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Post by quincannon on Oct 14, 2014 7:46:19 GMT -6
Jon: I have written many a frag order to be either transmitted or sent by other means. I am sure you, Fred, WO, Colt and others have done so as well. My habit was to think before I wrote about the clarity of what I was saying, write it, then pass it to someone in the TOC or near me, saying, read this and tell me what I said. If they understood my meaning and intent, my next words were send it. If not I re-wrote it. Undue haste is a mortal sin.
You cannot go wrong if your message contains Who-What-When-Where-How and Why.
Let this thread play out. One thing that becomes apparent when we go over things again is a new idea finds it way of popping up.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Oct 14, 2014 8:03:12 GMT -6
Jon I am sure that Martini claimed he was right behind Custer when he was ordered to deliver the note, so that would place him either as part of the RHQ or at the head of the company nearest.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Oct 14, 2014 8:22:26 GMT -6
Martini's location is largely irrelevant Ian. He was given a note to deliver. He was also instructed according to him to come back (read alone) if it was safe to do so. If not rejoin his company and stay with them.
The note is a result of either a poorly conceived order, or sloppy staff work in the transmission of that order. That is a given. Unless the note contains Who-What-When-Where-How and Why its value diminishes as an order with each of those components that is missing.
Now why was Martini not instructed to guide Benteen? Now why was he told to come back alone if it was safe? Now why would the logical thing to do - Martini remaining with Benteen to guide him not included in Martini's instructions? Why was Martini, a barely literate private soldier sent in the first place vice an officer or very senior NCO? None of these things add up when viewed as to the intention of getting Benteen up, with or without packs, in the most expeditious manner.
I have a couple of guesses in this regard, and they all revolve around the fact that the level of professionalism in the 7th Cavalry was somewhere between sub-standard and swirling around the bottom of the toilet bowl.
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jpru
New Member
Posts: 19
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Post by jpru on Oct 14, 2014 8:32:40 GMT -6
Chuck. Absolutely. Like many others I've seen good orders written on one side of a 3x5 card or the back of a MRE box (meals ready to eat)
I don't understand your comment about let the thread play out. Did you mean don't slap the table just yet or did you mean let's see what the others say? If the former, my bad, that was not my intent.
Ian - thanks, that's what I thought too.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Oct 14, 2014 9:02:59 GMT -6
I would say then Chuck, that Benteen was given the option of joining whoever he wanted to as long has he enters the Frey, the problem involving the train though is another issue, and one which he would need to have some contact with McDougal as to how they would achieve the order about hurrying forward along with the packs.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Oct 14, 2014 9:41:49 GMT -6
Jon: Let's see what others say. This is a horse that has not had the good graces to die in 138 years, primarily because there is no complete, and universal understanding of what was meant by the note. Therefore it will remain in play until the second coming, and probably never be understood or that understanding accepted by all. Thank God it was from incidents such as these that we have learned to communicate, MOST OF THE TIME.
The fact that you may take one meaning from that note, I another, Fred, WO, Colt, Ian, Mac, and those I forgot yet another, means only one thing. The note itself was schlock.
I always go forward with the idea that most people are smarter than I am so I want to hear what they have to say - MOST OF THE TIME.
Ian: When you look at Benteen's problem, it was divided into two parts. 1) Get where he thought he was supposed to go (wherever that was), and, 2) In so doing make sure that the advance of the train was covered, which is different for securing it and bringing it along with him. Recall what Will said. There was a great possibility that the Indians that confronted Reno would get a crack at those trains. They were close enough to do so. They did not know they were there, but unless action was taken there was the chance they would be stumbled upon depending upon how the battle flowed.
We have discussed what should have been done with them - hide them out of the way of the tactical flow of battle. The operative thought was though that this did not happen. Therefore you address the problem at hand. It was one of your own making, but it is and needs to be addressed. You can cry over the spilt milk of woulda, coulda, shoulda later.
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Post by Colt45 on Oct 14, 2014 10:15:56 GMT -6
Ok, I'm Benteen following the trail when Martini rides up and hands me the note:
Who - Me, Benteen. Note addressed to me. What - Come on. Ok, I was coming on anyway. Does this mean increase speed? I see the be quick part so yes, I need to pick up the pace. When - No time specified, but I will assume that means immediately due to the context, but assuming opens the door for screw-ups. Where - Where am I supposed to come on to? I don't know that Reno has separated from Custer, and I don't know where either are located so where the heck do I "come on" to? How - I have to assume this goes with be quick, but I also have to bring the packs, type not specified, but I can assume (again with the assume business) the ammo packs. Why - Well, there's a big village. Are we fighting or maybe negotiating. Maybe Custer wants the food packs because he struck a deal with the NA's - food for return to reservation
Now it gets really fun because the trail forks (Reno going into the valley, Custer up the bluffs). Where do I "come on" to? Scouts say come up the bluffs. I hear firing and probably can see action in the valley. Ride to the sound of the guns or follow the scouts up the bluffs? I think I can forget about the food packs and just bring the ammo packs.
