LTC Mark Hoyt

[fred]

There seems to be a rather interesting retired army lieutenant colonel on the boards next door. I noticed as well he has registered here, but no posts as yet. I am somewhat perplexed-- knowing the measure of intelligent posts over there-- why he has chosen as he has... maybe because of a thesis he wrote...? I do not know. I have, however, taken the liberty to copy-and-paste some of what he posted there and placed it below. I assume, legally, this is OK to do, since these are public boards and anyone may join and view them. Giving the man his proper due, the following three were recently posted and I have copied them directly.

He poses some interesting points that need to be discussed. Anyway, here they are: (and by the way, I will take this all down if there are objections)


“Custer Battle plan?” thread— approximately 2:47 PM, EST—

just look up Sioux and Mark Hoyt and Google it...there are some pages that upload from the DTIC website.

I am not sure of my rights to this, as someone else copyrighted it (maybe an author here could tell me if I can send it for free). I never really wanted to do anything but add to the research as I am not polished enough to publish something for general consumption. Besides you have to be a student of the Sioux Wars (like all the folks on this board) to probably even appreciate the paper. I was literally just trying to contribute something to the overwhelming amount of material and it was aimed at telling my fellow Army Officers to "think out of the box". I had been irritated by a Colonel that opened the CGSC course with a lecture on why he was so mad at Custer, and my first thought was that he would have probably have done the same thing - given the same information. I am not a "Custer lover", but he did what almost every cavalry commander would have done. My thought was that Custer, Reno, Benteen were all very stunned at the resistance they encountered, that was so overwhelming and violent that they all had trouble coping with it.

“Custer Battle plan?” thread— approximately 2:20 PM, EST—

The Army's Sioux Campaign Of 1876: Identifying The Horse As The Center Of Gravity Of The Sioux - by Mark Hoyt (I was a Major back then - retired as a LTC). As I didn't copyright it, someone else did, and they were probably disappointed when they sold 2 copies...LOL. I hope to heck they fixed the grammar errors, because when I reread my draft notes, it was embarrassing..

The thesis basically covered the Battles of the Powder River, Rosebud and Little Bighorn to help illustrate why the Army's campaign should have been focused at taking out the horse herds of the Lakota (understanding that I am not stating that this is political correct - or nice). My point was that the Army almost got it right, but they hadn't quite shifted the target from the village to the ponies. After Gen. Sheridan and Gen. Crook met with Grant in D.C. and collaborated to subvert the Sioux, and given the eventual follow on officer calls - it was obvious that the mobility of the Sioux and Cheyenne were appreciated. However, they didn't think of removing the mobility and were stuck in a single mindset of going after the village.

The Battle of Palo Duro Canyon reflects the right way to win (again not saying it is PC - this is after all a military thesis) - capture 1,400 ponies and 9 months later the Comanche enter Fort Sill and surrender. Therefore, at least Sheridan who directed Colonel Mckenzie and then Colonel Miles to the attack had a classic example of how to win the campaign and they still went towards the thoughts of having to get to the village. All parties should have considered getting every Crow, Arikara, and Shoshone warrior they could muster, and promising them ponies (which was basically money for the NAs) - then they should have focused on going after the pony herds. I don't say all that in the thesis, because you are not allowed to get to far off topic - to quote my conclusion.

General Sheridan writing about the remaining hostile Sioux and Cheyenne bands in his 1876 Annual Report might have recognized the answer: “the Sioux war will be at an end, and I think all future trouble with them, as it is intended to put most of them on foot, and a Sioux on foot is a Sioux warrior no longer.” No Army field commander in the Sioux Wars ever questioned whether the focus of an Army attack should not be the village. The COG of the Sioux was the horse, but developing a strategy to attack horse herds would have required a commander willing to challenge this old assumption. This challenge never happened, and the Army fought a drawn out and expensive war against the Sioux using a strategy of exhaustion, aimed at attacking villages to wear out the enemy’s will to fight. Even after Army commanders had evolved their strategy and operational maneuver in reaction to the enemy’s mobility, the Army never changed its focus to attack the enemy’s COG--the horse.


