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Bogheim
Feb 23, 2014 10:13:24 GMT -6
Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 23, 2014 10:13:24 GMT -6
Chuck, I have decided to post this here, so not to throw the tactical applications thread of topic.
I have found this about the 4th Cavalry (Group) in the Battle of the Bulge, strangely enough it mentions about Cavalry men dismounting from their vehicles and fighting as foot soldiers, which is something the 7th did in 1876, would they be effective in such a combat role? Or was this a waste of lightly armed men being thrown into a situation because of necessity, I thought that once Cavalry lost their mobility they could not function as well as normal Infantry.
Anyway enjoy the section below;
The battle for Bogheim:
Bogheim controlled all approaches to Untermaubach and Obermaubach and had been made into a veritable fortress by elements of the 6th German Parachute Regiment. An elaborate and heavily manned network of trenches surrounding the town.
With Combat Command "B" on the 5th Armoured Division on the left and the 121st Infantry Regiment on the right, the 4th Squadron was given the mission of attacking dismounted in its zone to capture and secure the town and the high ground southeast of it.
On December 19th, a dense fog blanketed the area reducing visibility to less than 25 yards. Moving out under cover of the mist, Troops "B" and "C" reached the town undetected, but near the centre of the village, fierce street fighting broke out.
In the first clash with the surprised defenders, twenty enemy paratroopers were slain and thirty seven captured as the Troops poured bazooka, machine gun and hand grenade fire into the buildings. Troop "A", closely following Troops "B" and "C", was met with devastating fire from an enemy strongpoint guarding the eastern outskirts of the town.
The initial entry into Bogheim had lifted just enough to permit the German outpost to spot the advancing "A" Troop men. Pinned down under withering machine gun and Panzerfaust fire, the troop hit the ground in the midst of a mine field. Captain William L. Goodard, Troop "A" Commander, and several other men were seriously wounded in this action.
From their commanding position southeast of town, the Germans laid down a heavy carpet of artillery with deadly accuracy but the Squadron clung to its positions. In an effort to eliminate the German force blocking "A" Troop's advance, Troop "F" was committed late that morning.
As the tanks broke out of the wooded area one mile southeast of the town and attempted to dash across the open plain, anti-tank guns perched on the ridge beyond Bogheim opened up with direct fire. The 88's struck the lead tank and Captain Clyde P. Williamson, Troop "F" Commander, was killed and the rest of the crew critically wounded.
In face of this murderous fire, the tanks were compelled to withdraw to the concealment of the woods. Meanwhile heavy fighting again broke out in the town's centre.
Both Troop "C" and Troop "B" Commanding Officers were wounded as the Troops became engaged in a bitter house struggle. As darkness fell, the last German resistance in the town subsided.
The Troop Commanders of every troop committed to this action had been killed or seriously wounded and five of nine platoon leaders evacuated as casualties, beside a 25% loss in enlisted casualties.
Despite the terrific toll, the Squadron took up defensive positions and secured Bogheim for the night. At dawn, after a continuous all night bombardment of artillery and mortar fire, the battered Squadron drove and fought its way to the heavily defended ridge southeast of town. In addition to casualties sustained the day before, twenty more men fell as Squadron overran well emplaced anti-tank and mortar positions. By noon, the ridge had been captured and the objectives consolidated.
In the two-day action, 118 Germans had been captured and over 62 killed.
The two remaining groups of the German 353rd Infantry Division, composed of elements of the 942nd and 943rd Infantry Regiments, had been completely destroyed by capturing or killing all of its personnel including the Division's Commanding Officer. The Squadron had also wiped out one company of the 6th Parachute Regiment, which then represented one of the crack units of the German Army.
The battle of Bogheim, costliest single operation for the 4th Cavalry Squadron, was over.
Ian.
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Bogheim
Feb 23, 2014 18:34:21 GMT -6
Post by tubman13 on Feb 23, 2014 18:34:21 GMT -6
Ian, there are many better here than I to tell you this, but that particular group was deployed as a rapid strike force. Hit fast and keep hitting do not let up. It is much likes a boxing match, you can take out the harder hitter, if he is never able to set his feet to land that haymaker. If you can jab, your opponent who may be bigger and stronger can never take the offensive. My branch of service has a rapid strike force, Air Commandos and you Brits have an even more devastating, force that compares with Seals and Delta. Fred, Chuck, or someone else may be more familiar with this action than I, probably can give you better info. When you attack, never, repeat never give up the initiative, make them take it from you. With regard to Custer, he never, repeat never seized the initiative after he left(ran out on) Reno!
