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Post by fred on Apr 20, 2019 7:26:23 GMT -6
... the tipis ("tipies"?).... I think you will find it spelled "tepee" and "tepees," generally. There are variations such as "teepee" and as you have spelled it above. I use "tepee." Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Apr 20, 2019 7:38:07 GMT -6
Do u know of any interesting sources of cavalry training & tactics? (Other than Upton 1874 cavalry tactics manual). Try the manual by Philip St. George Cooke: "The 1862 U. S. Cavalry Tactics." Cooke was a Northern flag officer during the Civil War... I believe he fought with Grant in 1864-1865, maybe in the Wilderness. It is an excellent book, even if it precedes Upton's. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by noggy on Apr 20, 2019 8:03:12 GMT -6
... the tipis ("tipies"?).... I think you will find it spelled "tepee" and "tepees," generally. There are variations such as "teepee" and as you have spelled it above. I use "tepee." Best wishes, Fred. Hm, okay. I`ve seen different versions myself (including tipis in the wikipedia page en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tipi), but have no idea if anything is more or less correct. I suggest we all learn Norwegian and move on in order to avoid such controversies!! All the best, Geir
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 20, 2019 9:37:04 GMT -6
Do u know of any interesting sources of cavalry training & tactics? (Other than Upton 1874 cavalry tactics manual). I was researching cavalry training during the Indian wars years back. found some interesting information on several sites, but a fraction of what I was looking for. One of the more interesting things turned up discussed company movements into & out of skirmish lines. In particular, falling back under pressure. Which consisted of a series volleys followed by half the company falling back to the horses & reforming into skirmish lines before mounting. The other half volleys again & falls back to the horses & mounts. The remaining soldiers now in skirmish lines in the vicinity of the horses volleys before mounting their horses. From what I recall - that is basically how the maneuver worked. I think that you can see what I’m getting at. Volleys could signify the beginning of heavy fighting in the Ford B/MTC area, or the end. Ur thoughts. I think Sgt Ryan addressed that and at least one tactic if surrounded is to concentrate force and breakout. A skirmish line is not effective against an enemy surrounding you 360 degrees. A line leaves the flanks and rear exposed 270 degrees. An L formation still leaves 180 degrees exposed. I think Custer used a 360 formation to move at the Yellowstone but they moved on foot. At one of the encounters firing with hits made did slow the Indians. A lot of this depends upon the commitment of Indians and the ability of their enemy to make them think it is a bad medicine day. So Godfrey's skirmish line works later on because the Indians were coming from one general direction to his front. A skirmish line when retrograding at full speed is a waste of soldiers. You simply ride to either flank and continue pursuit or overwhelm them in place and destroy them. If the main body is moving at full speed there is no way for a skirmish line to catch up. I am reasonably sure that once Reno broke out of the circling Indians that the movement was as fast as possible until reaching the river. Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by Dr Evil on Apr 20, 2019 12:37:30 GMT -6
Much of my point regarding skirmish lines/volley firing tactics & training had to do w/ deciphering the firing heard on Reno Hill. Meaning the firing heard could signify the beginning OR the end of fighting in a particular area of fighting. It appears that most assume the volleys heard was the beginning. But that may b a false assumption. Neither of Reno’s 3 company’s utilized any volley firing in the valley (as discussed). Meaning they didn’t BEGIN the attack using volley firing. On top of the ridges, Godfrey used the volleys to hold back the hordes temporarily then fell back. Did Keogh do the same? Perhaps he started just as the 3 companies in the valley did - soldiers firing at will. The enemy numbers were sparse early on, so it seems logical. Then as the numbers grew rather quickly - Keogh decided to fall back via volley fire. Not having a wooded area to run to like Reno’s men had to make things appear all the more dire. If Keogh had 30 men in skirmish on Luce. And 30 more on N-C Ridge, it wouldn’t take long for Indian numbers to become overwhelming. 60 soldiers holding that area. 100 Indians would be a handful. 200 a problem. 300-400, too many to hold that ground. 700 or 800? Game over. Very quickly.
