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Post by montrose on Jan 21, 2018 10:46:01 GMT -6
Robb is the Jethro Bodine of these boards. He has very limited education, some 10th rate high school and a community college education where he can neither read nor understand his diploma. He lacks the education, maturity, or judgement to understand anything on this board.
Go finish elementary school, and seek guidance from your more mature peers here. In 20-30 years, you may have the ability to operate on the 8th grade level.
Else you remain what you are, an immature, badly educated emotional child; full of rage, with the absence of any ability of rational thought.
Your posts just prove your ignorance, lack of maturity, lack of judgement.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 21, 2018 13:29:16 GMT -6
It was worth logging on, just to put a "like" by the above post!
People on these boards are judged by their contribution, Robb or Pequod or peabrain or whatever, has not even started a thread on this board, not one in almost two years, in fact all his has done is criticize and he even can't even do that without insulting the poster.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 22, 2018 9:58:26 GMT -6
Heading to the Shot Show in Las Vegas shortly will return next weekend. What happens in Vegas stays in Vegas.
Regards
Steve
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Post by noggy on Jan 23, 2018 3:46:17 GMT -6
I posted another link to a text here in the start of the thread, since I felt it (the memoirs of Lettow-Vorbeck) is a nice addition to Small Wars. After all, it deals with mall scale warfare and is quite interesting. The lessons in both books still hold up, and I was reminded of this story (if I may stray away from the ongoing battle here hehe);
Some time during WW2 on the Eastern front, German soldiers looking through an abandoned or captured Partisan position came across a copy of Lettow-Vorbeck`s book; it seemed the Partisans were using it as a manual when conducting their own guerrilla war against the invaders. Well, the Partisans and regular Soviet forces themselves were also struggling due to the "teachings" of Lettow-Vorbeck. Theodor von Hippel, the man who created the unconventional Brandenburger Unit which operated behind enemy lines, had himself served under L-W in east Africa and learned all the tricks inn the book (no pun intended). Between 1939-44 the Brandenburgers wreaked havoc especially in the East. When when the war ended, several of the surviving soldiers ended up in the Foreign Legion, going among other places to Indo China where their expertise in unorthodox warfare once again came to use. (I think there is a semi valid point her, or maybe just me rambling)
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 23, 2018 8:39:14 GMT -6
Way to stay on topic, Noggy.
Regards, Tom
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Post by montrose on Jan 23, 2018 14:09:56 GMT -6
Geir,
I understand the point you are making. A "small war" approach offers tactical advantages in fighting adversaries in areas, where neither of you represent the local natives.
Problem is the locals sometimes decide their own fate. The factions you mention as understanding the TACTICAL side of small wars, all won some battles and lost their wars.
A running argument in Army Special Forces is whether we can win wars solely through fighting "by, with, Through" local forces. Meaning we beat the local enemy by recruiting their own local opponents.
And here is the rub. You must understand local political, economic, social and military factors. (PESM if I need to discuss theory). A blanket LW theory fails, every time. We won the west despite incompetent leaders like Custer, because we had competent leaders like Crook. Use indig to fight indig, but you have to know the PESM factors to recruit support.
To understand the competence of Crook vice Custer, how many Indians Crook recruited vice GAC is the base line. Remember Crooks goal was 10 timees what he had, based on opposition from GACs allies. This puts Crook as at least 50 times more effective than GAC, but more 250 times more effective.
Play the Super Bowl with a single player, and tell me how that turns out. There is a general belief that massive force wins, every time, no matter what. But small wars involve massive logistical problems. Small wars are better suited to higher quality forces, with a lower supply window.
A standard saying of my former job was that quality mattered more than quality. Ummm, ACW, WWI, WWII all point against that. Situation matters. In a small war with large logistic issues, this matters.
Is this understandable?
