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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 10, 2014 20:17:52 GMT -6
I don't think they reacted to the army's mistakes per se, and I think it incorrect to visualize it as such.
They only reacted, as AZ pointed out well and convincingly, as they would to any game when the army bolted, and swarmed as they would in a buffalo hunt, which many including participants with Reno and Indians commented upon. Not much enthusiasm for much else, given they likely - were they organized - capable of slaughtering the entire 7th and maybe Terry as well, possibly with a night attack. But they just left. As at Beecher Island, a short siege of a few days held no attractions despite the fact it may well have worked before the Buffalo Soldiers arrived.
In a way, the opponents, once in contact, were doomed only if they were the first to run, although the army was totally dependent upon ammo and the Indians not. If the village didn't run, the 7th couldn't do much if anything. The 7th couldn't fight on horseback at all, really.
And really, whether they won or lost battles, the fact that they had to keep moving means they always lost the wars.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 10, 2014 20:28:02 GMT -6
Mike: I am all in favor of anything that works. What works however is more in line with your opponents weakness than it is with anything else. If you chose number 11 the Tactics Blue Plate Swarm Special off of the menu, and your opponent is Custer or Fetterman and their attendant raggedy ass militia, then you get your moneys worth.
On the other hand if you try that same swarm against Company F, 7th Marines at Toktong Pass with the better part of a Chicom division, or the 23rd Infantry at Chipyong Ni, with three Chicom divisions and your opponents names are Barber or Freeman, choosing that same blue plate special, you are likely to get your ass handed to you. You can't get into an OODA Loop unless someone of your enemy opens the door for you by his mistakes.
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Post by tubman13 on Mar 10, 2014 21:31:44 GMT -6
They only reacted, as AZ pointed out well and convincingly, as they would to any game when the army bolted, and swarmed as they would in a buffalo hunt, Glad to see you coming around, with the buffalo hunt stuff. But your earlier post, quoting Whitaker about the cavalry in 1876. You can't mean that famous, Custer admirer, LIbbie's lap dog. The man who wrote those rags I referred to earlier. You can't mean that Whitaker, can you.
Regards, Tom
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Post by mac on Mar 11, 2014 2:08:52 GMT -6
In regard to Fetterman as a way of illustrating my point... Fetterman (like Custer) had low regard for his opponents. The Indians, including a young Crazy Horse (who some say was the planner), gathered and concealed lots of warriors then led the Fetterman group into their midst. During this Fetterman allowed the troops to become separated and so the Indians were able to pick a point to swarm on the discrete groups. Chuck is correct to link the two incidents. So not just a swarm but a sentient swarm with tactical intent. Very dangerous to underestimate. Cheers
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Post by Mike Powell on Mar 11, 2014 3:49:02 GMT -6
QC,
I don't believe the OODA loop can only be breached by a mistake within the loop. OODA has a finite minimum cycle time and new events that require reaction which occur more rapidly than cycle time will disrupt the loop leading to flailing or paralysis. I think Mike Tyson had another idea though of how to go about it, "Everybody has an OODA loop until they get punched in the face."
Mac,
All swarms are by definition sentient, that is able to perceive or at its broadest meaning "alive". Insects perceive and respond by swarming to pheromones emitted by individuals that are attacking. The NDNs at LBH had only to swarm to visible cavalry, gunfire, yelling and dust clouds.
I'm open to arguments that there was a more developed command and control system in play than swarming on June 25th. And if there was, then evaluating for structure, competence of employment or other dimensions against any template of military tactical practice would make some sense. Absent compelling evidence of such a system, I think the swarm is the best fitting template. And given the numbers available over the terrain involved, the swarm was the most effective tactic the NDNs could have employed against Custer. It's elimination of the friction inherent in formalized command and control allowed the most rapid employment of their dominating advantage of sheer numbers. The results have spoken volumes with more to follow (especially I hope from Gordie and Fred).
