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Post by montrose on Feb 20, 2015 15:28:54 GMT -6
1. Discuss LTC Custer's estimate of the situation and its impact on his decision making.
2. First estimate. At the divide LTC Custer formed his first estimate of the enemy. From his follow actions we can determine this estimate. He believed there was an outlying village vicinity where south fork of Ash Creek joins the main creek. He put 3 companies left of the creek and five to the right and used the creek as his avenue of advance. He then sent Benteen and 3 companies to swing through the badlands on his left to get into the south fork valley and then head towards the objective. Benteen's orders to itch into anything he found here would include horse herds or another detached enemy village.
I assume the fresher signs from the summer roamers and whatever he saw from the Crows nest made him believe he could catch some outliers still heading in.
Remember at Washita he attacked a small outlying village, and not the main camps nearby. The only problem is that the Indians also remembered Washita, and the Mar 76 Powder river raid. Their plan was to stay massed within supporting distance of each other.
GAC send two messengers to Benteen very early in the flanking movement. This sows that his concerns were local to Ash Creek. Benteen's movement makes no possible sense if it is believed to have anything to do with any Indians in the LBH valley. Benteen had no visibility into the LBH valley at any point on his route.
3. Second estimate. LTC Custer formed his second estimate after reaching the south fork and Ash Creek juncture. There was no outlying village, just a few scattered tepees containing bodies and debris from an old camp site. There were 30ish Indians fleeing down the creek to Ford A. Note his orders to Reno. Reno was told to attack the enemy 2 miles away. This would place the village just across ford A, which was 1.6 miles away. Reno had 3 companies as an advanced guard, with LTC Custer following with 5 companies as a main body. Reno moved forward as ordered. GAC decided not to wait for Benteen to catch up, which means he thought he did not need him.
It is not possible to determine if he still thought/hoped for an outlying village, or was attacking a massed village. He had been following a 400 lodge camp, and his estimate of enemy warriors the previous day was 1500, so he must have had an idea.
4. Third estimate. In the next ten to fifteen minutes, GAC changed his mind. The move to the right means he determined the Indians were north of Ford A, before he or any of his elements had seen the village. I assume smoke and dust and Indian trails provided enough indicators to justify his call.
5. Fourth estimate. At 3411 the enemy situation was now known. The village was massed mainly west of Ford B. It was larger than the 400 lodge trail he had been following. Their were no outlying camps to strike. The Indian horse herds were west of the camp. The area east of the camp was empty, no camps, no pony herds, just a few stragglers. The decisions that follow are hard to understand. In response to the enemy mass, he chose to scatter his command.
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Post by Beth on Feb 20, 2015 15:57:24 GMT -6
Why did Custer believe he was following a 400 lodge camp? Is that based on the government estimates or the size of the trail?
Beth
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 20, 2015 16:50:25 GMT -6
RE first estimate the only knowledge he has here is that there is one heck of a large village and herd at about 2oclock as he viewed it. He may not have seen it but he had it on good authority.
2nd estimate fully agree with you. Disagree with Custer movement not to directly support Reno, predicated on 1st estimate.
3rd estimate, no concrete basis.
4th estimate, at this point he had to know that Reno could not drive that number of NA's nor hold his position for any length of time.
There is a line from a movie, that asked the star to choose wisely, Custer did not, at this point he needed to back track as quickly as possible and support Reno and send complete instructions to Benteen.
Regards,
Tom
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Post by montrose on Feb 20, 2015 17:18:13 GMT -6
Beth,
You opening a can of worms, and a point where Fred and I do not agree.
Look at Fred's book and Centennial Campaign by John Gray. If you are really interested, read Gray.
The simple version is that the winter roamer camp had an estimated 400 lodges. It had been seen several times, by Gibbon's units. The Reno scout also saw their old camp sites. GAC followed the trail of this camp, and saw many of their camps. So size and disposition was pretty well established.
Now to get complicated. The Indian leadership had put out a call to mass to defend their territory. So other Indians kept coming in, both from other non reservation elements, and from the reservations. The incompetent Indian bureau was not providing sufficient food on the reservations. Many Indians who would have avoided heading in to a war zone were forced to hunt, or die.
The general estimates of lodges at LBH on 25 Jun was 800-1000. So more Indians were present. The issue is when did they join, and how large was the Indian village that GAC trailed.
I believe the trail GAC followed clearly showed a growing village. The proof is the battle of the Rosebud. If you believe Gray, then the maximum force of Indians at Rosebud is 400-600. Are you kidding me? Gray had zero experience in history or military operations. It is painful reading his work. A very talented amateur, but ruled by very strong passions. Think Kathy Bates in Waterboy. Fred's best contribution to LBH literature is a less emotional and more factual upgrade of Gray's work. Gray was dying as he finished his work, so I think he felt an urgency to finish. I wish I had met him while he was still alive.
