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Post by quincannon on May 26, 2015 12:20:10 GMT -6
CUSTER DID NOT PAUSE. PERIOD.
There was no lull in the action, the firefight continued. The firefight was stationary, centered in one specific area, but there was NO PAUSE in the manner we think of the word as a stopping of events, a time out.
Let me see if I can put this in some perspective that can be understood, while removing what seems to be the self imposed mystery when discussing all things military
You own a gas station (command). The gas station office catches on fire (a lot of Indians crossing the river). Would you as a reasonable person just leave the office and stand outside on the apron where all the gas pumps are, or would you realizing the potential danger (decisive engagement - fix) move further away? Most would say the proper solution was to move away to a place of relative and more safety.
What you would not do is stand on the apron (where the gas pumps are, a few feet away from them and the fire) and try to provide treatment for one of your employees that fell trying to escape and broke his leg (wounded) What you a reasonable person would do is move that person to a place of greater safety and get him treated for his injury.
The ONLY reason you the owner (commander) would stay on the apron of that gas station a few feet away from gas pumps and fire, is if you thought the fire was manageable, and you could either take care of it, or at least manage it until help arrived. You place value on the station, so you wish to do everything you can to save it, but there are some things that cannot be saved regardless of the value it may have, and at some point it is foolish to try. Of course, deciding it is foolish to stay is of no avail, if you decide too late and the damned place blows up with you standing there.
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 26, 2015 12:23:43 GMT -6
Beth I recall asking a few questions some years back that raised some of the questions you ask.
I cannot remember who answered what, but I think that there was a short window of time in which Custer was too far north to see what went on behind him and this could be when Crazy horse nipped in and broke the back of the Keogh position.
But I think Custer would have known that all was not well over the ridge line (as he couldn’t observe what was happening) as Indians would still be seen in that direction as it would be beyond the realms of all possibility for every warrior to vanish between deep ravine and battle ridge.
Ian.
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Post by Beth on May 26, 2015 12:39:03 GMT -6
Military terms never get in the way if they are used properly. It is a common language, and each word has a specific meaning, and that must be if it is to be understood by all. Skirmishing is a good example. If you conclude that skirmishing and defending have the same meaning then you are thrown off on a tangent in determining the meaning of the event. If you conclude that cavalry becomes Infantry when they dismount, you alter the meaning of both Infantry and cavalry and again are sent on a tangent as to mission and performance of that mission. If you conclude that engagement always means decisive engagement you lose the meaning of both, and cant understand why someone can maneuver during an engagement, while they cannot during decisive engagement. If you define a fix as distracting the attention of, instead of what it is, pinning someone to the ground so they may not move, you have lost all chance of understanding what the term is. If you think to flank is always an assault into, instead of the movement itself, then it cannot be understood that an assault into is not always part of a flanking movement. If you do not understand that it may be impossible to support someone as close as ten feet away, one will never understand that supporting distance is the art of the possible. QC, with all due respects, sometimes military terms can be a problem to those of us who aren't military. To you, William, Fred, WO and others it is a common language but to me at least, it's like Spanish. I read and understand a lot of Spanish because I've lived in areas with high Latino population but I don't speak it and I have to translate ever word I see or hear into English before I can understand it. I can not translate what I want to say back into Spanish though and at times I have the same problem translating back what I am trying to say into military terms. For example last night I was trying to figure out if those who traveled to the bluff with Custer would be called. A platoon is a small group I believe, a regiment is all of the 7th I think, so was it a brigade? something else? I end up saying Custer and all because I just don't know... I am learning but it takes times and at times I just can't figure out the word I want. Now concepts I get, especially because you guys are so good at explaining them. It's just went I try to translate them back, it gets dicey. Beth
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Post by quincannon on May 26, 2015 12:58:27 GMT -6
If you do not know what a word in Spanish means, you either look it up or ask the question of someone who knows. To do otherwise leads you down the road of trying to understand without fully comprehending meaning.
You cannot arbitrarily put you own meaning upon a term as Captain Pretend does on the other board.
Those that traveled with Custer onto the bluffs were either a battalion (two or more companies) or two battalions. A battalion is a word drawn from the Italian (battaglia) meaning to give battle, or a force designed to give battle, There is some question if it was one battalion or two, and that depends upon when you decide Custer split the responsibility for command between Yates and Keogh. Most, including I, think it was long before going up onto the bluffs, others including this miscreant Hatch in his Appendix A to his latest tome, mentioned yesterday, lists all as the Custer battalion. Montrose has said a number of times here, and some very recently that a battalion of the time was a temporary grouping of companies for a given purpose. Today those organizations are established with a fixed organization of a headquarters and two or more subordinate companies, and the number of companies dependent upon the type of battalion it is, headquarters and four being the norm.
