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Post by tubman13 on Apr 10, 2019 8:02:52 GMT -6
I will beat Fred to this. I first read about it in Fred's book "Strategy". That Summer while at the LBH I checked from both sides, it is there, the anomaly can actually can be seen from HWY 212. if you know where to look. As Fred stated the upper portion is filled for the road.
Regards, Tom
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Post by fred on Apr 10, 2019 8:27:10 GMT -6
Fred, since I'm fairly new here on reading and definitely new on posting, I have a question. I've never heard of the existence of a GAP in the ridge. If there was a GAP, and I'm not doubting there was, it is fascinating to me and fills-in some questions I've had. So, for my question to you, sir. Are there posters here who doubt your GAP find? I know there are varying agreements and disagreements on here by some knowledgeable folks and I was just wondering. I do not know if there are posters here-- or elsewhere-- who doubt there was a gap or that it played a role. If they doubt either, they are absolutely wrong and have no clue about the effects of terrain on this battle. As Tom said, it is there... and maybe this photo will give you an idea of how prominent it must have been in 1876. Remember, this is filled in and capped by a macadam road. The key here is the gap lays at the top end of the Deep Ravine head-cut, so you know there was water run-off from that area of Battle Ridge forming the depths of Deep Ravine. That gap was where Crazy Horse crossed the ridge and split Keogh's forces and it goes a long way-- maybe 100%-- in explaining the locations of the bodies from Keogh's command. No one-- to this day-- has discussed or even mentioned this feature in any writings they have done. As I said, I discovered it in a sort of matter-of-fact footnote, cursorily glossed over in describing the road-building necessity of filling in "a gap." It brought me to attention immediately, simply because of the lingering questions regarding Keogh's actions, the troop dispositions, body locations, etc. To me, it is just another riddle solved. To my mind its existence simply befuddles most because they cannot figure why it mattered. There is, however, a head-nodding and a much greater understanding among those with some military experience, something lacking in about 95% of writers and historians. Remember Bluedog, above all, the LBH was a military operation and the general rules of the military apply: reconnaissance, speed, terrain, enemy forces, battle flow, all mixed in with logic and reason. If it ain't logical, chances are it did not happen. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 10, 2019 9:15:14 GMT -6
As far as the maps go I would have soldiers on Battle Ridge Extension (BRE) to the known artifact site and continuing to follow its left fork to where it ends at the old road entrance. Kellogg's marker would be seen in a photo of the new road dedication as being along BRE and the old entrance road. There is a drainage to the river about 80 yards from there.
Donahue has E & F heading out BRE and returning along where the old entrance road moves up to Cemetery Ridge (CR). While standing on CR with Will Hutchison we discussed that CR would be the place to hold but LSH was higher and could not be left unoccupied. The photos of the kneeling infantry soldiers firing has in one photo firing toward BRE and another toward LSH. I think that could be E. I suspect that E was withdrawing across CR and formed the skirmish line on CR close to the Admin site and that outdoor theater. E could have bailed off high into Cemetery Ravine and moved into Deep Ravine.
I think Deep Ravine has two movements of soldiers. There is a map that shows that with a line moving toward LSH and another a little further north moving toward the gully. I like to distinguish between Deep Ravine and the deep gully portion at the end of the current foot path. Deep Ravine is much larger.
Time to go to carbine class and instruct NAU Park Ranger Training Program students at the range. Of course it is snowing now.
Regards
Steve
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 10, 2019 9:15:56 GMT -6
Good to see you posting Will
Regards
Steve
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Post by dre859 on Apr 10, 2019 10:14:07 GMT -6
Thank you, I`ve been wondereing what this programme was called! Seen it used here before. Been bugging me a while. All the best, Noggy Noggy, it's the bomb. I use it professionally, and this is a way of honing those skills and diving more deeply into something that fascinates me. It's very powerful in terms of quickly measuring distances, and the elevation data is just indispensable (terrain features, possible routes, viewsheds/dead space, etc.). Cheers, Dwayne
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Post by dre859 on Apr 10, 2019 11:54:44 GMT -6
Thanks, Fred et al. I hope this one is more sensible: Ford D moved west to trestle, route to Cemetery Ridge follows old park road (thanks, Tom), HQ and E placed further west along Cemetery Ridge. Yates route (and, to a lesser degree, location) changed. Thanks, Mac, for saying the route was goofy without using that word - it was goofy, I don't know what I was thinking, and you're a diplomat. Right now, I've got Yates in the Deep Ravine basin (only just, obviously), about 520 yards from Last Stand Hill. The unit symbol is about 130 yards from the lowest point in the gap and within 200 yards range of length of the immediate approach (the final up-and-to-the-right bend). There are lines of site from the unit symbol to nearly entire length of the NA approach labeled "Crazy Horse" with little (though not zero) dead space. To the best of my ability to recreate an artifact map for the area (it would be really nice if those files were publicly available), the unit symbol placement is consistent with some .45-55 cases in the vicinity. With respect to the gap/saddle: I'd estimate the elevation at it's lowest point to be 3281 ft. This puts it about 10 ft lower than the highest point on Battle Ridge (200 yds northwest) and 15 ft lower than the peak of the first hill enroute to Calhoun Hill, about 250 yards southeast. Cheers, Dwayne
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Post by bluedog on Apr 10, 2019 19:48:45 GMT -6
Fred, thanks for this. I was gonna ask if you thought it was. I know enough about Crazy horse to know he was a risk-taker, but, his risks were calculated. He had to have had an edge to pull-off his actions that day.
