F joining at Calhoun Hill, then moving north while JSIT has some soldiers joining at LSH and then moving north.
Regards
Steve
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Post by fred on Aug 26, 2017 12:49:54 GMT -6
What I see in Scott and Bleed is the possibility that E and F moved through Keogh sector then north along BRE to Ford D and came back across CR. Is that what you think may have occurred? Yes, precisely. Scott and Bleed found artifacts in the Deep Coulee flats leading up to the top of Finley-Finckle Ridge and onto Calhoun Hill. This is consistent with Indian accounts of troop movements. It is also consistent with accounts of troops at Ford B, both with descriptions, i.e., gray horses at the river banks; consistent with bodies found, i.e., an F Company trooper (William Brown) across the river and a HQ trooper (TMP Dose) a couple hundred yards up the Deep Coulee flats. It also jibes with Benteen's killing of a gray horse near the ford. The archaeologists' interpretation of what they found there is also consistent with the Indian accounts, primarily Wooden Leg's. And here is something to chew on: Wooden Leg was there... and he was there as a young warrior; John Stands In Timber was not there and only relates what he was told. He also spoke about most of it in the 1950s and early 1960s, seventy-five years after the fact. Why should JSIT be believed while the accounts of someone who was there discounted? Do you know what Dark Cloud would make of that?So, yes, I believe, firmly, HQ, and companies E and F moved up the Deep Coulee flats, ultimately uniting with Keogh's battalion on Calhoun Hill. And all that can be corroborated by circumstantial artifactual interpretation and Indian accounts. Other than documentary film, it is the best we can hope for. I have no issue with that interpretation... none. My only question is, What makes you think they were troopers from E and F? Why couldn't they have been refugees from C, I, and L?... which I would argue would be more likely. I do not see any incompatibility with those two scenarios. Again, JSIT is all hearsay. For example... define Last Stand Hill. Does that include the BRE? How about the SSL? More telling, how about the basin? JSIT was born six years after the battle. All things being equal, I would suggest some 20 years went by before he fully understood the beginnings of Cheyenne lore as it pertained to the battle. By that time, myriad events had taken place, not the least of which was the forced migration down to Indian Territory and back. He was educated in Kansas, raised in three different and differing religions, and spent 50 years collecting stories, articles, documents, and according to Donahue, "powwow programs." Are we to put a lot of stock in "powwow programs"? So while I place confidence in JSIT's veracity, I place less confidence in what he had been told... or discovered. I prefer the first-hand accounts of men like Wooden Leg, regardless of how long after the battle he told some white-eye. I came home from Vietnam 50 years ago; do you doubt my stories or memories? Would I doubt yours? And I can say this: what Wooden Leg observed at the LBH far outdoes what I observed in Vietnam!!!! Getting back to that quote above, why wouldn't that movement-- after we define "Last Stand Hill"-- be referring to Yates' move out of the basin up to LSH? Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Aug 26, 2017 15:29:26 GMT -6
Hi Az I'M looking at the supposed main Indian firing position opposite Reno's troops on Reno Hill. The artifacts here suggest that more lead was slung at the military from this position than from anywhere else. Now at this stage of the battle there were at least 240 military carbines in the hands of the Indians yet it seems (if one puts any credence in artifacts) that not one found it'S way to the Reno fight? Further the suggested Indian position is 1000 yards to the East of Reno Hill.There is even a firing position located 1200yards to the south of Reno Hill. Now bearing in mind that the effective range of the firearms used by the Indians was less than 300 yards it throws doubt on these artifacts. In fact these artifacts are probably spurious . So if the greatest concentration of shells is spurious what does it say of othrr concentrations? Not to be relied upon. CHEERS Richard
Tom a full and speedy recovery to you .
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Post by noggy on Aug 26, 2017 18:32:30 GMT -6
This is a little on the side (not really, since the thread has spun in a new direction, which I just love it since I learn a lot from all this), but does anyone know a little of the finer points of battlefield archeology, as in statistic wise? A certain percentage of US cartridges found here and there must have been fired by warriors who picked up killed soldiers` weapons and used them else where. Personally, body placement is more telling, but where empty shells are found can also say a lot, yet be more deceiving the for example bodies (no, dead bodies being "moved around after the battle" isn`t a thing I take into consideration). As an example; 5-10 warriors could find a position from where they over a period of time fire several shots with US carbines. Would that due to the findings of spent cartridges automatically be assumed to be the result of organized firing from soldiers? I imagine archeology as a way to determine the course of battle on the East side of the river especially must be a bit difficult due to this, or is it in any way taken account for such variables?
