Command Responsibilities

[Deleted]

Ian,
In the service I was told to obey the last order first.
My opinion is that Benteen had to obey Reno. Outranked is outranked. If Reno had said to me (if I was Benteen) "Halt your command."
I'd have done so and as quickly, set up defense etc. then further inquire as to actions.

Wondering where you've been, always enjoy your posts!

Best,
c.

[Yan Taylor]

Thanks Chris, one of my older Brothers has emphysema and they are moving him to a new one bedroom apartment, the place needed painting before he could be moved so I have been decorating it for him, it had to be done quick so that the paint would be dry and we could ventilate it before he moves in (the paint fumes would be very harmful to his lungs), so that’s where I’m at, so I hope you all enjoy the super bowl and I we see you all later.

Ian.

[fred]

Feb 2, 2014 14:33:50 GMT -6 quincannon said:

If the 6th Cavalry Major had a compelling reason for his giving the 2nd Cavalry Captain the order, then yes it should be obeyed. In the absence of a compelling reason the Captain is obligated to use his best judgment and possibly refuse the order.

I would tend to agree.

I believe this quandary popped up when I was in the infantry. We were obligated to obey the orders of our unit commanders, not another unit's. I feel, however, this is an area where common sense may take over. Tactics, missions, situations... I believe all must be considered. Providing helping another command comes at no cost to anything your commander is doing or wants to do, you may assist another unit. I doubt there is an obligation, although, again, the situation prevails and I would not want to be in a position where you passed up helping wounded or plugging a tactical hole, just to go back and help out the battalion kitchen.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[alfakilo]

Feb 2, 2014 7:35:51 GMT -6 montrose said:

Steve,

An officer's job is to make decisions. A common saying for company commanders are the decision point where you " bet your bars". You make a decision on your own authority, despite whatever orders are out there. It's a hero or zero moment.

That pretty much sums it up. I remember reading some years back where officer behavior was being discussed. One opinion was that American officers tended to confound those from other nations, particularly those from Europe. The feeling was that American officers had a distressing habit of thinking for themselves, a characteristic that sometimes ran against the grain of traditional role following. While this obviously wasn't true of all US officers, I liked to think that enough of us, regardless of service, had our heads "out of the box" instead of up our butt and acted accordingly.

Blindly obeying orders without regard for circumstances is a sign of incompetence. The other board regards the charge of the Light Brigade as an example of military genius, the defining example of the 'cavalry school' . At LBH they believe a charge of the mule brigade would lead to a decisive victory. Arrant nonsense from rank amateurs with no understanding of tactics or the dynamics of battle.

Exactly.

From what I've learned of Benteen's actions on Reno Hill, I think he acted as I believe we were all trained. Somebody needed to take charge, and he was the one to do just that. Given the dire circumstances on Reno Hill and the great uncertainty of what was going on elsewhere, his decisions and actions were directly responsible for the lives that were saved.

[fred]

I think we are in total agreement here with this business of command responsibility and Benteen's interpretation of it.

For those of you who are interested, there is an extremely fine discussion of American and German tactics and methodology in a book titled, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, by the late Russell Weigley, a former professor of history at Temple University. As far as I know, the book is still in print... and it is absolutely superb.

Two of the more interesting points Weigley brought out were:

“So high were the professional attainments of the German army that a handful of German officers sufficed to accomplish apparent miracles of training and leadership. The officer corps comprised only 2.86 percent of the German army’s total strength at the beginning of the Second World War and declined in relative strength as the war went on. In contrast, officers represented seven percent of the overall strength of the American army (and were to grow to fifteen percent of the army during the Vietnam War).” [29]

“… in the German army the company developed a sufficient sense of comradeship and solidarity to constitute a primary group, whereas in the American army the usual primary group was the squad, or at the largest, the platoon. It is not the dedication to a cause but such unit consciousness and solidarity that makes an army an effective fighting force.” [29]

Another thing I have often heard-- though I am not sure if Weigley mentioned it-- was the fact the German NCOs were similarly trained and were given an inordinate amount of responsibility, often acting as officers might.