I'm a Vietnam vet, USMC - was there in '72. Just a lowly L/Cpl. battalion field radio operator attached to an infantry co. I do know the difference between brave and crazy.
Again, thanks Fred.
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Post by fred on Apr 11, 2019 5:05:51 GMT -6
I'm a Vietnam vet, USMC - was there in '72. Just a lowly L/Cpl. battalion field radio operator attached to an infantry co. I do know the difference between brave and crazy. You are neither lowly, nor crazy. My son is a Marine vet... Recon Marine, served in the Gulf War. I was a captain and company commander with the 1st Infantry Division in Di-An, about 30 miles from Saigon, 1966-1967. War Zones C and D; Parrot's Beak, Fishhook areas. I ran all the division convoys. Spent 10 years in the military. I was a Regular Army officer. Biggest mistake I ever made was in getting out; but then, family issues kind of override everything, don't they? Good to see you here, Bluedog. This site kind of draws you in, doesn't it? Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by tubman13 on Apr 11, 2019 5:35:13 GMT -6
BD, we have a # of vets here AZ Ranger also Marine Vietnam vet, I think circa 1969.
Regards, Tom
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Post by bluedog on Apr 11, 2019 6:19:28 GMT -6
Yes, this a great discussion site for LBH enthusiasts. I made my first trip to the battlefield last May. Two things that immediately drew my attention - the distance from LSH to Deep Ravine was much greater than I would have thought and the undulating terrain which prohibited line-of-sight between battle positions. That really got me to wondering just what Custer was thinking. From that point on, I was hooked. And, I suppose will forever be hooked.
Fred, the only "fishhook" I'm aware of was in Cambodia where the elusive NVA COSVN was supposed-to-be. I know SOG ran missions into Laos and Cambodia and I believe only once did they attempt a venture into that fishhook and it didn't go well. Sounds like you left before the Tet-Offensive?
Just for disclosure, I got out in '73. U.S. participation in combat in Vietnam was for all intent-and purposes over and stateside service wasn't something that appealed to me. I wasn't good at walking lines and picking up cigarette butts. It was a not-so-good time for soldiers returning home. Grow-out your hair and sit-down and shut-up was the order of-the-day. And, that's what we did - for the most part, anyway.
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Post by fred on Apr 11, 2019 11:58:56 GMT -6
Fred, the only "fishhook" I'm aware of was in Cambodia where the elusive NVA COSVN was supposed-to-be. I know SOG ran missions into Laos and Cambodia and I believe only once did they attempt a venture into that fishhook and it didn't go well. Sounds like you left before the Tet-Offensive? Just for disclosure, I got out in '73. U.S. participation in combat in Vietnam was for all intent-and purposes over and stateside service wasn't something that appealed to me. I wasn't good at walking lines and picking up cigarette butts. It was a not-so-good time for soldiers returning home. Grow-out your hair and sit-down and shut-up was the order of-the-day. And, that's what we did - for the most part, anyway. That's the "Fishhook." At the top of War Zone C. The Parrot's Beak was west of Saigon. I ran the first and maybe only infiltration convoys of the war into that area: An Loc and Quan Loi, but in those days Cambodia was strictly off-limits. Only after Nixon came in were troops authorized to go in. And yes, I had already gone home when Tet occurred. I was an RA officer for five years, but got out because of family issues. I missed it so much however, I joined the New York Army National Guard. Wasn't quite the same thing; and after five more years I had had enough. More family problems. Probably just as well; I was a far better combat officer than I was a staff officer or peacetime garrison soldier. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by montrose on Apr 11, 2019 13:36:30 GMT -6
Terrain analysis.
Software programs can take height data and generate excellent ability to analyze line of sight data.
The problem is that they create "naked" terrain, with no vegetation. (or effect of man made obstacles, like buildings, fences, etc;, not relevant to LBH).
Military distinguishes between cover and concealment. Cover means it blocks incoming fire, like a ridge or depression. Concealment means it blocks line of sight (LOS) but not bullets, like a bush or grass.
At LBH US forces used direct fire weapons. They needed LOS. Indians used direct and indirect fires. Indirect fire means bows. An Indian in a covered or concealed position could suppress or kill US forces with little probability of return fire. If US forces wanted to clear this fire, they would have to close to direct fire range. The C Company charge from Battle Ridge was clearly an effort to clear Indian advantage due to this issue. How did that turn out?