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Post by crzhrs on Mar 11, 2014 7:04:53 GMT -6
Wouldn't Crazy Horse's charge that divided Keough from Custer be considered a tactic rather than just a bunch of insects swarming around at anything that moved? As someone mentioned earlier about Fetterman being lured into a trap . . . that would be considered a tactic and if a overconfident and bigoted officer fell for the oldest trick in the book then it was a great tactic. As far as some stating that the least incompetent won that day . . . I would doubt if anyone saw a half-naked, hideously painted, barking & yipping wild man coming at you wanting to bash in your head with a club as incompetent.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 11, 2014 7:30:28 GMT -6
To be battle ready as an individual the Indians through living a hunting and hunting from horseback existence developed basic skills that regardless of hunting or fighting are needed. To say they didn't have command and control is not the same as not having a chain of command. Thier hunting techniques honed skills of team work in small teams. It took a while for the military to get down to small squad size fighting units.
I think we underestimate the fighting ability of these small groups that have spent many days riding around and killing things. They don't need to have the same commands and direction if the conditions are right. They were either successful or not and they preformed different activities all of the time and knew what the others in their group would do.
I agree they the didn't have command and control and no real chain of command but feed them small groups of soldiers that are riding a prey species and the limited Indian tactics were all they needed to win.
In my opinion we basically gave them the playing field that they could use to thier advantage with thier way of hunting/fighting. There was an assumption they would run and when they didn't the regiment never was reunited to counter the Indians fighting instead of fleeing.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by tubman13 on Mar 11, 2014 7:56:44 GMT -6
Mike, you get no argument from me that there was no developed command an control system on 6/25/76. Certainly as we know it. The swarm/ stamped was certainly employed against Reno in the valley. With regard to Custer there was a bit more in play, firing from cover, pinning down of antagonists, and counter attacks until you cut the commands in separate parts and then employ the swarm.
Then late on the 25th and 26 waste no more warriors, if possible by pinning down Reno and Benteen, picking off as many as possible. Do I think there was a big strategy session, at any point? No. I think OODA came into play thrice for the NDN's in this battle. First- very rapidly, when Reno was discovered coming up the valley. Second- When Custer was detected abreast of the village, also rapidly. Third- When things settled and they could lay siege to Reno/Benteen.
Also I am veryproud that it was an USAF Col. who came up with OODA.
Regards, Tom
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Post by fred on Mar 11, 2014 9:39:47 GMT -6
OK, you guys... I'll bite...
What exactly do OODA and NDN stand for? I know NDN refers to American Indians, but is that the new PC term for NA which was the new PC term for Indians which was the new PC term for savages... but what specifically do the letters N - D - N stand for?
OODA sounds like a post-commode groan....
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 11, 2014 9:44:31 GMT -6
Mike I fully agree on finite minimum cycle times. No argument at all. I still think that a mistake of some sort allows that door to be opened. In this instance perhaps the mistake was insufficient force., two many drunks and not enough bar maids, two many tables and not enough waiters, to many Indians coming from to many directions at once and not enough soldiers to counter them.
Steve has correctly I believe, differentiated between command and control, and chain of command. To often everyone, including myself, lumps these two together, and while they are similar they are not the same. That is one of the two reasons why I admire the Apache fighting style so much. The other is that when they made war they made war and did not drag grandma to an event where she could be no help only hindrance.
Yes ambush is a tactic, and assault by fire, assault, or both from an unexpected place/direction. The trap is also a tactic. Both were long well developed by the Indians. These two fights and others like them with the U S Army in the west were not these Indians first rodeo. They were quite effective against the USA for a number of reasons that have been hashed over here to the point of nausea, so need not be repeated. So the lesson the Indians learned was use what works until your enemy adapts (which they never did) then try something else. What works is the driving force for any tactician.
Observe - Orient - Decide - Act Not at all new. Present since man picked up his first rock., but fully developed by a Colonel named Boyd about forty years ago.
Custer's OODA Loop
He partially observed. He partially oriented. He neither decided nor acted. The Indians took advantage of all four, but got inside his loop because of orientation, and sealed the deal because of no decision and no action on Custer's part.
It is a time oriented decision making process where the guy who observes, orients, decides, and acts first usually takes home all the marbles, and the other guy gets another sort of marble, a headstone, as a consolation prize. iNDiaN
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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 11, 2014 10:00:43 GMT -6
tubman,
Not coming around, tubman, I've been saying much the same here for over a decade here and elsewhere. Still up. AZ said it better. But, it's a theme that originated with Benteen, so it's well known.
