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Post by Deleted on Jul 9, 2015 4:31:07 GMT -6
I can see where salt, beans, fodder and a slab of bacon are useless in battle so I feel pretty confident that as far as things needed in battle is the ammo. Funny how that brings us back to that darn note, if Custer felt he was about to go into battle why didn't he tell Benteen to bring up the ammo. If Custer felt they were going to move further afield then you would bring up everything-- Perhaps one of the bigger mistakes Custer made on the day of the battle was very poor communications and/or instructions. Do military orders usually include 'and if' or "once you've done that, then" type instructions-especially when communications might be a problem? Let's slow down and take a step back. Our fearless Capt Benteen hears gunfire in the distance. He knows contact has been made. GAC had informed them all that the expectation was 1,500 warriors. Martini arrives with the note. Big village....Come on....Be quick....Bring packs. Now our Benteen apologists want to reduce Benteen to the mental aptitude of a rank and file employee; a MacDonalds employee unable to think independantly or form a thought. What could GAC possibly need? What does this note mean?? I'm so confused!! He must need the beans and bacon. He hardly means just ammo!! Utterly ridiculous. Even the drunk Reno had enough sense about him to break out a few ammo packs.
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 9, 2015 5:34:17 GMT -6
Hi everyone, yes I think it was a big mistake to attack blind, just shows how much regard he had for his enemy, as he must have thought that around 350 men attacking blind in two groups from different directions with no LOS, clear orders, communication and co-ordination would carry the day. Ian. Ian, I love to give someone their wish, delivered in a PM. Please explain LOS. I had to go find this!
Regards, Tom
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 9, 2015 5:57:42 GMT -6
Hi Tom, LOS (Line of Sight), sorry my friend I went all military all of a sudden. Here is a "pdf" on the battle of the rosebud, and if you don't want to read the whole piece then here is a small snippet; "Each man would carry four days of rations with one hundred rounds of ammunition. Critical supplies (i.e., medical supplies, pioneer tools, and reserve ammunition) would be transferred from the wagons to the pack trains. The wagons would be secured with approximately one hundred men "on a island strategically located near the junction of Big and Little Goose Creeks"' under command of Captain John V. Furey, Chief Quartermaster for the expedition"For those who would like to endure, here is the whole document. linkGoing back to the ammo situation, if each trooper had 50 +50 in reserve then wouldn't it be down to the company officers and NCOs to control their fire and not expend large amounts just firing at nothing? Ian.
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 9, 2015 6:24:27 GMT -6
Thanks Ian, great link.
Regards, Tom
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Post by jodak on Jul 9, 2015 6:58:38 GMT -6
So we seem to be of a consensus that he attacked too soon and without the proper reconnaissance followed by dividing his forces. Do you think that assigning too many to guard the pack train was a factor? How far ahead could a main body of troops travel from their pack mules? Beth Beth,
Maybe it is just semantics in the way people express it, but there seems to be a common misconception that the troops with the pack train were there to "guard" it. In actuality they were serving as "packers", meaning that they were there to manage, not guard, the train. Of course, if the situation required it, they could serve to defend it as well, but, in answer to your question - 1) there were probably not too many men detailed to the train for the purpose of managing it, but, 2) their loss was undoubtedly a factor of some magnitude. When you consider that each already short staffed company lost some 5 or 6 men to the train, that was a loss in combat power of around 10%, which is significant.
In regard to Company B (McDougall), they were not tasked with guarding the train per-se either, but to serve as the rear guard for the column. Since the train was at the rear of the column, serving as rear guard and guarding the train amounted to much the same thing, but they had other responsibilities as well, such as rounding up and hurrying along stragglers. As several have mentioned, one possible course of action would have been to have cached the train in a safe place and left it with minimal guard while adding the others back into the combat power of the regiment, but, in the absence of that, the number of men with the train was probably appropriate.
