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Post by tubman13 on Aug 11, 2016 4:40:34 GMT -6
Hi Colt Impressive post and there is much with which to agree. Let me say at the outset that Custer blundered when he split his forces and placed a river between his forces and those of the enemy. As you know I am no Custer fan boy.In a word he was dead the moment he descended MTC. That's why he did not, at least not as traditionally depicted.His following operations were akin to moving the proverbial deckchairs on the Titanic .[poetic licence here] Was the Titanic built in Ireland? You can't say for certain that the markers indicate direction of travel toward Calhoun hill. They could just as easily be men fleeing that area toward MTC after C and L companies collapsed.The position of the Markers do not conform to "fleeing" but rather to loses from a formed and moving column. And flight would not be advisable in that direction. Markers give no indication as to which way an individual is moving. There is no military value in crossing at ford B directly into the middle of the village. You are attempting to cross in a narrow environment where it is not easy to cross in line abreast, which is how you bring a lot of firepower on the opposite force. You also wind up with hostiles to your front in a 180 degree arc. Crossing into those conditions is the same as walking into a u-shaped ambush, i.e. enemy on 3 sides, and with the narrow crossing and river to your rear, your options are very poor.The same would apply to any other possible fording location. You also pay a price for delaying attacking as I have set out in a previous post No delay if time is not wasted if no time is spent inspecting Ford B. Ford D, on the other hand, is a much flatter area with higher terrain to move back to if necessary.These suggested advantages would not have been known to Custer so you cannot offer them as support for a ford crossing. Not to Custer, but if be listened to his scout, Bloody Knife did, as he had camped in this area in the past.
Militarily, it has never made sense for Custer to send 2 companies to ford B, with 3 companies too far away on LNC to provide effective fire support. He wouldn't attempt a crossing with only 2 companies, and he didn't need 2 companies to inspect the ford for possibilities. It also never has made much sense to pull back to Calhoun hill if the pressure or perceived pressure at the ford B was enough to prevent a crossing. Why would anyone move north, further away from support, leaving a gap that is sure to be filled with hostiles that wind up in your rear. And to top that off, why leave 1-2 companies behind, position a 3rd back in the swale area, and then proceed toward ford D with only 2 companies. Custer was rash and aggressive, but not stupid.My scenario suggests Custer was attacking with all 5 coys ; Keogh holding back until the lead battalion had crossed . [avoiding a queue to cross Will not argue opinion not supported by fact. It is a lot more likely the JSIT account gives the most accurate picture of Custer's movements, and that account has all 5 companies staying east of MTC and approaching the river from the ford D area. The terrain there fits a cavalry attack better than MTC, and the fact they moved north after MTCF indicates the pressure was not strong enough to force a move back south toward Reno and Benteen.I'm suggesting the move North was triggered by Custer's incapacitation not by Indian pressure .The withdrawal triggered the pressure. If GAC was incapacitated at a ford and I am not sure he was it was at D, just makes more sense. As I said before, Godfrey an his orderly followed Custer's trail after Terry arrived, the trail was to the east of the ridges and did not diverge to Ford B.
It would only be after the attempt at ford D that the pressure would be enough to force a withdrawal.Again the aborted attack and withdrawal at MTCF was a reaction to Custer's incapacitation . Can't argue here, other than, if he never went there he could not have been incapacitated there.None of us know exactly what happened and most of what we think we know has come from accepting the assumptions of others as passed down in their stories or writings. At this point, the battle could have happened almost any number of ways, so all we can do is look at the evidence we have at hand and use our experiences to frame that evidence into a logical sequence of events, knowing all the while that we are working off a set of assumptions that could easily be wrong.Agreed If one can provide a logical reason for a piece of evidence being found where it was, or someone being at a certain place, then the assumption base becomes more likely. If there is no logical reason for someone being found where they were, or an artifact being found where it is, then it is more difficult to draw a conclusion that has a good chance of being correct.In general agreement but I hold that all artifacts and Indians accounts are tainted. I confine my "fabrications" to character,terrain,tactical logic , weapon potential. Fair enough. I personally believe that all 5 companies moved from the LNC area to Calhoun hill, through the Keogh sector, behind LSH and the battle ridge extension, and then attempted crossing at ford D, but for one reason or another, aborted that, moved back to cemetery ridge and BRE and setup a temporary defensive position. Pressure forced a retreat back to the south. The retrograde was led by L company that had enough time to have at least two different skirmish lines on the hill. C company followed closely behind L and probably tried to secure L's right flank. I company retreated under heavy pressure and got caught up in the Indians coming from Deep Ravine, Calhoun Hill and Calhoun Coulee, and from the east ridge to their left. E company lost their mounts and that exposed F company's left flank, and they already