Consider if many/most of the Indians approached just Luce. Coming from the south fighting Reno, around the bend at Ford B & attacking the first soldiers they see - the 30 on Luce. (30 soldiers against ?!!!) You could see that soldier position folding rather quickly. Then the collapse of all 5 to follow like dominos.
A question regarding Indian movement in the Ford B area. From the Indians perspective, as they crossed the Ford B area & entered the western end of MTC, is there room &/or necessary geographical cover to move up that area & flank Luce Ridge on their right (the soldiers left)? (assuming there were soldiers in skirmish lines on Luce Ridge).
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Post by fred on Apr 20, 2019 13:08:44 GMT -6
... Godfrey's skirmish line.... Steve, I do not know if you were there at the time: last year with me and my buddies, some time before we all went up to Sharpshooters' Ridge, I think.... Plus, I do not recall anyone ever looking for or mentioning the specific location of Godfrey's skirmish line; only that it was in the area between the head of Cedar Coulee and the northern end of Reno Hill. Anyway, my friends and I were traipsing all over that area, especially 3,411. I wandered a bit to the east of the road, just meandering around... I guess I wanted to see the head of Cedar... we had been talking about Custer's route into the coulee. In that area there is some rolling landscape and I came to a ridgeline, and it was another of those seeming, ah-ha moments. At the top of the small ridge the entire panorama of Cedar Coulee opened up. In my estimation, that was Godfrey's ridge, the ridge where he set up his skirmish line. Man, you talk about a perfect position for a skirmish line to stall warriors coming up Cedar Coulee, that was it. Were you with us? I took a bunch of photos and am totally convinced that was where Godfrey set his line. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by herosrest on Apr 20, 2019 17:30:02 GMT -6
Concerning the volley gunfire issue, there is a description by the testimony of Charles A. Varnum at the Reno Inquiry where those two volleys were more of a crash, crash, lasting a few minutes each.
This can be placed in time relative to the retreat from the valley to Reno Hill; can be related to the location of the pack train which was within hearing distance at that time; and can be related to events on the Custer battleground by reference in the Peter Powell accounts 'Sweet Medicine', Cheyenne record as related by John Stands in Timber. The Sioux and Cheyenne were marshalled to open a barrage of gunfire and I believe this to be what was heard by many and came to be given as bland volleys.
In this vein of theory, relying significantly upon Stands in Timber and Peter Powell. that gunfire was the end and not beginning. The published Cheyenne 'history' gives that the fight was hand to hand after the barrages of rifle fire. This isn't quite what most people want to hear and in terms of timing, their start of battle was actually the end of organised combat. C'est la battle.
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Post by fred on Apr 20, 2019 17:49:22 GMT -6
Much of my point regarding skirmish lines/volley firing tactics & training had to do w/ deciphering the firing heard on Reno Hill. Meaning the firing heard could signify the beginning OR the end of fighting in a particular area of fighting. It appears that most assume the volleys heard was the beginning. But that may b a false assumption. Neither of Reno’s 3 company’s utilized any volley firing in the valley (as discussed). Meaning they didn’t BEGIN the attack using volley firing. On top of the ridges, Godfrey used the volleys to hold back the hordes temporarily then fell back. Did Keogh do the same? Perhaps he started just as the 3 companies in the valley did - soldiers firing at will. The enemy numbers were sparse early on, so it seems logical. Then as the numbers grew rather quickly - Keogh decided to fall back via volley fire. Not having a wooded area to run to like Reno’s men had to make things appear all the more dire. If Keogh had 30 men in skirmish on Luce. And 30 more on N-C Ridge, it wouldn’t take long for Indian numbers to become overwhelming. 60 soldiers holding that area. 100 Indians would be a handful. 200 a problem. 300-400, too many to hold that ground. 