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Post by tubman13 on Sept 20, 2014 9:17:18 GMT -6
Hello Tubman, 3:00am. This is late? I haven't studied this hard since I tested at International Court of Sommeliers in 2006 for advanced Sommelier certification. 1) I have achieved recent minor milestone with first online victory recorded in Napoleon: Total War, winning difference being my effective use of cavalry forces. 2) Expecting Michael Donahue's Drawing Battle Lines: Map Testimony of Custer's Last Fight to arrive in mail soon. Mulligan Sommelier, eh! I am impressed, it certainly trumps my culinary training. If you achieved that cert. my admiration is certainly near the top of the chart. I myself am just a minor league wino, by comparison. Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Sept 20, 2014 9:28:38 GMT -6
Going to Ford D Steve, and I mean going there as in getting your feet wet, was both unnecessary and a considerable tactical error, that being leaving high ground for low. Anything needed to be seen could be seen from the higher ground. Now if you consider that ford down at the end of the Ranger road as D, then I could buy that, but I think it is more the last, (northernmost) of C rather than D, with D being on the top side of the old loop and ending where the bridge crosses
It has often been said here that the river can be forded just about anyplace. That's true I suppose, depending upon weather, but that fact does not mean the place you cross is necessarily a ford in a military sense. To be militarily significant is must have adequate access and egress, and it helps when it leads to some place you wish to go.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Sept 20, 2014 11:46:49 GMT -6
I am in agreement here with both of you, that a move to the north was taken by the two companies, but I get the distance a little shorter than Chucks, maybe a little further than the Kellogg marker, and my reason is that the Indians could have started to cross the river adjacent to the cemetery area and forced him back.
I know the story of artefact finds could be linked to Indians wearing army issue, but to me it makes no difference to any move north, I bet you could find cavalry gear scattered all over the place after the battle, how much was gathered together and dump later I don’t really know, and if they ventured that far north when gathering.
Talking about wine, I am going to have a chilled bottle of Prosciutto to accompany my DVD movie “The Monuments men”.
Ian.
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Post by mac on Sept 20, 2014 22:19:18 GMT -6
Ian I really enjoyed that movie even without a drink. Mulligan Thinking of your idea of a charge down MTC and across the river. I suggest you use your Napoleonic cavalry and play a scenerio where you attempt a cavalry movement to contact across a river and see what happens. Any river crossing in this context is always bound to be hard. Then figure in doing it in a column as you suggest and remember the battle of Thermopylae and how hard it is to attack on a limited front. Lastly when you get across the river you are in a village with six shots and one from a carbine from horse back. Then think if you were Custer or any of his officers whether you would try it. Do you really want to do this? Not me! Cheers P.S. I am going away for about six weeks and will be dependent on hotel wifi. So we will see how much I can stay in touch.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Sept 21, 2014 6:13:16 GMT -6
If Custer did what the military guys on this board reckon and kept to the eastern side of Battle Ridge (for concealment), then would he follow the lie of the land as much as possible, If he did then would this be a good route to the northern edge of the village, as it uses the coulee behind cemetery as cover, the dotted lines could be the route he took to get to cemetery hill, the red lines could the channels the Indians took to head him off; Mac I don’t usually drink on a Saturday because of work commitments, but after watching the Widnes Vikings get bet beat 19-22 by our local rivals Warrington, I had to take solace in two or three glasses, plus the film was good, I hope you manage to keep in touch. Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Sept 21, 2014 6:35:27 GMT -6
There are three tactical operations that rate about a 50 on a scale of 1-10 in difficulty, the withdrawal while in contact, breakout from encirclement, and the opposed river crossing. In this last any desire for success requires that you go across as wide as possible, as fast as possible, and once across penetrate as deep as possible before your momentum slows down (it will) and you are stopped. Then it is a matter of holding on, and not getting your shoulders pinched or thrown back. Most times this is accomplished by quickly reinforcing the area you have penetrated, then expanding the area you already have.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 21, 2014 7:23:49 GMT -6
