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Post by montrose on Sept 8, 2015 20:15:24 GMT -6
Hello
1. Opinion. I have been seeing folks who have been members of these boards for years, some decades, posting again.
My knowledge of internet boards is basically 8 boards on LBH. My observations over the past 9 years is that there are many nice people here.
But LBH attracts people with strong personal agendas. To the degree that we have many posters who are legally insane, psychopath and sociopath with numerous convictions establishing their status as fact, vice insults.
LBH boards are emotionally laden, meaning dependence on insulting the poster, vice responding to the post.
2. Recommendation.
a. Greybeards I would like to invite long term members of this board to post again. If you do not have an opinion on whatever threads are active, just say hello. Especially those of you who have been silent 90 days to ten years.
b. Lurkers. We have numerous lurkers who stay silent because they do not want to deal with personal insults as opposed to reasoned and rational responses to their views. Hate the post, not the poster. Ummm, I am one of these, I read these boards for 2 1/2 years before I started posting, because of the emotional attacks.
c. My intent. If you read these boards, and have not posted in last 15 days: just say hello. Say something relevant to these boards, or your personal life, or just tell a joke. AT best, we have 20 people reading this board. Just say hello, or cast rude gestures at Fred. (which I do frequently, since his college graduated a student who was not capable of reading or writing a the 3rd grade level. (Bonus, name that millionare)
Respectfully,
William
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Post by callmeconrad on Sept 9, 2015 7:37:21 GMT -6
Hi montrose,
I've learned to just let posts happen when they happen. They haven't been happening much lately.
cheers,
conrad
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Post by Colt45 on Sept 9, 2015 7:56:35 GMT -6
Hi Will. I have been lurking recently, only posting when I feel I can add something of value.
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Post by montrose on Sept 9, 2015 19:37:50 GMT -6
My intent is to develop a conversation on topics where I am not sure. There is a point where facts and military analysis fail, where we have to make assumptions.
1. Enemy size. Did the US force understand that they faced a large, consolidated village of 1500 or more combatants? LTC Custer's stated this at the 14 Jun 76 officers call, but his subsequent decisions show that he did not understand this. He acted like the Indian camp had 30 lodges, like Washita. Something here is not right.
2. Enemy intentions. There is a mantra unique to studying this battle, at complete odds of everything we know about Indians from 1492-1900. This is the ludicrous and counterfactual theory that the Indians always ran. There is zero truth in this argument. I do not understand how to create an argument against a theory so insane.
The Indians were not cowards. They always fought. Hundreds of tribes in thousands of engagements over 400 years.
I believe the Indian always ran theory is really a complaint that the Indians were competent. The US wanted the Indians to fight in a manner that maximized our advantages, and guaranteed their defeat. So if US forces formed a line with excellent cover, like Gerard's brow, the Indians should and must line up shoulder to shoulder and march to their deaths, like so many Western armies of this era.
Instead, the Indians deployed into the rear and flanks of the US linear formation. The Indians showed a great ability to react to US tactics.
But the US Army distinguishes between tactics, operations, and strategy. US and Indian interaction shows a draw at tactics, mostly a win at operations, and no contest at strategy. They had none, we had a lot.
Tactics is what happens on a battlefield. Operations is campaigns. Meaning a yearly thing, focused on Departments. Strategy is the master plan, which was destroying the buffalo herds and expanding railroads into enemy territory.
We spend a lot of time on tactical decisions, basically the bread and butter of every internet board that talks this battle.
How many folks realize that operationally, and strategically, the LBH disaster caused by the incompetent fool Custer meant nothing.