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Bogheim
Feb 23, 2014 21:04:35 GMT -6
Post by quincannon on Feb 23, 2014 21:04:35 GMT -6
Tom: Fully concur. Nothing else need be said.
Ian: American cavalry, you will recall, is a general purpose mounted force. If it were all added up since 1832 I think you would find that about 70 % of American cavalry actions have been fought dismounted. An even higher percentage would be achieved if you added in actions that we fought partially mounted and partially dismounted. We looked upon horse, 1/4 truck,helicopter or the vehicle du jour as a means of transportation. Cavalry having both speed and flexibility of organization made them very useful for the reconnaissance role, but because of high automatic weapons density made them very useful in defense and limited mission dismounted operations also.
Those that draw a straight line from mounted combat on a horse to mounted combat in a tank, and draw the conclusion that all cavalry combat must be mounted don't know B from a bull's ass about American cavalry doctrine, have watched to many John Ford movies, or never read a lick. To those I would recommend "Through Mobility We Conquer" the story of how horse cavalry transitioned from horses to horsepower. They fail to understand how the branch developed yet they opine, and opine, and opine.
Thank God we are getting away from the tank and heavy armored recon vehicle mindset, and concentrating more on mobility.
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Bogheim
Feb 24, 2014 4:22:12 GMT -6
Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 24, 2014 4:22:12 GMT -6
Thanks Guys. That’s one of the reasons I posted the story, to me Cavalry was a reconnaissance force and best when deployed as the eyes of the army, they would make contact and either pull back or stand their ground till re-enforced by the main body, but the battle of Bogheim seems to me to be conducted as a set piece battle and taking specialists troops out of their normal role and using them as standard Infantry, Tom has enlightened me to the fact that the group was formed and used as a rapid strike force so this changes there role from just a recce unit to a fully armed force capable of looking after itself. It’s a bit on the light side but it is what you would expect from a Cavalry unit; Chuck, the reason for adding heavy elements to light recon forces may have been down to the men in the field, now obviously you know this better than I do but… did they request the heavy elements so they could handle themselves and be a fully independent force? Not saying this is right and you have experience in this field, and I know your feelings on this subject, and I am glad that they are changing back to what they were initially designed to do. Ian.
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Bogheim
Feb 24, 2014 11:38:56 GMT -6
Post by quincannon on Feb 24, 2014 11:38:56 GMT -6
Ian: I have several projects to work on today, but this evening I will endeavor to write a long post on how cavalry developed in the US Army. It is a story of conservative thinking, politics (Army politics) and much too quick a transition employing concepts and equipment not fully developed. Needless to say though cavalry is not a branch in the U S Army, but rather a state of mind, a state of mind which most tankers do not understand.
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Bogheim
Feb 24, 2014 13:27:33 GMT -6
Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 24, 2014 13:27:33 GMT -6
Look forward to reading your work Chuck, it will probably be tomorrow before I get to reply though. Found this on WW2 US Mechanized Battalions; linkAs the old saying goes "Through Mobility We Conquer" Ian.
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Bogheim
Feb 24, 2014 15:52:30 GMT -6
Post by quincannon on Feb 24, 2014 15:52:30 GMT -6
The American Concept of Cavalry:
As most of us know American Cavalry draws most of its doctrinal underpinnings from dragoons, soldiers who would ride to battle, and could then continue mounted or dismount and fight on foot using the most lethal of their weapons the carbine. We, in the early days had three names/designations for cavalry forces, dragoon, mounted rifles, and cavalry. Regardless of designation though the doctrine was that of the dragoons. Along came 1861 and these names, and the supposed specialties they represented merged both in fact and name, and the six existing regiments of regular cavalry were all redesignated in the order they were originally constituted as follows
1st Dragoons became 1st Cavalry 2nd Dragoons became 2nd Cavalry Regiment of Mounted Rifles became 3rd Cavalry 1st Cavalry became 4th Cavalry 2nd Cavalry became 5th Cavalry 3rd Cavalry became 6th Cavalry
Through the Civil War, not a heck of a lot in doctrine changed. The technique of use though changed about mid war when cavalry were grouped together into larger and larger formations, and became both a force used for reconnaissance, screening, guarding, and all of the other functions associated with cavalry, AND also allowed cavalry to be used as a main battle force of its own supplemented by highly mobile field artillery. Both Sheridan and Wilson used it this way, and there are indicators that Stuart would have done so as well had he had the resources to pull it off. Forrest combined cavalry with infantry on occasion, but fought them chiefly as a mobile infantry force, integrating them with infantry as the occasion arose.