(Manchester United just won AGAIN and I`m too cheery to write perfect English, hope this makes sense)
PS: I apologize for the over-use of brackets. Suddenly I could not stop using them...
And a speedy recovery to you, montrose. I know it means nothing, but I have read these boards for years and I have enormous respect for both your knowledge of the LBH battle and what I know of your career. And you seem like a nice guy too.
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Post by fred on Aug 26, 2017 20:07:34 GMT -6
This may help you...
More than 100 cases were found by Superintendent Edward S. Luce on what is now termed Luce and Nye-Cartwright ridges, generally three to four yards apart, indicating dismounted skirmishers. As the trail of cases continued, the spacing changed to about nine yards indicating mounted skirmishing; 214 empty carbine cases were found on or near Nye-Cartwright Ridge.
Along the front side of Butler Ridge which faces the LBH, were found: • Ten .45/55-caliber bullets • Four .45/55 cases • Two unfired .45/55 cartridges • Two Colt .45 bullets • One .50/70 cartridge • Three .44 Henry cases • Three .50 Spencer cases • Four brass cavalry insignia • One arrowhead • Two half horseshoes • One metal ring • Brass grommets • Iron snaps • One Winchester rifle
In the north fork of MTC, below and along the south and southeast face of Luce Ridge—traditional Luce Ridge is East Ridge—roughly parallel to East Ridge: • Four .45/55 cases • Three .50/70 cases • Fourteen .45/55 cases, plus an additional undetermined number • At least three horse skeletons, plus additional horse bones • At least three human skeletons, plus additional human bones • A saddle and bridle, saddle leather and pommel rings, and horseshoes • Much of this was probably from the battle with the southern half of Wolf Tooth’s band.
In the lower ground, north and northwest of Butler Ridge, east of Deep Coulee: • Two .45/55 cartridges • A horseshoe, harness buckle, and straps • A leather boot • A leather scabbard • An arrowhead • Two human skeletons • Numerous horse bones
On the southern slope of Nye-Cartwright Ridge, directly behind the LBH face of Butler Ridge: • Four .45/55 cases • Four .45/55 cartridges • Six .56 Spencer cases • Twenty-four .50/70 cases • Fifteen .44 Henry cases • Nine .44 Henry cartridges • An Indian bridle
All along the Nye-Cartwright/“new” Luce Ridge complex. This is now behind all of the previous (Letters), including (B): • Upwards of 480 .45/55 cases and cartridges • Several .50/70 cases • An undetermined number of additional shells • Saddle and tack parts • Uniform buttons and buckles
Behind Nye-Cartwright along a dry ravine of South Branch: • Three .44 Henry cases • This was probably from the skirmish with the northern half of Wolf Tooth’s band.
Below the western edge of Nye-Cartwright, in what appear to be a series of gullies or ravines leading to, but before, Deep Coulee: • Three human and three horse skeletons • Various bridle and saddle parts
Northern part of Deep Coulee on its west side, toward Calhoun Hill and the Henryville area: • Human bones and two horse skeletons • Eight .45/55 cases • Two .50/70 cases • Two .50- and one .56-caliber Spencer cases • One .32 rimfire case • Two .44 Henry cases • One Winchester rifle
(A) Henryville, on the Deep Coulee side: 32 Indian cartridge cases. (B) Henryville, on the Calhoun Hill side: 13 Indian cartridge cases. (C) Across Calhoun Hill, roughly from west to east: nine Indian cartridge cases. (D) All along the ridges and gullies east of Battle Ridge and the Keogh Sector: 108 Indian cartridges, including .50/70’s, .44’s, and .56’s. (E) Along the south side of Finley Ridge: nine Indian bullets. (F) Across Calhoun Hill, roughly north to south: 5 Army cartridge cases.
Shell cases have been found for nearly a quarter mile along the crest of Blummer-Nye-Cartwright Ridge. Henry Weibert reported he found a number of shell cases along the crest of Blummer-Nye-Cartwright Ridge. However, Joseph Blummer wrote to Robert Cartwright in 1928 that he found a number of shells along the northern slope of this ridge about 10 feet from the crest.
Greg Michno breaks the 1984 – 1985 archeological finds into 12 main areas. All areas had a mix of Indian and army relics, while some had a predominance of one type over another to mark it as either a soldier or Indian position.
1. Greasy Grass Ridge, particularly in the southern portion (173 artifacts); northern portion (32 artifacts): Indian positions.