Going to Ford D Steve, and I mean going there as in getting your feet wet, was both unnecessary and a considerable tactical error, that being leaving high ground for low. Anything needed to be seen could be seen from the higher ground. Now if you consider that ford down at the end of the Ranger road as D, then I could buy that, but I think it is more the last, (northernmost) of C rather than D, with D being on the top side of the old loop and ending where the bridge crosses It has often been said here that the river can be forded just about anyplace. That's true I suppose, depending upon weather, but that fact does not mean the place you cross is necessarily a ford in a military sense. To be militarily significant is must have adequate access and egress, and it helps when it leads to some place you wish to go. I agree. The river can be forded almost anywhere but not everywhere. With a small group of riders or warriors check your close bank and your far bank and see what you can see in between and go for it. Of course if there is a bluff or even a high bank then you can't enter or exit in those locations. Crossing anywhere to me means there are lots of places to cross for an individual without having to travel long distances if you decide you want to cross. For a large body of riders then ingress and egress along with width, depth, current, and substrate become of greater concern especially to the military. Those are concerns even when marching. Ambush and the ability to cover your troops become concerns when in close contact. And you're right on conditions also at flood stages with trees floating probably not a good idea. I did go in the Verde River during a 20 foot flood condition and it was not one of my wisest decisions. I was in a raft and had two summer students along for the ride in a military rubber raft. We survived but the raft did not. Regards Steve
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 21, 2014 7:28:25 GMT -6
When you visit the battlefield you can get overwhelmed with information of all sorts. It doesn't help if you kill some brain cells in the evening. That being said I believe that there is an account of 6 dead troopers in the Ford D area. Can't remember who stated it. I blame that on Tom and drinking beer in the evening.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by Yan Taylor on Sept 21, 2014 7:29:35 GMT -6
There is a shot of the ford area on the site, and I cannot even see the river, so I don’t know how much has changed since 1876 but from this view it seems rather flat with little cover; linkIan.
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Post by fred on Sept 21, 2014 11:53:06 GMT -6
Part I... My approach to the battle of the Little Big Horn is based on the fact it was a military operation and to that end I look at it through my own experience and the accounts of those who were there. Based on what Custer knew—or thought he knew—and what he expected, everything he did on the 25th depended on speed. There were no 45-minute delays, no side-trips, no bloated conferences; only actions to make contact and hold the enemy and to develop sufficient intelligence to formulate an attack plan and therefore a plan for victory. After realizing whatever surprise he hoped to achieve was dissipating or already lost, he let Reno fend for himself—believing Reno could hold warriors in place—while Custer would determine the extent of the exodus, thereby basing plans on solid intelligence gathered by speedy reconnaissance. Custer’s various moves were dictated by each new piece of intel he gathered. Once Reno was released and Custer turned to the right, the latter’s recon mission began. The first useful information he gathered was at a brief, probably eight-minute halt at 3,411. This is what he saw: Looking back up the valley, this is what Custer would have seen. Notice the valley itself on the far right: flat, clear, empty. The decision to recall Benteen is made based on this view. (This following is a different view, extended more to the right. The photo was taken a little farther downstream from 3,411, and Custer probably didn’t see this precise view because he would have already been moving into Cedar Coulee, off to the left. Still, it gives good perspective of the upvalley views.) Custer also saw this view. Reno’s skirmish line would be forming on the far right of the photo. This is another view of the middle valley and Reno’s line would be directly ahead. More to follow...
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Post by fred on Sept 21, 2014 11:56:44 GMT -6
... Part II Looking north, Custer would be viewing the heights of Weir Point, and as you can see, above, not much else in that direction. Cedar Coulee is down to the right, from this vantage, an easy and accessible route north. The next time Custer would have gotten a glimpse of the LBH valley was when he turned into Medicine Tail Coulee: The trees in the distance may or may not have been there in 1876, but what was there was the Cheyenne village and it is just possible he could have seen parts of it. Regardless, Custer moved down the coulee, then up to Luce Ridge. As you can see, getting to the top of Luce was pretty easy, nature providing a convenient ramp: Now what did he see? Apparently not much, for then he moved toward Ford B. And this is what he viewed from the edge of the bluffs several hundred yards back from the river: ... end of Part II.
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Post by fred on Sept 21, 2014 12:14:53 GMT -6
Part III... Again, we do not know about all the trees, but what we do know is that he could not see the northern extent of the village because this scene blocked his view: ... end of Part III.
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Post by fred on Sept 21, 2014 12:16:17 GMT -6
Part IV and last... Custer then moved to Calhoun Hill and this is what he could see: After that Custer’s next view would have been Mulligan’s superb photo heading toward Ford D: And that should be about it. These should give you a fairly decent idea of what Custer saw. And in not one single picture could he see the full extent of the village or what he was facing. Not until it was too late. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Sept 21, 2014 12:25:05 GMT -6
Thanks Fred, your sequence of photos was like having a guided tour.
Ian.
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Post by Deleted on Sept 21, 2014 13:59:57 GMT -6
Fred,
Finally I do have a decent idea of what Custer saw. Many thanks!
All the best, Henk
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