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Post by Beth on May 26, 2015 13:05:40 GMT -6
CUSTER DID NOT PAUSE. PERIOD. There was no lull in the action, the firefight continued. The firefight was stationary, centered in one specific area, but there was NO PAUSE in the manner we think of the word as a stopping of events, a time out. Let me see if I can put this in some perspective that can be understood, while removing what seems to be the self imposed mystery when discussing all things military You own a gas station (command). The gas station office catches on fire (a lot of Indians crossing the river). Would you as a reasonable person just leave the office and stand outside on the apron where all the gas pumps are, or would you realizing the potential danger (decisive engagement - fix) move further away? Most would say the proper solution was to move away to a place of relative and more safety. What you would not do is stand on the apron (where the gas pumps are, a few feet away from them and the fire) and try to provide treatment for one of your employees that fell trying to escape and broke his leg (wounded) What you a reasonable person would do is move that person to a place of greater safety and get him treated for his injury. The ONLY reason you the owner (commander) would stay on the apron of that gas station a few feet away from gas pumps and fire, is if you thought the fire was manageable, and you could either take care of it, or at least manage it until help arrived. You place value on the station, so you wish to do everything you can to save it, but there are some things that cannot be saved regardless of the value it may have, and at some point it is foolish to try. Of course, deciding it is foolish to stay is of no avail, if you decide too late and the damned place blows up with you standing there. Let me just say, after a day or so of seeing people on the news doing very stupid things during flash floods, people even who should know better, don't do what is smart, right or what they are even trained for in emergency when they are in high stress situations. I understand what you are saying. I also understand that one of the things that the military--or police, emergency, fire or any number of other organizations do, is train people to do certain behaviors practically automatically in high stress situations. It increases your survival when you can act nearly instinctively instead of thinking it out when you have moments to move. However all the training, common scene, and know how can fly out the window at times when extreme emotions enter the picture. Now I am not saying this is what happened. Or could have happened. It's just an illustration of what might have caused Custer to pause and check on a wounded man or to spend a moment too long distracted by a detail instead of on the battle. How do you think Custer would have acted if it had been brought to his attention that Autie Reed, Boston or even Tom, had become wounded, unaccounted for, or in general missing? Mind you I feel Autie Reed and Boston had absolutely no business being there that day because they would have been nothing but a distraction but it the fact they were highlights that Custer didn't think the battle that day would be a serious matter. Beth
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Post by crzhrs on May 26, 2015 13:16:03 GMT -6
<However all the training, common scene, and know how can fly out the window at times when extreme emotions enter the picture>
Just look at all the "problems" the police have had recently with shootings and/or handling of Blacks who may or may not have committed crimes or are treated like the FBIs' "Most Wanted". The police supposedly have all kinds of training and experience and yet react in unaccountable ways . . . either justified or unjustified resulting in deaths of Blacks who may just be in the wrong place at the wrong time. It seems all the training and/or experience is thrown out the window at crucial times when emotions and/or prejudices take over for common sense. Whether this was a factor at the LBH or not is something to consider.
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Post by montrose on May 26, 2015 13:16:24 GMT -6
QC,
I do not believe the evidence supports a certainty that there was no pause.
The only evidence we have on US actions on Battle Ridge is from the Indians. Given translation problems and a different culture, this evidence is murky. From JSIT's work, mostly secondhand or decades after the fight, the Indians had the impression of a US pause on cemetery ridge. Many of these testimonies are on this board, especially 2008-2010.
Even the Ford D excursion rests on Indian accounts, with little supporting evidence.
The pause confused the Indians, which is why so many recalled it. They did not understand it.
I am willing to say that they stopped moving for some time on cemetery ridge, then later moved to Last Stand Hill. It probably happened. I have no certainty, because nothing is certain about what happened on Battle Ridge, except all the Americans died.
From a tactical point of view, I would not have stopped there. It has too many covered and concealed approaches. The suicide boys attack most likely occurred in this area.
Fred thought this area was supposed to be the Regimental attack position. CPT Keogh would have led the regiment rear here, where they would launch an attack. Maybe, I can not disprove it.
I have other posts exploring other options.
If they did go to ground here to establish a hasty defense; then they did a piss poor job of it. It does not feel right.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by quincannon on May 26, 2015 13:25:46 GMT -6
Beth: How do I think he would have acted, or how do you think he should have acted if one of his relatives was wounded or killed.
Being Custer he would have staged a scene reminiscent of the famous painting Death of Wolfe.