700 or 800? Game over. Very quickly. Consider if many/most of the Indians approached just Luce. Coming from the south fighting Reno, around the bend at Ford B & attacking the first soldiers they see - the 30 on Luce. (30 soldiers against ?!!!) You could see that soldier position folding rather quickly. Then the collapse of all 5 to follow like dominos. A question regarding Indian movement in the Ford B area. From the Indians perspective, as they crossed the Ford B area & entered the western end of MTC, is there room &/or necessary geographical cover to move up that area & flank Luce Ridge on their right (the soldiers left)? (assuming there were soldiers in skirmish lines on Luce Ridge). I hate to keep harping on this, but once again, this becomes a timing issue: who was where and when were they there? There were several lines of approach for and by the Indians, but in no case have we accurate numbers. In my opinion, "volley firing" is more of a large target-scare tactic than effective, aimed firing. At the time of the volley firing-- 3:07 pm-- Custer was already moving away from Ford B and Indians, in no great numbers, were trailing him. It is generally believed somewhere between 15 and 20 Indians put up the fight at that ford, but my work shows there were probably close to double that number: simply by accounts. So let's use 30 as a baseline. What you have here is infiltration from the west. Use that at point one. By the time of the volley firing, Benteen had already arrived on Reno Hill and had ordered out a skirmish line to chase marauding warriors who had crossed the river in pursuit of Reno, albeit farther downstream that Reno crossed. Again, we have no numbers, but we can consider these fellows to be a multiple of what you had crossing at Ford B. Remember, estimates of Indians in the valley at the time of Benteen's arrival ran anywhere from 600 to 1,200, Benteen himself using 900. With Benteen's arrival and the new and growing knowledge of more troops to the north, some-- many?-- of these warriors turned and headed toward Medicine Tail Coulee using both West and Middle coulees as their route. So now you have Indians converging from the south. That is point two. Point three is more easily defined: the Big Foot-Wolf Tooth band. With this group we have some idea of size. John Stands In Timber-- the Cheyenne historian born a few years after the battle-- tells us there were 50 warriors with them, but Indian numbers are notoriously inaccurate. Whenever I see numbers like that I tend to use them as a guide. In other words, 100 = a lot of Indians!!! So when I see a number like 50 I figure it is realistically 50 at a minimum and probably a fair amount more. (Crazy Horse was reported to be ahead of about 200, so his force was probably considerable and since he overwhelmed Keogh I figure that is fairly accurate.) The Wolf Tooth-Big Foot band was coming from the east, so that is point three, and it gives Keogh three separate directions and groupings to concentrate on. Like I said above, volley firing is more than likely used for masses and at greater range: all three groups of warriors would fit into those categories. Since the cartridge cases on both Luce and Nye-Cartwright ridges were found in a certain order, i.e., mounted skirmish lines, we can assume the volleys were directed to specific areas. Take your pick. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Dr Evil on Apr 20, 2019 22:43:13 GMT -6
Much of my point regarding skirmish lines/volley firing tactics & training had to do w/ deciphering the firing heard on Reno Hill. Meaning the firing heard could signify the beginning OR the end of fighting in a particular area of fighting. It appears that most assume the volleys heard was the beginning. But that may b a false assumption. Neither of Reno’s 3 company’s utilized any volley firing in the valley (as discussed). Meaning they didn’t BEGIN the attack using volley firing. On top of the ridges, Godfrey used the volleys to hold back the hordes temporarily then fell back. Did Keogh do the same? Perhaps he started just as the 3 companies in the valley did - soldiers firing at will. The enemy numbers were sparse early on, so it seems logical. Then as the numbers grew rather quickly - Keogh decided to fall back via volley fire. Not having a wooded area to run to like Reno’s men had to make things appear all the more dire. If Keogh had 30 men in skirmish on Luce. And 30 more on N-C Ridge, it wouldn’t take long for Indian numbers to become overwhelming. 60 soldiers holding that area. 100 Indians would be a handful. 