|
Post by jodak on Jan 28, 2016 15:31:32 GMT -6
|
|
|
Post by jodak on Feb 1, 2016 8:59:59 GMT -6
February 1, 1941 Admiral Husband Kimmel becomes commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, replacing Admiral James Richardson who was relieved from command due to his opposition to the basing of the fleet in Hawaii. Prior to summer 1940 Pearl Harbor was a minor naval base, serving as the permanent base of only one cruiser division and an assortment of submarines and other small craft, while the bulk of the fleet was based at San Diego and other West Coast locations. In April of 1940 the fleet conducted its annual large scale exercise, or "Fleet Problem" XXI, much of which took place in Hawaiian waters, and it was subsequently ordered to remain in Hawaii to serve as a deterrent to Japanese aggression in the Pacific. Richardson vehemently opposed this, insisting that basing the fleet at Pearl served no useful purpose while degrading its combat capabilities, due to the lack of facilities and logistics for adequately maintaining it there. He also believed that the base was largely indefensible and was the logical first point of attack, likely without warning, in the event of war with Japan. He was so persistent in his opposition that President Roosevelt effectively fired him and replaced him with Kimmel, who was at the time the commander of the fleet's cruisers.
It is often stated that Kimmel was promoted over "X" number of more senior admirals, with the implication being that he was not the most qualified person for the job. However, that needs to be placed in perspective. At the time of his assignment to command the fleet, Kimmel was nearly 59 years old with 37 years of service, so, while it was true that some others were more senior, he was still very senior and experienced. Furthermore, the mandatory retirement age was 64, and, when it is considered that the assignment was normally for two years, that means that the pool of viable candidates was essentailly limited to only those under 62 years of age, meaning that, at most, Kimmel was only about three years junior to any other possible candidate. In addition, many of those possible alternatives were already serving in high level positions, from which it was not practical or desirable to reassign them, or had previously served in such positions, making it simply someone else's turn. All-in-all there was really only a very small handful of officers with the requisite experience, seniority, and availability to have been given the command. One of these, Ernest King, was named commander of the Atlantic Fleet at the same time that Kimmel was named to the Pacific, and we can speculate as to what the outcome might have been had the roles been reversed. Another candidate was Chester Nimitz, who was to succeed Kimmel. Some sources claim that Nimitz was offered but declined the command prior to it going to Kimmel, so, again, we can speculate on what might have been different. While by all accounts an energetic and effective organizer and commander, Kimmel was perceived as being overly focused on detail, at the expense of a broader vision. That too can be the basis of speculation as to what impact it might have had in Kimmel's actions or lack thereof in the run up to the attack.
|
|
|
Post by dave on Feb 1, 2016 12:20:29 GMT -6
jodak Admiral James Richardson's amazingly prescience vision must have irritated FDR and any others who advocated for and removed him from command. History could have been altered if he had been able to resist the movement of the fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor.
I know very little about this person or his career. I wonder if he would have made a good CinCUS during the War or would he had been replaced by either Kimmel or Nimitz? Such are the capricious acts of history.
I really appreciate your posts and look forward to many more. Regards Dave
|
|
|
Post by jodak on Feb 1, 2016 13:43:21 GMT -6
Dave,
I can find nothing to share with you about Richardson other than a fairly limited wiki biography. However, in addition to a overall strong background of experience, the wiki entry offers this -
"[Richardson] was one of the Navy's foremost figures. Since his earliest days, after leaving Annapolis, he had made the study of Japanese warfare his life's work. He was beyond question the Navy's outstanding authority on Pacific naval warfare and Japanese strategy."
It would therefore appear that he would have been ideally suited to command the fleet during the war. However, at the time of his dismissal he was only a few months short of the end of the normal two year assignment, and, while it is possible that he may have been extended in or reappointed to the position, especially in light of the brewing international situation, there is also the possibility that he would have shortly rotated out of it anyway. He would have also encountered the mandatory retirement age in 1943, but it seems that the Navy and FDR looked the other way when it suited their purposes to do so in that regard. For example, upon reaching 64 in late 1942, Admiral King sent FDR a letter informing that he had reached mandatory retirement age, to which Roosevelt replied "so what?"
I did find the information about Nimitz being offered the position as Richardson's replacement. Nimitz later stated that Navy Secretary Frank Knox had offered him the job in January 1941, but Nimitz declined because he considered himself too junior and feared his early advancement would generate bad feelings. There may also have been an element of self serving to it, as indicated in a mid 1930's conversation with his son, Chester Nimitz, Jr. - "I do believe we are going to have a major war, with Japan and Germany, and that the war is going to start by a very serious surprise attack and defeat of U.S. armed forces, and that there is going to be a major revulsion on the part of the political power in Washington against all those in command at sea, and they are going to be thrown out, though it won't be their fault necessarily. And I wish to be in a position of sufficient prominence so that I will then be considered as one to be sent to sea, because that appears to be the route".
