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Post by quincannon on May 25, 2015 17:56:35 GMT -6
Agree, and I think there was just about as much chance of there being a pause, in the manner we normally understand the meaning of the word as there is of finding a distillery in the basement of the Women's Christian Temperance Union.
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Post by dave on May 25, 2015 20:33:29 GMT -6
While reading this fact based logical discussion taking place on this thread I liked to had a heart attack. I am making notes and learning so much from people who are familiar with the subject matter and presenting thoughts, ideas and opinions based on evidence and professional experience not fantasy dress up wishes and wants.
This is the type of thread that is mothers milk for the battle enthusiasts such as myself. The quality of the participants is reflected in the information offered for study.
Regards
Dave
PS WO you will really enjoy Fred's book
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Post by quincannon on May 25, 2015 21:06:28 GMT -6
Am I to assume that among those facts Dave, you have concluded that there is no distillery in the basement of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union?
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Post by tubman13 on May 25, 2015 21:29:10 GMT -6
NO- You either love the guy or despise the guy, and that leaves very little room for a balanced middle ground. I think it would be easier to find a balanced biography of Benedict Arnold written by George Washington. I am still ambivalent, he sucked from 24th on, despise is too harsh a word.
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Post by quincannon on May 26, 2015 0:14:44 GMT -6
Both words are inappropriate Tom if you wish balance.
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Post by montrose on May 26, 2015 5:32:43 GMT -6
1. Custer Bio. I know of no decent biography of Custer. In fact, this is a gap in history. I nominate Beth to write one.
I bought a really horrible book over the winter. I had to dig around to find it. Glorious War by Thomas Hatch. The author's research is shallow. There is more information in a typical wiki article than in this book. Custer did well in ACW. But this book makes him look like a buffoon. This book is not worthy of reading, not worthy as an emergency toilet paper.
2. The Lethal Pause. Custer with the regiment HHD (Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment; this means Custer and his entourage of officers, messengers, medical folks, straphangers) and Yates Battalion returned from Ford D to cemetery ridge area. They were there an estimated (guestimated) 20 minutes before the move to LSH. I believe John Stands in The Timber established this position in his research. (And we know from these boards that any Timber position is impregnable).
I would say that the fact they had moved from Calhoun Hill area to Ford D, and then to cemetery ridge, means they retained their mobility.
The logical action would be to continue to move to the other end of Battle Ridge, to link up with the battalion there. Amazing thing about ridges, if the west side is too hot, flip over to the east side. I believe from the very fact of a pause that it was possible.
There is something very wrong with the decisions made on the north end of Battle Ridge. A regimental commander with a small detachment finds an aggressive enemy in superior numbers. Any competent command would want to reestablish contact with the regiment main body. This would be vital, regardless of casualties. So why sit on his ass? Why not yell "Come on you wolverines" and charge to his other battalion?
Darkcloud makes an argument that GAC was wounded early, to explain decision making at LBH that is cowardly, timid, indecisive and incompetent. My problem is these decisions started at lone tepee, and he was still alive and healthy.
I do not believe LTC Custer was decisively engaged on or near Ford D. He was not pinned down on Cemetery Ridge. He still had the initiative, for a window in time.
Very Respectfully,
William
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 26, 2015 6:26:02 GMT -6
William, I was always under the illusion that Custer/Yates never even reach the ford (river), I think that they stopped short saw what they needed to see and also saw Indians gathering not only to oppose them but cut them off. And they beat the hell out of there, losing Kellogg on the way.
But I have recently changed my mind over this scenario and think that they reached the cemetery area in good order. Now I have to be extra careful here because I usually get the rounds of the kitchen from the ex-military when I try to work on your ideas, plus folks think I was talking about ford D when I meant ford B, but I am not ex-service and probably write things down different. Anyway back to the topic in hand.
Now if they did stop on cemetery (in good order), then they may have pause before making their next move, if E Company was told to dismount and form skirmish lines then they would be part of a plan defend the area and would need orders issued from the HQ to do so. But would they try and stop hundreds with around 30? People say that I am crazy to suggest that they stop to treat the wounded, but it could be likely that they halted and tried to stop three or four times their number on an exposed hill, which to me sounds more ludicrous.
Ian.
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Post by mac on May 26, 2015 6:29:27 GMT -6
I agree William that had he not paused he may have had time to move to Keogh. I wonder though if that just would have resulted in more bodies in the Keogh sector? Cheers
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Post by quincannon on May 26, 2015 7:38:15 GMT -6
If you all are defining pause as stopping, then the only answer for stopping is thinking he could and it turning out he could not.
I do not believe Custer was decisively engaged at Ford D either. The very definition of decisive engagement is a loss of the ability to maneuver, and we know that he maneuvered away from that area.