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Post by mac on Jul 9, 2015 6:59:16 GMT -6
Really interesting discussion! Thanks all! Cheers
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Post by jodak on Jul 9, 2015 7:26:24 GMT -6
As a side note on the pack train and its manpower requirements -
The Wyoming column (Crook) used civilian packers, but the Dakota column (Terry/Custer) used military personnel (with a handful of civilians). I think the reason for that was that there were not sufficient civilian packers available, but I don't recall the exact details. In any event, the use of soldiers for that function served to deplete the combat power of the regiment by a significant degree. Also, remember that the majority of the Dakota column's baggage was originally carried in wagons, and it was only when Custer split off that his supplies were transferred to pack mules. A major factor in that was the difficulty that Reno encountered with the Gatlings during his scout and the resulting perception that the terrain was too rugged for the Gatlings or wheeled transport. However, someone (I don't recall who) that had been present on both the Reno scout and the later march to the LBH said that, as it turned out, the portion of the route previously traveled by Reno was the worst part and, after that was put behind, gatlings and wagons would have done fine with the remainder.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 9, 2015 7:52:19 GMT -6
Tom: What you see in the material Ian provided would be, using modern terminology, combat trains, and field trains.
The material transferred to the packs would be the combat trains, who move further forward and follow the line of march of the combat elements. These are the people in modern times that would provide your immediate after action fuel and ammunition.
The wagons left on Goose Creek, which is near Sheridan to give you perspective would be the field trains, your source of food and all other classes of supply for the expedition. They too would have been called forward at some point had Crook met success. I think it a bit of a tell into Crooks thinking, or the intensity of the Rosebud battle, that he chose to fall back on his field trains. The tell being that he expended so much during the battle, that even with his combat trains available they could not replenish his stocks.
Jodak is right on the money with his commentary. Those detail men were there to supplement the inadequate number of packers. He is also correct about diluting combat power by an overall 10 percent, but that percentage is greater than that if you look at the percentage of combat power lost in some of those companies. The regimental average was 10 percent but I think you will find it might be as high as 15 percent at company level in some instances.
Beth military orders must as a first requirement be clear. They should also ideally be short, but clarity of purpose trumps short and any other consideration. Today we have a very rigid stylized format for such thing. All you need do is follow the format as a check list to guard against the forgotten or overlooked. Then, it was a matter of presenting the idea on paper in as clear a manner possible, and if it took a first your do this then you do that so be it. You never want a subordinate walking away not understanding.
Back to that Bulge book. One of the combat command commanders was brand new to his job. Prior to the operation being unfamiliar with his two maneuver commanders he chose to write out a full five paragraph order, and deliver that order to them in person, mainly to size them up and assure clarity. The other two combat command commanders, being familiar with their people chose to transmit execution orders by radio. So how formal you are depends upon previous associations as well. All three of the commanders were correct, even though all three did it a bit differently.
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Post by dave on Jul 9, 2015 10:51:09 GMT -6
As a side note on the pack train and its manpower requirements -
The Wyoming column (Crook) used civilian packers, but the Dakota column (Terry/Custer) used military personnel (with a handful of civilians). I think the reason for that was that there were not sufficient civilian packers available, but I don't recall the exact details. In any event, the use of soldiers for that function served to deplete the combat power of the regiment by a significant degree. Also, remember that the majority of the Dakota column's baggage was originally carried in wagons, and it was only when Custer split off that his supplies were transferred to pack mules. A major factor in that was the difficulty that Reno encountered with the Gatlings during his scout and the resulting perception that the terrain was too rugged for the Gatlings or wheeled transport. However, someone (I don't recall who) that had been present on both the Reno scout and the later march to the LBH said that, as it turned out, the portion of the route previously traveled by Reno was the worst part and, after that was put behind, gatlings and wagons would have done fine with the remainder. Jodak How effective would the Gatling have been during the LBH fight? Did the gun train or was it shifted by moving the carriage? Regards Dave
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 9, 2015 11:47:42 GMT -6
Dave, I provided some info some months ago concerning the traverse mechanism on the Gatling, here is some more; linkIan.
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Post by crzhrs on Jul 9, 2015 12:00:26 GMT -6
A major flaw in the US military's way of thinking was that Indians would run rather than fight. True in some cases, but if surprised as they were at the LBH the Indians had capable leaders who were not going to panic. This wasn't Sand Creek or the Washita with the hapless Black Kettle . . . this was Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, Crow King, Low Dog, He Dog, Lame White Man and many other hard-cord warriors/leaders who never signed treaties or lived on reservations. The main goal of the military was to find the "hostiles" (ergo FREE Indians). One would think these Indians were not the run-and-hide types, but the aggressive and hard-core fighters (with just as hard-core women)who weren't going to roll over and cower in fear. Custer had been out west since 1867 and had many run-ins with Indians. Most of the time he couldn't find them and when he did find Indians at the Washita he used the same tactics as he did at the LBH. This time it wasn't winter, this time it wasn't an attack at dawn, this time it wasn't against wavering Indians. This time it was the heart-and-soul of the Lakota/Cheyenne Nation. Underestimating one's enemies has been a long-standing concern. This time Custer thought he was going to ride through the Sioux Camp (Kanipe/Martini's glowing reports to fellow 7th members confirm that) only to find these Indians weren't the cowering-in-fear-of-the-US-military type). Whether Custer's plan was perfect or not may not have mattered this time. He hit the wrong camp at the wrong time containing the wrong type of warriors for a rout!