Still waiting for indication of warrior society training and superiority, or your sources for it. You can count on this being brought up until you admit you have no sources and just assumed.
And yes, that very Whitaker.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 11, 2014 10:57:00 GMT -6
DC, you devil you. You are leading Tom into a trap. You know very well that his statement can neither be sourced or its content quantified. That said, I think there is a great deal of validity to it if you remove the words warrior society, which I believe to be of western derivation (could very well be wrong on that) and insert small band, roughly the modern equivalent of squad or perhaps platoon.
There is no question in my mind that one for one these folks were far superior in basic soldier skills than were their Army counterparts. Did they have deficiencies? Of course. What they lacked though in adaptation to modern weaponry was offset by a similar lack of training on the part of the Army. Grouping these folks together, led by a leader of proven value would suggest then that there was more military potential there than a similar sized Army unit.
Now if these societies did exist it stands to reason there would be some selection process. Indians may have been primitive by our standards, but they knew from among their brothers who could cut it and who could not, who could perform and who could not. Primitive does not mean stupid or lacking discrimination. Any commander, at any level wishes that he could chose those men he fights with. We as humans do get to chose who we associate with and those whom we reject.
While we are at it your by now famous statement - The least incompetent side won - can be said of any battle, any place, since the beginning of time, and is not just applicable to this one battle, but to all battles.
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Post by Mike Powell on Mar 11, 2014 11:28:41 GMT -6
Fred,
Not sure where NDN originated. Like you I was puzzled by it but Google saved me. It is not an acronym but a rough phonetic spelling. Just pronounce the three letters aloud.
QC
I'm glad to see John Boyd's name brought out. Popularizing OODA as a term for discussion of what you point out is a natural process was not all he did. Wikipedia credits him with "substantial influence" in Schwartzkopf's "left hook" in the First Gulf War. The following lifted from Wiki's article on Boyd sounds a lot like AZ's comments on NDN small bands:
Boyd theorized that large organizations such as corporations, governments, or militaries possessed a hierarchy of OODA loops at tactical, grand-tactical (operational art), and strategic levels. In addition, he stated that most effective organizations have a highly decentralized chain of command that utilizes objective-driven orders, or directive control, rather than method-driven orders in order to harness the mental capacity and creative abilities of individual commanders at each level. In 2003, this power to the edge concept took the form of a DOD publication "Power to the Edge: Command ... Control ... in the Information Age" by Dr. David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes. Boyd argued that such a structure creates a flexible "organic whole" that is quicker to adapt to rapidly changing situations. He noted, however, that any such highly decentralized organization would necessitate a high degree of mutual trust and a common outlook that came from prior shared experiences.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 11, 2014 11:33:55 GMT -6
Hi everyone, Crazy Horse and Lame White Man, now these two individuals led attacks on Custer men, and these two attacks alone may have contained enough warriors to trouble Custer, now the Lame White Man charge was him rousing up the men around him by bravely leading a charge up Calhoun Hill (they may have swept C Company out of the way too), so this was not really a planned move as such, but to me the Crazy Horse attack looks different, he turned his band (some say around 200 men) around and rode back to the village, then he passed by Ford B and diverted his attack to come up from deep ravine and hit the soldiers from a different direction, now maybe he saw this opportunity to cut off Custer’s men and encircle them, so if there is any truth in this then in mind he used sound tactics.
The Fetterman battle again was another over confident Officer leading a battle group (for want of a better word) against an enemy he too totally underestimated. Fetterman’s force consisted of 48 Infantry and 27 Cavalry (plus a few odds and ends), so in reality over half of his command had to march on foot. His Infantry component was armed with muzzle loading muskets, his Cavalry fared better with Spencer Rifles (containing seven rounds), and another two men (civilians) had Henry Rifles. So when these two groups got separated (apparently by Indian decoys to lure them into an ambush), they stood no chance, so again overconfidence won over by rudimentary tactics.
Ian.
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Post by crzhrs on Mar 11, 2014 11:33:53 GMT -6
At what point did both sides' incompetency start and end? Someone must have snapped out of it to win. Looks like the Indians.
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