As a commander he should have done nothing including dwelling on it for even a fraction of a second. His responsibility was to his living soldiers, and no one else, to preserve their lives as best he could and fight his command. You take your eye off the damned ball in battle and you are going to get hit by the pitch from which you will not recover. If you live you can mourn later. If you fail it does not matter.
Training, common sense, and know how is what is supposed to keep you on track, and if it goes out the window in time of extreme emotion, you have not trained enough, do not have enough common sense, and you know how is sadly deficient. That is why we train. That is why we evaluate the mental and physical capacities of our leaders and soldiers.
I think Fred understands the value of establishing a regimental attack position, and were I to do it the Cemetery Ridge or Battle Ridge Extension would be prime candidates. I can only conclude that he stopped for some reason, and a RAP is one of those possible reasons.
None of it feels right. Nothing the man did from leaving the Powder River Depot feels right. None of it. If any of it did you could easily say this is the point where everything started to go wrong. As it is, just when you think you key in on the critical event where things started to get off track, someone will say , yes but did you think of thus and so that happened an hour or a day before, this causing you to think for a moment or two, and then start over again at square one. One think for sure it happened sometime between the time he got up in the morning he left PRD, and about 1700 hours on 25 June 76.
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Post by quincannon on May 26, 2015 13:36:21 GMT -6
Will:
I believe the evidence does support the certainty there was no pause in the manner we understand the word.
I believe the evidence does suggest that Custer stopped, where he should not have and when he should not have. Stopped does not mean stopped fighting. It means he fought from the same position for a period of time. I fully agree that was a poor place to stop, and if I had been an Indian, one of several hundred that were crossing that river after him at the time I must admit I would be confused, and not understand why that silly SOB was stopping and disputing my crossing when I have the numbers to clean his backside with a blowtorch.
This is all a word game I think, pause meaning something to us, neither accurate or conveying the proper meaning by those who told the tale.
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Post by montrose on May 26, 2015 13:54:19 GMT -6
Ian,
Tactics is not rocket science. We use terms as shorthand to discuss concepts. If there is an issue on meanings, the greybeards will help sort out terminology. SO say what you want to say, we will help out.
For example, you used the term platoon in an earlier post. A platoon for the last 120ish years is a standing organization with an officer, NCO and several subelements, generally called squads.
In 1876 the smallest organization in the US Army was a company. The term platoon meant a temporary detachment within the company led by a junior officer. The company was supposed to have a CPT and two LTs. The term squad was also a temporary element. So in practice a single soldier could be a member of several different platoons and squads, all a single day.
So a term that the military uses now, had a different meaning then.
Really, we should not use the terms squads, platoons or battalions in LBH, the term we use now would be detachments. A detachment is a temporary grouping of soldiers who do not habitually work together, established to cnduct a specific task. The element is dissolved when the task is done.
Look at the Reno, Benteen and McDougal Bns at Reno Hill. Once units linked up subsequent decisions ignored the battalion designation. The Reno Hill defense line bears no relationship to the divide BNs. No one formerly gave an order to dissolve these temporary task forces, because no one saw a need.
Of course, this does not mean that tactical concepts can mean any damn thing. The other board grossly corrupts tactical terms to justify or defend ludicrous, if not insane, theories.
The actions of a few fanatics limits rational discourse. Whatever LTC Custer did after leaving Ash Creek, it was not a flank attack. He never went near any Indian in the valley fight. He was doing something else. Saying he wasn't doing a flank attack is not an indictment of GAC.
In fact, the effort to defend the false flank attack theory has led to some 2,000 posts, that make GAC look like an incompetent fool.
GAC made a decision to not support the Reno Bn in the valley. At 3411 he made a decision to order the Benteen and McDougall Bns to move towards him, east of the river, and not support Reno.
I am interested in what he saw, and how the regimental decision making process and command and control led to these decisions.
One of the biggest challenges the Custer fanatics have to answer is 3411. If GAC at any point in the battle arrived on the bluffs, anywhere, then the fanatic theories fail.
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Post by quincannon on May 26, 2015 13:54:24 GMT -6
Will forgive me. The last two paragraphs posted to Beth above were meant to be posted to you.
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Post by montrose on May 26, 2015 14:13:26 GMT -6
Chuck,
I do not think it is a word game. Concepts matter.
Let's say GAC stopped his element due to enemy vicinity cemetery ridge. So how many, 20? He abandoned Reno facing 1200 plus.
And a decision to stop facing an insignificant threat shows another factor. He was acting like a company commander. Not like a BN commander, not like a regimental commander.
Cemetery Ridge was not critical terrain, nor was it relevant to the regimental battle. At what point does a regimental commander need to know he needs contact with more than one sixth of his command? How ever many Indians GAC saw vicinity Cemetery Ridge, he had abandoned Reno in the valley facing more.