The emotionalism thing is what makes LBH so hard to understand. Every player is totally good or totally evil. I do not find these arguments even relevant. Far too many authors and hobbyists get wrapped around whether they like or dislike certain individuals. That is great for reality TV shows. How the heck is that relevant to military history.
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Post by welshofficer on Feb 20, 2015 17:39:48 GMT -6
Montrose,
Surely the unremedied underlying mischief was that a situation developed where GAC was guesstimating matters that were and should have been dealt with by proper intel/recon before joining battle....?
WO
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Post by montrose on Feb 20, 2015 17:54:31 GMT -6
WO,
I understand your view that lack of recon was cause of failure.
But I do not agree.
The intelligence collection plan is based on the operational plan, not independent of it. This means that I gather information at this point in time and space, and then react to it with combat elements at these other points in time and space.
LTC Custer was making decisions based on assumptions, or hope. He positioned combat power to pursue some courses of action, and deny others, before he allocated intel assets to validate assumptions, determine reality. And he was a Plan A guy, he never in his life had a backup plan if he was wrong.
His decision making process made an intelligence collection plan not relevant. He made decisions before he made collection plans.
I can post some IPB doctrine data to explain the process. I know WO knows it, the Brits taught this to us.
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Post by welshofficer on Feb 20, 2015 18:06:59 GMT -6
Montrose,
Your version used to be prepared at Huachuca, if my memory serves me correctly.
The point is that prior recon/intel was not integral to his tactical and decision making process.
He had the means to verify what he was engaging, before committing his assets on the 26th.
WO
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Post by Beth on Feb 20, 2015 18:09:45 GMT -6
Beth, You opening a can of worms, and a point where Fred and I do not agree. Look at Fred's book and Centennial Campaign by John Gray. If you are really interested, read Gray. The simple version is that the winter roamer camp had an estimated 400 lodges. It had been seen several times, by Gibbon's units. The Reno scout also saw their old camp sites. GAC followed the trail of this camp, and saw many of their camps. So size and disposition was pretty well established. Now to get complicated. The Indian leadership had put out a call to mass to defend their territory. So other Indians kept coming in, both from other non reservation elements, and from the reservations. The incompetent Indian bureau was not providing sufficient food on the reservations. Many Indians who would have avoided heading in to a war zone were forced to hunt, or die. The general estimates of lodges at LBH on 25 Jun was 800-1000. So more Indians were present. The issue is when did they join, and how large was the Indian village that GAC trailed. I believe the trail GAC followed clearly showed a growing village. The proof is the battle of the Rosebud. If you believe Gray, then the maximum force of Indians at Rosebud is 400-600. Are you kidding me? Gray had zero experience in history or military operations. It is painful reading his work. A very talented amateur, but ruled by very strong passions. Think Kathy Bates in Waterboy. Fred's best contribution to LBH literature is a less emotional and more factual upgrade of Gray's work. Gray was dying as he finished his work, so I think he felt an urgency to finish. I wish I had met him while he was still alive. The emotionalism thing is what makes LBH so hard to understand. Every player is totally good or totally evil. I do not find these arguments even relevant. Far too many authors and hobbyists get wrapped around whether they like or dislike certain individuals. That is great for reality TV shows. How the heck is that relevant to military history. Gray's book is on my list, however I found myself drawn back to Fred's book to read about a couple spots again (Harrington), that's not a complaint mind you. Everytime I pick up the book I learn something new. So the question is did the camp of 400 lodges join another camp of various tribes that happened to be roughly about the same size? Or did Custer just read the signs wrong and not realize he was following a much larger camp? My own mental image is that there was Sitting Bull's camp and people kept just drifting in and joining the journey until it reached the size it was on June 25th. I don't think the camp could have stayed at that size long because of the resources it would need. Custer just found it at the right time--or perhaps the exact wrong time. I'm open to any other theory though. I try very hard to remain neutral about the personality involved with the battle. I tend believe that Reno, Benteen and Custer acted to their professional best on the day, with the information they had or believed. Unfortunately they didn't have or believe the information they actually needed. Beth |
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Post by Beth on Feb 20, 2015 18:20:28 GMT -6