Infiltration versus mass. Infiltration tactics means sneak and peek, stay separated, maintain fire to attrit enemy. Indians used this to set the conditions for a mass charge. So where you say open fields of fire, on the ground I saw numerous places I could sneak and peek. Vegetation now is different than 1870s, but I am comfortable in what I say.
The problem is Indians were very ineffective outside 150 meters. (I get the sharpshooter at Reno position, but one exception in 2500-ish sample size).
The Indians used infiltration tactics to set the conditions for a close assault. Bowmen crawled within range. Riflemen established firing positions as a distraction, not as combat power. We see Henryville and other Indian positions ridiculously beyond effective range. Shooting at 800 meters with a weapon with a max range of 300 meters for a TRAINED marksman.
Getting an enemy to trade fire at long range is very effective, if you want to close the gap. You want them to be short of ammunition when you go from 300 meters to 50 meters.
Say at 800 meters it takes 100 Indians to beat 1 US soldier. At 300 50 to 1. At 150 10 to 1. At 50 3 to 1. At melee range even odds.
Indian tactics were very bad with respect to creating casualties at range in LBH. The idea was not to inflict casualties. It was to set the conditions to close the gap. US soldiers had a cartridge box that held 20 rounds. Remainder of ammunition was in saddle bags. Dismounted skirmish lines were separated form horses, by hundreds of meters. US skirmish lines had repeated problems with ammunition resupply. Indians found thousands of rounds after the battle: in the saddlebags.
Indian tactics were better than US, at LBH, and only LBH.
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Post by dre859 on Apr 11, 2019 14:12:11 GMT -6
Terrain analysis. Software programs can take height data and generate excellent ability to analyze line of sight data. The problem is that they crate "naked" terrain, with no vegetation. (or effect of man made obstacles, like buildings, fences, etc;, not relevant to LBH). Military distinguishes between cover and concealment. Cover means it blocks incoming fire, like a ridge or depression. Concealment means it blocks line of sight (LOS) but not bullets, like a bush or grass. AT LBH US forces used direct fire weapons. They needed LOS. Indians used direct and indirect fires. This means bows. An Indian in a covered or concealed position could suppress or kill Us forces with little probability of return fire. If US forces wanted to clear this fire, they would have to close to direct fire range. The C Company charge from Battle Ridge was clearly an effort to clear Indian advantage due to this issue. How did that turn out? Infiltration versus mass. Infiltration tactics means sneak and peek, stay separated, maintain fire to attrit enemy. Indians used this to set the conditions for a mass charge. So where you say open fields of fire, on the ground I saw numerous places I could sneak and peek. Vegetation in 1990s different than 1870s, but I am comfortable in what I say. The problem is Indians were very ineffective outside 150 meters. (I get the sharpshooter at Reno position, but one exception in 2500-ish sample size). The Indians used infiltration tactics to set the conditions for a close assault. Bowmen crawled within range. Riflemen established firing positions as a distraction, not as combat power. We see Henryville and other Indian positions ridiculously beyond effective range. Shooting at 800 meters with a weapon with a max range of 300 meters for a TRAINED marksman. Getting an enemy to trade fire at long range is very effective, if you want to close the gap. You want them to be short of ammunition when you go from 300 meters to 50 meters. Say at 800 meters it takes 100 Indians to beat 1 US soldier. At 300 50 to 1. At 150 10 to 1. At 50 3 to 1. At melee range even odds. Indian tactics were very bad with respect to creating casualties at range in LBH. The idea was not to inflict casualties. It was to set the conditions to close the gap. US soldiers had a cartridge box that help 20 rounds. Remainder of ammunition was in saddle bags. Dismounted skirmish lines were separated form horses, by hundreds of meters. Indian tactics were better than US, at LBH, and only LBH. Couldn't agree more. I think of the software capabilities as a tool in generating and eliminating possibilities, and nothing more. For example, if a unit with only direct fire capability is hypothetically positioned to cover a particular avenue of approach, but that avenue of approach is not within the "viewshed" of that position (whether standing, mounted or prone), then I'm going to look for a new hypothesis. It's generally about whether a bullet can be put somewhere, and not whether the target can actually be seen. The remainder - absolutely. The NAs were using tactics suitable for their terrain and their enemy, and it worked. Cheers, Dwayne
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Post by fred on Apr 11, 2019 17:36:31 GMT -6
I agree, 100%, with the "montrose" post. Now let's follow through with it.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by bluedog on Apr 12, 2019 7:32:39 GMT -6
Montrose definitely is astute with his competent post.
The arrows to be compared with modern-day mortar rounds being lobbed-in. The psychological damage of hearing mortars being walked-in to your position is a precursor to the physical damage when they do reach your position. When your position is static, such as it was for the soldiers on the ridge, the feeling of helplessness easily gets overwhelming. Depending on the discipline of line-of-sight and fields-of-fire when you see that discipline does you no good, well, it hurts just to imagine the overwhelming feeling of helplessness those soldiers felt.
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