Post by herosrest on Jan 6, 2013 17:34:11 GMT -6
l shall here, run through a tactical overview and various option plays available to 7th Cavalry at LBH as they closed on the village of hostiles during the morning of 25th June, 1876. Opinion about events is divided as were the battalions deployed by G.A. Custer.
Various traditions sway pinions about the intentions and abilities of 7th Cavalry's commander and his decisions, and l do not intend to challenge them. lt is suffice to say that the regiments officers were told there was to be an attack and the accompanying scouts at that time, were told to run off the enemy pony herd. The regiment advanced then, battalions were formed on the march and deployed to advance.
A tactical formation was decided upon and deployed line abreast advancing down what is today Reno Creek. The left of the line under command of Capt. F.W. Benteen were ordered to a line of bluffs five miles or so, distant to scout and ensure that hostiles were not travelling up Little Bighorn valley towards the south in the direction of Lodge Grass.
Orders to the battalion maneuvering left were developed with instructions to proceed to a second valley to obeserve, engage or return to the regiment. This suggests strongly that deployment was initially aimed at an abandoned camp where Reno Creek forked toward the south where a single burial tepee remained standing. Opinion on this aspect of the advance is confused greatly because of the battles recriminations.
Sufficient knowledge of the terrain existed at hand with Crow scouts, their interpreter and George Herendeen attached to the command as scout and messenger, for Custer to have been familiar with the forks in Reno Creek and the valley of the Little Bighorn beyond to the west. Herendeen was called to the staff meeting aboard Far West and questioned as to the terrain.
The advance continued to a further decision. Scouts ordered to hurry on and raid the hostile herds of ponies known to be ahead, proved to be skittish in that endevour and dallied at a burial tepee. The battalion at centre of Custer's advance led by Maj. M.A. Reno was ordered into advance previously, indicating certainly that Custer was intent upon attack. At least one scout had reported the village standing an not running by this time and during march to this point, distant clouds of dust had been reported and small numbers of hostiles ran on ahead of the advance.
At three quarters to one mile from Little Bighorn river, Maj. Reno was ordered to turn west and cross the river into its valley. Variously, he was to either bring them to battle or attack the village. This is one of those nit picking items that can only be rationalized due to prevalent argument as to what was actually taking place.
As the battalion led by Maj. Reno developed across the river, Custer rode with an orderly trumpeter onto bluffs east of the river and overlooking the valley. From this point he led two battalions to the east of the river and a further four miles down river to MTC.
Everything undertaken so far was offensive, close and attack, and the entire command understood that. Until Custer viewed the valley from the bluffs, his major concern was the experience suffered during august 1873 when Sitting Bull's large Hunkpapa camp eluded 7th Cavalry, despite a prolonged forced march after the travelling tepees. 'we've got 'em' was his cry, according to the attendant orderly who survived the fighting.
It is surprising that no message was sent to Maj. Reno by Custer once he led two battalions downriver opposite the advance across the river but from near the ford in MTC a message was sent to Capt. Benteen to hurry to the big village. Everything undertaken so far was offensive, close and attack, and the entire command understood that.
Maj. Reno's battalion deployed and skirmished in the valley, the gunfire was undoubtedly heard by Custer and those with him east of the river. A message was in progress to Capt. Benteen to close and engage and Custer obviously intended to cross the river into the valley beyond. what took place subsequently is the stuff of myth, mystery and history.
As Maj. Reno opened his fight, Custer moved down river of the skirmishers in the valley and did not cross the river. It is not known why this took place but Custer's last order indicated intention to attack into the valley by sending Capt. Benteen's battalion quickly to the village.
Reno found a very large encampment and did not proceed down river, Custer would have been aware of this by the lack of Reno's presence opposite MTC in the village. Custer would have been aware of the entirety of the village from MTC either by his observation or his advance guard.
Had Reno penetrated the village, could he have progressed to the river opposite Custer. We will never know. Did Custer intend to maintain the offensive? Yes, this is the fact of the order to Benteen.
Did Custer send one battalion further down river to cross into the valley? The answer is simple and is no. Benteen was sent to the village and would have joined Reno in the attack in the valley. Custer therefore understood at the time the message was sent to Benteen that his regiment must concentrate its strength on the village.
We will never know precisely when problems with ammunition jamming in weapons after firing 8~10 rounds became known to Custer and his men. Herendeen told of that number of volleys being fired by Custer's command after the retreat by Maj. Reno from the valley. It is not unreasonable to conclude that Custer delayed his own attack for Benteen's battalion to close up, as it did. But pressure against Reno's battalion led him to withdraw from the valley allowing Custer's companies to be cut off from the rest of the regiment and unable to concentrate their strength in an offensive attack.
Until news of a retreat from the valley by Maj. Reno was known to Custer, he was on the offensive and intended to attack into the valley. It may be that attack and retreat coincided. Custer certainly was advised of the retreat from the valley but it became impossible to retreat his own command towards Reno's and Benteen. At that point Custer was on the defensive and that took place at the latest, shortly after Reno's retreat and probably at the time that heavy gunfire was heard by Herendeen in the valley.
As Reno's command retreated from the timber, F.F. Girard heard trumpet calls. Reno made none and Benteen was only then receiving orders from Custer to move to the village quickly. Custer charged the river as Reno retreated from it, and had Benteen been only minutes closer at Ford A a different casualty list would have been published on 6th July 1876.
It is mooted that Custer progressed one of two battalions easr of the river several miles beyond MTC towards lower fords and evidence is construed to present this as aggresive, it is not. It is foolish beyond the rational or extreme and is unsubstantiated fabrication from thinner than air. Custer worked with what he had and what he knew as it developed. The gray horse troop were present and observed from MTC when the other companies were fighting there and afterwards.