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Post by herosrest on Jan 23, 2018 14:16:47 GMT -6
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Post by noggy on Jan 24, 2018 2:52:09 GMT -6
Geir, Listen to montrose, he's the authority on small wars and large, and if you don;t believe me, just ask him... Regards, Pequod I have nothing but the greatest respect for Montrose. I "stalked" this boards for a good while just reading in order to further my own understanding of the LBH battle. Posts by Montrose, Fred (books plushere) and others, including some who don`t post here any more, are the reason I joined. Regards, Geir
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Post by noggy on Jan 24, 2018 4:11:48 GMT -6
Geir, I understand the point you are making. A "small war" approach offers tactical advantages in fighting adversaries in areas, where neither of you represent the local natives. Problem is the locals sometimes decide their own fate. The factions you mention as understanding the TACTICAL side of small wars, all won some battles and lost their wars. A running argument in Army Special Forces is whether we can win wars solely through fighting "by, with, Through" local forces. Meaning we beat the local enemy by recruiting their own local opponents. And here is the rub. You must understand local political, economic, social and military factors. (PESM if I need to discuss theory). A blanket LW theory fails, every time. We won the west despite incompetent leaders like Custer, because we had competent leaders like Crook. Use indig to fight indig, but you have to know the PESM factors to recruit support. To understand the competence of Crook vice Custer, how many Indians Crook recruited vice GAC is the base line. Remember Crooks goal was 10 timees what he had, based on opposition from GACs allies. This puts Crook as at least 50 times more effective than GAC, but more 250 times more effective. Play the Super Bowl with a single player, and tell me how that turns out. There is a general belief that massive force wins, every time, no matter what. But small wars involve massive logistical problems. Small wars are better suited to higher quality forces, with a lower supply window. A standard saying of my former job was that quality mattered more than quality. Ummm, ACW, WWI, WWII all point against that. Situation matters. In a small war with large logistic issues, this matters. Is this understandable? I absolutely understand, and agree. But maybe we are also talking a little bit "past each other" (I`m sure this is a direct translation of a Norwegian saying, but I should make sense)? The LW book was posted as a supplement, presenting a different view on how small wars are waged, this time by the outgunned and outnumbered. And he makes for an interesting case regarding your points, so bear with me a little here while I ramble on while the computer system we use at work is down: In the case of LW and small wars, the pre-1914 warfare in German East Africa can somewhat be compared to the US conquest of the West; a large territory with numerous martial tribes willing to fight each other and the colonialists. The Germans more than I`d reckon any other colonial power relied heavy on the use of Natives to do their fighting in the 75 plus big and small uprisings finding place between the end of the 1880s and 1914. The whole Schutztruppe (German colonial forces) was built around local and Sudanese privates and NCOs, led by German officers who spoke Swahili and had stayed long enough in the field to handle malaria, know the terrain and understand the customs of the locals. The position of the askari (the native soldier) was constructed by the local German Government so that they had a status almost like that of the samurai in old Japan, only with whites above them, given more or less carte blanche and thereby creating an incentive for other natives to want sign up. And like the Apache scouts and so on, soldiering was seen as a valid way to remain a warrior among martial tribes not allowed to fight each other anymore. After their service were over, the veterans were given land and cattle, just as much as a reward as to keep them loyal. This combined with the fear previous wars had stricken in the rest of the population meant that during the 1WW in GEA, there were no uprisings or other situations of note that disturbed the German defense effort. The German colonial wars where brutal beyond words; I believe that during the Maji-Maji rebellion an area the size of Germany itself was burned and laid waste to deny the rebels safe bases and crops, causing 300-500k civilians to starve to death and others to succumb to disease. So when the Allies started invading, the native population either supported or feared the Germans too much to rise up. Well prepared supply depots had been arranged early on and allowed the often smooth tactical retreats of the Germans, and even if they were seldom guarded few if any instances of sabotage found place. The allied forces, at it`s most consisting of some 300k men and 1 