200 a problem. 300-400, too many to hold that ground. 700 or 800? Game over. Very quickly. Consider if many/most of the Indians approached just Luce. Coming from the south fighting Reno, around the bend at Ford B & attacking the first soldiers they see - the 30 on Luce. (30 soldiers against ?!!!) You could see that soldier position folding rather quickly. Then the collapse of all 5 to follow like dominos. A question regarding Indian movement in the Ford B area. From the Indians perspective, as they crossed the Ford B area & entered the western end of MTC, is there room &/or necessary geographical cover to move up that area & flank Luce Ridge on their right (the soldiers left)? (assuming there were soldiers in skirmish lines on Luce Ridge). I hate to keep harping on this, but once again, this becomes a timing issue: who was where and when were they there? There were several lines of approach for and by the Indians, but in no case have we accurate numbers. In my opinion, "volley firing" is more of a large target-scare tactic than effective, aimed firing. At the time of the volley firing-- 3:07 pm-- Custer was already moving away from Ford B and Indians, in no great numbers, were trailing him. It is generally believed somewhere between 15 and 20 Indians put up the fight at that ford, but my work shows there were probably close to double that number: simply by accounts. So let's use 30 as a baseline. What you have here is infiltration from the west. Use that at point one. By the time of the volley firing, Benteen had already arrived on Reno Hill and had ordered out a skirmish line to chase marauding warriors who had crossed the river in pursuit of Reno, albeit farther downstream that Reno crossed. Again, we have no numbers, but we can consider these fellows to be a multiple of what you had crossing at Ford B. Remember, estimates of Indians in the valley at the time of Benteen's arrival ran anywhere from 600 to 1,200, Benteen himself using 900. With Benteen's arrival and the new and growing knowledge of more troops to the north, some-- many?-- of these warriors turned and headed toward Medicine Tail Coulee using both West and Middle coulees as their route. So now you have Indians converging from the south. That is point two. Point three is more easily defined: the Big Foot-Wolf Tooth band. With this group we have some idea of size. John Stands In Timber-- the Cheyenne historian born a few years after the battle-- tells us there were 50 warriors with them, but Indian numbers are notoriously inaccurate. Whenever I see numbers like that I tend to use them as a guide. In other words, 100 = a lot of Indians!!! So when I see a number like 50 I figure it is realistically 50 at a minimum and probably a fair amount more. (Crazy Horse was reported to be ahead of about 200, so his force was probably considerable and since he overwhelmed Keogh I figure that is fairly accurate.) The Wolf Tooth-Big Foot band was coming from the east, so that is point three, and it gives Keogh three separate directions and groupings to concentrate on. Like I said above, volley firing is more than likely used for masses and at greater range: all three groups of warriors would fit into those categories. Since the cartridge cases on both Luce and Nye-Cartwright ridges were found in a certain order, i.e., mounted skirmish lines, we can assume the volleys were directed to specific areas. Take your pick. Best wishes, Fred. Fred my man. “Timing” again?!! All due respect, but u draw it like a gun. But please, don’t hold back. I dig the back & forth. Will definitely have to debate you on those Indian numbers. But for now - I have 2 more questions... 1.The Indians fighting Keogh on Luce Ridge (assuming there were soldiers in skirmish lines on Luce), does the geography favor a flanking maneuver to the right (the soldiers left)? Or is it too wide open or close to the southern bluffs to facilitate flanking? 2.Back to 3411. How far back would a soldier (standing or on horseback) have to be to NOT be able to see into the valley where Reno was fighting? 10’ from the edge? 20’? More or less? I haven’t been to the battlefield since 1992. 27 years. To those soldiers & Indians who were interviewed some 30 & 40 years after the battle, recounting not only major events that day, but distances & times. All I can say is they are all better men than me. Cause other than some moments here & there on the battlefield, I can’t remember crap. Evil.