It's decision time on my part because I don't know where I need to go. The order didn't tell me anything other than come on (two horns of a dilemma). If I can see Reno's men retreating up the bluffs, I go up the bluffs as well. If not, should I go into the valley. I may see action in the valley and men going up the bluffs at the same time, so what to do? Custer's note provides no help at all. I assume (there's that word again) that the scouts were probably sent by Custer so I guess I'll go up the bluffs and follow them. Once I get to Reno Hill, I see the major having a very bad day. He asks me to help him with his troops (in so many words). He outranks me, so at this point I have new orders that override the note.
If I had been Benteen, this is most likely how I would have had to interpret the note's meaning. It is one hell of a bad frag order. Like QC, I also had someone read my frag orders to make sure it said what I wanted it to say. Assuming the reader will interpret your message the way you meant it to be interpreted is the best way to have a class 1 screw-up. Feedback is essential to getting the proper meaning and intent across to the recipient. As was noted in previous posts, why was the note so badly constructed? If Custer were not under pressure, Cooke could have taken his time and written a much more clear order, and why not just send a better messenger, one who spoke English fluently? It appears from testimony that Custer was not under any pressure at the time Martini was sent back, so the only explanation for using an Italian with poor English and a half-assed note is just plain old sloppy work on the part of the officers involved, mainly Custer and Cooke.
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Post by quincannon on Oct 14, 2014 10:50:09 GMT -6
Command is vested by statutory authority, a stroke of a pen. Control is what commanders do.
Moving a platoon can be hard. Moving a regiment or its equivalent a brigade much harder still. Clarity in communications is the requisite skill necessary for such movements. In fairness it must be practiced, and practiced, and practiced some more, and when you think you have it just about right, you are usually wrong and need more practice. It sounds easy when you look at all this on a game board, on this board, or when discussing it. The reality is that it is a cluster fornication in even the best of units.
These units rarely engaged in operations above the company level. The headquarters conducted no command post exercises. The field officers were put in charge of units thrown together that they rarely worked with, commanded by people who they may not have known as well as they should. This is not a good thing, if you want an organization that performs the way its designers intended. Then you throw in the shortages and the shortcomings. What are we supposed to expect people? Oh yes, some will say Goldilocks will make it all right. We see how well that all turned out.
Even in this later day these things exist. Reading the AAR's of the armored divisions especially, indicated early on (1945) that the tank-armored infantry team was not as efficient in practice as it was on paper. Sixty years later we get around to combined arms battalions, where the commander owns all his assets, all the time. He knows the people, he knows the equipment. Forgetting that critical set of tools or extra fuel tanker is now much less of a possibility. Is it perfect, no, but it is a hell of a lot better than what was in 1876 and 1976.
Doing this stuff is hard folks, and the easy going may cut some slack. I don't. I expect people hardened enough to do hard things.
While I am on my soap box this morning there is a tangential subject that needs to be brought up and cleared up. Will mentioned the other day that five companies were not mutually supporting on battle ridge. He was correct. I meant to comment then but got sidetracked.
Most think mutual support is a function of distance alone. Nothing could be further from the truth. You may be ten feet from the man you are supposed to support and may not by reason of enemy action be able to do so. Mutual support then is the ABILITY to support. It must be thought of in those terms. There is no matrix to be applied. You can or you can't dependent upon circumstance and what enemy activity allows you to do. To say then that Benteen, by the distance factor alone, or Reno, or Cinderella, should be considered Custer's mutual support is therefore a product of Cloud Cuckoo Land. The same can be said of the Keogh battalion in mutual support of the Yates' battalion. None had the ability, regardless of distance, for that ability had been taken away from them. In the instance of LBH that ability was allowed to slip away, and the enemy impose themselves at the hand of one man. Anyone care to venture a guess.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Oct 15, 2014 4:38:03 GMT -6
Well written Chuck, I have mentioned before about what is classed as support and what is not, you guys have been trained in a manner that I unfortunately haven’t, and this is probably one of those moments that your training will out weight my ignorance, but support to me is being there ready to support another unit and not having to travel a distanced to support that unit especially if that unit is out of view, and don’t forget we are dealing with a Victorian type army here so visual contact is paramount, well I think so anyway.