2. Henryville (114): Indian.
3. Today’s cemetery (53): Indian.
4. The “bend” of Deep Ravine (34): Indian.
5. North of Custer Hill (45): Indian.
6. Soldier positions were strongest at Custer Hill (80) and to a lesser extent at Calhoun Hill (63).
7. Mixed areas were in Calhoun Coulee (43), Finley Ridge (23), the Keogh Sector (86), and the South Skirmish Line (169). The latter two areas show considerable mixed activity.
The archeological survey conducted by Fox and Scott in 1984 found that at least seven of the Indian weapons which were used to break the soldier’s line on Finley-Finckle Ridge were also fired against Calhoun’s position from Henryville, southeast. The reason for this was because at 700 yards away on Greasy Grass Ridge, the Indians’ fire was not effective against troops on Calhoun Hill, but at the shorter distance of about 350 yards from Henryville, the Henrys and Winchesters were lethal.
Firearm artifact analysis indicates seven discrete Indian positions: 1. The so-called Henryville area near Calhoun Hill. 2. A small knoll some 200 meters northeast of Last Stand Hill. 3. Two positions on Greasy Grass Ridge. 4. Three positions on the lower end of Greasy Grass Ridge and the flanks of the upper portion of Deep Ravine. • Government cartridge cases were found at these three positions, but it is possible these cartridges could have been retrieved from either the Rosebud fight or the Reno valley fighting. • [This would give a good indication of the tribes involved. Probably Sioux at these locations, rather than Cheyenne.] 5. For the Custer field the number of Indian firearms is projected to be 354 – 414. 6. At the Reno defense site the projected number of Indian guns ranges between 259 and 300, with the repeating guns ranging between 150 and 174.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by mac on Aug 26, 2017 22:36:15 GMT -6
In Strategy of Defeat Chapter 13 Fred discusses the approach to Ford B in his usual even handed manner and comes down on the side of Custer making such an approach. In so doing he points out that this has always been a contentious issue and that both Godfrey and Benteen ultimately did not believe that Custer approached Ford B. I have previously posted that any warrior who was at the Reno valley fight cannot have actually seen the approach to Ford B. On this basis I reject as hearsay the statements in this chapter from Flying Hawk, Two Eagles, Lights and Brave Wolf. Wooden Leg too was at the Reno fight. This leaves the cupboard quite bare. I do not doubt the thrust of the accounts as to how Custer moved to the river. I do not think it happened at Ford B. These accounts are not wrong, they are hearsay and so are misplaced at Ford B. The account of Shave Elk is another matter. He was not at the Reno fight. He does not say Custer came to the river at Ford B. He says (with no time reference) that he was riding up MTC when he saw soldiers coming (I deliberately replace the original description of Custer’s column as there is no evidence Custer personally was present) he says they “came down this coulee toward the river and stopped just a little while, but not long and the Indians crossed over and attacked them. There were a few soldiers ahead of the main body.” There was firing on both sides and “we chased the soldiers up a long, gradual slope or hill in a direction away from the river and over the ridge where the fighting began in good earnest.” Add this to the Red Hawk account I have already posted. Note the bold terrain description and it sounds exactly like the Red Hawk observation. Three divisions of soldiers coming along behind Battle Ridge, stopping and going to skirmish and being forced up a long slope (Company L archaeology) over the ridge (FF Ridge/ Calhoun Hill). So what have we got. No archaeology to suggest any major action at Ford B, no reliable accounts of any approach to the river, two accounts that directly support the premise that Companies L, C, and I were moving away from LSH when they were engaged in battle at Calhoun Hill by warriors coming from the village and the south. I am with Godfrey and Benteen; Custer did not go to Ford B. Please note this argument is not a North South flow and bears no resemblance to Gordon Harper’s work. I have never seen or read any of his work. This theory says there were two battles. The Custer battle at Ford D environs and the Calhoun battle at Calhoun Hill. Two related but discrete events.
Cheers
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Post by mac on Aug 26, 2017 22:37:39 GMT -6
Montrose I trust you see now that with no trip to Ford B we can see Custer took all 5 companies to Ford D. More of that later perhaps. You ask why he did not leave Ford D to the east. I have never been in battle. Those that have tell me it is chaotic and messy and often inexplicable things happen. I can suggest that it is a standard procedure. I can suggest that the warriors have a vote and that tactically they like to move around the enemy’s flanks and form a crescent shape, usually not committing to completing the envelopment until they are sure of victory. Perhaps they had sufficient strength to the east to prevent escape that way. I can suggest that Custer thought that there were still many warriors occupied by Reno/ Benteen and he could safely use that route to return and re unite with them. You ask why he did not leave Ford D to the east. I do not know. It is simply where the evidence leads us. Cheers
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