The primary focus of the book is the D-Day invasion's aftermath. Like I said, superb!!

Best wishes,
Fred.

[quincannon]

I completely agree with you Fred on the value of Weigley's book. Eisenhower's Lieutenants is a must read for anyone interested in the campaign in France and Germany. Another of his books The American Way of War is very good as well.

One of the real strengths of the German Army was their replacement system designed to foster that primary group construct. It could also be a disadvantage as well in that units were usually reduced in combat to mere shells of themselves before being rebuilt, and this is especially so as the war progressed.

[Yan Taylor]

Here is one example of the German system of command at lower level, it shows the lack of junior Officers in a Panzer Grenadier Company late 1944.

1st Platoon;
1 x Lieutenant
3 x NCOs
26 x Privates

2nd & 3rd Platoon;
4 x NCOs
26 x Privates

Ian.

[Yan Taylor]

Going back to the topic of training and organisation; the German high command gave way to Goring’s idea of using Luftwaffe personnel to form Infantry formations to replace losses suffered on the eastern front, they formed these units in to Luftwaffe Field Divisions, with men of no previous Infantry training or leadership, they were organised differently from their counterparts in the Wehrmacht;

2 x Jäger Regiments (containing three Battalions)
1 x Füsilier Battalion
1 x PanzerJäger Battalion
1 x Artillery Battalion
1 x Flak Battalion
1 x Pioneer Company
1 x Signals Company

These Divisions simply disintragated before the Russian onslaughts and the Soviets singled them out as weak points in the line, as they used have different colour uniforms to the Heer.

Ian.

[scottbono]

Feb 3, 2014 7:53:24 GMT -6 fred said:

I think we are in total agreement here with this business of command responsibility and Benteen's interpretation of it.

For those of you who are interested, there is an extremely fine discussion of American and German tactics and methodology in a book titled, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, by the late Russell Weigley, a former professor of history at Temple University. As far as I know, the book is still in print... and it is absolutely superb.

Two of the more interesting points Weigley brought out were:

“So high were the professional attainments of the German army that a handful of German officers sufficed to accomplish apparent miracles of training and leadership. The officer corps comprised only 2.86 percent of the German army’s total strength at the beginning of the Second World War and declined in relative strength as the war went on. In contrast, officers represented seven percent of the overall strength of the American army (and were to grow to fifteen percent of the army during the Vietnam War).” [29]

“… in the German army the company developed a sufficient sense of comradeship and solidarity to constitute a primary group, whereas in the American army the usual primary group was the squad, or at the largest, the platoon. It is not the dedication to a cause but such unit consciousness and solidarity that makes an army an effective fighting force.” [29]

Another thing I have often heard-- though I am not sure if Weigley mentioned it-- was the fact the German NCOs were similarly trained and were given an inordinate amount of responsibility, often acting as officers might.

The primary focus of the book is the D-Day invasion's aftermath. Like I said, superb!!

Best wishes,
Fred.

A  anecdote I think appropriate - a paternal uncle was in France, Belgium and Germany; his personal experiences as recounted around the kitchen table a dozen times was that a single German infantryman with an MG could consistently and effectively hold up an American infantry company for hours - a few times for days. His term for the German Wermacht was 'ruthlessly efficient' to which he added "Why do you think Europe is terrified of a militarized Germany?" After coming out of the Heurtgen Forest he told his mother the German soldier was the most efficient infantryman he'd ever been around. He absolutely hated the SS but the rank and file German soldier had all his respect.

[quincannon]

Scott: That is not the first time I have heard versions of that same story. From your uncle's perspective I am sure it was true enough, but there is more than true enough to the tale.