WO, I understand your view that lack of recon was cause of failure. But I do not agree. The intelligence collection plan is based on the operational plan, not independent of it. This means that I gather information at this point in time and space, and then react to it with combat elements at these other points in time and space. LTC Custer was making decisions based on assumptions, or hope. He positioned combat power to pursue some courses of action, and deny others, before he allocated intel assets to validate assumptions, determine reality. And he was a Plan A guy, he never in his life had a backup plan if he was wrong. His decision making process made an intelligence collection plan not relevant. He made decisions before he made collection plans. I can post some IPB doctrine data to explain the process. I know WO knows it, the Brits taught this to us. Tell me something is Custer's Luck--or Custer's thinking he had luck something that existed at the time or is it a modern thing? I could see why a person who always based his decisions on assumptions and hopes and guessed right more times than not would consider himself lucky, but it would almost certainly mean that one day you are going to make the wrong guess and it will be bad, if you have a really bad day and start getting thrown off your game at every choice, it could lead to a disaster. I would be interested in the IPB doctrine stuff. Beth |
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Post by fred on Feb 20, 2015 18:34:40 GMT -6
Beth, You opening a can of worms, and a point where Fred and I do not agree. I'll bite... where do we disagree? Best wishes, Fred. |
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Post by dave on Feb 20, 2015 18:51:30 GMT -6
Beth
I have to wonder just how much fatigue, poor/lack of supplies and lack of potable water affected the behaviors and responses of all. Benteen mentioned the lack of sleep and I am sure they did not ibuprofen or aspirin and just plain hurting had to
wear on them all. Fatigue causes poor decisions and may have degraded their abilities to respond to events. Plus I am sure the horses and mules suffered greatly.
This is something that Will, Steve, Fred and others could speak to.
Regards
Dave
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Post by Deleted on Feb 20, 2015 19:14:56 GMT -6
Beth I have to wonder just how much fatigue, poor/lack of supplies and lack of potable water affected the behaviors and responses of all. Benteen mentioned the lack of sleep and I am sure they did not ibuprofen or aspirin and just plain hurting had to wear on them all. Fatigue causes poor decisions and may have degraded their abilities to respond to events. Plus I am sure the horses and mules suffered greatly. This is something that Will, Steve, Fred and others could speak to. Regards Dave Fatigue can impair judgement and decision making, but these were trained soldiers. Harsh conditions are expected. Look at General Mike Ryan and what he accomplished with a rag tag band of marines under the worst possible conditions over a 76 hour period. He was a soldier, an officer, and an example of a true leader. |
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Post by dave on Feb 20, 2015 19:31:57 GMT -6
General Ryan was a great man and warrior. Two things he had that Custer didn't
1) Better parity of numbers involved
2) He had US Marines
Regards
Dave
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Post by Deleted on Feb 20, 2015 19:45:10 GMT -6
General Ryan was a great man and warrior. Two things he had that Custer didn't 1) Better parity of numbers involved 2) He had US Marines Regards Dave Yes, he had marines. He only had 200 men from various commands and the smallest of footholds against 4,500 entrenched Japanese who fought till the death. He did get reinforcements once he opened up the beach. |
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Post by Beth on Feb 20, 2015 21:34:28 GMT -6
Beth I have to wonder just how much fatigue, poor/lack of supplies and lack of potable water affected the behaviors and responses of all. Benteen mentioned the lack of sleep and I am sure they did not ibuprofen or aspirin and just plain hurting had to wear on them all. Fatigue causes poor decisions and may have degraded their abilities to respond to events. Plus I am sure the horses and mules suffered greatly. This is something that Will, Steve, Fred and others could speak to. Regards Dave Studies show that sleep deprivation is the equivalent of driving drunk. At 17 to 19 hours you are functioning the same as someone who is .05 at 24 hours it gos to .1 After It effects your judgement, the ability to process what you are seeing and to remember. The brain will literally start to do microsleeps or blackouts. Dehydration causes weakness, dizziness, confusion, sluggishness, inablity to sweat and palpitations. (Palpitations are going to make you feel more panicky) Since it was really hot we have to also look at heat exhaustion: Confusion ,dizziness, fatique, headache, muscle cramps, nausea, profuse sweating and even more rapid heartbeat. Once you have sweated out, you are going to start loosing salt and other important minerals and your body is going to even shut down more. If any of the soldiers have gone from heat exhaustion to heat stroke it causes a really bad headache , dizziness, lightededness, muscle weakness, nausea and vomiint, confusion, disorientation or staggering and seizures. Even hunger effects your ability to function. These are physiological reactions, I don't know how much being battle worn veterans would stave off the effects, but especially with dehydration and sleeplessness, once you get so low, your body is going to start it's coping measures and the only way to stop it is to drink or sleep. What strike me when I read that list is how many of the behaviors NA reported seeing. Beth |
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