Gordie's Daughter!

[quincannon]

Ian: The way he came was ,most probably through two adjacent draws (ravines) meant for concealment of his forward movement. Returning the same way would be both longer and suicidal.

Having Kellogg fall where he evidently did would not necessarily mean pressure applied and continued. It may, but it could have just as easily been from the first few Indians across who got lucky. I can see where continuing pressure though is a reasonable conclusion.

Keogh's defense theory is a idiotic rambling on the part of an idiot. The only place up there that could be defended, but for only a very short period is Cemetery Ridge. Would not want to do it. The high ground of Battle Ridge looks down on you, and there is a finger of ground that leads to your back door. Very iffy.

The purpose of a recon in force is to both reconnoiter and engage. The trick is to not become decisively engaged. Decisively engaged is another term for being "fixed"

I do not see how the whole of body, sound of mind, and fairly well informed can conclude any other motive for Custer than a reconnaissance of D.

As I understand it the Harper theory has a north-south battle flow. Have never read a complete account of it, just pieces. I am anxious to see the reasoning, logic, and references behind it.

[tubman13]

Jul 1, 2014 11:07:57 GMT -6 quincannon said:

Ian: The way he came was ,most probably through two adjacent draws (ravines) meant for concealment of his forward movement. Returning the same way would be both longer and suicidal.

Having Kellogg fall where he evidently did would not necessarily mean pressure applied and continued. It may, but it could have just as easily been from the first few Indians across who got lucky. I can see where continuing pressure though is a reasonable conclusion.

Keogh's defense theory is a idiotic rambling on the part of an idiot. The only place up there that could be defended, but for only a very short period is Cemetery Ridge. Would not want to do it. The high ground of Battle Ridge looks down on you, and there is a finger of ground that leads to your back door. Very iffy.

The purpose of a recon in force is to both reconnoiter and engage. The trick is to not become decisively engaged. Decisively engaged is another term for being "fixed"

I do not see how the whole of body, sound of mind, and fairly well informed can conclude any other motive for Custer than a reconnaissance of D.

As I understand it the Harper theory has a north-south battle flow. Have never read a complete account of it, just pieces. I am anxious to see the reasoning, logic, and references behind it.

You are totally on top of this, it is a shame you spent so much time in Guard and missed D.S. due to retirement. What I will lay out are more questions than answers. Gordy's book has much and little to do with it, as I have not read but intend to. Steve, with a thumb nail sketch and geography is more important. I spent time up Reno Creek, wrecked hiking boots, went to morass, up to my ass. Much rain this year., Saw where Benteen witnessed a portion of the Reno fight. None of this is important however as we have testimony for all of this. MTC, is the key, as you all know. Pretty much the point of no return, unless it was done then. QC, in my opinion there were two rear guard actions. Ian, you pretty much have the advance pegged, I think. DC you have the shod hooves pegged, I think. Still have 50 ft of tree to do and it is now cooler. I will get back to MTC asap. I don't wish to bore anyone, but I do have questions.

Regards,
Tom  

[Yan Taylor]

"Keep em coming" Tom you are our man in the field (or back from the field).

Ian.

[tubman13]

The photo was from Calhoun or maybe the point of LWM attack. I know this, Chris cleaned it up some. My thoughts are more questions and assumptions. E company proceeds to Ford B covered by remainder of Custer's command, I think a bit closer than the ridges. I don't think E even attempted to cross, not so much because of the resistance, but because they were recalled. Were they recalled because HQ saw dust and many warriors approaching from the southwest and south? I think so. If HQ made that call, was it on Custer's orders? I think so. If that was the case Custer could not have been in the group that approached the river. By the time COS E&F reach the rest of the command at Calhoun Hill the troops on the ridge are already taking fire and Custer has been taking fire as he has returned as well. Did Custer attempt to form the entire command for a move north and asking that the companies in the rear to keep the back door closed? I think so. At this point moving forward was not so hard, keeping the rear door shut was becoming more difficult all the time. As the lead troops with Custer were confronted with impossible numbers,(on the basin below the cemetery) he attempted to wheel the entire command around for a retreat from whence he had come. At this point has become the rear guard for the rest of his command, I think it was only at this point that he realized that CI&L were completely engaged/stuck. His retreat only got to LSH before he had resistance from all sides.

Side thoughts, Keogh was not waiting for Benteen. No cavalry horses reached Ford D with cavalry on board. Kellogg's marker may have been moved. I have very good Pentax binoculars, nothing in Reno's command could have made out much from Weir, the top of which provides a wonderful 360 degree view

[Yan Taylor]

Tom, the possibility of Custer’s command splitting into three has always been at the back of my mind, the thought that Keogh was on Nye-Cartwright with three companies, E company was around the flats near the river and the HQ/F was around a couple of hundred yards behind, as the ground rises.