The other factor in the ACW which effected all type forces, but the cavalry most of all was increased volume and accuracy of firepower. Something had to be done to reduce vulnerability and that something was more and more the use of the horse for transportation, and fighting the battle itself largely on foot. Upton and other visionaries in the Army recognized this, and I will let Montrose expound on Upton.
In the Spanish American War cavalry found nearly exclusively dismounted and left their horses behind, most not even deploying to theater. It was an infantry war dictated by terrain and the Mauser bolt action rifle or "Spanish Hornet" as it was sometimes known. Wheeler's Cavalry Division fought in Cuba without horses, but they still were employed as cavalry, leading advances and fighting the initial actions of the Santiago Campaign as Las Guasimas, as well as acting as infantry at San Juan Heights/Kettle Hill.
Post Span-Am War the Army was in a quandary, they recognized that cavalry of the future was going to have to fulfill two functions, the traditional roles in advance of the Armies main body, and the ability to themselves be a main body, as a highly mobile strike force able to penetrate deep into the rear of the opposing force and disrupt and unhinge enemy defenses. Further it was realized more and more that the horse could not cut it for this latter role and was becoming problematic for the former. But the horse was all they had for the present
In Would War I along came the armored fighting vehicle, which really muddied the waters into not two but three factions. The "real" cavalry guys thought the horse was just fine for recon, screening etc. The advanced thinkers saw the tank as a replacement for the horse exclusively, and those poor old dull witted infantrymen saw it as nothing more than a mobile gun platform, a means of providing direct fire to aid the dismounted infantry advance. These people fought like cats and dogs over the next twenty years, each trying to prove their point, and each in part created an organizational abortion. Branch politics and turf protection also played a large part in all this, and all that did was retard progress.
The National Defense Act of 1921 stipulated that the tank was an infantry system, by law. That did not stop the advanced thinkers who worked their way around the law by calling their tanks combat cars. The "real" cavalry was still shoveling horseshit and playing Polo, and the infantry was still thinking at a speed of three miles per hour. Something had to give to break this log jam, and that was a piece of :innovative" thinking called the Armored Force "experiment" In effect another branch of the Army was created (just what we needed another fiefdom)to give the advanced thinkers just what they wanted a recreation of Sheridan's mounted main battle force. Meanwhile they gave the traditional cavalry function short rations, keeping the horse as a mount on the eve of the largest conflict man has ever known. Even the horseshit shoveling Polo players realized that 1) the horse could no longer cut it for the non-main battle force cavalry missions, and 2) the 1/4 Bantam (Jeep), decently designed armored cars, and the FM radio all came along at the opportune time. But the dirt grinders still needed that mobile direct fire power.
The solution was the Armored Division for the advanced thinkers, the Cavalry Group for the exclusively cavalry missions, and the separate tank battalion (part of the Armored Force, but not part of the armored divisions). So in the end compromise was the order of the day. All of it worked out fairly well but there were gross deficiencies that were addressed in post war battle studies which led to organizational structure changes in the immediate post war period.
Some of the lessons learned in World War II as they concern mobile forces were as follows.
The Armored Divisions were infantry poor. As a result they added another infantry battalion. They also added a heavy tank battalion to replace the tank destroyer battalion they habitually had attached from non-divisonal pools during the war. They retained the combat commands making the barely functional Combat Command Reserve (CCR) into a fully functioning combat command, and redesignating it Combat Command C.
In the infantry division it was realized that they needed and organic tank battalion, not one that was attached for the occasion, so each ID got it's own heavy tank battalion, while each of the three infantry regiments of the divisions converted their anti-tank companies into large medium tank companies.
The cavalry groups were found to be quite useful, but their equipment was found wanting in that the armored car was a death trap, the jeep was less than ideal for recon but all we had, and there was a need for a heavier mortar at platoon level and more dismounts were required. Light tanks replaced armored cars, the jeeps remained until replaced by another deathtrap the M114, a rifle squad was added at platoon level, and the 4.2 inch mortar replaced the 60mm.By then Cavalry as a branch had been amalgamated with the Armored Force, which was then given lawful legitimacy by becoming the ARMOR BRANCH with a footnote "a continuation of Cavalry" Groups added a third battalion (squadron was by law a no no) and they became Armored Cavalry Regiments, a compromise designation.
Armies react to potential threat, and our particular reaction to threat was to over a period of ten years or so convert all of our forces Stationed in Europe as well as their immediate stateside backup into heavy divisions where the infantry and armored divisions were essentially the same organizations except in name. Fred's 3rd Infantry Division, was structured almost identically to its neighbors the 3rd Armored Division.