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Post by jodak on Sept 10, 2015 9:29:30 GMT -6
My intent is to develop a conversation on topics where I am not sure. There is a point where facts and military analysis fail, where we have to make assumptions. 1. Enemy size. Did the US force understand that they faced a large, consolidated village of 1500 or more combatants? LTC Custer's stated this at the 14 Jun 76 officers call, but his subsequent decisions show that he did not understand this. He acted like the Indian camp had 30 lodges, like Washita. Something here is not right. I think that both the army and Custer understood that there were a lot of Indians somewhere, but whether all or a large portion were together in one location was a different question. However, their words and actions seem to indicate that they believed that the latter was the case as well, but how they came to that conclusion, I do not know. In particular, Terry, by whatever means, appears to have had a good grasp of the size and location of the village but seems to have been concerned that there were other bands roaming around as well. This was the impetus behind Reno's earlier scout and Terry's later admonition to Custer to proceed further up the Rosebud, even if he found the trail cutting across to the Little Bighorn. We don't really know what all was discussed and shared with Custer prior to the splitting of forces, and while we assume that Terry imparted his thoughts to Custer and that Custer understood and absorbed them, that may not be the case. Furthermore, it appears that Custer's force may have misread the signs of a large village as they followed the trail across the divide. I read somewhere (RCOI testimony?) that one of the survivors indicated that they didn't know if the various side trails branching off of the main trail were indications of bands joining or leaving the main group. It seems curious to me that experienced scouts and soldiers couldn't tell the difference between whether a trail was coming or going, but that is what they said. Likewise, they seem to have misinterpreted the various camp circles at the Sun Dance location as being just a few groupings that moved around several times rather than a number of groupings that were all there at the same time. Regardless, there are enough indications that Custer was informed that he was approaching a very large group of Indians that he should have known that was the case, but there are some indications that Custer didn't believe what he was told. On the other hand, there were several comments that Custer was strangely withdrawn and not acting himself in the days leading up to the battle, which could be an indication of worry, but that doesn't seem like Custer's nature. Therefore, while that was undoubtedly an indication of something, I'm not sure what. 2. Enemy intentions. There is a mantra unique to studying this battle, at complete odds of everything we know about Indians from 1492-1900. This is the ludicrous and counterfactual theory that the Indians always ran. There is zero truth in this argument. I do not understand how to create an argument against a theory so insane. The Indians were not cowards. They always fought. Hundreds of tribes in thousands of engagements over 400 years. I believe the Indian always ran theory is really a complaint that the Indians were competent. The US wanted the Indians to fight in a manner that maximized our advantages, and guaranteed their defeat. So if US forces formed a line with excellent cover, like Gerard's brow, the Indians should and must line up shoulder to shoulder and march to their deaths, like so many Western armies of this era. Instead, the Indians deployed into the rear and flanks of the US linear formation. The Indians showed a great ability to react to US tactics. One thing that somewhat bothers me in our discussions is that we seem to always talk in terms of "Indians", as if all Indians were the same and went to the same Indian military academy. In fact, there was quite a bit of difference between tribes, individual bands, and individuals. For example, the Cheyenne had a more centralized system of government and decision making than did the Sioux, both as it applied to their population as a whole and to their various military societies, and that may have played a roll in the question of "Indian" command and control that we have debated. In other words the Cheyenne may have had greater CaC than did the Sioux, but we don't take that into consideration in our discussions and just lump them all together as "Indians", and it seems to me that is the case when we say the "Indians" did or didn't do or could be expected to do anything.
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Post by crzhrs on Sept 10, 2015 11:25:36 GMT -6
GAC was not concerned with the size of the village or number of Indians. He had been told by scouts (White & Red) that it was a large village, maybe more than he had bullets for. His along with most of the US military's concern was not letting Indians escape, break up into smaller groups and then it would be impossible to do anything about hitting any of them and his name would be M-U-D! If he was concerned about the size of the village he would not have broken up the command into smaller units unable to deal with any size Indian force. He felt Benteen, Reno and his own command would be able to handle any size Indian force. Don't forget his famous quote: (paraphrase): "There aren't enough Indians in North American to defeat the 7th Cavalry." In the end the greatest fear of the military took hold and Custer based all his actions on that point: Indians would escape and Custer would be blowing in the wind (Thank you Bob Dylan)
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Post by Beth on Sept 10, 2015 13:24:53 GMT -6
How many folks realize that operationally, and strategically, the LBH disaster caused by the incompetent fool Custer meant nothing. True. Custer lost one battle for the US but in the end the Centennial Campaign was a success. I would be willing to bet money though that most people on the street don't even realize that there was a series of battles in 1876. They have been lost to anyone beyond hardcore history addicts. Custer and the BLBH is that moment in time that triggered a major change in society's thinking--which is why it stands out in people's minds more than any other battles. I suspect if you talked to people from the last half of the 1800's they would remember when they heard about Custer's Last Stand the same way we recall events like (depending on your age) Pearl Harbor, Kennedy assassination, the moon landing and so on. In the end though the US forces won the campaign- NA leaders and tribal structure were subjugated by the reservation system. The tribes were striped of their culture, religion and language then taught to fit into the Western world standards. Children were sent off to places like the Carlisle Indian School or any of the other boarding schools where they were 'civilized' and taught to assimilate. In the end many of generations of children found that they were too white to be Indian and too Indian to be white.