This would give GAC control and enable him to gather all the intel he could about the village, E Company would provide a screen if anything came across to try and spoil the party, Keogh could cover the whole show from the high ridge line.

So if this was the case then Custer may have changed his mind about crossing before he actually reached this location, probably on route, Keogh could have detached halfway down MTC and without these three companies, Custer couldn’t attack over Ford B.

Ian.

[mac]

"Did Custer attempt to form the entire command for a move north and asking that the companies in the rear to keep the back door closed?"
Tom
I am not exactly sure what this means. I am looking forward to this discussion!
Cheers

[quincannon]

I want to digest this more, before I make specific comments BUT, I will put out three things that first struck me about Tom's post

1) In times of immediate danger human beings cluster together for the safety, even temporary safety that numbers offer, IF POSSIBLE.

2) There are two Kellogg markers. Either one might have been moved, but the one down by the river, near Ford(s) C is where Gibbon or some of his people described finding him. I believe there are a few other markers in that general area as well, not real close but near. That must be explained in any developing scenario.

3) There is only one rear, and that is 180 degrees opposite the direction of travel or intended travel. Keogh was doing what Custer told him (by some means) to do I believe, and waiting for Benteen was not in those instructions. When you think about it, waiting for Benteen and doing what Keogh was tasked to do are mutually exclusive tasks. Waiting would mean retaining terrain. Covering would mean maneuver, and maneuver means giving up terrain. If Benteen came along, fine and dandy, but a deliberate wait, maybe not so much.

I can rightly see how Tom could be mulling these expressed views about. They postulate near continual motion, and a compression of time and events rather than the more normally viewed sequential. I would remind all as we view and discuss these thoughts that even the compression of time and events are sequential, and the same rules of cause and effect apply.

Tom the pathway/road, and the near green area had me flummoxed. Also the Big Horns look a lot closer in this photo than they are in reality.

[quincannon]

Further thoughts upon digestion.

1) It makes sense that only E went to Ford B with F in close cover. Custer most probably was with F. That is where he should have been to both observe and retain command and control over the whole. So far so good Tom. I don't believe two things here. a) That there was ever an intention to cross, and, b) That warriors from the south and southwest would have been alert to any cavalry presence at Ford B that early, early enough for them to both detect and react. Elapsed time of the Ford B thing was not long enough to permit such discovery and reaction. They would become aware, but not while E was there.

2) The deep cover force being closer than, I presume you mean Nye-Cartwright-Luce. Don't think so. There must be sufficient space between the close cover and the deep cover forces. Ideally that deep cover force must also be higher. N-C-L provides both. The last thing you want to do is have your deep cover force be at the same relative level, and in that bowl nearer the bottom of Medicine Tail Coulee, and too close, so that they might not maneuver if necessary to accomplish their mission should the need arise..

3) Custer ordered the withdrawal of E from Ford B no question.

4) Unlikely that Custer formed the entire command for northward movement. Had he done so only one company would have formed a rear guard, and we would not have what is portrayed by L and C. In this the position of I is a neutral. The positioning of L and C are what counts, and disputes this theory.

5) Movement north was neither difficult or opposed. No opposition would appear that would immediately concern Custer until he approached the river.
Had it been otherwise the movement could not or would not have been made.

6) I have absolutely no doubt that Custer wished he had not gone north. I also think there was nothing of an attempted withdrawal back to Keogh, or any rear guard action. Yes they maneuvered within a very confined space bounded by the Flats, Cemetery Ridge, North Fork of Deep Ravine and LSH, but in fact they were fixed by enemy maneuver within that area, and knew it. Game. Set. Match.

[Yan Taylor]

Hello Chuck, just reading through your post, and decided to throw my lot into the Frey;

1) It makes sense that only E went to Ford B with F in close cover. Custer most probably was with F.
That is where he should have been to both observe and retain command and control over the whole.
So far so good Tom. I don't believe two things here. a) That there was ever an intention to cross,
and, b) That warriors from the south and southwest would have been alert to any cavalry presence at
Ford B that early, early enough for them to both detect and react.
Elapsed time of the Ford B thing was not long enough to permit such discovery and reaction.
They would become aware, but not while E was there.

Yes I agree.

2) The deep cover force being closer than, I presume you mean Nye-Cartwright-Luce. Don't think so.
There must be sufficient space between the close cover and the deep cover forces. Ideally that deep cover
force must also be higher. N-C-L provides both. The last thing you want to do is have your deep cover force
be at the same relative level, and in that bowl nearer the bottom of Medicine Tail Coulee, and too close,
so that they might not manoeuvre if necessary to accomplish their mission should the need arise..