This heavy up trend extended to the five armored cavalry regiments as well, and the more heavy equipment they added the less they were able to function as cavalry. This was pointed out as early as 1954 in an article in Collier's Magazine by LTG James Gavin who entitle the piece "Cavalry and I don't Mean Horses" and in the first sentence asked Where was Walker's Cavalry, referring to General Walton Walker and the early (July to Dec 1950) months in Korea. He went on to quote Hooker's "Whoever saw a dead cavalryman" by expanding it and stating "Whoever saw a cavalryman". His basic argument was that cavalry , and he meant "real cavalry" had disappeared into the great armor branch dream machine. Further he called for the reconstitution of light highly mobile forces that could be transported about the battlefield in helicopters, and other types of light vehicles. More on that in a moment.
Gavin's article had far reaching implications and was soon followed by arming of helicopters by Colonel Jay Vanderpool at the Aviation School and formulating doctrine for their use by consulting 1920;s and 30;s editions of Cavalry field manuals. A few years later Robert McNamara the SECDEF "forced and I do mean forced" the Secretary of the Army to look at the aviation picture Army wide to see how rotary wing assets could be better applied. This sent the Air Force into convulsions. Reluctantly SECARMY set up the Howtz Board to study the issue and over the period of one summer their report was revolutionary. Drawing on Gavin's ideas, Vanderpool's work and their own experimentation they created the blueprint of a modern cavalry division that could be used as both main battle force and in the traditional cavalry roles, associated with that arm since man first sat a horse. And along about that time came Vietnam and the concepts could be tested in battle. The other parts of the Army threw a hissy fit, and the Air Force's convulsions turned to foaming at the mouth and crying aloud "I want my mommy" Sorry Tom, but that's how it was.
The 1st Cavalry Division was very successful in Vietnam, and looking at their operations you can see the effect of the dragoon doctrine. The 101st Airborne Division was reorganized in theater to mirror the 1st CD. Looking at their operations though you see an infantry division with helicopters. Huge difference in methodology. Unfortunately at the end of that conflict the 1st CD was converted into just another heavy division and the 101st was retained as is in the structure REALLY BAD MOVE, and all that potential, all those possibilities lost.
Fast forward to the first Gulf War and the heavy guys had their day, all was right with the world, the bigger the better blah, blah, blah. perfect situational awareness, electronic revolution, biggest toys win the day bull crap.
Then along comes Iraq and Afghanistan and we find out that the cell phone is just as good as all that electronic hoo haa, there is no such thing as perfect situational awareness, the biggest toys are not always the best, and we had to rethink all this again. Cavalry once again trended toward the light. Heavy mobile forces are or soon will be a diminishing breed within the Army, and revelation of revelations, the man using the Mark I eyeball, mounted on something light and fast, and I don't care if it is wheeled or rotored or magic carpet, in short a cavalryman still needs to get in there and find out what the hell is going on.
CAVALRY IS A BATTLEFIELD FUNCTION, NOT A BRANCH, THEY MUST BE TOUGH, RESILLIENT, AGGRESSIVE, LIGHTLY MOUNTED BUT ALSO AT HOME ON FOOT, ARMED WELL ENOUGH TO GET HIMSELF OUT OF TROUBLE ---- THEY ARE A STATE OF MIND.
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Bogheim
Feb 24, 2014 17:15:24 GMT -6
Post by tubman13 on Feb 24, 2014 17:15:24 GMT -6
You don't have to be sorry to me. After all we stole all of the Army Air Corps planes, and the vast majority of their officers. So in large part the officers who were crying for mommy were also from the Army in the first place! Before Curtis Lemay helped to design our silly looking bus driver uniforms, be was busting out of a green Ike jacket.
Regards, Tom
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Bogheim
Feb 24, 2014 17:39:19 GMT -6
Post by quincannon on Feb 24, 2014 17:39:19 GMT -6
Indeed they were. The biggest fight was over two airframes the Caribou and the Mohawk. The Caribou was to be organic to the 10th Transportation Brigade to provide inter-theater transportation above and beyond what the airmobile cavalry division could provide for itself. That violated a memorandum of understanding between the Army and the then "new" Air Force on roles and missions. The Mohawk was a reconnaissance fixed wing aircraft that the Army wanted to arm to the teeth and provide their own close air support, another technical violation. In addition there was supposed to be an air cavalry combat brigade, with about 120 attack helicopters that did not exist at the time but led to the Cobra. The Air Force was correct in their objections, and that is really to bad. The 10th Trans Brigade was inactivated before deployment although a few Caribous found there way into the division until the argument was settled. The Mohawks were in the 230th Aviation Battalion. That was to be organic to the division but it too was inactivated. The ACCB was put on the back burner, and was eventually activated after Vietnam. All this was a great shame because if you read the Howtz Board study all these units working in concert under a single commander were essential to the concept.