The Germans were the only ones I know of the integrated the light machine gun into their rifle squads. In fact their rifle squads were built around the firepower of the light machine gun be it MG34 or MG42. I telling all of the truth you must also realize that that one German machine gunner had another nine men there to protect him and his gun and to nullify small unit maneuver against the gun. The Germans were also master at integrating the fires of the other two rifle squads in that platoon to form of cohesive whole.

We tried to do the same thing with the BAR, but it was not nearly as effective as the 34 or 42.

I would be interested to know in what unit did your uncle serve.

[scottbono]

Feb 10, 2014 15:00:10 GMT -6 quincannon said:

Scott: That is not the first time I have heard versions of that same story. From your uncle's perspective I am sure it was true enough, but there is more than true enough to the tale.

The Germans were the only ones I know of the integrated the light machine gun into their rifle squads. In fact their rifle squads were built around the firepower of the light machine gun be it MG34 or MG42. I telling all of the truth you must also realize that that one German machine gunner had another nine men there to protect him and his gun and to nullify small unit maneuver against the gun. The Germans were also master at integrating the fires of the other two rifle squads in that platoon to form of cohesive whole.

We tried to do the same thing with the BAR, but it was not nearly as effective as the 34 or 42.

I would be interested to know in what unit did your uncle serve.

QC, the 28th Infantry Division. Beyond that I just don't know except he had come through France and Belgium and spent too much time in the Heurtgen Forest (bronze medal). He swore the Brits were the absolute best at securing an area, the Americans were best on offense, the French...well, his opinions best be left unsaid. Monty never moved unless he was assured of a set-piece battle, Patton couldn't sit still and always insisted on attack-mode. My uncle was a somewhat slight guy and joked that, when using a Thompson he could never fire from the shoulder; rather, needed the butt firmly against his pelvis to control the arc. He swore the MG42 was the best MG ever manufactured outside "Ma Deuce", the Browning M-2.

[quincannon]

I would agree on both the MG42 and the M-2.

[Yan Taylor]

Hi Chuck, I was interested in your post yesterday that said;

The Germans were the only ones I know of the integrated the light machine gun
into their rifle squads. In fact their rifle squads were built around the firepower
of the light machine gun be it MG34 or MG42.

Here is a breakdown of a German Panzer Grenadier Squad 1943-45;

Each Rifle Squad had been reduced to ten men, losing two riflemen. The leader still carried a machine pistol and his assistant a rifle. The two light machine gunners each carried an MG34 or MG42 and pistol, their two assistants and the two riflemen all rifles. The Squad halftrack still had a two man crew, driver and assistant, the latter of whom now carried a pistol. Oddly, the driver had lost his rifle, but the halftrack still mounted a machine pistol along with the light machine gun.

That’s two LMGs per Squad and three if you count the one carried on the Sd.Kfz 251 Armoured Personnel Carrier, how they utilised these Machine Guns I have yet to find, but they may have split into two groups;

Unteroffizier (Corporal + MP40)
Machine Gunner (MG42 + Pistol)
3 x Riflemen (K98 Rifles)

Gefreiter (Lance Corporal + K98 Rifle)
Machine Gunner (MG42 + Pistol)
3 x Riflemen (K98 Rifles)

Ian.

[quincannon]

English in his book "On Infantry" has the 1941 Infantry Section broken down into a squad/section leader, a four man machine gun group, and five man rifle group. The machine gun group formed the base of fire in both offense and defense, and the rifle group was the maneuver element on offense and the supporting fires element on defense.

I would expect panzer grenadier units to be both different and more heavily armed.

[Yan Taylor]

Chuck, the Infantry carried on with the section tactics you have mentioned, and early in the war a standard German Infantry Platoon had four Sections, each with one LMG, this could not be kept up of course and three became the norm from 1943 onwards.

Just thought I would tell you that the BBC are showing a four part series on WW1, it’s called Britain’s Great War, I have watched the first three programs up to now and they are excellent, so keep an eye out for them over there (you will enjoy them darkcloud)

Ian.