“Custer Battle plan?” thread— approximately 1:05 PM, EST—

Since someone quoted my thesis (and I just found the site), if we look at this in hind sight (its history) I wrote my thesis (the COG of the Sioux) to try to discuss something I had not seen mentioned (at least I couldn't find it in 2002). Given the quality of comments and expertise on this site (which I have never encountered on this topic) I dread making this comment (but I like being shredded - and after Afghanistan, Iraq - feel free).

I think that having observed that the horse herd was on Reno's side of the river - the easiest way (not only) to defeat the Sioux was to keep the force together and strike immediately trying to drive a wedge between the horse herd and the majority of the Lakota/Cheyenne - and their short ranged weapons and the village.

However, the very classic flank attack was the method almost any officer would probably have used (or some variant), and my above sentence takes a lot of 20/20 into account. Custer would have had to known that he was taking the village nearly completely by surprise (I don't think he knew that - in fact I think he felt they were being alerted). He would have had to understood that forcing the Lakota to fight dismounted would have allowed him to dominate the battle - as their lack of mobility and lack of an unified command structure would have been great barriers (not to mention the panic...etc.). The Lakota were NOT Zulus, and they didn't charge in masses while taking huge casualties - the Zulus actually had formations and a command structure.

OF course the question then is could the slower Cavalry have done this. It looks like some of the Scouts did, but their mobility was better. I also apologize for the Grammar and other errors in my thesis.

I do love the conversations, and catching up on them is like Crack - although I think I have seen more arrows fired on it - then were fired at this battle.



Best wishes,
Fred.

[dan25]

Nov 11, 2015 14:21:04 GMT -6 fred said:

There seems to be a rather interesting retired army lieutenant colonel on the boards next door. I noticed as well he has registered here, but no posts as yet. I am somewhat perplexed-- knowing the measure of intelligent posts over there-- why he has chosen as he has... maybe because of a thesis he wrote...? I do not know. I have, however, taken the liberty to copy-and-paste some of what he posted there and placed it below. I assume, legally, this is OK to do, since these are public boards and anyone may join and view them. Giving the man his proper due, the following three were recently posted and I have copied them directly.

He poses some interesting points that need to be discussed. Anyway, here they are: (and by the way, I will take this all down if there are objections)


“Custer Battle plan?” thread— approximately 2:47 PM, EST—

just look up Sioux and Mark Hoyt and Google it...there are some pages that upload from the DTIC website.

I am not sure of my rights to this, as someone else copyrighted it (maybe an author here could tell me if I can send it for free). I never really wanted to do anything but add to the research as I am not polished enough to publish something for general consumption. Besides you have to be a student of the Sioux Wars (like all the folks on this board) to probably even appreciate the paper. I was literally just trying to contribute something to the overwhelming amount of material and it was aimed at telling my fellow Army Officers to "think out of the box". I had been irritated by a Colonel that opened the CGSC course with a lecture on why he was so mad at Custer, and my first thought was that he would have probably have done the same thing - given the same information. I am not a "Custer lover", but he did what almost every cavalry commander would have done. My thought was that Custer, Reno, Benteen were all very stunned at the resistance they encountered, that was so overwhelming and violent that they all had trouble coping with it.

“Custer Battle plan?” thread— approximately 2:20 PM, EST—

The Army's Sioux Campaign Of 1876: Identifying The Horse As The Center Of Gravity Of The Sioux - by Mark Hoyt (I was a Major back then - retired as a LTC). As I didn't copyright it, someone else did, and they were probably disappointed when they sold 2 copies...LOL. I hope to heck they fixed the grammar errors, because when I reread my draft notes, it was embarrassing..

