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Post by Beth on Jul 7, 2015 21:05:26 GMT -6
Even if there was serious, trained, military reconnaissance was Custer the type of commander who would take their information under consideration? He doesn't seem to have listened well to feedback from others.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 7, 2015 22:10:02 GMT -6
I don't know.
By serious, trained, military reconnaissance, I mean a unit trained in the type of reconnaissance necessary in that theater, relying upon stealth rather than the beef and brawn of the ACW. Such a type subunit was not available to Custer by organization and would not be in the U S Army for sixty odd more years. What he could have done though, long before have established a provisional off the books unit, very much like the created from hyde regimental band, who for a good while were on detail from their parent companies, before there was a formal authorization for such. These guys, or at least this guy, did not think like that though. To him the tooters were always more important than the shooters, strictly all hat and no cow.
The reason I say I don't know, is that if such a provisional unit existed, it would be much harder for Custer to cover up mistakes he might make. With Indians and civilian guides though, it would be rather easy to say, they did not provide me this or that. With all of the language difficulties, plus some civilian scouts that owed their next paycheck to being in Custer's good graces, I find it difficult to believe that he would not have prevailed were push to come to shove. With Army officers and presumably seasoned NCO's though I believe he would have had to spin a very good tale to extract himself from charges of battlefield incompetence. That is especially true of spinning that tale in front of superiors who were fully aware of his track record. There are only so many times a blind eye can be turned.
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Post by Beth on Jul 7, 2015 23:26:25 GMT -6
Good points.
I do believe that Custer believed this campaign was his 'last chance.' Perhaps one of the reasons he seemed over eager.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 8, 2015 5:26:15 GMT -6
Hi everyone, yes I think it was a big mistake to attack blind, just shows how much regard he had for his enemy, as he must have thought that around 350 men attacking blind in two groups from different directions with no LOS, clear orders, communication and co-ordination would carry the day.
Ian.
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Post by jodak on Jul 8, 2015 6:05:53 GMT -6
Forget the 25th, as calamitous as it was. That was consequence, not cause. Death spiral downwards. GAC's biggest mistake (I assume the equine logistical debacle had its roots when he was in Washington) was moving the body of the 7th too far forward on the 24th. Hold back with the regiment, throw the scouts/guides out further ahead. Particularly those 6 Crows. WO I agree, and this was what I was going to post myself until I saw yours. I believe Custer's biggest mistake(s) occurred before the 25th in his rapid push forward and in not properly reading the trail signs as they gave clues to the number of Indians. I think his biggest mistake on the 25th was in not entering the valley on Reno's left - the only way that a favorable outcome was possible.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 8, 2015 6:49:01 GMT -6
Forget the 25th, as calamitous as it was. That was consequence, not cause. Death spiral downwards. GAC's biggest mistake (I assume the equine logistical debacle had its roots when he was in Washington) was moving the body of the 7th too far forward on the 24th. Hold back with the regiment, throw the scouts/guides out further ahead. Particularly those 6 Crows. WO WO I agree. Custer created the exigent circumstance and then used the general reliance of exercising his judgment given him in the order. Once he took the trail without the recon the rest falls into place and Custer was on his own. Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by dave on Jul 8, 2015 9:40:40 GMT -6
Custer Wore his unit out by force marching from June 21 to 24 Split his command into smaller and smaller units. Pack Train 1 company Benteen's Battalion 3 companies Reno's Battalion 3 companies Custer rode off with 5 companies that he spread all over the battlefield ensuring they would be defeated in detail. He sent Benteen 2 messages and a oddly worded vague message that directed Benteen to take 2 opposite actions. Either be quick or bring the packs. Benteen/Reno fought the battle by combining 7 companies and Custer lost by separating his companies. Benteen's performance exceeded Custer's but to protect Custer's reputation and his poor use of tactics many blame Benteen Regards Dave
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 8, 2015 11:57:42 GMT -6
Forget the 25th, as calamitous as it was. That was consequence, not cause. Death spiral downwards. GAC's biggest mistake (I assume the equine logistical debacle had its roots when he was in Washington) was moving the body of the 7th too far forward on the 24th. Hold back with the regiment, throw the scouts/guides out further ahead. Particularly those 6 Crows. WO WO I agree. Custer created the exigent circumstance and then used the general reliance of exercising his judgment given him in the order. Once he took the trail without the recon the rest falls into place and Custer was on his own. Regards AZ Ranger AZ,
Correct action on the 24th was to hold the regiment back until after Varnum and his scouts/guides verified hostile strength and terrain.
25th was recon/intel and formulating the battle plan.
Any attack involved a push forward at speed early on the 26th. That was Godfrey's "touch and go", with the benefit of recon/intel.
So the 24th is where it all goes wrong. No TC scout by Herendeen, no communication with Terry and the regiment comes too far forward into "touch" range.
WO
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Post by Deleted on Jul 8, 2015 17:23:35 GMT -6
The amount of utter garbage that is spouted on this board is becoming laughable. You guys need to seriously take a step back and revisit the facts. The facts speak clearly for themselves; no need to put your spin and agenda on them. GAC had free reign to attack when and where he wanted. He had the full support of his COs. He attacked ahead of his planned schedule because his Jr officers failed to follow his orders and were sighted. A drunk Reno failed to follow orders, got his command decimated and retreated with his tail between his legs. Benteen, also failed to follow orders and took his command out of the fight.
The only mistakes GAC made were giving Reno the lead and placing trust in Benteen.
That's it; end of story. No spin, and no agenda.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 8, 2015 17:55:12 GMT -6
If Custer had sent scouts only one days ride up the Rosebud they would have discovered fresher trails of Indian ponies without Tipis in tow and in large numbers. That would require further scouting since it would be possible for the Indians to escape over the same routes that they used for the Rosebud battle.