The assignment went to Kimmel instead. The Pacific Online Encyclopedia has a good biography of Kimmel, reflecting upon his qualifications, strengths, and weaknesses - pwencycl.kgbudge.com/K/i/Kimmel_Husband_E.htm
|
|
|
Post by jodak on Feb 1, 2016 14:48:22 GMT -6
The US has a tendency for tech arrogance. We assume away enemy countermeasures. www.mintpressnews.com/the-story-you-arent-being-told-about-iran-capturing-two-american-vessels/212937/Iran took over a US drone, flew it into their territory, and landed it. Iran, China, Pakistan and Syria all have GPS spoofers. The Air Force is pushing a strategy where they claim they can win unconventional wars purely through air power, with no ground troops required. The current US President has embraced this strategy. Look at a map of ISIS/terrorist territory from the height of the surge to today. On the scale of a 2000% increase that has gone from 2 countries to dozens. Our enemies are learning to counter our technology. Our answer so far is to keep pushing what we have, not what we need. Imagine the impact on the world if we lose a carrier? The Iranians conduct annual exercises developing tactics to do just that. Taking a carrier out at sea is hard, but they have conducted exercises attacking one in a port, or surprise attacks from commercial ships. Another Pearl Harbor surprise is not out of the question. Our enemies show more creativity than we do. High tech meets low tech. I've no doubt that our military and civilian agencies, such as the Secret Service, have similar programs. globalnews.ca/video/2490373/dutch-police-training-eagles-to-attack-drones
|
|
|
Post by dave on Feb 1, 2016 22:45:27 GMT -6
jodak Thank you for the further information about Admiral Richardson. I wonder what if he had been listened to and his plans and ideas adopted? Nimitz was an prescient as well with his prediction about the coming war. Thank God we have always had great leaders in times of crise of our country. To bring up another subject. I have had a discussion with another poster regrading the fate of the USS Porter in October of 1942. A couple of prominent authors have provided different ideas as to the demise. One attributing the sinking as the result of a Japanese submarine attack and th other to a TBF torpedo accidentally releasing a torpedo. Have you any information regarding this matter? If so please share. Regards Dave
|
|
|
Post by jodak on Feb 2, 2016 8:38:20 GMT -6
Most attribute the sinking of the Porter to the submarine. The fellow that attributed it to a torpedo from a ditching Avenger seems to have just thrown that out as a theory, but with nothing concrete to base it on. Also, for a damaged Avenger to carry its torpedo all of the way back to the task force before jettisoning it in preparation for ditching would make little sense, but stranger things have happened. However, it might be explained by the pilot being wounded and not thinking or functioning properly.
|
|
|
Post by dave on Feb 2, 2016 10:47:00 GMT -6
jodak Thank you for the information about the Porter. I would love to discover their sources and see for myself the data. Regards Dave
|
|
|
Post by jodak on Feb 2, 2016 15:59:44 GMT -6
jodak Thank you for the further information about Admiral Richardson. I wonder what if he had been listened to and his plans and ideas adopted? Nimitz was an prescient as well with his prediction about the coming war. Thank God we have always had great leaders in times of crise of our country. To bring up another subject. I have had a discussion with another poster regrading the fate of the USS Porter in October of 1942. A couple of prominent authors have provided different ideas as to the demise. One attributing the sinking as the result of a Japanese submarine attack and th other to a TBF torpedo accidentally releasing a torpedo. Have you any information regarding this matter? If so please share. Regards Dave Check this out - www.pelicanpub.com/content/9781589805927_CH1.pdf
|
|
|
Post by dave on Feb 2, 2016 16:40:17 GMT -6
jodak Admiral Richardson was the 20th century's version of Nostradamus. He had such incredible insight and vision as to the happening of the War and how long it took for the US to respond and eventually overcome the Japanese. He was a brilliant man who had compassion for his colleagues in his memoirs by not naming names and statements made by others. A very fine man. Thank you so much for sharing this material with me. Regards Dave
|
|
|
Post by jodak on Feb 3, 2016 12:18:00 GMT -6
I don’t know that Richardson’s insight was necessarily greater than many others. The navy had anticipated and planned for war with Japan for many years and, as evidenced by several of the Fleet Problems, even anticipated an attack on Pearl Harbor. However, there were several items in the article I linked that caught my attention. One was that Richardson was sufficiently worried about a surprise attack that, unlike Kimmel, he maintained a semblance of an early warning air patrol. The article indicates that Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Stark ordered him to desist from that, but I don’t know why he would, and nothing in the record regarding Kimmel’s failure to maintain air patrols hints that it was in any way as a result of any influence by Stark. Moreover, Stark did not really have the authority to “order” Richardson to do anything. The Navy’s structure was somewhat confusing, and, as CNO, Stark was primarily responsible for only the administrative type functions of the Navy, including such things as personnel, ships, intelligence, war plans, etc. He was also what we would now call the Chief of Staff, meaning Chief of Staff to the Secretary of the Navy and the President. As such, as is true of the chief of staff of anything, he really had no command authority of his own but only served to “advise” the secretary and president and those truly in command. However, as is also generally true of chief of staffs, his words were generally perceived as carrying the authority of the secretary/president, for whom he spoke. In that sense he was somewhat like Cooke was under Custer – not having actual command authority but at the same time having the imputed authority to issue orders in the commander’s name, even to those of higher actual rank. On the other hand, Richardson, in his relationship to FDR, was more like Reno or Benteen were to Custer, and his relationship to Stark was somewhat analogous to the Reno/Benteen relationship to Cooke.