The thesis basically covered the Battles of the Powder River, Rosebud and Little Bighorn to help illustrate why the Army's campaign should have been focused at taking out the horse herds of the Lakota (understanding that I am not stating that this is political correct - or nice). My point was that the Army almost got it right, but they hadn't quite shifted the target from the village to the ponies. After Gen. Sheridan and Gen. Crook met with Grant in D.C. and collaborated to subvert the Sioux, and given the eventual follow on officer calls - it was obvious that the mobility of the Sioux and Cheyenne were appreciated. However, they didn't think of removing the mobility and were stuck in a single mindset of going after the village.

The Battle of Palo Duro Canyon reflects the right way to win (again not saying it is PC - this is after all a military thesis) - capture 1,400 ponies and 9 months later the Comanche enter Fort Sill and surrender. Therefore, at least Sheridan who directed Colonel Mckenzie and then Colonel Miles to the attack had a classic example of how to win the campaign and they still went towards the thoughts of having to get to the village. All parties should have considered getting every Crow, Arikara, and Shoshone warrior they could muster, and promising them ponies (which was basically money for the NAs) - then they should have focused on going after the pony herds. I don't say all that in the thesis, because you are not allowed to get to far off topic - to quote my conclusion.

General Sheridan writing about the remaining hostile Sioux and Cheyenne bands in his 1876 Annual Report might have recognized the answer: “the Sioux war will be at an end, and I think all future trouble with them, as it is intended to put most of them on foot, and a Sioux on foot is a Sioux warrior no longer.” No Army field commander in the Sioux Wars ever questioned whether the focus of an Army attack should not be the village. The COG of the Sioux was the horse, but developing a strategy to attack horse herds would have required a commander willing to challenge this old assumption. This challenge never happened, and the Army fought a drawn out and expensive war against the Sioux using a strategy of exhaustion, aimed at attacking villages to wear out the enemy’s will to fight. Even after Army commanders had evolved their strategy and operational maneuver in reaction to the enemy’s mobility, the Army never changed its focus to attack the enemy’s COG--the horse.


“Custer Battle plan?” thread— approximately 1:05 PM, EST—

Since someone quoted my thesis (and I just found the site), if we look at this in hind sight (its history) I wrote my thesis (the COG of the Sioux) to try to discuss something I had not seen mentioned (at least I couldn't find it in 2002). Given the quality of comments and expertise on this site (which I have never encountered on this topic) I dread making this comment (but I like being shredded - and after Afghanistan, Iraq - feel free).

I think that having observed that the horse herd was on Reno's side of the river - the easiest way (not only) to defeat the Sioux was to keep the force together and strike immediately trying to drive a wedge between the horse herd and the majority of the Lakota/Cheyenne - and their short ranged weapons and the village.

However, the very classic flank attack was the method almost any officer would probably have used (or some variant), and my above sentence takes a lot of 20/20 into account. Custer would have had to known that he was taking the village nearly completely by surprise (I don't think he knew that - in fact I think he felt they were being alerted). He would have had to understood that forcing the Lakota to fight dismounted would have allowed him to dominate the battle - as their lack of mobility and lack of an unified command structure would have been great barriers (not to mention the panic...etc.). The Lakota were NOT Zulus, and they didn't charge in masses while taking huge casualties - the Zulus actually had formations and a command structure.

OF course the question then is could the slower Cavalry have done this. It looks like some of the Scouts did, but their mobility was better. I also apologize for the Grammar and other errors in my thesis.

I do love the conversations, and catching up on them is like Crack - although I think I have seen more arrows fired on it - then were fired at this battle.



Best wishes,
Fred.

Fred,
This guy has a very interesting point. He really should be on this board where he would be more appreciated. I wonder if he even knows about this board?

Regards
dan25

[fred]

Nov 11, 2015 17:59:35 GMT -6 dan25 said:

This guy has a very interesting point. He really should be on this board where he would be more appreciated. I wonder if he even knows about this board?

