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Post by Deleted on May 26, 2015 22:02:10 GMT -6
Since this is the active thread....
Bill O'Reilly "Legends and Lies" is about Custer on May 31st.
Regards
Mark
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Post by dave on May 26, 2015 22:16:28 GMT -6
Beth: You mentioned above that we kinda disagree. Don't think so. Emotional stress is a very serious issue and always has been. You need only watch the movie 12 O'clock High with Peck to see how unrelenting pressure in positions of great responsibility bring down even the most competent of commanders. For two generations the film was shown at West Point, and maybe still is. Just don't know. The book by Bernie Lay was even better, and was based upon some unidentified war time experience. The problem is sometimes this becomes very apparent, and at others not so much. When does emotional stress cause stupid, and when does stupid cause stupid? In the sandbox we are playing in today, it is fairly apparent that stupid caused stupid. If you have not seen the movie, it is highly recommended. So is the book if you can find a copy. QC Thank you for the heads up on the book. I have seen the movies many times and did not realize there was a book. I got my copy for $23 on Amazon. Regards Dave
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Post by welshofficer on May 27, 2015 0:14:45 GMT -6
QC,
I have no issue with GAC identifying Ford C/Deep Ravine as a danger, all the way up to Fred's headcut near Keogh's I Company. The issue, for me, is understanding GAC's mindset. The relative combat strength was all wrong, and deploying Yates there constituted a further dispersing of combat power. Why didn't GAC return to Keogh? What prompted him to believe that he could prevent the egress? What was the condition of the RHQ/Yates battalion upon returning from the recce towards Ford D?
WO
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Post by mac on May 27, 2015 1:36:15 GMT -6
QC, I have no issue with GAC identifying Ford C/Deep Ravine as a danger, all the way up to Fred's headcut near Keogh's I Company. The issue, for me, is understanding GAC's mindset. The relative combat strength was all wrong, and deploying Yates there constituted a further dispersing of combat power. Why didn't GAC return to Keogh? What prompted him to believe that he could prevent the egress? What was the condition of the RHQ/Yates battalion upon returning from the recce towards Ford D?WO These are the questions that make me suggest that he had not the "horsepower" left to do much of anything. Reno had had his mounts resting while they were in the skirmish line and was able to break contact. Custer had men dropping out on the way up to 3411 and had been in continuous motion since then, Ford B, Calhoun, Ford D. All probably at a brisk pace. What are the chances that by the time he got to Cemmetery he had mounts that would not be able to make a quick move towards Keogh? I assume that he can only travel as fast as his slowest mounts. Maybe this is why what he does seems so strange. Best he can manage is to move up to LSH. Cheers
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Post by welshofficer on May 27, 2015 3:13:05 GMT -6
Mac,
That still begs the question; why did he think the cemetery area was "safer" than a return to Keogh minus some unfortunate troopers? They all died by staying put.
Going up LSH was a last ditch instinctive, reactive, desperate move by RHQ/F, I suspect triggered by the need to reel in a few Keogh battalion survivors. And they were fixed up there. And when I mean fixed, I mean fixed. Not the way that Reno was "fixing" hostiles for GAC's "flank" attack miles downriver!!!
WO
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Post by welshofficer on May 27, 2015 3:31:32 GMT -6
Mac,
It's GAC's mind set that interests me. Turning down the chance to have 16 companies. Not sending Herendeen down TC to seek to "co-ordinate" with Terry/Gibbon/Brisbin. The night march. The hurried attack on the 25th when discovery was feared. And then the frittering away of combat power on the 25th that Montrose alludes to i.e. commanding 12 companies at the divide, 8 companies at the lone tepee, 5 companies at 3411, 2 companies on the northern recce, and finally 1 company fixed up LSH. Much of it is tactically inexplicable...
WO
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Post by mac on May 27, 2015 4:13:25 GMT -6
WO I understand what you are saying and I think somewhere QC was saying much the same. It seems glib to say "well he wasn't that good" but one would think that he wasn't that bad! I wonder is he looking for the big victory to make him a star again, many do, and trying to make sure he does it alone and unaided like a superhero. I just don't know; so in the mystery of the end game I go to what could have gone wrong beyond his ability to ad lib his way out (Custer's luck). So maybe the horses. Of course this says nothing at all about all the preceeding decisions. Cheers
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 27, 2015 6:36:33 GMT -6
WO; the four points you make concerning the four extra companies of the 2nd cavalry, not scouting Tullocks, the night march and dispersal of force are valid points and I will try and answer them.
4 x 2nd companies cavalry; not taking these troops could be down to ego, but there are a few that say that these cavalry were needed elsewhere and Terry would be down to an infantry only force.
It does seem like Custer was blinkered when it came to Tullocks, he was like a bloodhound with his nose to the ground and following the trail (side bar: if he did take the extra companies then these could have been sent on this mission).
The night march, well how long did this march last, now I cannot recall off hand but it was I think about three hours (I will have to check this out in my signed copy of Fred’s book). But if it did last three hours then just how far could they move in the dark dragging along a pack train.
