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Post by quincannon on Jan 8, 2015 21:34:07 GMT -6
Horseflesh not withstanding, what you are saying here Justin is the worst indictment of Custer of them all
"Five weak companies spread out from L to E under two separate battalion commands" If you mean to say that Custer did not give the authority to command, along with giving Keogh a command, then you have hit upon the core issue that confronts us. That goes back to command climate, and if someone given command can't command for fear of doing something wrong, the whole structure collapses. Only the overall commander can be held responsible for that.
Keogh should have beet feet the minute he detected that mass to his front. He had the distance, therefore he had the jump and gave it away. Custer's situation was a little different in that the hostiles were close upon him, not giving him much of a decision window.
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 8, 2015 21:42:42 GMT -6
QC,
For there to be any possibility of an organised retreat by GAC to the north or to the east, whatever the consequences for Reno/Benteen/McDougall, then Keogh has to fend properly and join GAC with some warning and with most of his L and I companies (even if his C company has been badly mauled). Others of course might argue that GAC was only after glory or death, and a retreat/flight away from Reno was not a career choice that GAC was in a position to make...
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jan 8, 2015 21:50:03 GMT -6
I think there is a timing issue there WO. Keogh fending would be doing his job, but I don't think he could have fended his way to Custer, and if he did, I think the only thing that would change would be the markers would be clustered closer. He has to fend eastward drawing those masses toward him, for Custer to even have a ghost of a chance, and that ghost depends on Custer using his decision window wisely.
These two guys were separated in both time and space and they had to operate independently in my opinion for either one or both to have a chance.
Two people. Two decision windows. Two avenues for at least a semi-successful retrograde. Two separate battles. Two separate and avoidable defeats.
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 8, 2015 22:07:57 GMT -6
QC,
My gut reaction (and entire professional career, for that matter) has been telling me for some years that C company got in trouble down in the coulee and there was a domino effect upon L and I companies before Keogh could or did properly react.
To my mind, Keogh had to either warn GAC that his entire battalion is folding under pressure (so as not to end up with a fixing of remnants of both battalions on LSH) or to preferably earlier extricate himself in sufficient time and force to give GAC the option (under both scenarios, but preferably the latter) to evacuate in force if he can still disengage the Yates battalion. The limited evidence suggests neither event happened.
I doubt that GAC would have taken that escape option, but I see little evidence that it was ever offered to him by Keogh.
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 9, 2015 5:15:31 GMT -6
QC,
Keogh's "fending" mission, once he detects the mass to the south of Calhoun Hill, becomes not to get engaged.
I agree that a fighting retreat is not a desirable option.
WO
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 9, 2015 6:58:02 GMT -6
I don’t want to call these professional soldiers, but how many times has a US Cavalry battalion made a fighting retreat against Indians opposition? I would hazard a guess and say that none of these men had been in a situation like this before, I could be wrong but a 120+ men battalion and 80+ man battalion putting together manoeuvre like that, now I don’t know the ins and outs of a “fighting retreat” but it sounds to me like you do it in bounds with one covering while the rest move back, repeat and repeat until clear, did the men of the 7th ever practice this highly complex retrograde?
Nice to see you back safe and well Justin and your trip to antipodes went well.
Ian.
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 9, 2015 7:40:29 GMT -6
Ian,
Thanks. Indeed. Far better to extricate themselves and withdraw northwards when the long range single firers are still maintaining some distance. Predominantly a disengagement, with many of the hostiles without mounts.
WO
p.s. by the time they reach the northern end of the ridge, it might well be more like the Reno retreat from that stage - how many of E company would still have their mounts?
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 9, 2015 7:49:17 GMT -6
True, but the frame I had in mind was RHQ/Yates just arriving around the cemetery area as Keogh reaches LSH, the Yates battalion was still intact and mounted and they ride to meet Keogh, the other point maybe is that Keogh moves down the east slope of Battle Ridge and follows Custer’s trail, that would leave GAC moving towards cemetery hill without any knowledge of Keogh’s whereabouts.