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Post by callmeconrad on Sept 22, 2015 9:45:31 GMT -6
My intent is to develop a conversation on topics where I am not sure. There is a point where facts and military analysis fail, where we have to make assumptions. 1. Enemy size. Did the US force understand that they faced a large, consolidated village of 1500 or more combatants? LTC Custer's stated this at the 14 Jun 76 officers call, but his subsequent decisions show that he did not understand this. He acted like the Indian camp had 30 lodges, like Washita. Something here is not right. Hi Montrose, It's possible Custer may have quoted the number but didn't grasp the consequences of what that figure really meant. Custer's view on fighting that many warriors didn't happen in a vacuum, so I sorted through some pre-LBH fights that included larger groupings of Native Americans and how Custer may have viewed a figure of 1,500 hostiles in light of those previous battles. The first thing I noticed was how many accounts from the wars in the 1860's referred to the tribes as lacking in good firearms. Did Custer know how well armed the Sioux and Cheyenne had become and did he have too much confidence in the new carbine for his troops? The second thing I noticed was that apart from Fetterman, Birch Coulee, and some smaller fights, army casualties were generally low even against large groups of warriors. If Custer believes that the worst case scenario is a repeat of the Battle of Whitestone Hill, he may try to take some bigger risks. What's not right here is that I think Custer had a classic case of rationalizing that even though Fetterman may have been wiped out, it couldn't happen to him. Custer had the whole 7th, and besides Fetterman's "one-off" no major command had suffered a defeat of that magnitude on the Plains. I don't think he was relying on Custer's Luck; I think it didn't even dawn on him that he might need it, even against 1500 hostiles. Cheers, conrad
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Post by Beth on Sept 22, 2015 15:18:05 GMT -6
People often mention Custer's Luck. Perhaps his 'luck' should be viewed as just an extreme sense of confidence that whatever he does will turn out right and even if it doesn't, he will spin it until it does. A lot of people have that sort of confidence so it isn't unique. Maybe it's just me but I suspect that a modern example of someone who would sort of parallel the type of person that Custer was, might be someone like but not necessarily be Donald Trump.
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Post by Diane Merkel on Sept 26, 2015 22:21:53 GMT -6
Montrose, Thanks very much for bringing up "The Conversation." I also hope occasional posters and frequent lurkers will check in once in a while. It was, in fact, a self-described lurker who informed me of the death of Dark Cloud. Speaking of DC, one of the last things he wrote to me was about you. He emailed me on Christmas Day and on December 30. He sounded very cheerful, very playful. He told me he was going to drift away from the boards in 2015. The next I heard from him was a couple of PMs in April, but that wasn't unusual. We never did have many conversations off the boards. I hope you don't mind my sharing the following from DC last December 30. He was replying to my telling him I planned to be in Boulder in May (never happened) and that I'd love to bend elbows with him. I'll have to huddle with my social secretary. May is so busy...coronations, dynastic christenings, celebrity weddings with bridesmaids and the bride looking at me in lust, so tedious.... it'll have to be ad libbed as it closes in. Your enthusiasm is misplaced, though, I'm a physical wreck, aged and slow in conversation, a genre which from my end consists of recollections of drooling in the soup the previous week (a laff riot). And, you know, knock-knock jokes. It's just often a busy month, and family and friends zooting through the state.
Sure as hell sounds like you're on the right road with the right attitude and dedication. Cancer isn't in my family history absent a brief skin episode with my father from captaining a PT boat as air rescue in the Philippines in WWII and being sun burned to a frightening extent (where's Angelina Jolie doing a movie about my Dad??!! So unfair....). Four minor bumps on his face, removed, done. That never happens in Florida, of course, so I added the details.
Will stay in touch, but I'm unreliable. Montrose, today, replied to a post ON TOPIC, which he usually does, and does not go into a spate of free association like others. So rare, it requires a response in turn.
Happy New Year, Diane and Chuck!
Dick That was the man I enjoyed so much. That was the real Richard MacLeod.
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