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Post by herosrest on Jan 6, 2014 16:59:14 GMT -6
My tone is the same tone I have with all dumb asses. I don't like you. I don't like you because you add nothing and confuse the lot, those that come here for information, and you provide gibberish and nonsense, to their detriment and this boards devaluation. So if you don't like my tone toughshit. Don't engage. I am sure your not a bad guy, and you have obviously researched and come up with one hell of a lot o raw data, but raw data is absolutely no good unless you can sift and sort that data and place it in the context and flow of this battle, or battles in general. If you can't do that it, your efforts are worthless to the study of the battle and to glean value from that study. Short of putting it in context and flow, you can't fully understand what you have, nor can anyone else. This is not the first time you have been told this by myself as well as others. You look upon what is said to you as a personal attack when in reality it is nothing of the kind What it is, is a growing frustration with the disconnected, the disjointed, and the inability to determine fabrication for cause with fact. That is your problem. Until it is solved by you, then please do not think you are owed a hearing, because you lay out something which is nothing more than disconnected junk and try to pass it off as serious study/ You are entitled to your own opinion. What you are not entitled to is trying to pass off your opinion as fact. Nor are you entitled to any more of my time Good night. As an aside, ford d's below and downriver of Custer's Hill are the modern reincarnation by Fox, of the John Stands in Timber guidance as he continued his family's and tribes struggle to have their fallen marked on the battle ground. Pure politics and tell the white man what he wants to hear, if it gets the job done. According to the Rickey interview transcripts, which very few ever get to read; JSiT told rickey, it's on page 3, that the battke ended near Calhoun Hill with a skirmish line shooting WEST. Go check it out for a handle on the modern history and Fox based interpretations of what happened. There is no way on earth Fox didn't check out the transcript of that interview. If you look at Fox's interpretation of Freeman's sketch, he assigns 'one' to the squiggle beside the compass arrow to indicate cavalry fighting tere. In fact '1' given by Freeman is in the river loop where Reno fought for his horses. So much for archaeology's interpretations of battlefields. I will say that his anthropological work was well done and demolished Kuhlman's SSL. Go figure. Maybe the guy has a dream, just like John Stands in Timber's tribe. The free and the brave, perhaps. I shall adopt your tone. Someone looked at the overlay of artifacts and decided it meant Custer's command did as you described based purely upon the FLOW apparent to those artifacts. To cross a river to his west, Custer marches EAST. You are passing your confused ideas as fact. Military analysts looked at the trail of relics and bingo, that's the answer. John Gray picked up on it and today it is established as serious. To cross a river and support the advance, fighting in the valley, Custer rides in the opposite direction away from the river and camps out his command a mile from the nearest fords, to do what? To fulfil the assessments of idiots playing with new toys. My understanding of the relic trails a mile from the river is that enough brass exists to support an engagement by a platoon which shot away its carried rounds. Freeman showed where they fought on his sketch and the route of march. The route of march can be accepted as fact, because Freeman rode with Benteen on the 27th. Freeman identified the lower ford as Real Bird, having indicated that he understood the camp was smaller than its impression. That ford being the lower ford, it is where the route of march along the river, turned north towards Battle Ridge. That ford being the lower ford, it is the Ford D of Lt. Clark's map. It is the ford where Crazy Horse crossed the river. You know all this. Relics in small amount were found beyond the National Cemetary and have give rise to the western fords D