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Post by fred on Apr 21, 2019 5:21:35 GMT -6
“Timing” again?!! All due respect, but u draw it like a gun. I draw it like a gun because if you do not understand the timing or the times when events occurred you will never understand what really happened at the Little Big Horn and your conclusions will be clouded with poorly constructed data. If you put timing aside, you can debate with someone else. Why? Do you have more accurate numbers? There were no Indians fighting Keogh on Luce Ridge. I think you need to read what I have written a little more closely. Why would you assume otherwise when the only evidence we have shows that was the formation? Again, do you have more accurate data or are you just trying to cram context into your theories? What is with the tactical flanking business with some of you guys? This was an "act-react" battle, sharp, fast, quickly reflexed, with no instantaneous "planning" of, "Go around to the right and let's flank them!" tactical maneuvering. It was a heads-on, surround fight, quickly fought and with the terrain dictating maneuver. Luce/Nye-Cartwright is a wide, long set of undulating ridges. There was no time for flanking or even getting up close. The soldiers' "left" would, in all likelihood, have been anchored on the top of the ridge adjacent to MTC. The only easy way up Luce was the Ramp and Keogh did not stay long enough for Indians to make their way up there. Besides, the Ramp was not like Calhoun Coulee: Indians would never have tried using that route, not with 121 soldiers atop. They would have tried coming in from the rear and Wolf Tooth-Big Foot did not have enough warriors even to get close. Not far. And remember, when De Rudio testified he saw Custer, Cooke, and one other up there, he also said the bluffs came butt-up to the river's edge. That means a full view of the valley would have been obstructed unless you were close to the edge. That is an odd question, but the lack of obvious conclusions leads me to believe I know the direction of your next question. Forget it. Martini was not that close, but what he claimed to have seen could have easily been seen in the approach route because the land jutted far out from the Weir Point bluffs. And when you were there... for how long? And what did you do? Who were you with? How many times had you been there before? I fought through an ambush in Vietnam 53 years ago and I remember it vividly: where, how long, who was involved, distances, terrain, participants, situation, location, etc. Would it help if I told you this valley was a traditional watering hole and camping ground for these guys?; that afterwards, many of them lived nearby (the Cheyenne reservation is all up and down the Rosebud valley). There were "re-unions" 10 years, 25 years, 50 years later.... Even in those days, this became a memorable battle, a historic event, whose import was not lost on these Indians. In 1876, could anyone, in their wildest dreams, envision Gall and Godfrey walking the field, maybe arm-in-arm, 10 years after the battle? Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 21, 2019 7:28:29 GMT -6
... Godfrey's skirmish line.... Steve, I do not know if you were there at the time: last year with me and my buddies, some time before we all went up to Sharpshooters' Ridge, I think.... Plus, I do not recall anyone ever looking for or mentioning the specific location of Godfrey's skirmish line; only that it was in the area between the head of Cedar Coulee and the northern end of Reno Hill. Anyway, my friends and I were traipsing all over that area, especially 3,411. I wandered a bit to the east of the road, just meandering around... I guess I wanted to see the head of Cedar... we had been talking about Custer's route into the coulee. In that area there is some rolling landscape and I came to a ridgeline, and it was another of those seeming, ah-ha moments. At the top of the small ridge the entire panorama of Cedar Coulee opened up. In my estimation, that was Godfrey's ridge, the ridge where he set up his skirmish line. Man, you talk about a perfect position for a skirmish line to stall warriors coming up Cedar Coulee, that was it. Were you with us? I took a bunch of photos and am totally convinced that was where Godfrey set his line. Best wishes, Fred. Fred I was there with you guys and so was Dale. I have a friend who owns land in Cedar Coulée. He is a Marine and Crow. Next year when you guys show up again maybe we can arraign a trip with him. I agree with you regarding the Godfrey line approximate location. It works from what would be an effective use of a skirmish line to slow advancing Indians. This year is the trifecta of meetings. Friends at the battlefield, CBHMA in Hardin, and LBHA in Sheridan. Should be a great June in Montana? Regards Steve
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Post by fred on Apr 21, 2019 7:45:36 GMT -6