Ian.
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 9, 2015 11:03:37 GMT -6
Ian,
Keogh undoubtedly would have had to send at least part of I company ahead to highlight and/or give notice of his intended movement.
My suspicion is that F company got fixed on LSH in hastily reacting to the sudden news of the destruction of the Keogh battalion and the last remnants of that command fleeing towards LSH.
WO
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shaw
Full Member
Posts: 187
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Post by shaw on Jan 11, 2015 15:48:47 GMT -6
All due respect, the last thing I would ever think is that Custer is wonderful. Appreciate your perspective though. My source was a website on the battle under the title of Buckland Races. It was brief. My sense is that Custer did get out of there afterwards. No argument, but he was not chased from the field. I see Custer as a tactical leader. By nature he was not strategic. He was personally brave. He was Marshal Ney in miniature. Sheridan valued him during the CW because he would attack. And the next sentence should be both of them got the hell out of there, and were lucky to do so. Read what Thomason says in his biography of Stuart. Stuart was in front with Hampton and Lee were watching them from the flank and hit them. Please cite your source. Mine is "Jeb Stuart by John W. Thomason Lt Col USMC pages 468-471 inclusive published by Scribner's in 1930 and reprinted several times since and still quite readily available. When you lose your combat and field trains you have had a bad day. Custer had a bad day, although he did better than Kilpatrick Shaw please do not fall into the Custer is wonderful trap. Every commander makes mistakes, every one. Every commander does something that he had wished he did not. They are all human. Much of the opinion forming done about Custer is by the hands and from the pen of his adoring Madam Fluffy. There is more to the man than what Fluffy wants you to know. Had it been only for Fluffy we would have never known for instance of the man's very serious character flaws. I can't stand her either. You probably guessed that didn't you?
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Post by quincannon on Jan 11, 2015 16:35:24 GMT -6
I think if you would read Thomason you would draw a different conclusion, at least somewhat different about this particular action.
Custer it seemed, was hesitant to move forward of Broad Run. I think his instincts were far better than those of his commander Kilpatrick who moved forward after Stuart/Hampton after those two deliberately made a retrograde to entice Kilpatrick to follow. Kilpatrick indeed did follow, Custer begged off saying his horses needed tending and his men needed feeding. Many including Thomason divine that Custer was smelling a trap.
Well he did feed and then started a movement as Fitz Lee on the Union divisions flank came out of the woods, dismounted (largely) and struck Custer. Custer did hold the Broad Run line long enough for Kilpatrick to come streaming back through and Custer saved his own guns, but run they did at the end losing the entirety of the division trains.
That was I think very good Ney and Custer. Very good indeed.
You need guys like Custer. You need a dog that answers to sic em. What you don't do, you never do is give a guy like Custer a long leash where he is away from close supervision. That was the error of LBH. Custer's personality was one not equipped to act independently There was too much little boy in him.
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Post by Beth on Jan 11, 2015 16:58:02 GMT -6
I think the Ney to Custer comparison is right on. Unfortunately I suspect Custer saw himself as more of the Napoleon of the West.
Beth
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 11, 2015 17:05:33 GMT -6
QC,
Hence my belief that, if GAC was commanding the 7th, he should have been on a tight leash with Sheridan personally commanding the Dakota brigade.
Terry was not the commander to keep GAC on a tight leash.
WO
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 11, 2015 17:48:05 GMT -6
Custer's hero was Joahim Murat, he was also a pretty dresser, even prettier than Custer during the ACW. Was once called the "1st Horseman of Europe." Died by firing Squad. Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Jan 11, 2015 18:18:54 GMT -6
Yes, but I think he spread his affections around a little including Ney and Kellerman, as well as Murat.
There is no doubt Georgie was a Napoleonic fan boy
Beth I am the Napoleon of the West, the west side of my street.
Here is a bit of trivia to join that of Will's that he posted earlier. No peeking Tom Who is credited with the invention of chewing gum.
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