Ian? I am going to have to look at Bogheim more carefully to see the rational behind the use of the 4th Cavalry Group in this. They had the Old Gray Bonnets (121st Infantry GAARNG) on their right and the 5th AD on the left so it looks like Bogheim was in the gap between these two more powerful organizations and the 4th CG was covering that gap. I just moved the Green Books (U S Army WWII) history to the basement library so I will get at them either this evening or tomorrow.
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Bogheim
Feb 24, 2014 18:19:37 GMT -6
Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 24, 2014 18:19:37 GMT -6
That’s one hell of a posts Chuck, and I enjoyed reading it.
At Bogheim the four Troops involved must have been organized in this fashion;
HQ Section: 2 x Officer & 13 EMs + 3 x Jeeps (.30 MGs) & 2 x M8 Armoured Cars 3 x Reconnaissance Platoons each containing; Scout Section: 17 x EMs + 3 x Jeeps (.30 MGs) & 3 x Jeeps (60mm Mortars) Armoured Car Section: 1 x Officer & 11 x EMs + 3 x M8 Armoured Cars Admin & Supply Section: 31 x EMs + 1 x Jeep, 1 x Truck & 3 x Half-Tracks Maintenance Section: 12 x EMs + 1 x Jeep, 1 x M8 Armoured Car, 1 x Truck & 1 x Half-Track Total: 6 x Officers & 140 x EMs Support came in the form of 6 x M8 HMC and 15 x M3 Light Tanks.
So really the Troop has no Infantry Component except for vehicle crews, which was not the case for the British and German Recce units, the British had an assault Troop (Infantry mounted in Carriers) and the Germans A Company of Infantry mounted in Sd.Kfz 250 Half-Tracks).
Ian.
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Bogheim
Feb 24, 2014 18:47:10 GMT -6
Post by tubman13 on Feb 24, 2014 18:47:10 GMT -6
If I am right, my uncle was wounded near there, he told me about a cavalry unit that was available, and used to plug a hole(much like "The Little Dutch Boy" and the d**e). They obviously took advantage of some weakness and continued to exploited it.
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Bogheim
Feb 24, 2014 19:20:50 GMT -6
Post by quincannon on Feb 24, 2014 19:20:50 GMT -6
Ian: You present MTO&E at full strength. I doubt if they were. I would expect something like 70% of the combat power you portray being what they had. I suspect each of those troops could field about 70 dismounts including the leadership group, if they were very lucky.
Hurtgen was a place the Bloody Bucket (28 ID) got a hell of a lot more bloody Tom, and they were not alone. Bradley should have been shot for that, then tarred and feathered. Soldier's General my ass.
I see the boards politically correct auto-sensor can still not differentiate between a piece of construction designed to hold water back or out, and a rather nasty word for someone of the homosexual persuasion. And we wonder about why all electronic, all seeing, perfect situational awareness eludes us.
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Bogheim
Feb 25, 2014 9:16:51 GMT -6
Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 25, 2014 9:16:51 GMT -6
Hi Chuck, yes you are probably right, this unit would not have been at full strength but those 70% would be Gunners, Drivers and Radio Operators so basically specialists not Infantry, seems like a waste to me so this battle must have been fought in extreme circumstances, probably to do with the fact that the US forces in the area at the time would be understrength too, and it was every man to the pump.
Ian.
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Bogheim
Feb 25, 2014 10:54:21 GMT -6
Post by quincannon on Feb 25, 2014 10:54:21 GMT -6
Those people would be cavalrymen Ian. Assignments to use mortars, machine guns, radios and drive Bantams would be secondary duties. Their MOS listed them as Cavalry Scouts, who were if anything more skilled in dismounted tactics and techniques than their infantry brothers. They had to be in that they normally operated in three man teams when dismounted seeing hopefully without being seen. Make no mistake the were combat soldiers first and whatever else they did second.
The units you had that were most similar in construct and mission were Long Range Desert Group, and Popski's Private Army, and even the SAS in the desert. Warriors first and whatever else listed as other duty as assigned.
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Bogheim
Feb 25, 2014 11:05:44 GMT -6
Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 25, 2014 11:05:44 GMT -6
Chuck, just checked my TO&E list for a US Cavalry Troop 1943-45 and each man carried a personal weapon, they had their fair share of Rifles, Carbines and 60mm Mortars, every drive had a Sub-Machine Gun, and almost every vehicle carried a Machine Gun plus a Bazooka, so in a way they were better armed than there Infantry equivalent.
Ian.
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