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Post by dave on Jul 9, 2015 12:02:05 GMT -6
Ian Thank you for the link about the Gatling guns. Very informative and helpful. Appreciate your efforts. Regards Dave
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Post by jodak on Jul 9, 2015 12:30:20 GMT -6
Jodak How effective would the Gatling have been during the LBH fight? Did the gun train or was it shifted by moving the carriage? Regards Dave As per the information provided by Ian, the Gatlings were trainable (within limits), but, even so, I have my doubts as to how much of an asset they would have been. I view them as being principally a defensive weapon, and, unless the Indians would have been accommodating enough to charge basically straight into them, I feel that they would have been of little practical use at the BLBH. They also had a voracious appetite for ammunition, which would have been difficult to transport and supply to the weapons in sufficient quantity. On the other hand, all of the Gatlings (depending on the account, anything from 2 to 4) didn't necessarily have to be taken along, and one may have been of at least some benefit and have been able to have been supplied with ammunition without too much of a problem. However, all-in-all, my belief is that Custer was correct in his assessment that they would have "embarrassed" him, meaning that they would have slowed him down and been more of a burden than an asset. Of far greater utility than the Gatlings would have been one or two mountain howitzers, but I don't know why none were available. I presume, but do not know, that there were some at either Fort Abraham Lincoln (Terry/Custer) and/or Fort Ellis (Gibbon), and, if so, I wonder why they were not taken along. They were used later in the summer in other situations, so some were obviously available somewhere.
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Post by Beth on Jul 9, 2015 13:39:07 GMT -6
If Custer had taken the Gatlings guns, he would have had to take whole battery and most likely someone to protect the battery. It would have meant that he would have had to increase the size of the pack train to allow for the extra supplies and horses.
I have a question about the Company D and the rear guard. Since Custer didn't call McDougall forward for the battle does that mean Custer expected that the pack train would always be moving forward, which kind of makes sense if he expected that the NA would 'run' and they would be giving chase.
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Post by Beth on Jul 9, 2015 13:59:29 GMT -6
A major flaw in the US military's way of thinking was that Indians would run rather than fight. True in some cases, but if surprised as they were at the LBH the Indians had capable leaders who were not going to panic. This wasn't Sand Creek or the Washita with the hapless Black Kettle . . . this was Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, Crow King, Low Dog, He Dog, Lame White Man and many other hard-cord warriors/leaders who never signed treaties or lived on reservations. The main goal of the military was to find the "hostiles" (ergo FREE Indians). One would think these Indians were not the run-and-hide types, but the aggressive and hard-core fighters (with just as hard-core women)who weren't going to roll over and cower in fear. Custer had been out west since 1867 and had many run-ins with Indians. Most of the time he couldn't find them and when he did find Indians at the Washita he used the same tactics as he did at the LBH. This time it wasn't winter, this time it wasn't an attack at dawn, this time it wasn't against wavering Indians. This time it was the heart-and-soul of the Lakota/Cheyenne Nation. Underestimating one's enemies has been a long-standing concern. This time Custer thought he was going to ride through the Sioux Camp (Kanipe/Martini's glowing reports to fellow 7th members confirm that) only to find these Indians weren't the cowering-in-fear-of-the-US-military type). Whether Custer's plan was perfect or not may not have mattered this time. He hit the wrong camp at the wrong time containing the wrong type of warriors for a rout! I've been reading sort of omnibus version of Indian battles from the end of the Civil War onward. I am surprised by the number of times the NA, didn't run but chose to engage in battle--enough to do damage to the US military. Granted, they don't fight by European or West Point standards, but they fight wisely for an army with limited means and men. Would it be fair to compare them to more of a guerrilla or partisan fighter group?
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