theories that given as fact by people who accept very poor evidence cobbled together in modernity mainly by Richard Fox. What in fact took place occured at the end of the battle and was told of in 1886 by Gall, Sitting Bull also. 14 men fled into the valley, recrissed, and were killed. Custer advised Reno that the Regiment would support him. Flank attacks were cavalry practice and 7th Cavalry's CO's preferred method of attack. It was not nevcesary to capture the village population. Ss at Washita, destroying the property would force a surrender. The property, the enemy lay across the river. What did Reno do, cross and ride straight to the village. Custer did the same and arrived near the river at B to send Martin to get Benteen and McDougall up to Reno. Custer then set about finding and making a crossing. Reno's unauthorised retreat threw a wrench into things and Benteen elected not to commit into the valley across Ford A. Custer pulled back from east of the river. Curley did not carry a message to or frim Reno on the 25th June, Bouyer carried information about Reno's fight. Curley did carry a message from Far West to Reno on the 28th June and return. He arrived before all the burials had been completed. Ford D being that indicated by Freeman, the Real Bird ford, the route of march given turned north onto Greasy Grass Ridge towards the location given for Smith's Comoany by E.S. Godfrey. There may be a ravine there with dead buried in it. Clark's map indicates the warrior attacks on Calhoun Hill. The map was forwarded to Sheridan, what was Clark going to do if an when he realised his error. A unit on NC, E at the river and the elusive three companies on the ridges towards the river, waiting and preparing to cross and enter the fight. It didn't work out that way. Having ordered Benteen and McDougall up and spent up to 20 minutes fending off bunches of warriors east of the river and moving to the mouth of Deep Coulee, Bouyer rode up with unfortunate news and Crazy Horse was arriving at Real Bird ford, the real ford D. Gall got to see the unit on NC pull out towards Calhoun Hill and pull the Cheyennes and Ogalalas along with them. By the time the main body of companies got beyond Deep Coulee they were already surrounded and their volley fire was heard on Reno Hill. lbha.proboards.com/thread/3634/rubbing-out-long-hair?page=3
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Post by herosrest on Jan 6, 2014 18:41:47 GMT -6
Officer on parade! There were reasons why every officer of Terry's command who viewed the battlefield and talked with officer's who fought, decided Custer tried to cross the river at the mouth of Medicine Tail's Coulee. Guess what those reasons were? Guess why no-one present left record of cavalry at fords below Custer's Hill? There were three basic theories of maneuver, clockwise, anti-clockwise and a split route of march from B towards Custer's Hill and no further. The first evidences of the fighting discovered by Bradley on the 27th was Custer upon the highest point of the field; and around him, within a space of five rods square, forty-two men and thirty-one horses. The dead soldiers all lay within a circle embracing only a few hundred yards square. Despite the fact that Maguire accompanied Benteen on the 27th, it is obvious that he rode to Calhoun Hill before moving downriver, from his testimomy to the Reno Inquiry. Benteen led his company up Crazy Horse gully and whilst that specific locale is a quandry, it explains the lower route of march shown on Maguires map. The data was gathered by Sgt. Becker. Let's hope his diary soon comes to light. Brig. Gen. Henry B. Freeman's Journal, The Infantry in the Sioux Campaign of 1876. books.google.co.uk/books?ei=eUHLUpWrFYmr0QXHgoG4Dg&output=html_text&id=0Xt0AAAAMAAJ&dq=henry+b.+freeman+sioux+wars+journal+1876&focus=searchwithinvolume&q=regimental+flagFrom inside the book ~ regimental flag Search Results 1-1 of 1 Page 64 The regimental colors were captured. 93 Custer had them, and Indians called out that they had them and dared Reno to come after them. Custer had followed the range of bluffs in column of 4's to the ford where he attempted to cross but was ... Freeman was 7th Infantry, with Terry, Gibbon and Brisbin.
