|
Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 28, 2015 8:22:06 GMT -6
"I think my only plan will be to give Custer a secure base well up on the Yellowstone from which he can operate, at which he can find supplies, and to which he can retire at any time the Indians gather in too great numbers for the small force he will have. Several companies of infantry would accompany the Seventh to man the supply depots while Custer searched for the enemy, and steamers would freight supplies up the Missouri and Yellowstone rivers. The Dakota column would leave Fort Lincoln on April 5."
Wild
Apparently Custer was there and heard all this. See the above underlined and tell us what number of Indians would be too great?
We know what happened so the minimum number must be less than the actual number there.
To me this points to a lack of sufficient recon which is within the subject of this thread.
"The Art and Science of Scouting"
Regards
AZ Ranger
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 28, 2015 8:28:11 GMT -6
bc
A free rein to operate within certain parameters. The sideboards discussed included the Indians gathering in great numbers.
That number threshold should have been discovered through proper scouting and not by making Terry's prediction correct that a great number of Indians could defeat the 7th.
Regards
Steve
|
|
|
Post by edavids on Sept 3, 2015 20:31:21 GMT -6
Hi Ed As mentioned above I believe the results of LBH were primarily due to the N/A being able to "outeverything" the 7th Cavalry that day.Agreed. A day when the numerically stronger combined individuals out performed the rigid slow formations of the regimental system. Cheers Well put and you may be 100% correct. A little more simplistically; I've mastered the obvious: "Outnumbered" - anywhere from 1.5-1 to 8-1 with a middling ground of about 3-1. This is all before Custer divvied up his force into digestible morsels. "Outmaneuvered" - N/A's turning Reno's left flank; Custer getting caught flat-footed on unmanageable terrain for starters and "Outfought" - I understand that victories are not always determined by casualty figures but Custer lost 50% of his regiment KIA/WIA. The N/A's? No one knows for sure but as little as 2% and maybe as high as 15%? It was not pretty regardless of the numbers. Sorry for delay in response btw and my name is David.
|
|
|
Post by wild on Sept 3, 2015 23:55:01 GMT -6
Hi AZ
Apparently Custer was there and heard all this. See the above underlined and tell us what number of Indians would be too great? Just saw that now. I think the Rosebud is the standard . Indians could hold their own in a stand up fight involving equal numbers. Cheers
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Sept 9, 2015 7:45:23 GMT -6
I have not forgotten this thread.
Tunkasila raised a theory that the Custer column scouts were highly skilled and proficient.
Now, one of my own rules on LBH is to fight tunnel vision. This means the assumption that whatever happened at LBH is what happened with every other US unit in the Indian wars. I look for consistencies and differences with other actions from this era.
Also, I know many board participants are only interested in this fight. I am not. My background and research is on how to fight and win unconventional wars. I look for examples of when a bad force design can beat an enemy through brute force, where you buy a win through blood and treasure.
I also look for when you must adapt your force design to meet an "inferior" enemy. This is an enemy who is not regarded as a long term threat to your nation. Force design means the USC Title 10 tasks of manning, training and equipping a force. The Indian scout companies and the wagon and mule supply trains are examples of this. They were temporary elements, not permanent parts of the Army.
In this environment, use of scouts shows a massive variation of success. The efficiency and effectiveness of scouts shows enormous disparities.
Remember, scouts I this era were Indians from hundreds of different tribes, civilians with a wide range of SKA (Skills, Knowledge, Ability), and members of the US military.
|
|
|
Post by dave on Sept 9, 2015 8:17:43 GMT -6
Montrose Using your skill sets and experience, does the performance of the scouts at the LBH jump out to you? Were they that bad, or were they doing well? I am unable to judge their actions and would appreciate seeing how your metrics would rate their performace level. Regards Dave
|
|
|
Post by montrose on May 14, 2016 8:21:49 GMT -6
Recent discussions are pointing back to this thread.
