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Post by Deleted on Jul 12, 2015 19:58:40 GMT -6
What area do you consider more defensible? Â Should Keogh have selected one place and concentrate his power so he did not spread everyone so thin or do you think Custer dictated placement? Beth,
Keogh should have stayed mobile. Look at the distance between companies. Look at the distance from Calhoun's skirmish line to his horse-holders.
WO
Where do you come up with this thrash?? Are you making it up as you go? |
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Post by Deleted on Jul 12, 2015 20:04:46 GMT -6
Potential members and guests....
Before you consider joining, let me direct you to our resident class bully, Quincannon. Go to his page and read all of the foul mouthed rants that he has directed to all new members and anyone who dares question the spin he and the rest of the class idiots shovel. Think twice before joining.
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Post by Deleted on Jul 12, 2015 20:09:27 GMT -6
Good night dear friends, it's been a real pleasure. Don't forget to tip your waitresses. See you all tomorrow for more fun and laughter. I'll be here all week.
BABA BOOEY
P.S. Only one way to get rid of me. I want an apology for how I have been treated - doesn't matter from whom. One apology and I will be gone forever.
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Post by Beth on Jul 12, 2015 20:09:39 GMT -6
I have always leaned to the idea that Keogh was hit just as he was preparing to move. Not a good thing. This would explain the move of C off the ridge as a preparatory clear out that went terribly wrong.I also wonder when Keogh personally was wounded as this would have a bearing on things. Put the two together?? Cheers Mac,
If that happened. and it is a big "if", wouldn't it take us back to the title of the thread?
What caused a leadership vacuum? Was it too many junior officers in the wrong place, or was the entire ethos of this regiment compromised?
Why did the battalion quickly collapse and take another battalion down with it?
There were no hostiles further down the valley. There were no hostiles to the east.
WO
Wasn't part of the problem with the regiment being sort of an officer lite version have to do with Congress underfunding the army and a large number of positions either not filled because the officer holding the position was on a different assignment elsewhere. That is probably one of the things about the 7th that Custer didn't have much control over. Did the battalion collapse because it was hit by overwhelming numbers of warriors or were the Indian's able to exploit weakness of the battalion and quickly overwhelm it. It's kind of potayto or potahto but I tend to lean towards the first but am open to persuasion towards the later.. Beth |
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 12, 2015 20:25:51 GMT -6
Tom/Colt,
Out of interest, which of the available plausible explanations would you lean towards?
(1) GAC gave Keogh stupid orders to hold pointless terrain leading to disaster?
(2) Keogh stupidly complied with such stupid orders leading to disaster?
(3) Keogh had an unfit for purpose battalion, in that command and control disastrously collapsed when e.g. Keogh got wounded?
(4) Keogh had an unfit for purpose battalion, in that e.g. Harrington disastrously attacked without Keogh's orders?
(5) Keogh disastrously disobeyed orders or lost tactical sense in failing to move northwards long after reinforcement was no longer a viable option having lost confidence in the move away from supporting Reno as promised (and away from Benteen)?
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 12, 2015 20:32:05 GMT -6
Did the battalion collapse because it was hit by overwhelming numbers of warriors or were the Indian's able to exploit weakness of the battalion and quickly overwhelm it. It's kind of potayto or potahto but I tend to lean towards the first but am open to persuasion towards the later.. Beth Beth,
How many hostiles warriors do you think it took to overrun such a poorly deployed 120 men...?
It wouldn't have taken many in that formation, and the hostiles had a couple of thousand to spare.
Look at how Reno/Benteen concentrated and deployed until Terry arrived.
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 12, 2015 20:41:50 GMT -6
Wasn't part of the problem with the regiment being sort of an officer lite version have to do with Congress underfunding the army and a large number of positions either not filled because the officer holding the position was on a different assignment elsewhere. That is probably one of the things about the 7th that Custer didn't have much control over. Beth Beth,
Those were issues across all regiments. We need to focus on the issues specific to the 7th cavalry to understand why it performed so poorly on 25 June 1876.
Say, for the sake of argument, that Keogh was wounded. M Sheridan may have been detached, but TWC riding as ADC to his brother?!
Look at the command structure if Reno or Benteen had been wounded and compare.
WO
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Post by Beth on Jul 12, 2015 20:53:01 GMT -6
Beth,
How many hostiles warriors do you think it took to overrun such a poorly deployed 120 men...?
It wouldn't have taken many in that formation, and the hostiles had a couple of thousand to spare.
Look at how Reno/Benteen concentrated and deployed until Terry arrived.
WO
Not as many as one would first think. Someone like Crazy Horse and a few dozen of eager followers could probably handle it. If they didn't in the first wave, then I am sure there were plenty others NA wanting a chance to prove their bravery. If I am recalling right, Keogh had his people dismounted and stretched out like ducks in a shooting gallery. Add to that exhaustion, fear, panic, noise, dust and confusion--Keogh was probably easily over run. I agree he had to stay on mounted and moving because unlike Reno Hill there was no place or time to hunker down and dig in. |
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Post by Beth on Jul 12, 2015 21:03:18 GMT -6
Wasn't part of the problem with the regiment being sort of an officer lite version have to do with Congress underfunding the army and a large number of positions either not filled because the officer holding the position was on a different assignment elsewhere. That is probably one of the things about the 7th that Custer didn't have much control over. Beth Beth,
Those were issues across all regiments. We need to focus on the issues specific to the 7th cavalry to understand why it performed so poorly on 25 June 1876.