Fred I was there with you guys and so was Dale. I have a friend who owns land in Cedar Coulée. He is a Marine and Crow. Next year when you guys show up again maybe we can arraign a trip with him. Steve, Yes, I remember us all together; I was just not sure you and Dale were with us when I made that little "discovery." I will let you know when we will be there next June. We would love to meet with your friend and go into Cedar Coulee. That is one of my dream trips!!! Happy Easter, Steve.Very best wishes, Fred.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 21, 2019 7:53:23 GMT -6
Much of my point regarding skirmish lines/volley firing tactics & training had to do w/ deciphering the firing heard on Reno Hill. Meaning the firing heard could signify the beginning OR the end of fighting in a particular area of fighting. It appears that most assume the volleys heard was the beginning. But that may b a false assumption. Neither of Reno’s 3 company’s utilized any volley firing in the valley (as discussed). Meaning they didn’t BEGIN the attack using volley firing. On top of the ridges, Godfrey used the volleys to hold back the hordes temporarily then fell back. Did Keogh do the same? Perhaps he started just as the 3 companies in the valley did - soldiers firing at will. The enemy numbers were sparse early on, so it seems logical. Then as the numbers grew rather quickly - Keogh decided to fall back via volley fire. Not having a wooded area to run to like Reno’s men had to make things appear all the more dire. If Keogh had 30 men in skirmish on Luce. And 30 more on N-C Ridge, it wouldn’t take long for Indian numbers to become overwhelming. 60 soldiers holding that area. 100 Indians would be a handful. 200 a problem. 300-400, too many to hold that ground. 700 or 800? Game over. Very quickly. Consider if many/most of the Indians approached just Luce. Coming from the south fighting Reno, around the bend at Ford B & attacking the first soldiers they see - the 30 on Luce. (30 soldiers against ?!!!) You could see that soldier position folding rather quickly. Then the collapse of all 5 to follow like dominos. A question regarding Indian movement in the Ford B area. From the Indians perspective, as they crossed the Ford B area & entered the western end of MTC, is there room &/or necessary geographical cover to move up that area & flank Luce Ridge on their right (the soldiers left)? (assuming there were soldiers in skirmish lines on Luce Ridge). DE I have found two things that help me. The Bonafede archeological map and the Weibert book on Indian sites. This last year I went from MTC to Luce. I had been at some of the Weibert sites before and seen where he had placed metal pins in the ground. From looking at the Indian sites (4) they seem to represent small numbers of Indians firing. The terrain prevents a direct attack and I can see a volley fired to suppress them. I believe some dead horses were found in the vicinity. I think Custer was on the move north and still thinking offense. From Luce through NC a line leads toward Deep Coulée which is a significant drainage between Luce and the Calhoun Area. I don't think there is many significant casualties between Luce and NC and that the soldiers continued north into Deep Coulée and egressed close to CA and Battle Ridge. I think the soldiers on Luce and NC were moving and in a position of advantage but the Indians were using the terrain features to provide cover and concealment. I think some Dog Soldiers and Sioux came up MTC. I think Crazy Horse used MTC also. There certainly was not enough Indians available to fix the 5 companies between MTC and DC which is where Luce and NC are located. The lack of causalities should also be a clue to the nature of the contact. Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 21, 2019 7:55:32 GMT -6
Fred I was there with you guys and so was Dale. I have a friend who owns land in Cedar Coulée. He is a Marine and Crow. Next year when you guys show up again maybe we can arraign a trip with him. Steve, Yes, I remember us all together; I was just not sure you and Dale were with us when I made that little "discovery." I will let you know when we will be there next June. We would love to meet with your friend and go into Cedar Coulee. That is one of my dream trips!!! Happy Easter, Steve.Very best wishes, Fred. Happy Easter Fred
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 21, 2019 13:42:33 GMT -6
I tend to believe that the column stopped to fire at Indian targets to the west and probably to the east too, before they reached deep coulee. The Bonafede map mentioned by AZ, does show cartridge case finds along a trail leading up from MTC to Luce and then onto Nye-Cartwright. They form a distinct letter ‘W’ as they journey up the slope. Metal detectors found groups of army shell in groups of three along part of the route, which certainly looks like a pause to fire. It does look like Custer felt threatened well before they got to battle ridge.
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