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Post by quincannon on Jul 2, 2014 15:38:50 GMT -6
Nothing to forgive. Questions are healthy. Blind acceptance is not.
1) Strike what. He does not know if there is anything to strike, nor if the place is conducive to a strke of any sort. He was doing on the fly what should have been done previous to mounting up that morning. Too little effort to find, conducted much too late to do anything about the finding. This is the textbook picture of haphazard planning and piss poor execution, and you cannot make a silk purse out of the sows ear of incompetent performance.
2) Yes I suppose LWM could have hit I not Keogh writ large. You still must deal with the positioning of L and C which tell a completely different story but related to that of the whole. If you get hit in the nose, assuming L was the nose, disorder not orderly skirmish lines would be present. It would be like throwing crap against a stone wall. It would splatter all over the place. What we have with L is a gradually retrograding orderly movement until finally broken.
3) Columns are stretched out over a good piece of ground. A running column is an abortion, and I would envision what you postulate as a redo of what Reno did an hour or so before. Control under those circumstances would be like trying to control a crowd at a doorbuster sale on Christmas Eve at Walmart.
PS: The control issues, the doorbuster at Walmart on Christmas Eve, goes the same way if the movement was a chase from south to north. No signs of chase either way point to deliberate movement, paced orderly action, having time available, not the rout, the scattered corn, the appearance of a bazillion out of nowhere, not the shoot off the horse at the head of the column. It was deliberate, relatively fast paced, under positive, if disjointed control, and it flowed south to north in sequential order.. That is how I read it, but I also listen to well reasoned alternatives, and it is well known I have no patience for fairy tales created out of magic bullets and transvestite imposters.
Here is my reasoning. In the south to north scenario. The position of Company C, absent anything else gives the appearance of a rear guard action designed to cover a withdrawal from MTC Ford (B). This has been refuted by Indian testimony, that it was a deliberate maneuver that started on Battle Ridge. The position of Company L also mitigates against the rear guard by C, in that the mission of a rear guard is to allow the withdrawing main body to break contact, even though the rear guard may have to be sacrificed. Therefore if C is a rear guard, Company L is much too close, and the opportunity for a full withdrawal and breaking of contact was squandered. It makes no sense for L to stop therefore, any notion of a rear guard action on the part of C is suspect. The position of Company I also speaks to a deliberate placement, then further deployment. These are mounted soldiers. Under stress they will stay high, and not ride low. Keogh and I were low. Another strike against a rear guard going south to north. We then come to E and F. If under extreme pressure, and unable to withdraw away from MTC Ford further than LSH, the logical thing is for the column to fold back upon itself and consolidate. Even consolidation on bad ground is preferable to being piecemealed and cut up as individuals. All this is not in any tactical manual, but rather the manual of natural human behaviour.
The reverse of all these things is found in the north to south movement. Same humans, reacting the same way. Sometimes we look too closely at the tactics themselves, good or bad, and forget who it is, the human element that employs them. Putting on a soldier suit does not divorce one from human emotion and natural instincts.
Good discussion Tom, and I am certainly glad you got more than sunburn out of your trip.
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Post by mac on Jul 3, 2014 4:17:55 GMT -6
I love ideas Tom and I believe we need to consider all alternatives plus it is fun to do so. The thing here is observers have a pattern of markers to interpret and we all want to construct any geometry that can fit to make an explanation. What I have learned is that soldiers made decisions based on the kind of considerations soldiers have made for thousands of years. Regardless of any view of Custer I doubt he would move his whole command past MTC with no regard to preventing the enemy using it as a highway to surround him. So that part makes no sense to me. It just seems too basic for any soldier of experience. I am reminded of an excellent US show "Band of Brothers". (Don't digress folks) At the end one of the veterans said he shuddered to think what he did in his first battle and how dumb it was from a military perspective. Many of these guys, including Custer, had fought the Civil War and were wise to common wisdoms of war. I do not buy everyone head North after we show ourselves at MTC. Having said that, I am enjoying this discussion and have an open mind and am receptive to evidence. Thanks for these ideas! Cheers
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 3, 2014 4:54:45 GMT -6
Mac, I wanted to apply a different logic, I don't think Custer could have done any thing but lose his command once he turned north from MTC. I never attended our famous War College in PA, know many who have, but never got knowledge through osmosis. So here goes. BY MTC Custer has already left behind more than half of his firepower and should not expect to get it back. He knew the size and scope of his adversary after 3411. He either turned down to the river at the wrong spot (MTC) or thought he could cut through and get his hostages from there. I think he may have made the wrong turn or choice. So from MTC on if I was still determined to get hostages and move north I take all of my fire power and move with all speed, and all else be damned. He had to know this was not the small visible village he encountered in s.w. OK. I said early on this was more about the geography and less about the time. After the Ford B excursion Custer made it about time, as he has now given his adversary the time advantage as well. Geography was never equal and now he has lost any time advantage he may have had.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 3, 2014 8:27:53 GMT -6
Some years ago, there was some debate about C Company just sending half of its strength to either chase off hostiles or form a firing line, most of it came about because their 1st Sergeant (Bobo) was found near Capt. Keogh, the Officer who some think led C Company that day (2nd Lieutenant H. Harrington) was never identified amongst the dead. That leaves C Company with three Sergeants, Sergeant W. Kanipe returned to the pack train, that leaves two, these two NCOs (Sergeants Finckle and Finley) were found dead along with others men on FFR. It does seem strange that the Company’s only two line Sergeants died together whilst there 1st Sergeant was around a 1000 yards away with his Battalion Commander.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 3, 2014 9:29:55 GMT -6
Why does it seem strange?