Say, for the sake of argument, that Keogh was wounded. M Sheridan may have been detached, but TWC riding as ADC to his brother?!
Look at the command structure if Reno or Benteen had been wounded and compare.
WO
Do you mean that Keogh doesn't seem to have a clear second in command? So losing Keogh removed any sort of workable command. Custer was not only greedy about not saving Indians for Gibbon but he also pulled too many officers away to form his HQ staff. |
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 12, 2015 21:09:32 GMT -6
Beth,
How many hostiles warriors do you think it took to overrun such a poorly deployed 120 men...?
It wouldn't have taken many in that formation, and the hostiles had a couple of thousand to spare.
Look at how Reno/Benteen concentrated and deployed until Terry arrived.
WO
Not as many as one would first think. Someone like Crazy Horse and a few dozen of eager followers could probably handle it. If they didn't in the first wave, then I am sure there were plenty others NA wanting a chance to prove their bravery. If I am recalling right, Keogh had his people dismounted and stretched out like ducks in a shooting gallery. Add to that exhaustion, fear, panic, noise, dust and confusion--Keogh was probably easily over run. I agree he had to stay on mounted and moving because unlike Reno Hill there was no place or time to hunker down and dig in. Beth,
There were more than enough hostile warriors to overrun Keogh in that formation, and there would have been more than enough spare during the height of the valley fight. Calhoun was on a skirmish line with horse-holders, but there was no need for the other 2 companies to lose mobility.
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 12, 2015 21:11:57 GMT -6
Beth,
Those were issues across all regiments. We need to focus on the issues specific to the 7th cavalry to understand why it performed so poorly on 25 June 1876.
Say, for the sake of argument, that Keogh was wounded. M Sheridan may have been detached, but TWC riding as ADC to his brother?!
Look at the command structure if Reno or Benteen had been wounded and compare.
WO
Do you mean that Keogh doesn't seem to have a clear second in command? So losing Keogh removed any sort of workable command. Custer was not only greedy about not saving Indians for Gibbon but he also pulled too many officers away to form his HQ staff. Beth,
What was the command structure if Keogh was incapacitated, with TWC riding as "ADC" to GAC? And those 3 companies were widely dispersed...
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 12, 2015 21:18:02 GMT -6
Beth,
Compare with Reno, if he had been incapacitated.
Another 3 company battalion, but he had 2 subordinate captains and an adjutant to issue interim emergency orders. What was the structure around Keogh at ILC battalion, compared to Reno at MAG battalion? Even Benteen's "lean" HDK battalion had a seamless transfer to Weir.
Thanks for the link to the Baker Fight. Comedy gold.
WO
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Post by mac on Jul 12, 2015 21:52:18 GMT -6
The first thing I did when I became interested in this topic was acquire a map. At first glance one can easily see that as soon as Keogh et al set up on that hill they will easily and quickly be surrounded by infiltration from the village. After that it is simply a matter of time before any attack on multiple axes will bring them into close combat and the cavalry will be quickly dealt with. I would think this should be easily seen from Calhoun hill. The presence of Fred's gap makes this that much easier. When the gap was sighted Keogh should have known the jig was up and moved. Maybe he tried too late....ok charitable of me.
Cheers
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Post by Beth on Jul 12, 2015 22:09:35 GMT -6
Beth, Compare with Reno, if he had been incapacitated. Another 3 company battalion, but he had 2 subordinate captains and an adjutant to issue interim emergency orders. What was the structure around Keogh at ILC battalion, compared to Reno at MAG battalion? Even Benteen's "lean" HDK battalion had a seamless transfer to Weir. Thanks for the link to the Baker Fight. Comedy gold. WO I had to pull out my handy-dandy cheat sheet because I never remember what officer goes with what Company. It appears that Calhoun would be next in line but he was pretty far away from Keogh and then Jame Porter followed by two dewy cheeked 2nd LT's Harrington and Crittenden--(who hopefully was placed correctly on the line to make up for being blind on one side.) Not a wealth of experience to draw on there since all 4 junior officers (That is the right term right?) joined the army post ACW. I have never understood why Custer needed so many officers with him--at least at that battle. What should have been their purpose and did Custer use them effectively? |
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Post by Beth on Jul 12, 2015 22:23:21 GMT -6
The first thing I did when I became interested in this topic was acquire a map. At first glance one can easily see that as soon as Keogh et al set up on that hill they will easily and quickly be surrounded by infiltration from the village. After that it is simply a matter of time before any attack on multiple axes will bring them into close combat and the cavalry will be quickly dealt with. I would think this should be easily seen from Calhoun hill. The presence of Fred's gap makes this that much easier. When the gap was sighted Keogh should have known the jig was up and moved. Maybe he tried too late....ok charitable of me. Cheers But what way should he move--to plug the gap or to a more defensible position? Sometimes I wonder if they didn't realize they were on the defense until it was way to late to do anything about it. I mean if Keogh was placed so he could be seen by Benteen, then he was like a beacon saying 'attack me.' |
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