Yes that makes good sense.

3) Custer ordered the withdrawal of E from Ford B no question.

Yes, I think so to.

4) Unlikely that Custer formed the entire command for northward movement. Had he done so only one company
would have formed a rear guard, and we would not have what is portrayed by L and C. In this the position of I
is a neutral. The positioning of L and C are what counts, and disputes this theory.

Well I have held the notion that he left Keogh there to fulfil some kind of role, and he positioned his force
with the two mounted and one in skirmish formation.

5) Movement north was neither difficult or opposed. No opposition would appear that would immediately
concern Custer until he approached the river. Had it been otherwise the movement could not or would not have been
made.


Any move north would be a surprise to the Indians, if he bumped into a large war party or parties that was moving
to get behind Keogh then this could be were a clash happened.

6) I have absolutely no doubt that Custer wished he had not gone north. I also think there was nothing of an
attempted withdrawal back to Keogh, or any rear guard action. Yes they maneuverer within a very confined space bounded
by the Flats, Cemetery Ridge, North Fork of Deep Ravine and LSH, but in fact they were fixed by enemy manoeuvre within
that area, and knew it. Game. Set. Match.

I don’t think that Custer knew what to do once his position was rumbled, was there some kind of military etiquette that demanded him to stand his ground? If he fled and left Keogh would he be disgraced? Any way you look at it he stayed in that basin/cemetery area too long, and every minute he dithered his enemy not only got stronger, he covered all the escape routes.

Ian.

[tubman13]

Jul 2, 2014 6:49:54 GMT -6 mac said:

"Did Custer attempt to form the entire command for a move north and asking that the companies in the rear to keep the back door closed?"
Tom
I am not exactly sure what this means. I am looking forward to this discussion!
Cheers

Mac I think the whole command was on the move, and originally a fairly tight unit. As with all I have said/postulated, it is a crap shoot.  

[quincannon]

Ian: We have a TV commercial here in the States for an insurance company, that depicts the guys sitting on a sofa watching a football game. A drop of water falls on the coffee table in front of them. Don't worry it's just a leak says the dialogue. Within seconds it is followed by the roof collapsing upon them. Now that's a flood. What looked like a leak to Custer became a flood before he realized it. In those situations the only military etiquette that counts is save what you can and live to fight another day. The idea is not to die for country or cause, but to visit that malady on the other fellow.

One thing Tom mentioned about the view from Weir to BR. I had a pair of Navy watch standers field glasses with me when I viewed the ridge from Weir, and I could not pick out squat. Very significant observation Tom, making poop of Weir's fairy tale.

[tubman13]

Jul 2, 2014 9:27:53 GMT -6 quincannon said:

I want to digest this more, before I make specific comments BUT, I will put out three things that first struck me about Tom's post

1) In times of immediate danger human beings cluster together for the safety, even temporary safety that numbers offer, IF POSSIBLE. Would not Custer want the entire command to move to the northern end of the village, as quickly as possible, now knowing the enormity of his task?

2) There are two Kellogg markers. Either one might have been moved, but the one down by the river, near Ford(s) C is where Gibbon or some of his people described finding him. I believe there are a few other markers in that general area as well, not real close but near. That must be explained in any developing scenario.

3) There is only one rear, and that is 180 degrees opposite the direction of travel or intended travel. Keogh was doing what Custer told him (by some means) to do I believe, and waiting for Benteen was not in those instructions. When you think about it, waiting for Benteen and doing what Keogh was tasked to do are mutually exclusive tasks. Waiting would mean retaining terrain. Covering would mean maneuver, and maneuver means giving up terrain. If Benteen came along, fine and dandy, but a deliberate wait, maybe not so much. Agreed,  but when Custer Was brought to a halt in his forward motion an has retreat sounded could not the head become the tail? Could he not have than begun directing a rear guard action to help extricate the entirety? When the new front was brought to a halt, could not have Custer have thrown out  flankers in attempt to protect the whole (E)?

I can rightly see how Tom could be mulling these expressed views about. They postulate near continual motion, and a compression of time and events rather than the more normally viewed sequential. I would remind all as we view and discuss these thoughts that even the compression of time and events are sequential, and the same rules of cause and effect apply.

Tom the pathway/road, and the near green area had me flummoxed. Also the Big Horns look a lot closer in this photo than they are in reality.

I told you my opinions were filled with questions, maybe questions that have no answers

[tubman13]

Jul 2, 2014 12:18:49 GMT -6 Yan Taylor said:

3) Unlikely that Custer formed the entire command for northward movement. Had he done so only one company
would have formed a rear guard, and we would not have what is portrayed by L and C. In this the position of I
is a neutral. The positioning of L and C are what counts, and disputes this theory.