Regarding your two platoon comment. I could buy it hook line and sinker, if I did not know the present for duty strength of Company C, and if both Bobo and either Finkle or Finley were found on Battle Ridge or with Keogh, and of course be able to count. Think about both of them, Finkle and Finley being down there and why the only two available line sergeants were there.
Were there two platoons, with only one officer present, I think it would make the most sense to have Harrington and one line sergeant take them down, while Bobo and the other line sergeant (the second most responsible person) remained with the other platoon.
Not a sure thing, but one of the real benefits of trying to piece things together is looking at the preponderance of evidence, not evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 3, 2014 9:55:13 GMT -6
Chuck, I remember going through this on the other board, I said then that to split C Company would give you two Details (or Platoons) of around 18 men each, so if say Harrington took himself and two NCOs plus 15 men down to Calhoun Coulee or FFR and deployed, immediately he would lose four or five men as horse holders, taking himself out of the firing line, that would leave him with a firing line of 12-13.
Now down to figures, there are 17 markers around FFR, another 5 along the western perimeter, Bobo was found near Keogh, Foley was found further south (I think) and Pvts Stungewitz and Wright were found on the Custer sector along with TWC, that makes 26 out of 38, that leaves 12 unaccounted for and one of those was Harrington).
So if we take say the 17 on FFR and the 5 on WP, that would make 22, so if these 22 men went on a mission down near CC, that would leave Bobo and 14 men up on BR.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 3, 2014 10:26:06 GMT -6
Ian: What makes the most reasonable of scenarios is that all went down together, and some came back, rather rapidly I might add. To me the key point is having both Finkle and Finley down there. They would be the defacto platoon sergeants if the company were split into two platoons. Them being there makes it most probable that the entire company was there.
You must also answer the question why would they split. Splitting means there are separate missions for both halves. Assuming the mission of those going down was to clear their front, it does not make much sense to me to leave anyone back to hold the front you are trying to clear.
If one wishes to make the argument that both went down, one platoon dismounted to skirmish, while the other stayed mounted to cover the skirmish line, that would be consistent with known tactical doctrine, and I would agree that would be the most likely scenario.
Chapter 10 of Where Custer Fell has just as good a discussion of this event as I have ever read. I think it logical, well presented, and very hard to find fault with. I therefore accept it as the closest to truth, and the reasons behind that truth as we will ever get.
We are however getting sidetracked, but I think here for good cause. The position of C refutes both direction ridge running, just as much in my mind as the successive and retrograding lines of Company L does. Neither fits, and when something does not fit, that not fitting must be explained or the scenario itself loses credibility.
I will tell you this openly. For forty years before I visited this field, my opinion was that Custer was a fairly competent officer, on his game for the most part, and was overcome by one bad decision (everyone makes them, so forgivable), and that being followed by a series of events largely out of his control. I went to the field ten years ago next month with one hell of a lot of questions needing answers. I came away with few answers immediately and one hell of a lot more questions, just as our friend Tom has done. It is in the ten years since, but only after being on the terrain, that I have come to the conclusion that what was done there was a totally incompetent performance, most at the hands of a tactically incompetent commander, who let his personality and emotional instability influence decisions more than sound tactical doctrine. He is not the only one who fornicated with Fido, but it was he who either took the action or was the enabler of all such actions. It is for two reasons I hold him totally responsible for all that happened. The first is that he as the commander is responsible for all that happens or fails to happen. The second is that it was his decisions alone that placed all where they were, and personally facilitated the happening.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 3, 2014 11:53:34 GMT -6
Chuck, sorry about the side tracking issues, what I was doing (in my own little way) was to try and ascertain that Keogh didn’t deploy his troops under pressure, and that to begin with he had enough time to order L into skirmish, C (mounted) to hold back to the right of L (probably at the southern tip of BR, and his own Company (I - mounted) to take up positions further behind L to fend off any intrusion on L’s left flank.