Prior to 1941 there were no separate Pacific and Atlantic Fleets, as such, but the bulk of the fleet was divided into what was called the Battle Force and the Scouting Force. The Battle Force was built around battleships and light cruisers, and was stationed in the Pacific, while the Scouting Force was built around heavy cruisers and was stationed in the Atlantic. Both “Forces” had an aerial component, with aircraft carriers assigned to them. The forces often came together for joint maneuvers, such as the Fleet Problems that we have discussed, and it was envisioned that they would combine in the event of war. As such, they were treated as one overall fleet, designated as simply “United States Fleet”, with one overall commander, which from 1940 to 1941 was Richardson. In that respect, although we primarily associated him with the Pacific component, the larger and more important of the two, his true position was Commander in Chief United States Fleet (CinCUS [ironically pronounced sink us]), making him the highest ranking naval “commander”. His interactions with FDR should therefore be viewed in that light – as the highest naval commander dealing with his civilian commander – and, as is sometimes the case, those interactions can become heated and contentious, and culminated in Richardson telling the president that the navy had lost faith in its civilian leaders. MacArthur had done much the same while serving as army Chief of Staff, and he later said that one meeting with FDR became so heated that he became physically ill and threw up on the steps of the White House in leaving. However, MacArthur survived (or maybe he didn’t and would otherwise have been reappointed as CoS), but Richardson did not. Coincident with his replacement the navy reorganized into separate Pacific and Atlantic Fleets, with true commanders for each – Kimmel for the Pacific (ComPac) and King for the Atlantic (ComAtl). However, there was still the concept that the fleets might combine in the event of war, so one of the commanders was designated to be the overall commander if that occurred, and that was Kimmel, so he was “dual hatted” as ComPac and CinCUS. Subsequent to Pearl Harbor and the reshuffling that entailed, Nimitz replaced Kimmel as only ComPac, while King was replaced as ComAtl and became CinCUS and, at the same time, CNO, combining the offices, which, to my mind, made more sense. I’ve greatly diverged from my original point of Richardson being perceptive enough to maintain aerial patrols, but hopefully the additional information, although I am sure very confusing, is helpful.
|
|
|
Post by dave on Feb 3, 2016 18:45:01 GMT -6
jodak As always your posts are enlightening and enjoyable. I believe Richardson was ill treated by the President and the navy. He was confident enough of his beliefs to act and employ them as able. I have studied additional information about this man and the attack. Thank you for sharing this subject with me and I look forward to more posts. Regards Dave PS did you get the pm I sent?
|
|
|
Post by jodak on Feb 4, 2016 8:24:24 GMT -6
Dave, I've never given much thought to Richardson, and I guess I viewed him as just a footnote. However, your interest in him has piqued mine as well, with the result that I have done some digging and found more information on him. In particular, I found his memoirs here (babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015014181898;view=1up;seq=7 ), that you will find of interest. However, I must say that I am not favorably impressed, and he reminds me a lot of Omar Bradley in his memoirs, in that it is largely self serving hyperbole. In that sense, we should not be misled into believing that he was more than he was just because he tells us he was. He also makes a number of assertions about various things that we should be careful to remember are just his opinions and not necessarily correct. While probably unfair, impressions matter, and in every photo that I have seen of him ( www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/OnlineLibrary/photos/pers-us/uspers-r/j-richdn.htm ) he has a sour looking, possibly arrogant countenance, and superficially doesn't appear to me as if he would have been very likeable. As far as his treatment by Roosevelt, I doubt that there are many situations in which someone can tell their superior that they do not have confidence in them and not suffer repercussions.
|
|
|
Post by jodak on Feb 4, 2016 10:30:05 GMT -6
Let me preface the following by saying that I am talking about something that I really know nothing about, but a particular concern of mine relates to the F-35 that you mention above as well as numerous other air and naval assets. It seems to me that the Navy and even more so the Air Force have become infatuated with stealth technology, making it the be all and end all of future weapon systems. As a result, they devote tremendous resources toward developing and deploying stealth technology, with little apparent real utility, when other systems would be "good enough", at much lower cost and with greater availability and reliability.
www.cnn.com/2016/02/04/politics/pentagon-f-35-fighter-jet-report/index.html
www.cnn.com/2015/07/16/politics/f-35-jsf-operational-costs/
|
|
|
Post by dave on Feb 4, 2016 11:20:24 GMT -6
jodak I am looking forward to reading the info you sourced. I am really enjoying the opportunity to expand my knowledge about the men and WW II. I imagine that most if not all folks write their memoirs putting themselves in the best light. Richardson was impressive to me in that his predictions as to when and where the Japanese would strike along with his idea of the war going for 4 years. Others may have done the same but I am not aware of them now but could change ideas as I learn more. Regards Dave
|
|