I question his decisions.
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Post by Beth on May 26, 2015 14:26:59 GMT -6
Beth: How do I think he would have acted, or how do you think he should have acted if one of his relatives was wounded or killed. Being Custer he would have staged a scene reminiscent of the famous painting Death of Wolfe. As a commander he should have done nothing including dwelling on it for even a fraction of a second. His responsibility was to his living soldiers, and no one else, to preserve their lives as best he could and fight his command. You take your eye off the damned ball in battle and you are going to get hit by the pitch from which you will not recover. If you live you can mourn later. If you fail it does not matter. Training, common sense, and know how is what is supposed to keep you on track, and if it goes out the window in time of extreme emotion, you have not trained enough, do not have enough common sense, and you know how is sadly deficient. That is why we train. That is why we evaluate the mental and physical capacities of our leaders and soldiers. I think Fred understands the value of establishing a regimental attack position, and were I to do it the Cemetery Ridge or Battle Ridge Extension would be prime candidates. I can only conclude that he stopped for some reason, and a RAP is one of those possible reasons. None of it feels right. Nothing the man did from leaving the Powder River Depot feels right. None of it. If any of it did you could easily say this is the point where everything started to go wrong. As it is, just when you think you key in on the critical event where things started to get off track, someone will say , yes but did you think of thus and so that happened an hour or a day before, this causing you to think for a moment or two, and then start over again at square one. One think for sure it happened sometime between the time he got up in the morning he left PRD, and about 1700 hours on 25 June 76.
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Post by Beth on May 26, 2015 14:37:19 GMT -6
Ian, Tactics is not rocket science. We use terms as shorthand to discuss concepts. If there is an issue on meanings, the greybeards will help sort out terminology. SO say what you want to say, we will help out. For example, you used the term platoon in an earlier post. A platoon for the last 120ish years is a standing organization with an officer, NCO and several subelements, generally called squads. In 1876 the smallest organization in the US Army was a company. The term platoon meant a temporary detachment within the company led by a junior officer. The company was supposed to have a CPT and two LTs. The term squad was also a temporary element. So in practice a single soldier could be a member of several different platoons and squads, all a single day. So a term that the military uses now, had a different meaning then. Really, we should not use the terms squads, platoons or battalions in LBH, the term we use now would be detachments. A detachment is a temporary grouping of soldiers who do not habitually work together, established to cnduct a specific task. The element is dissolved when the task is done. Look at the Reno, Benteen and McDougal Bns at Reno Hill. Once units linked up subsequent decisions ignored the battalion designation. The Reno Hill defense line bears no relationship to the divide BNs. No one formerly gave an order to dissolve these temporary task forces, because no one saw a need. Of course, this does not mean that tactical concepts can mean any damn thing. The other board grossly corrupts tactical terms to justify or defend ludicrous, if not insane, theories. The actions of a few fanatics limits rational discourse. Whatever LTC Custer did after leaving Ash Creek, it was not a flank attack. He never went near any Indian in the valley fight. He was doing something else. Saying he wasn't doing a flank attack is not an indictment of GAC. In fact, the effort to defend the false flank attack theory has led to some 2,000 posts, that make GAC look like an incompetent fool. GAC made a decision to not support the Reno Bn in the valley. At 3411 he made a decision to order the Benteen and McDougall Bns to move towards him, east of the river, and not support Reno. I am interested in what he saw, and how the regimental decision making process and command and control led to these decisions. One of the biggest challenges the Custer fanatics have to answer is 3411. If GAC at any point in the battle arrived on the bluffs, anywhere, then the fanatic theories fail. I'd like clarification on your last couple of lines please. I'm not quite sure what you are saying and I can see it's important to understand. Beth
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Post by Beth on May 26, 2015 14:41:33 GMT -6
Chuck, I do not think it is a word game. Concepts matter. Let's say GAC stopped his element due to enemy vicinity cemetery ridge. So how many, 20? He abandoned Reno facing 1200 plus. And a decision to stop facing an insignificant threat shows another factor. He was acting like a company commander. Not like a BN commander, not like a regimental commander. Cemetery Ridge was not critical terrain, nor was it relevant to the regimental battle. At what point does a regimental commander need to know he needs contact with more than one sixth of his command? How ever many Indians GAC saw vicinity Cemetery Ridge, he had abandoned Reno in the valley facing more. I question his decisions. I am curious, and perhaps this is something you have answered before or maybe better for a different thread. What points of the battle really for a lack of better words 'trigger your spidy senses' as this is just not right? I will ask the same of any of the other military people on the board. What points in the battle raise the most alarms as to what the heck was he thinking and why? Beth
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