Well I have held the notion that he left Keogh there to fulfil some kind of role, and he positioned his force
with the two mounted and one in skirmish formation.


Any move north would be a surprise to the Indians, if he bumped into a large war party or parties that was moving
to get behind Keogh then this could be were a clash happened.


Ian, what if Calhoun had become the lead in a retreat scenario, after have being the rear guard, a total about face of the command?

[quincannon]

Ok: Lets get down in the weeds here.

1) "Entire command to the north end of the village" No more than if you were not sure of the directions you were taking were you leading your friends and family to a picnic in the park, a park you had never visited before. What you might want to do is find out if there were picnic tables over thataway, and if this was the route to best reach them before you led five cars down a dead end road. Custer had no idea what was up there if anything, thus he reconnoitered with part, not committing the whole.

2) Would not the head become the tail? No not at all. Custer did not retreat anywhere. He was confined within a small battle space within moments. He was fixed, defined as losing the ability to maneuver.

The positioning of L alone and evidence of successive retrograding skirmish lines speaks to the fact they were in that position for some good time. That would not be the case if they became a lead element going south. That does not even address the positioning of Company C off to the west and slightly further south. That refutes the theory as well. C and L would be much closer together if what you postulate happened.

The Custer area only shows evidence of a two company battalion operating in mutual support of one another as doctrine dictated. That support broke down rather quickly, and the two parts pinned in separate areas of an already confined space.

Actually Custer would have been better off if he did have all five companies in the LSH area. It would not have meant a difference in outcome, but they would have lasted longer. Running up and down that ridgeline makes no tactical sense to me. If he was confronted up there with mass, he would have fought there with whatever mass he could muster, or run like hell with all to the east in an attempt to break contact. I don't think he would have tried to retrace his steps southward, a direction that would run him headlong into another bunch.

Everything we have points to a deliberate move by two companies to the north, with three companies remaining behind. Those three were overrun first, and those that could went in the direction Custer went in an attempt to reach safe harbor. In effect these were two battles fought 3/4 of a mile apart, facing two different groups of Indians, with maybe just a smidgen of spillover between those two groups on both sides.

When Fred's book is published I think you will see why the ridge running you postulate was not in the cards. Nothing is as what it first appears to be.

[tubman13]

Jul 2, 2014 14:28:28 GMT -6 quincannon said:

.Ok: Lets get down in the weeds her . As I said many more questions than answers

1) "Entire command to the north end of the village" No more than if you were not sure of the directions you were taking were you leading your friends and family to a picnic in the park, a park you had never visited before. What you might want to do is find out if there were picnic tables over thataway, and if this was the route to best reach them before you led five cars down a dead end road. Custer had no idea what was up there if anything, thus he reconnoitered with part, not committing the whole. You mentioned above sticking together for safety, or similar. Would not Custer want whatever strike force he could muster when he reached his objective?. 

2) Would not the head become the tail? No not at all. Custer did not retreat anywhere. He was confined within a small battle space within moments. He was fixed, defined as losing the ability to maneuver.

The positioning of L alone and evidence of successive retrograding skirmish lines speaks to the fact they were in that position for some good time. That would not be the case if they became a lead element going south. That does not even address the positioning of Company C off to the west and slightly further south. That refutes the theory as well. C and L would be much closer together if what you postulate happened. Could not LWM have hit L on the return and the momentum pushed Keogh off the ridge into the hands of CH, separating and crushing both groups?

The Custer area only shows evidence of a two company battalion operating in mutual support of one another as doctrine dictated. That support broke down rather quickly, and the two parts pinned in separate areas of an already confined space. I also wonder  in columns of 4's or 2's, how much space/length a horse takes up, how much distance is between the horses, how much distance between the companies, how beat were the horses were some having trouble keeping up? How long was the column if they had tried to stay together? I watched part of the rehearsal for Saturdays big event and a column of 2,s 12 horses was somewhat  near 40 yds. 

Actually Custer would have been better off if he did have all five companies in the LSH area. It would not have meant a difference in outcome, but they would have lasted longer. Running up and down that ridgeline makes no tactical sense to me. If he was confronted up there with mass, he would have fought there with whatever mass he could muster, or run like hell with all to the east in an attempt to break contact. I don't think he would have tried to retrace his steps southward, a direction that would run him headlong into another bunch.

Everything we have points to a deliberate move by two companies to the north, with three companies remaining behind. Those three were overrun first, and those that could went in the direction Custer went in an attempt to reach safe harbor. In effect these were two battles fought 3/4 of a mile apart, facing two different groups of Indians, with maybe just a smidgen of spillover between those two groups on both sides.

When Fred's book is published I think you will see why the ridge running you postulate was not in the cards. Nothing is as what it first appears to be.

Please forgive all the questions