had issues with their front and right flank. F had no choice but to retreat back toward LSH.The 7th had no command and control system to support such a series of moves . Moving while in contact with the enemy is lethal This scenario also helps explain why LSH has men from C company and I company in the mix when their companies were much further away. These might not be men fleeing from Calhoun Hill and I company, but rather men lost during the retreat movements or separated from their companies during the confusion and the retreat. To me, this is a more logical sequence of events than the traditional notion of an attempt to cross at ford B, repulsion and retreat up to calhoun hill, followed by a further move north. It also gives a little more credit to the officers' decisions once past ford B as they responded to what they faced.Moving past MTCF left a door open behind him . Custer did not know there was a ford at D or what the local conditions were nor was he likely to ask advice of his scouts. The price of searching for another ford was such as to bankrupt the operation.At MTCF Custer still had suprise,possible local superiority and this was IT he had to attack. Again Bloody Knife knew where it was and originally there were markers across Hwy 212, one of those markers now resides in the foundation of a Cheyenne home.This is just my opinion. It is no better or worse than any other theory. I just think it can explain what was found and how people were found better than the traditional theory.Gallantly put and a pleasure talking with you. Richard Richard, When it comes to foils, you do good work. I wish AZ would get back from his duties an contribute to this discussion. I am a fair swimmer, but at my age this upstream stuff is getting harder!
Regards, Tom
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Post by wild on Aug 11, 2016 4:42:30 GMT -6
Shan
If the move down to ford B. was primarily to figure out if it made any sense to use it, either directly, or, if the opportunity arose, at some point in the future, and if, as a result of the reconnaissance they found that the other side of the ford was already occupied by Indians who were giving every indication that they were prepared to stand and fight, Indians who were about to be reinforced by even more, mounted Indians making their way towards it, wouldn't this have provide a good opportunity to inflict some serious casualties on them should they attempt to cross? Agreed ; Custer wants to confront the Indians not to avoid them or spend time in pointless manuevering against them
Now this might serve two ends. Firstly, this would allow the other three companies back on Luce ridge to move rapidly North and look for a further crossing: The 7th do not have the command and control assets or communications to facilitate fragmentation of the command. Look at what happened with Reno and Benteen. [Custer does not even brief his senior officers] Ya got to keep it simple. concentrate your strenght and attack before the enemy know you are on to them
Don't follow your last point Cheers
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Post by montrose on Aug 11, 2016 6:18:19 GMT -6
1. Purpose. Discuss the LTC Custer shot at Ford B theory.
2. Discussion. Military organizations act in predictable ways.
a. Impact of Custer WIA. The moment LTC Custer is shot, MAJ Reno becomes regimental commander, and CPT Benteen becomes second in command. The officers and NCOs aware of Custer being WIA are obligated to notify the new chain of command. In particular, that becomes the main effort of the adjutant, to find the new commander and help lead the unit.
b. This means there can not be any movement towards Ford B. There can not be any movement towards north end of Battle Ridge.
c. The location of the adjutant is significant. His job is to get to the new commander as fast as he can, given tactical analysis. CPT Keogh has the rank and seniority to command the detached elements, until the new commander conducts his BFA (Battle Focus Analysis means figures out what the heck is going on) and issues orders.
3. Analysis. I see zero probability of this theory being valid. The behavior of US forces, Indian accounts, location of bodies and archeology all prove this theory to be false.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by wild on Aug 11, 2016 7:40:43 GMT -6
Hi Tom Yes the Titanic was built in Ireland .
I'll strip this down to it's bear essentials .
Custer orders Benteen to pitch into whatever he finds. Custer orders Reno to attack and he will be supported. After viewing the Indian encampment he rallies his troops with " We'll finish them off and go home to our station. Custer is in attack mode. There is only one ford and that is MTCF. Ford D does not exist other than as a possibility. Everything, terrain,situation,Indians dispersed,his own personal agenda ,compells the man to attack at MTCF. Cheers Richard PS Yes we could do with AZ
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Post by Colt45 on Aug 11, 2016 7:56:31 GMT -6
PS Just to emphasise this point again as I think it important for our discussion You cannot offer possible advantages at Ford D in support of Custer going there as these would have been unknown to Custer. The choice Custer had was MTCF or a possibility of something better at a price. cheers How do we know Custer had no knowledge of ford D. Boyer or Bloody Knife could have known and advised him of same. Ford B is visible from LNC, and the village would also have been visible extending north from the ford, up to the point the bluffs to the north obscure the view. It would have been obvious that the village extended farther north than the ford, hence the move north to get around the village, with or without knowledge of another ford. Custer used encirclement in the past and I believe was attempting to do so again, not conduct a flank attack.