Stopping in good order in the Cemetery Ridge area is a given. He threw out a skirmish line, and disposed of his horses in the normal manner (only to be later run off), so he was in control of his own force, which is another way of saying in good order.
My point here, and one that has not changed, is that Custer stopped for a reason, but that reason was not to wait for Keogh, Benteen, or the Good Fairy, to tend wounded, to eyeball the ladies, or for a hundred and one different reasons given over the years. He thought (erroneously) that he could stop the flow of the hostiles over the river. He could not. He was wrong.
Now as has been said the proper course of action would be to go back up and over LSH and use the back (east) side of Battle Ridge to mask his movements toward Keogh. The fact he did not do that, and the attempt to stem the flow of hostiles across the river, lead me to the conclusion that he saw something of value in his trip to the environs of Ford D (I don't think he got all the way to D either).
Ian: Defending is a deliberate decision. Skirmish lines do not, and are not intended to defend anything. Their sole purpose is to dispute ground, short of a deliberate defense, or as a prelude to resumed forward movement. NO ONE CONDUCTED A DEFENSE ANYWHERE ON THAT FIELD, until Reno and Benteen deliberately decided to defend the Reno Hill Area late in the day, NO ONE. This reminds me of that continual discussion with the late departed and unlamented (by me) who could not get it into his mind that dismounted cavalry does not suddenly become infantry when it dismounts. It is still cavalry, operating like cavalry, doing a cavalry mission, except they are not presently on horses or any other means of mobility
While wounded may be tended to in the middle of a firefight, you do not stop for the sole purpose of tending wounded. That goes against the training and culture of officers and leaders, and considering the responsibility given officers and leaders is a moral and ethical wrongdoing. Your responsibility as a leader is accomplishment of the mission and the welfare of the whole. It does no good to try and save the few, if in so doing you lose the many.
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 26, 2015 8:16:21 GMT -6
Chuck, I don’t know what is happening here because if you read my last post then I am actually agreeing with what you say, but again the military terms are getting in the way, any attempt by E or F for that matter to halt the influx on enemy to their front was going to fail, as they didn’t have the man power to achieve this. It doesn’t really matter just how they formed up or if it was defending or repelling, if they dismounted a fired at the enemy then they had not only lost their mobility but handed the initiative over to the Indians and that is why I said the it was ludicrous to attempt this rather than moving on to re-join Keogh.
Again the notion of treating the wounded was only a response to what Montrose said about some sort of pause happening on cemetery hill, I mentioned a wounded Smith as the cause, then I mentioned some sort of defense may have been the reason, but at the end of the day any pause on this feature was a mistake, they should have carried on moving, but they were surrounded by a ridge line to the east and a tree line to the west both of which could mask any enemy build up.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on May 26, 2015 8:44:21 GMT -6
Ian: People make the wrong decisions every day. We, everyone here, know that Custer made the wrong decision by stopping and trying to deal with the enemy crossing that river. That is not, nor has it ever been in dispute. Us knowing it was wrong though is irrelevant. What is relevant is did Custer know it was the wrong thing to do. My answer for that is - Not at the time of the doing. You have to look at these things as Custer saw them, not as we see them. Trying to do that, must lead us to the conclusion there was some reason he did what he did, and the only possible reason is that there was some value in trying to retain that area in his mind. He could have left. He could have done a few things as variations of the leaving. He was not pinned to that position when he made the decision to stay.
Every time I speak about wounded I come off like the Marquis de Sade. An officer and a leader does have a responsibility to the wounded. First and foremost it is to render immediate aid, without endangering the rest of the force or any part thereof. His next order of business is to remove them to a place of relative safety for further treatment.
How does this relate to the story at hand.
Many believe it was Smith wounded at Ford B. Given that this is correct, what would be the next action taken in line with the responsibilities outlined above - move him away from the area to the first place of relative safety and treat the wound. That would be the Calhoun Hill area, and it would be likely that Doctor Lord would be involved in treating him. What you would not do if he was wounded at B is keep him with you on the long trek to Ford D, engage in a small firefight, carry him back to Cemetery Ridge, then onward to LSH.
Considering that Smith was found on LSH and not with the bulk of his company, would lead one to believe he was wounded in the environs of D or on his company skirmish line, and was then moved to the nearest place of relative safety, to be treated, that being LSH. That explains the whole thing in my mind and is completely consistent with the normal procedure for these things both then and now.
You must attempt to see what Custer saw, to understand, or try and understand, what Custer did. Montrose and I along with quite a few others can opine on what Custer should have done until the second coming of Christ or until dinner time whichever comes first, but none of that shoulda coulda matters. The only thing that matters is what Custer saw and based his decisions upon if we want to try and reason this thing out.