Dispersal of force; he tried to cover all bases with too small a force, in the case of Benteen he needed to cover his left, the pack train needed protection so I suppose B company had to ride shotgun. Separating along Reno creek sounds ok if they kept within supporting distance of each other, but then he virtually detaches himself from any supporting role, but the main thing is that once he gets round the side of the village, he divides again which to me defies all logic as these two battalions were not strong enough to function alone. So again he tries to cover too much with too little, a holding mission and a scouting mission and this was done in front of the largest villages ever assembled.
Ian.
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Post by montrose on May 27, 2015 8:36:04 GMT -6
Let me address a single point. What is so hard with the concept of using a cache? This was a standard procedure in this era, and is a staple of operations now.
The pack train was mobility train wreck. The mules were untrained, and the packers were grossly incompetent. Compare Custer's pack train with Crook's. Crook used bell mares, shave tails, and extensive training of man and animal.
But in June 1876 it is too late to bitch about the incompetence of LTC Custer is training and organizing his force. You go to war with the regiment you have, not the one you should have had.
The pack train mostly carried food for an extended patrol. There was a small ammunition resupply. This ammo was intended to allow the unit to fight a second battle, so that one fight did not force them to leave the area of operations. It was not intended for resupply in the middle of the units first battle.
Now apply the So What test.
The 7th Cavalry Regiment should have dumped the mules and supplies before starting any combat. This was a standard procedure In the 1870s-1880s. Just look at this very campaign. Crook dumped his trains on 16 Jun 76 to allow him the mobility to attack the Indians. The Rosebud battle would not have occurred if he had not done this.
There are various methods used to establish a cache. You can just leave the supplies. You can leave the supplies and the animals that carry them. You may leave a guard force, but in many cases you should not. You are dumping gear to fight, so anyone who can fight should be with the attacking force.
By the way, I have a supply cache from the first gulf war, that to the best of knowledge is still in the Iraqi desert.
The decision to not cache the useless pack train was a major cause of the defeat. Hundreds of shooters were kept out of the fight by this incompetent call. And for what? If you win, eat the enemies food stores. If you lose, eat the mules. If the bad guys captured your train, it just did not matter.
The purpose of the pack train was to extend the time you needed to find the enemy. Ummm, after you found them, why in God's Name are you crippling your combat power for no reason?
The Hussar school claims LTC Custer was some highly agressive tactical genius. But what we see is a very indecisive commander, timid, hesitant, confused.
There is a difference between physical courage and moral courage. GAC had a lot of the first and none of the second.
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 27, 2015 8:58:59 GMT -6
Good points Montrose, the pack train contained around twelve civilians whose job it was to aid with the packs, plus we have people like Reed, Boston and Kellogg who could have stayed out of the fight. These along with one man from each company makes 28 which could be enough to stand guard.
Ian.
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Post by Beth on May 27, 2015 9:29:49 GMT -6
Good points Montrose, the pack train contained around twelve civilians whose job it was to aid with the packs, plus we have people like Reed, Boston and Kellogg who could have stayed out of the fight. These along with one man from each company makes 28 which could be enough to stand guard. Ian. Kellogg was a reporter. I doubt that he would have been left behind but other than that the cache makes very good sense. It also might have eliminated one of Custer's 'oh crap' moments that triggered his fear of discovery--the dropped box. One of the problems I see at least especially when it comes to Custer was he always insisted on covering too much distance in any given move so he used up his supplies faster--or his men and horses. Perhaps Custer didn't cache because right or wrong, it wouldn't give him the freedom of quick movement he seemed to thrive on. Beth
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 27, 2015 9:42:16 GMT -6
Beth, I bet Kellogg wished he was back with the packs when things went pear shaped LOL.
Looking at the men who was with Custer that afternoon does make you think just how serious he took this mission, I mean they are entering a combat zone and Custer takes every Male member of his immediate family along plus a reporter, I am surprised he didn't have Libby with him darning his socks.
Ian.
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Post by Beth on May 27, 2015 9:46:00 GMT -6
Does anyone wonder if Custer's inability to organize his mule train is indicative of his contempt for the mule train? He must have felt it was a ball and chain. Just the fact that he made accompanying it a punishment seems to show it wasn't high on his list of favorite things.
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Post by dave on May 27, 2015 9:57:05 GMT -6
Will
The decision to not cache the useless pack train was a major cause of the defeat. Hundreds of shooters were kept out of the fight by this incompetent call. And for what? If you win, eat the enemies food stores. If you lose, eat the mules. If the bad guys captured your train, it just did not matter.
What a remarkable post! I do not remember ever reading about the pack train being a cause of GAC's losing the battle. Now that I read your post I see a whole new facet of this conflict. Thank you for sharing this information with me. Regards Dave
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Post by Beth on May 27, 2015 10:37:57 GMT -6
Beth, I bet Kellogg wished he was back with the packs when things went pear shaped LOL. Looking at the men who was with Custer that afternoon does make you think just how serious he took this mission, I mean they are entering a combat zone and Custer takes every Male member of his immediate family along plus a reporter, I am surprised he didn't have Libby with him darning his socks. Ian. I am sure she tried everything she could to get Grant Marsh to take her aboard the riverboat. You know history is always "Poor Libbie" but seldom do you see much mentioned about Margaret Custer Calhoun Maugham. She lost in one day her husband, 3 brothers and a nephew. In the end she isn't buried with either her first husband or second but under a stone that identifiers her as Margaret, sister of Major General George A. Custer. Really? That is the sum of her life? Pseudo widow of her brother?
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