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Post by wild on Aug 11, 2016 8:04:22 GMT -6
I'm not totally clear as to Col.Williams reasoning . So just one or two observations.
The chain of command in the 7th was Custer Clan dominated. With the incapacitation of Custer, Reno becomes i/c with Benteen moving to 2i/c . As the units have independent missions and are engaged with the enemy the senior officer present takes control and in this case it is Keogh. All of this is academic under the circumstances and has little or no bearing on the dynamic triggered by Custer's demise. Cheers
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Post by dave on Aug 11, 2016 8:14:08 GMT -6
Colt Good post! You did a really good job of explaining a complex military action so that a civilian like myself could easily grasp.
Will I appreciate the insight you offer in discussing if Custer was shot at Ford B. I do have a couple of questions.
Would the 7th have operated in a predictable manner after Custer was WIA? It seems that in every discussion we have on the board deals with the non standard makeup and operation of GAC, his officers and the regiment.
Would the Custer clique make an effort to find Reno and notify him of GAC's wounding? They seldom followed military customs did they not?
Would they not just rally around him and worry about following proper procedures after the fight if possible? Do you see the adjutant really searching for Reno to notify him he is in command during the fight?
If these are foolish questions, I apologize and just ignore. Regards Dave
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Post by wild on Aug 11, 2016 8:17:22 GMT -6
How do we know Custer had no knowledge of ford D. Boyer or Bloody Knife could have known and advised him of same There were no briefings and no one knew of Custer's plans . Why would BK or Boyer take upon themselves the task of outlining the advantages of fords or any other features for that matter to Custer who would not even listen to his senior capt. There is too much hind sight in play here. Cheers
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Post by wild on Aug 11, 2016 8:19:24 GMT -6
They are not foolish questions Dave ,they are on the ball. Cheers
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Post by Colt45 on Aug 11, 2016 10:21:40 GMT -6
Colt Good post! You did a really good job of explaining a complex military action so that a civilian like myself could easily grasp. Will I appreciate the insight you offer in discussing if Custer was shot at Ford B. I do have a couple of questions. Would the 7th have operated in a predictable manner after Custer was WIA? It seems that in every discussion we have on the board deals with the non standard makeup and operation of GAC, his officers and the regiment. Would the Custer clique make an effort to find Reno and notify him of GAC's wounding? They seldom followed military customs did they not? Would they not just rally around him and worry about following proper procedures after the fight if possible? Do you see the adjutant really searching for Reno to notify him he is in command during the fight? If these are foolish questions, I apologize and just ignore. Regards Dave Dave, the rally around Custer you describe is exactly the sort of thing you would expect if no one had an idea of his overall plan, and fits very well with the description of cavalry actions at cemetery ridge, which would indicate Custer's wounding (if it was Custer that was wounded) was at ford D, not ford B.
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Post by Colt45 on Aug 11, 2016 10:28:38 GMT -6
How do we know Custer had no knowledge of ford D. Boyer or Bloody Knife could have known and advised him of sameThere were no briefings and no one knew of Custer's plans . Why would BK or Boyer take upon themselves the task of outlining the advantages of fords or any other features for that matter to Custer who would not even listen to his senior capt. There is too much hind sight in play here. Cheers Wild, How do you know there were no briefings after Custer went up the bluffs? This is an assumption on your part and you are making statements as facts that are based upon your assumptions. I am not saying you are wrong, you could very well be exactly right, but can you show any proof that there were no briefings or that Custer was the wounded officer? All we have is an Indian account (White Bull Cow if I remember correctly) that stated Custer was wounded at the ford. But his description of the wounded officer conflicts with testimony about what Custer did with his buckskin coat given by soldiers, plus WCB does not specifically identify the ford as ford B, as I recall. You may be correct in your statements, but then again, so might I. I am basing my scenario of Custer's actions on Indian accounts (JSIT), plus my own military experience in mobile warfare and tactics, and the artifact evidence at hand.
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Post by dave on Aug 11, 2016 10:50:33 GMT -6
Colt I have read so much about how dysfunctional GAC and the 7th were both here and in other sources. It seems like Custer was so far from Washington and the army that he had carte blanche to command and use his unit anyway he chose.