1. Scouting. The function of scouting is a different issue than who does the scouting.
2. Use of indigenous forces.A separate issue is the proper use of Indian auxiliaries. I believe that the use of Indians as ideal scouts is vastly overrated Scouting provides the what, the raw facts. Then you need to analyze the what to determine the why and predict enemy locations, movements, capabilities and intentions. Having members of the target tribes in your employ provides an enormous advantage. And if they remain loyal to their tribe, hire their enemies who have some knowledge of the target. And if that doesn't work, hire whoever you can find, Indian or civilian.
3. Combat. A very effective use of indigenous force is to use them to fight their peers. I regard this as the best use of such forces based on my own experience and field of study. Just a reminder, the insignia of my branch is crossed arrows, which comes directly from this era. Use indig forces to fight their own, countering any advantages they have over your own asymmetric force. Then use your, by definition, asymmetric advantages to overwhelm and destroy the enemy.
The Indians were great individual fighters, pretty good at "clump" fighting of adhoc 2-50ish groups, and as the scale gets larger, their command and control gets worse and worse. 1876 was the last defiance of the Plains Indians. They would have lost to the same degree, in the same timeframe, if the 7th had remained at FAL.
Just a reminder: Crook wanted 400 Sioux as a combat force in 1876. He was blocked by the incompetent civilian Indian Bureau. Think about what would have happened if he was allowed to do his job.
Second reminder: Hundreds, maybe thousands, of Plain Indians flipped sides. The major obstacle to using indig was GAC and his sock puppet Terry. LBH eliminated the incompetent US COC and obstacles to success, allowing better decision making. To a large degree, the US successful outcome in the Plains Indian war could not have happened if GAC survived LBH. Addition by subtraction.
Very Respectfully
Montrose
|
|
|
Post by dave on May 14, 2016 12:57:28 GMT -6
montrose If Crook wanted to use 400 Sioux would he not have had problems working with both them and Crows? It would seem a difficult nut to crack aligning these traditional enemies together as one force or am I missing something? Regards Dave PS Glad to have you back!
|
|
|
Post by benteen on May 14, 2016 15:16:17 GMT -6
Recent discussions are pointing back to this thread. 1. Scouting. The function of scouting is a different issue than who does the scouting. 2. Use of indigenous forces.A separate issue is the proper use of Indian auxiliaries. I believe that the use of Indians as ideal scouts is vastly overrated Scouting provides the what, the raw facts. Then you need to analyze the what to determine the why and predict enemy locations, movements, capabilities and intentions. Having members of the target tribes in your employ provides an enormous advantage. And if they remain loyal to their tribe, hire their enemies who have some knowledge of the target. And if that doesn't work, hire whoever you can find, Indian or civilian. 3. Combat. A very effective use of indigenous force is to use them to fight their peers. I regard this as the best use of such forces based on my own experience and field of study. Just a reminder, the insignia of my branch is crossed arrows, which comes directly from this era. Use indig forces to fight their own, countering any advantages they have over your own asymmetric force. Then use your, by definition, asymmetric advantages to overwhelm and destroy the enemy. The Indians were great individual fighters, pretty good at "clump" fighting of adhoc 2-50ish groups, and as the scale gets larger, their command and control gets worse and worse. 1876 was the last defiance of the Plains Indians. They would have lost to the same degree, in the same timeframe, if the 7th had remained at FAL. Just a reminder: Crook wanted 400 Sioux as a combat force in 1876. He was blocked by the incompetent civilian Indian Bureau. Think about what would have happened if he was allowed to do his job. Second reminder: Hundreds, maybe thousands, of Plain Indians flipped sides. The major obstacle to using indig was GAC and his sock puppet Terry. LBH eliminated the incompetent US COC and obstacles to success, allowing better decision making. To a large degree, the US successful outcome in the Plains Indian war could not have happened if GAC survived LBH. Addition by subtraction. Very Respectfully Montrose Colonel Montrose, The Special Forces are not only known for their fighting abillity, but for their ability to teach and train indigenous peoples and use them as effective fighting force. That sounds like it could get a bit hairy if one or more of them were actually working for the enemy. How do you weed out those that you may suspect as being turn coats. Well at least what you can post on the board Be Well Dan
|
|