Military terms never get in the way if they are used properly. It is a common language, and each word has a specific meaning, and that must be if it is to be understood by all. Skirmishing is a good example. If you conclude that skirmishing and defending have the same meaning then you are thrown off on a tangent in determining the meaning of the event. If you conclude that cavalry becomes Infantry when they dismount, you alter the meaning of both Infantry and cavalry and again are sent on a tangent as to mission and performance of that mission. If you conclude that engagement always means decisive engagement you lose the meaning of both, and cant understand why someone can maneuver during an engagement, while they cannot during decisive engagement. If you define a fix as distracting the attention of, instead of what it is, pinning someone to the ground so they may not move, you have lost all chance of understanding what the term is. If you think to flank is always an assault into, instead of the movement itself, then it cannot be understood that an assault into is not always part of a flanking movement. If you do not understand that it may be impossible to support someone as close as ten feet away, one will never understand that supporting distance is the art of the possible.
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Post by dave on May 26, 2015 10:56:43 GMT -6
William, I was always under the illusion that Custer/Yates never even reach the ford (river), I think that they stopped short saw what they needed to see and also saw Indians gathering not only to oppose them but cut them off. And they beat the hell out of there, losing Kellogg on the way. But I have recently changed my mind over this scenario and think that they reached the cemetery area in good order. Now I have to be extra careful here because I usually get the rounds of the kitchen from the ex-military when I try to work on your ideas, plus folks think I was talking about ford D when I meant ford B, but I am not ex-service and probably write things down different. Anyway back to the topic in hand. Now if they did stop on cemetery (in good order), then they may have pause before making their next move, if E Company was told to dismount and form skirmish lines then they would be part of a plan defend the area and would need orders issued from the HQ to do so. But would they try and stop hundreds with around 30? People say that I am crazy to suggest that they stop to treat the wounded, but it could be likely that they halted and tried to stop three or four times their number on an exposed hill, which to me sounds more ludicrous. Ian. Ian I agree with you and understand. My mouth and tongue---actually my hands and fingers---get in my way trying to express thoughts and ask questions to the point of almost babbling. However, I can read and comprehend enough to learn and have found that I do better when I listen. Regards Dave
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Post by Beth on May 26, 2015 11:20:39 GMT -6
Both words are inappropriate Tom if you wish balance. What about just recommended then?
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Post by Beth on May 26, 2015 11:47:54 GMT -6
1. Custer Bio. I know of no decent biography of Custer. In fact, this is a gap in history. I nominate Beth to write one. I bought a really horrible book over the winter. I had to dig around to find it. Glorious War by Thomas Hatch. The author's research is shallow. There is more information in a typical wiki article than in this book. Custer did well in ACW. But this book makes him look like a buffoon. This book is not worthy of reading, not worthy as an emergency toilet paper. 2. The Lethal Pause. Custer with the regiment HHD (Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment; this means Custer and his entourage of officers, messengers, medical folks, straphangers) and Yates Battalion returned from Ford D to cemetery ridge area. They were there an estimated (guestimated) 20 minutes before the move to LSH. I believe John Stands in The Timber established this position in his research. (And we know from these boards that any Timber position is impregnable). I would say that the fact they had moved from Calhoun Hill area to Ford D, and then to cemetery ridge, means they retained their mobility. The logical action would be to continue to move to the other end of Battle Ridge, to link up with the battalion there. Amazing thing about ridges, if the west side is too hot, flip over to the east side. I believe from the very fact of a pause that it was possible. There is something very wrong with the decisions made on the north end of Battle Ridge. A regimental commander with a small detachment finds an aggressive enemy in superior numbers. Any competent command would want to reestablish contact with the regiment main body. This would be vital, regardless of casualties. So why sit on his ass? Why not yell "Come on you wolverines" and charge to his other battalion? Darkcloud makes an argument that GAC was wounded early, to explain decision making at LBH that is cowardly, timid, indecisive and incompetent. My problem is these decisions started at lone tepee, and he was still alive and healthy. I do not believe LTC Custer was decisively engaged on or near Ford D. He was not pinned down on Cemetery Ridge. He still had the initiative, for a window in time. Very Respectfully, William Good Lord NO! I can't think of anything more torturous then spending years researching George and by association Libbie. You are evil to even suggest it. Truly evil. Fortunately Stands in Timber is LOL funny so you are saved. I agree with you that there was something wrong with Custer's decision making process that day. Sometimes I think it's like if he had set out to make every bad move possible that day. Seriously as a military man, did he make one smart call when you look from the 24th on? I know there is no way to answer this but could it be that at some point that afternoon, Custer just folded under the pressure and lost it?
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Post by Beth on May 26, 2015 11:55:11 GMT -6
I agree William that had he not paused he may have had time to move to Keogh. I wonder though if that just would have resulted in more bodies in the Keogh sector? Cheers When Custer was paused in the cemetery, what was going on with Keogh? What is visible from the cemetery? Could Custer have seen NA coming from Deep Ravine and moving towards the ridge?
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