Did he follow army customs and procedures in this campaign, that were in fashion in 1876, since leaving FAL? Was Custer's actions/decisions that different from other army commands while on campaigns? It appears to me he just kinda winged on the fly? But I have no prior knowledge or experience to back up my thoughts so am I far off? Regards Dave
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Post by Colt45 on Aug 11, 2016 11:59:00 GMT -6
Custer's biggest mistake was assuming the Indians were running when he had not yet turned up to the bluffs. He received a report, I think from Herendeen, that they were fleeing. Most people of the era though the Indians would flee when confronted by the army, rather than fight, as that had happened before. But the Indians had also stood and fought before also, so the mindset of "Indians always flee when confronted by the army" is and was crap.
Probably assuming that the Indians were fleeing, Custer needed to have a victory that belonged to the 7th only, as he was in the doghouse politically and felt a victory would return him to favor. If, by capturing the women and children, he could bring the Indians to heel, that was the way to do it. He knew beforehand he was facing at least 1500, so he knew he was outnumbered, but if he could capture the non-coms, he might win without having to fight a pitched battle. I think that was his plan when he turned and went up the bluffs, which was the mistake that set everything in motion. The place for the cavalry to fight was the valley, where he sent Reno.
His sending Benteen on the left scout after crossing the divide was a sound military maneuver, and he had experience with unseen hostiles showing up to a battle at Washita. Sending Reno into the valley to attack the village with instructions that Reno would be supported by the whole outfit indicates he planned on having Reno start the engagement and develop the battle space, after which Custer could then maneuver with the rest of the unit to take advantage of what Reno started. That order to Reno infers that the whole fight will be in the valley. Hearing that the Indians were fleeing caused him to change his plans. That is the point where he begins to wing it and fly by the seat of his pants.
His movements from the bluffs on also indicates proper use of terrain, if we accept JSIT's account and Godfrey's account about seeing Custer's trail. That trail stayed behind the ridges east of MTC to provide concealment, and the movements up to ford D also indicate the desire for concealment until ready to attack. We can't know exactly what happened at the crossing point with regards to formations or plan of attack after crossing, nor can we know the exact intermediate locations of the 5 companies before their destruction. The artifact evidence gives us clues as to where the men were at times, plus the bodies that could be identified as belonging to a certain company also help in establishing that certain people were at one time in that location. So we can't say for sure if he used good tactics to try and extradite himself from a bad situation or if he just totally went stupid after the crossing attempt. If he was the one wounded at ford D, it really helps explain why officers like Smith were found on LSH instead of with his company and why the 5 companies appear to have been herded and driven like buffalo.
A really good book that lays out Custer's personality and mindset, and helped me to envision what might have been his thinking at LBH is "Custer's Trials". It covers Custer up to the point where he leaves FAL, but you wind up with plenty of evidence about how he goes about his business and what his priorities were. I highly recommend reading it. It helps in correlating the evidence and accounts into a likely scenario of what happened in the Custer sector of the battle.
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Post by benteen on Aug 11, 2016 15:18:44 GMT -6
Beth/Gentlemen
I have been reading with interest this fine discussion of Custer at Ford D. I agree that Custer was looking to attack there. Why..because thats what Custer always did, he attacked. However I think an important fact has been overlooked in this discussion. That is, why was Custer looking to attack the North end of the Village
Gen Terrys orders to Custer was not to find and destroy an Indian Village. The main thrust of his orders to Custer were that if the Indians were where he thought they would be, (Valley of the LBH)that Custer was to prevent them from escaping to the South. Terry hoped that the two columns could act as a hammer and anvil in defeating them. Now I understand that Terry gave Custer some leeway, but I think that is SOP. A commander is sending a subordinate 100 miles away and does not know if that subordinate will run into something previously unknown, so he giving him the authority to assess and evaluate the situation and come to the best possible decision. Custer did not run into anything unknown or unexpected, the Indians were exactly where Terry thought they would be. So, Custers entire objective would be to prevent them from escaping to the South...So why didnt he.
I dont believe that these Indian were looking to escape anywhere. They had given up their mobility for protection in numbers. If they were going to scatter they would have done it after they fought Crook. In fact I dont think this small city of 8-10 thousand could flee if they wanted to. However of Custer thought they would flee. why is he attacking in the North the only direction they could flee would be South, exactly the opposite of what Terry wanted.
I have ny own opinion of why he did it, but I am interested in hearing other views or opinions on it,
Be Well Dan
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Post by tubman13 on Aug 11, 2016 16:52:36 GMT -6
Dan,
I was only an E-7 and I saw officers skirt the intent of an order. I have even seen disobedience, with the excuse of on not clear or given latitude. Custer wanted this to be his show(game, set, and match).
Regards, Tom
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