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Post by scottbono on Jan 8, 2014 19:03:04 GMT -6
A component of a military organization can adopt an echelon formation. Formations are not in themselves tactics. Formations are the tools of the tactician. We call officers that do not grasp warfare at brigade, division, and corps level by one name FAILURE. First off if I were Custer I would never be on the east side of the river in the first place as it serves no military purpose whatsoever and being there, and adopting the scheme of maneuver he did violates each and every one of the Principles of War. Were I in that unfortunate situation though, having been ordered there for I would never have ordered it myself. I would move in column up to 3411 and remain in column as I move down Cedar Coulee, with the provision that I would have a strong company watching my left rear. Once at MTC I would divide, sending one battalion up onto the L-N-C Ridge complex, with the other battalion parallel on the eastern side of the coulee, with both heading in a general northwesterly direction. At the point the ground around Ford B came into view, I would reject it for an attack across the river at that ford, and not go near the place for love nor money. The ground does not permit an attack on a broad front, and I am not going to try and cross that river in column. What makes you think that a fatal error is made by crossing MTC. Non such. It is only fatal if you continue to move north. The ground on the eastern side of MTC (L-N-C Ridge) offers excellent fields of fire, maximum exposure to those trying to get at you, and most important a back door. Crossing any piece of terrain in and of itself is not a fatal error. Separating yourself further from those who can lend you support is and was the fatal error So you ask yourself the question, rather than piss about with formation discussions you don't understand, if it was just a matter of adopting a formation why did not Custer just do it. Why did he apparently look at B and reject it. Why did he move further north? There is no terrain over there that is suitable to conduct offensive operations on an axis east to west. The opposite direction is well suited to offensive operations. There is no ground over there that can be held with the force Custer had available for any extended period of time. Instead of asking me stupid questions, why don't you just look at the ground, and then if you have eyes to see and a brain to think, you would have every answer your little heart desires why George Custer and 209 other men lay dead on a ridge top. Braden: So what's your point. Different day. Different terrain. Different situation. Okay QC, let me see if I can at least get THIS correct; a "left echelon" might have greatly assisted Reno in his charge down the valley. It seems from your rather clear explanation, a 'left echeon' might have negated (possibly) the NA's turning Reno's flank in that direction. Am I at least in the ballpark tactically?
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Post by quincannon on Jan 8, 2014 19:20:37 GMT -6
You are correct. It is most often used when one flank is of no concern such as moving along a river, and the exposed flank presents possible dangers you wish to guard against.
If both flanks are matters for concern you use a wedge, essentially a double echelon (inverted V)
If you desire all around security you adopt a diamond.
The reason exact terminology is so important, calling it an echelon, wedge, whatever, is that it cuts down on time
For instance, a mechanized infantry or tank platoon leader just has to say three words - echelon left - execute, and his unit moves into this formation seamlessly, because it has been practiced so many times it is second nature.
These formations are applicable at every ECHELON (the other meaning of the word) from squad to multiple army corps. We talked about Gulf War 91 a few days ago. The initial formation for that movement was a multi-corps left echelon. First the right most starts, then the next, and the next.
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Post by scottbono on Jan 8, 2014 19:36:12 GMT -6
You are correct. It is most often used when one flank is of no concern such as moving along a river, and the exposed flank presents possible dangers you wish to guard against. If both flanks are matters for concern you use a wedge, essentially a double echelon (inverted V) If you desire all around security you adopt a diamond. The reason exact terminology is so important, calling it an echelon, wedge, whatever, is that it cuts down on time For instance, a mechanized infantry or tank platoon leader just has to say three words - echelon left - execute, and his unit moves into this formation seamlessly, because it has been practiced so many times it is second nature. These formations are applicable at every ECHELON (the other meaning of the word) from squad to multiple army corps. We talked about Gulf War 91 a few days ago. The initial formation for that movement was a multi-corps left echelon. First the right most starts, then the next, and the next. Got it, thanks. In medicine there are "echelons of care" but the definition fits your first description, e.g. squads, platoons, companies, battalion, etc. The reasoning for the "abbreviated terminology" fits as well; in 'civilian-speak' it's a heart attack, medically it's a myocardial infarction, and gets more specific; "l eft anterolateral infarct". To the informed listener/reader, the professional terminology carries with it far more information than 3-4 words might suggest. Thanks again.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 9, 2014 10:37:31 GMT -6
Now you are in good hands here Scott and I am not going to compete with the military staff on this board but I found this on Cavalry in Echelon formations; Attachments:
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Post by scottbono on Jan 9, 2014 14:04:49 GMT -6
Ian, thanks! It's printed and in my notes as I type this.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 10, 2014 5:23:19 GMT -6
No probs mate
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 13, 2014 11:46:17 GMT -6
Wonderful link. Thanks.
Regards, Tom
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Post by herosrest on May 31, 2018 10:31:11 GMT -6
I have fond memories of being in a discussion which 'instructed' me that a formation is not tactics. Tassafaronga any one?
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