to 2 million native carriers couldn`t handle a couple of thousand askaris and their German officers, since they refused to fight conventionally and just left the colony to fight on in Mozambique when allied pressure started to be a little to much i GEA. The Germans were as expected by LW met as liberators there, since the Portuguese were hated and there was a constant series of rebellions going on, and the Germans were assisted by the locals during their "stay" there. LW never meant to win anything in East Africa, just create a drain of allied resources for as long as possible since he knew the war would be won in Western Europe. Still, when the war ended he was still undefeated in the field, having just invaded British Northern Rhodesia and planning his next move when news about Germany having surrendered some days ago reached him. Now as you say, LWs side lost the war. His campaign, by his own goals and due to never being defeated, was a success one could say. In addition to binding up Allied forces, Great Britain alone used something like its whole military budget in 1913 on chasing LW and his troops. I`d say he succeed at least in some regards, cut of from the rest of the German Empire as he was. And like I wrote, Soviet Partisans adopted some of his principles. I may have misunderstood your line about factions, but they didn`t loose the war. And oh: I am really sorry for the wall of text, this was almost like a PTSD moment where years of research and writing came flashing back. Hope some of it made sense, but i can understand if not! ()Please say it did....) All the best, Geir
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Post by montrose on Jan 24, 2018 4:31:30 GMT -6
Geir,
Great post.
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Post by herosrest on Jan 24, 2018 5:04:44 GMT -6
Gentlemen,
Was their ever doubt that the US would overcome Japan or Russia beat Germany. Both fights for Domination and survival example mindsets best in terms that this argument ripples through study of the blunders leading to humiliation on Greasy Grass. That defeat was a catalyst which galvanised a benevolently divided nation.
Small battles, small wars, regular military branches (Arms), special forces, and the logistics of getting the job done. Japan's three month conquest of the Southwest Pacific was perhaps the most brilliant military campaign ever but, of course the entire endeavour and the mindset which brought it about was flawed and the military undertaking the endeavour understood that they would ultimately be defeated without 'them' bringing about a favourable political settlement.
There is a practical problem with special forces. They are resented by their own military establishment. This is the infantry vs cavalry mindset discussion which dribbles over partisan consideration of Little Bighorn. Special Forces are universally resented, disliked and pariah'd by their own. It's very interesting psychology.
Montrose might just care to illuminate the matter of military elitism. Elite's within elites from the minority (Special Forces) point of view.
Had 7th Cavalry's attack been successful on 2561876 then subsequent history would have been different. As far as Custer was concerned he led the best troops on the planet. According to Sheridan he had no option but to do what he did.
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Post by noggy on Jan 25, 2018 2:36:28 GMT -6
I`m not so sure myself, so if you`re sarcastic I`d understand and even agree a little bit. If not, thank you. Geir
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Post by montrose on Jan 25, 2018 3:51:49 GMT -6
Geir,
Lettow Vorbeck made valuable contributions to the field of Small Wars, Unconventional Warfare. I regard him as the equal of Crook, who was the best my country had in the Indian Wars.
Lettow Vorbeck caused the English Empire (not a coincidence that the Star Wars empire all use English accents) significant problems.
My moniker here is a tribute to a distant ancestor, James Graham. He excelled at Small Wars tactical and operational levels of war, dies because he did not understand strategic level, or just did not care.
Montrose toast:
He either fears his fate too much, Or his desserts are small, Who dares not put it to the touch, To win or lose it all!
I have enormous respect for your posts. The challenge of operating outside your primary language is subtlety, sarcasm, puns, double entendre. A post may unintentionally cause offense to another poster. If I do intend to cause offense, I will send you a tell and make sure we know why. Like that Fred guy, I hates heem.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by pequod on Jan 25, 2018 11:28:41 GMT -6
Montrose is the hater-in-chief....and he works hard to keep the honor...
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Post by Colt45 on Jan 25, 2018 17:50:51 GMT -6
Sorry pequod, have to call BS on your last post. Montrose is a class act, with years of experience to back up anything he says.
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