The word support in my book can be described on a rugby pitch, if my standoff made a break and I was supporting him, then I would be on his shoulder waiting for the pass to send me through, now I was pretty fast over five yards so near the line I was devastating, but if he made a break and I was out of position, this would mean that he had no support and would probably get a smack for his trouble, the point is that in the era we are talking about, support should be local and not miles away.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Oct 15, 2014 9:21:08 GMT -6
Support is rendered by fire (both direct and indirect), maneuver, or both. I wrote what I did to dispel this myth that distance was the prime factor considered, when deciding if a unit is in mutual support of another. It is a factor, but not the prime factor.
Artillery is always in support of maneuver. They are assigned either a direct support mission meaning they primarily work for one brigade, with each of the artillery battalion's batteries supporting one of the brigade's maneuver battalions, or in general support, meaning they are tasked to support whichever brigade or battalion needs it most. All of this is to no avail if in the time of need, the artillery is receiving counter battery fire, or being attacked by enemy ground forces and forced to defend themselves. In this small scenario the enemy has negated your ability to lend support. This latter was a favorite Immun Gun and Chicom tactic in Korea. They would infiltrate and go after the supporting artillery, or in lesser depth mortars, before they would assault the friendly FLOT. Clever fellows and it worked nearly every time they did it.
Support by direct fire largely depends upon the range of your weapons, and those ranges vary. If those weapons are out of range, or the enemy has directed his attention on you, you cannot support. You must address your own threat as a primary requirement.
Support by maneuver can be conducted in so many ways that they all cannot be possibly listed. It may be done by the traditional and largely misunderstood ride to the sound of the guns, but most of the time it is a maneuver to place the enemy force engaging those you are supposed to support in check - pose a danger to them that keeps the enemy off the back of your brother. This latter can be done in either offense or defense.
In the offense, the most common supporting maneuver is the supporting attack. It is designed to draw attention and resources away from the area where you main attack is going in, much like a boxer jabbing with his left, then striking the knockout blow with his right. If as you are preparing to deploy for that attack, the enemy launches a spoiling attack on your force, you are not going to support anyone.
As in everything else the enemy is a thinking enemy and he always has a say, a vote, in what you are attempting to do.
In the instance of LBH the Indians in getting at Keogh put a large force between Keogh and any support from the south. They drove a wedge between those in need of support, and those intended to lend that support. Time therefore had nothing to do with it. They would have been there if Benteen and Reno had departed within ten minutes of joining together or two hours. The deed preventing support was done. Neither could Keogh support Custer, or Custer Keogh. Another wedge was driven between them.
If you expect units to be in mutual support, you must both facilitate the means to lend that support, while preventing your adversary from Peeing in your Post Toasties, which reminds me I am hungry and it's time for breakfast.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Oct 15, 2014 13:09:56 GMT -6
Chuck, I think the best way to try pin down the notion of support, is to try and see just what support a circa 1876 US Cavalry Regiment can provide, for one they had no artillery, so as you said that support depends on the range of your weapons, so due to the use of carbines this gives us around 300-500 yards max. Then we have LOS, to support each other with carbine fire, both units must be in LOS and under 500 yards.
So if we look at the two groups, Reno and Custer, now these to me are both out of support range of one and other, so let’s keep it simple and concentrate on the Custer battalion, now this again can be broken into two segments, Custer and Keogh. Keogh could have had his men position and pretty much tick the two boxes, I think he was under 500 yards and in LOS of all of his three companies, Custer too ticks these boxes, but with only 80 and 120 men respectively, each battalion could not cover all of the surrounding areas with enough suppressing fire.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Oct 15, 2014 14:43:13 GMT -6
Your back bean counting numbers-distance-range again Ian. Mutual support is rendered by fire, maneuver, or both. Out of range does not mean out of supporting distance. You can support by maneuver alone. Placing an attacker in check by you own movement/maneuver is one way to support, and you may not have to fire a shot to do it.
Case in point. A whiff. Keogh is on Calhoun Hill. The Indians cross at Ford B loaded for bear. They get half way up Deep Coulee only to look over their shoulder to discover that Reno-Benteen, and 400 of their nearest and dearest are on the northern slope of Weir. Reno-Benteen are well out of effective small arms fire support of Keogh, but they have rendered support by their maneuver. Says Constipated Buffalo - FOLLOW ME (It is a well known fact CB has an IBB degree) to which Egg in the Face replies AFTER YOU BIG BOY.
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