Various traditions sway pinions about the intentions and abilities of 7th Cavalry's commander and his decisions, and l do not intend to challenge them. lt is suffice to say that the regiments officers were told there was to be an attack and the accompanying scouts at that time, were told to run off the enemy pony herd. The regiment advanced then, battalions were formed on the march and deployed to advance.
A tactical formation was decided upon and deployed line abreast advancing down what is today Reno Creek. The left of the line under command of Capt. F.W. Benteen were ordered to a line of bluffs five miles or so, distant to scout and ensure that hostiles were not travelling up Little Bighorn valley towards the south in the direction of Lodge Grass.
Orders to the battalion maneuvering left were developed with instructions to proceed to a second valley to obeserve, engage or return to the regiment. This suggests strongly that deployment was initially aimed at an abandoned camp where Reno Creek forked toward the south where a single burial tepee remained standing. Opinion on this aspect of the advance is confused greatly because of the battles recriminations.
Sufficient knowledge of the terrain existed at hand with Crow scouts, their interpreter and George Herendeen attached to the command as scout and messenger, for Custer to have been familiar with the forks in Reno Creek and the valley of the Little Bighorn beyond to the west. Herendeen was called to the staff meeting aboard Far West and questioned as to the terrain.
The advance continued to a further decision. Scouts ordered to hurry on and raid the hostile herds of ponies known to be ahead, proved to be skittish in that endevour and dallied at a burial tepee. The battalion at centre of Custer's advance led by Maj. M.A. Reno was ordered into advance previously, indicating certainly that Custer was intent upon attack. At least one scout had reported the village standing an not running by this time and during march to this point, distant clouds of dust had been reported and small numbers of hostiles ran on ahead of the advance.
At three quarters to one mile from Little Bighorn river, Maj. Reno was ordered to turn west and cross the river into its valley. Variously, he was to either bring them to battle or attack the village. This is one of those nit picking items that can only be rationalized due to prevalent argument as to what was actually taking place.
As the battalion led by Maj. Reno developed across the river, Custer rode with an orderly trumpeter onto bluffs east of the river and overlooking the valley. From this point he led two battalions to the east of the river and a further four miles down river to MTC.
Everything undertaken so far was offensive, close and attack, and the entire command understood that. Until Custer viewed the valley from the bluffs, his major concern was the experience suffered during august 1873 when Sitting Bull's large Hunkpapa camp eluded 7th Cavalry, despite a prolonged forced march after the travelling tepees. 'we've got 'em' was his cry, according to the attendant orderly who survived the fighting.
It is surprising that no message was sent to Maj. Reno by Custer once he led two battalions downriver opposite the advance across the river but from near the ford in MTC a message was sent to Capt. Benteen to hurry to the big village. Everything undertaken so far was offensive, close and attack, and the entire command understood that.
Maj. Reno's battalion deployed and skirmished in the valley, the gunfire was undoubtedly heard by Custer and those with him east of the river. A message was in progress to Capt. Benteen to close and engage and Custer obviously intended to cross the river into the valley beyond. what took place subsequently is the stuff of myth, mystery and history.
As Maj. Reno opened his fight, Custer moved down river of the skirmishers in the valley and did not cross the river. It is not known why this took place but Custer's last order indicated intention to attack into the valley by sending Capt. Benteen's battalion quickly to the village.
Reno found a very large encampment and did not proceed down river, Custer would have been aware of this by the lack of Reno's presence opposite MTC in the village. Custer would have been aware of the entirety of the village from MTC either by his observation or his advance guard.
Had Reno penetrated the village, could he have progressed to the river opposite Custer. We will never know. Did Custer intend to maintain the offensive? Yes, this is the fact of the order to Benteen.
Did Custer send one battalion further down river to cross into the valley? The answer is simple and is no. Benteen was sent to the village and would have joined Reno in the attack in the valley. Custer therefore understood at the time the message was sent to Benteen that his regiment must concentrate its strength on the village.
We will never know precisely when problems with ammunition jamming in weapons after firing 8~10 rounds became known to Custer and his men. Herendeen told of that number of volleys being fired by Custer's command after the retreat by Maj. Reno from the valley. It is not unreasonable to conclude that Custer delayed his own attack for Benteen's battalion to close up, as it did. But pressure against Reno's battalion led him to withdraw from the valley allowing Custer's companies to be cut off from the rest of the regiment and unable to concentrate their strength in an offensive attack.
Until news of a retreat from the valley by Maj. Reno was known to Custer, he was on the offensive and intended to attack into the valley. It may be that attack and retreat coincided. Custer certainly was advised of the retreat from the valley but it became impossible to retreat his own command towards Reno's and Benteen. At that point Custer was on the defensive and that took place at the latest, shortly after Reno's retreat and probably at the time that heavy gunfire was heard by Herendeen in the valley.
As Reno's command retreated from the timber, F.F. Girard heard trumpet calls. Reno made none and Benteen was only then receiving orders from Custer to move to the village quickly. Custer charged the river as Reno retreated from it, and had Benteen been only minutes closer at Ford A a different casualty list would have been published on 6th July 1876.
It is mooted that Custer progressed one of two battalions easr of the river several miles beyond MTC towards lower fords and evidence is construed to present this as aggresive, it is not. It is foolish beyond the rational or extreme and is unsubstantiated fabrication from thinner than air. Custer worked with what he had and what he knew as it developed. The gray horse troop were present and observed from MTC when the other companies were fighting there and afterwards.