This could have changed however when the situation deteriorated, C went down to cover the right and I was pulled out of position. So initially Keogh’s position started with a one up and two mounted scenario, but later all three Companies were thrown forward to stem the flow, C Company was the first to fall, as it was drawn out of position, and this started the ball rolling.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 3, 2014 12:24:32 GMT -6
Ian: You were on topic, although it was the larger topic, and that is good. When you key in on something as you did with Company C, that contributes to the rational of the argument, in this instance the argument against, that which is offered in theory.
Everything in the Keogh area points to deliberate deployment and maintaining sustained positions for some little time, then maneuver. Neither of these would be present if the ridge running first north, then south were in serious play.
Tom is going through a process here of what I call "The Might Have Beens" What is helpful in the process itself is that it tests other theories. Often the process itself, while possibly proving invalid itself, serves to shore up other theories. Sometime though, it sheds light when no light has shown before.
In this instance it is distance and disposition that refutes, but in the examination of the aspect you strengthen the whole.
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 4, 2014 4:57:24 GMT -6
Enough of my flights into fantasy regarding battle and battle flow. The last stop on my "Magical History Tour" (thanks John, Paul, George, and Ringo) was the Washita Battlefield, late on Friday, last. The visit was of short duration, as we were pushing to get home. The description below is strangely similar to the campaign of 1876. Insert Reno for Elliott on the scout, the three different locations from which the three prong campaign departed from, and the difference in time of year and you have the same plan. Somewhere in the recesses of Benteen's mind he may have decided he was not going to let Custer leave another Major hanging out. digital.library.okstate.edu/encyclopedia/entries/W/WA037.htmlRegards, Tom
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 4, 2014 7:39:54 GMT -6
Tom, Custer's battle plan at the Washita, was to separate the Regiment into four Battalions; If you can trust the scale on that map then just look at the distance between each Battalion, it is around a mile to begin with, and converges at the point of contact. I don't know which Companies formed these Battalions, but Elliot didn't have that many men with him when died, unless he led a detail from his Battalion and chased a band that was getting away, but surly if he was a Battalion Co, he would have a junior Officer to do such a task. Another thing about the Washita, did Custer actually lead the attack from the front? was he the first man at the head of his Battalion to enter the village? may seem like a lame question, but if he didn't lead the attack at the Washita, how can we believe that he was at the head of the column at Ford B. Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 4, 2014 9:09:07 GMT -6
I think it a mistake to draw on Washita to determine any intent at LBH. A completely different engagement. I won't call something just short of a garden variety breaking and entering followed by murder a battle. Different terrain, different weather conditions, different everything.
There is a line in the Army Song which reads:
"Proud of all we have done, fighting 'til the battle's won"
How could we ever be proud of Washita? A shameful day for us I believe.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 4, 2014 9:44:59 GMT -6
It certainly was, but I was trying to compare Custer’s actions to how he could have behaved at LBH, it looks like he headed one of the Battalions at the Washita, and if he didn’t lead from the front, and by that I mean the very front, then why should we believe that he lead from the front at Ford B, the Washita was a relatively small sleeping village, Ford B would be a bit hotter, so if he didn’t take the lead against a helpless target, why would he do it against one that was fighting back.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 4, 2014 10:08:02 GMT -6
Taking the lead and being always in front are two different things. That latter is a figment of DC's imaginings.
Two different things here as well. Custer would have no business at Ford B (by this I mean the ford itself), were he to accomplish what he set out to do which was look, not assault.
Being in the lead, meaning with the lead element in any type military venture is the commander's call. That does not mean he is first in line or out in front of the others. That is comic book fiction. Smart commanders place themselves where they can both see and control action and reaction. That place is most often directly behind the lead element, whatever that elements size may be. If it is a squad, the leader is with the trailing fire team. If a platoon, the leader most often follows the first squad, and so on. Being in front, literally in front, reduces the leader to the status of just another rifleman, and he divorces himself from the greater responsibility of and to command.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 4, 2014 12:02:26 GMT -6
Well I suppose we can put this down to artistic license; Or can we? Ian.
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