Dan,

Oh, he does. Check out the last person who joined the board. Some interesting stuff. I have his thesis, but have not read it. I will try to skim through it tonight.

I have read two others, one by a West Pointer who got his masters from LSU. The thesis was awful, but the real disgrace lies with the university granting a masters degree with that drivel.

The second was an army major at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University. Awful work... and that got a masters as well.

Hoyt's should be interesting: it at least has some substance to it.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[fred]

I finished reading this fellow’s masters thesis and while I am hardly qualified to render any sort of “review,” per se, or give a paper such as this a grade, I will grade it according to how I liked it, the information I gathered and learned, and its overall impact on me.

Based on those criteria, I would give Colonel Hoyt a B+, my feelings varying from the C-level to A- or maybe even an A in parts. For the most part, Hoyt achieved his objective, more than adequately making his point. He gave an analysis of the three battles comprising the summer offensive of 1876: Reynolds’ Powder River fight; Crook’s Rosebud fight; and Custer’s Little Big Horn battle. His best description was the Powder River battle and his poorest was the Little Big Horn. In fact, I found his knowledge of this latter battle cursory at best and he used a little disingenuous posturing to prove his point, something he really did not need to do.

His first couple of chapters were nicely done, though rather sparse and it seemed to me he was trying to extend the work—lengthwise—by spreading out his text and graphics, when he could have added a lot more detail… then again, I am big on detail and I do not know what the parameters of such a work encompass, so my comments there may be a bit disingenuous themselves; nor do I know what the colonel’s time restraints may have been. This was good work though and I enjoyed his Indians strength summaries and comparisons of various population numbers. I particularly liked his comparison with John Gray’s numbers—to me, it shows he did his work—though he should have elucidated a little more, explaining discrepancies and making his choice clear in choosing the “correct” numbers. To me, this is solid A- work.

I liked his detail on the logistical composition of the Crook columns; this was really good stuff and I am incorporating some of it in my own notes. Crook’s Rosebud battle was also nicely done, but he could have made it somewhat more detailed as well, so I would average that one out to a B+.

The Little Big Horn work was a little more problematic. He got some of the details wrong regarding the Curtiss incident and I think that could have been overcome easily with a little more research. One of his more egregious errors was his claim most Indian accounts say those warriors who fought Reno also fought Custer. This is completely incorrect, both in claim and in analysis. In fact, only about 44% of those engaged with Reno managed to get into the Custer fracas, so to me, this is a rather big faux pas, though secondary to the point Hoyt was trying to get across. He did, however, bring out the fact many of the Indians facing Reno initially were on foot, something not a lot of people understand. While I liked that, I was less impressed with his glossing over the reasons for Reno dismounting in the first place, attributing it more to: that’s what cavalry always does… or that is cavalry SOP.

The worst error, however, was in his description of Custer’s dilemma. In several places—or at least more than one—Hoyt brought out the fact cavalry could not fight effectively while mounted and were most dangerous as dismounted skirmishers… something I agree with totally. (He also did a yeoman’s job in discussing the issues of horse-holders and the shorter range and firepower of the Springfield carbine versus the rifle version.) While well toward proving his thesis, Hoyt then writes, “Custer was not able to retreat back to Reno, because Custer’s command was less mobile than the warriors.” Yet this was the essence of cavalry tactics: dismounted combat; so the author is blaming—or maybe I should say, chiding—since I hate the word, blame!—Custer for doing what he should have done. In reality, circumstances forced Custer to fight this way.

The thesis was also rather poorly edited, a number of times the word “loss” was used incorrectly in place of “lost.” I am something of a stickler about that sort of thing, however, thinking if a work is going to be publicly displayed, it should be displayed perfectly.

Overall, I thought this was a nicely done work and it is something I shall keep in my files and I can see me referring back to it as a decent source. It is, by far—and I mean by far!!—the best of the three masters theses I have read.


Best wishes,
Fred.