What is important is that Custer would need to move faster than a walk to block off SFRC. That is what Fred's timeline shows that Custer did.
It also shows a potential good reason for Benteen's scout to the left. For my own enjoyment I want to look more into the route up SFRC to the Rosebud. HR has disappeared but I think he had something regarding a route know at the time.
More fun for next year.
AZ Ranger
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Post by Deleted on Jul 8, 2015 17:59:13 GMT -6
Custer Wore his unit out by force marching from June 21 to 24 Split his command into smaller and smaller units. Pack Train 1 company Benteen's Battalion 3 companies Reno's Battalion 3 companies Custer rode off with 5 companies that he spread all over the battlefield ensuring they would be defeated in detail. He sent Benteen 2 messages and a oddly worded vague message that directed Benteen to take 2 opposite actions. Either be quick or bring the packs. Benteen/Reno fought the battle by combining 7 companies and Custer lost by separating his companies. Benteen's performance exceeded Custer's but to protect Custer's reputation and his poor use of tactics many blame Benteen Regards Dave I don't whether to laugh or cry when I read your feeble attempts at constructing a post Dave. This is one of your best. Did you go though all the pages of QC tripe and cut and paste what you thought he would like to hear?? Come on Dave. I feel embarrassed for you. Just a slight correction to your wonderfully thought out post. Custer lost because 7 companies were removed from the fight by Reno/Benteen. One because he was a drunk coward; the other because of his personal dislike for GAC. The note to Benteen was clear. Big village, be quick, bring packs. Pretty simple and to the point. Only those, like Benteen, with a personal agenda find it vague or confusing.
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 8, 2015 18:43:06 GMT -6
If Custer had sent scouts only one days ride up the Rosebud they would have discovered fresher trails of Indian ponies without Tipis in tow and in large numbers. That would require further scouting since it would be possible for the Indians to escape over the same routes that they used for the Rosebud battle. What is important is that Custer would need to move faster than a walk to block off SFRC. That is what Fred's timeline shows that Custer did. It also shows a potential good reason for Benteen's scout to the left. For my own enjoyment I want to look more into the route up SFRC to the Rosebud. HR has disappeared but I think he had something regarding a route know at the time. More fun for next year. AZ Ranger AZ,
The scouts were simply not thrown out far enough ahead, precipitating the hurried blind action on the morning of the 25th once surprise (perceived or actual) was lost.
I have some problem with the Benteen scout, for the simple tactical reason that recon should have already told GAC what/who was in the Upper LBH and intervening valleys before formulating his assault on the hostiles. That was a pre-battle task. As it was, GAC didn't have 3 companies to spare once battle was joined. Reno's skirmish line had no left flank in the valley, and it didn't take the swarming hostiles long to work it out either.
I can see the logic of blocking SFRC.
WO
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Post by Deleted on Jul 8, 2015 19:35:22 GMT -6
If Custer had sent scouts only one days ride up the Rosebud they would have discovered fresher trails of Indian ponies without Tipis in tow and in large numbers. That would require further scouting since it would be possible for the Indians to escape over the same routes that they used for the Rosebud battle. What is important is that Custer would need to move faster than a walk to block off SFRC. That is what Fred's timeline shows that Custer did. It also shows a potential good reason for Benteen's scout to the left. For my own enjoyment I want to look more into the route up SFRC to the Rosebud. HR has disappeared but I think he had something regarding a route know at the time. More fun for next year. AZ Ranger AZ,
The scouts were simply not thrown out far enough ahead, precipitating the hurried blind action on the morning of the 25th once surprise (perceived or actual) was lost.
I have some problem with the Benteen scout, for the simple tactical reason that recon should have already told GAC what/who was in the Upper LBH and intervening valleys before formulating his assault on the hostiles. That was a pre-battle task. As it was, GAC didn't have 3 companies to spare once battle was joined. Reno's skirmish line had no left flank in the valley, and it didn't take the swarming hostiles long to work it out either.
I can see the logic of blocking SFRC.
WO
Another myth about the LBH that is constantly put forth to beat GAC. His scouts were deployed as was par for the course. The forced march and speed on the 24th....same as the forced night march of the other column. Nothing GAC did was out of the ordinary. He played it by the book. Very easy in hindsight to question his every decision. You hammer him for no recon; then berate him for sweeping his left. Cake and eat it too comes to mind.
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Post by Beth on Jul 8, 2015 19:44:30 GMT -6
So we seem to be of a consensus that he attacked too soon and without the proper reconnaissance followed by dividing his forces. Do you think that assigning too many to guard the pack train was a factor? How far ahead could a main body of troops travel from their pack mules?
Beth
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 8, 2015 19:44:44 GMT -6
Custer Wore his unit out by force marching from June 21 to 24 Split his command into smaller and smaller units. Pack Train 1 company Benteen's Battalion 3 companies Reno's Battalion 3 companies Custer rode off with 5 companies that he spread all over the battlefield ensuring they would be defeated in detail. He sent Benteen 2 messages and a oddly worded vague message that directed Benteen to take 2 opposite actions. Either be quick or bring the packs. Benteen/Reno fought the battle by combining 7 companies and Custer lost by separating his companies. Benteen's performance exceeded Custer's but to protect Custer's reputation and his poor use of tactics many blame Benteen Regards Dave Dave,
Focus on 24 June 1876 and also on what GAC did/did not do to define what QC would call his "battle space"....
Remember that, in the end on 25 June, 25% of GAC's combat companies actually assaulted that village. 67% conducted recon and 8% guarded a supply train.
WO
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