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Post by plainsman on Jul 30, 2012 9:38:05 GMT -6
A lot of putting this thing together for me is the question of who knew what and when did they know it.
Apparently once Reno had retreated to his hilltop bastion the greater part of the 1000 or so Indians went toward Custer. This happened very quickly by all accounts. We might almost call it a "surge."
Was anyone in the Custer battalions in a position to see this happening? Sightlines are an obvious issue and not having visited the battlefield I am handicapped. From the map I have it appears if sizable numbers crossed the river under the bluffs they would be into the ravines and coulees before being seen. If they went thru the village their appearance of mass may have dissipated. Only if they swung around the village to the west and made straight for Ford B would they be in plain sight of the troops.
I'm curious about what impact the sight of such a surge, if in fact there actually was one and it was visible, might have had on the command decisions that followed. It would certainly have indicated that the Reno fight was "done," one way or another.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 30, 2012 9:54:11 GMT -6
Plainsman: My impression from memory is that not a lot could be seen, even if you discount the dust that must have been kicked up. I believe the answer to your question must be all of the above. Those from Reno would probably go by way of Ford B with some getting over the river by the most available route. Others in the village that did not fight Reno were to use several other crossing points available to them.
Now I think that the end of the Reno fight was unknown to Custer. While there may have been the odd report, and I will not hang my hat on that, I believe that the first that Custer knew of the end of Reno was when the hostiles were massing in great force. We don't even know if he realized it even then. Realization was not even relevant. Don't think it mattered much anyway. There were in all probability enough hostiles not engaged with Reno to take care of Custer. Those that came from Reno, 43% I believe is what Fred figures, would only make an already impossible problem for Custer more impossible, and not spell the difference between victory/tie or anything favorable into a defeat. Defeat was already at hand.
So I guess the routes taken by those that fought Reno are somewhat immaterial to outcome, and knowledge of the routes on Custer's part did not make any difference, nor would certain knowledge of Reno's fate.
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Post by plainsman on Jul 30, 2012 10:09:42 GMT -6
Q, Yep: What difference would it have made by then? Custer had no doubt already had his "Where'd all the Indians come from?" moment. What would a few more matter? Benteen said at the RCOI that the ones that left the Reno fight weren't needed down there anyway. Maybe there wasn't even room for them.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 30, 2012 10:20:59 GMT -6
Actually, you are correct, there was probably not enough room for them all to be engaged meanfully, if all that faced Reno showed up. I think as those company perimeters grew ever so smaller due to action, those of the hostiles meanfully employed would shrink as well. and the rest would be in the bleecher cheap seats.
I think this is the primary reason I do not get tied into one scenario or the other. The real difference between Fred (the long), DC (The shorter) and Dan/Richard (The quick) is time available. With Fred, who did a magnificent job on his time study, the time available is of longer duration, therefore he puts movements, particularly the movement north, into that time frame and assigns reasons and objectives of movements. With DC, it is hard to find fault with his reasoning process, and a large part of that process deals with breakdown of command and control. For Richard and Dan it was quick and dirty, very quick and extremely dirty.
The bottom line then for me is that, not being a down in the weeds guy, I don't really care which, and have no particular favorite, although I bend and lean from time to time as this or that piece of the puzzle is brought forward. To me the great mystery is Company C. Never has, and I should not say, never will make sense, but I shall. They were either there by design for reasons so far unknown, or they were there by virtue of FUBAR. In the end regardless of scenario or time the end was what it was. It was in a way preordained. It then makes no never mind about Custer's genius or foolishness, his tactical moves or his being caught with his drawers droped. They are all still dead through misadventure, no matter the characteristics of that misadventure.
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Post by fred on Jul 30, 2012 11:17:44 GMT -6
Apparently once Reno had retreated to his hilltop bastion the greater part of the 1000 or so Indians went toward Custer. This happened very quickly by all accounts. Actually, no, this is not correct. Accounts say Crazy Horse-- one of the last to arrive at the Reno fight-- was one of the first to leave. He probably had about 200 warriors accompanying him. Others left piecemeal and the valley was not free of the majority of those fighters until some 10 to 30 minutes after the volley firing was heard. Remember, regardless of that firing and who saw what farther downstream, the immediate threat to the village was still reno, now reenforced by more troops. No. Where? By Reno or at Ford B? Most accounts claim this is correct. And they took their damn sweet time of it, as well, thereby exacerbating the feeling of "safety" and the lack of threat within the Custer command. Best wishes, Fred. |
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Post by plainsman on Jul 30, 2012 11:35:21 GMT -6
Thanks for the correction about numbers. I had been laboring under a misunderstanding about how many left the Reno scene.
I was thinking about crossings above Ford B.
They may have neglected some of the ritual prep for battle in their initial rush to get to Reno and cut him away from the village. Now, in a lull, they could make up for that and go into the next fight properly attired and properly protected. We don't usually wear stuffed weasels on our heads so we can't appreciate their importance.
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Post by biginjunfight on Jan 25, 2013 2:46:14 GMT -6
Well, if it was me, Indian or not, I would have ridden as fast as my hoss would go to get involved and I bet that's what they did.Call it whatever, call of war, thrill of the kill, whatever.
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Post by benteen on Jan 25, 2013 15:46:04 GMT -6
Well, if it was me, Indian or not, I would have ridden as fast as my hoss would go to get involved and I bet that's what they did.Call it whatever, call of war, thrill of the kill, whatever. biginjunfight, Im sure you are correct in many cases, I think in this case however, their motive was to save their families. Be Well Dan PS....Dont think I said it before, but welcome aboard |
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Post by herosrest on Jan 26, 2013 10:58:02 GMT -6
A lot of putting this thing together for me is the question of who knew what and when did they know it. Apparently once Reno had retreated to his hilltop bastion the greater part of the 1000 or so Indians went toward Custer. This happened very quickly by all accounts. We might almost call it a "surge." Was anyone in the Custer battalions in a position to see this happening? Sightlines are an obvious issue and not having visited the battlefield I am handicapped. From the map I have it appears if sizable numbers crossed the river under the bluffs they would be into the ravines and coulees before being seen. If they went thru the village their appearance of mass may have dissipated. Only if they swung around the village to the west and made straight for Ford B would they be in plain sight of the troops. I'm curious about what impact the sight of such a surge, if in fact there actually was one and it was visible, might have had on the command decisions that followed. It would certainly have indicated that the Reno fight was "done," one way or another ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In regards who knew what and when they knew it, lies a crux of matters that remains tediously confused despite a mountain of evidence. What happened was that no-one in the villages actually expevted a lunch time attack which was unheard of. That is the surprise of which much is made and it was a general surprise to the civilian population.
Those who expected the army presence were to varying degrees, prepared for trouble and this is perfectly clear reading the warrior Paints Brown story in F. Bennett Fiskes 'Taming of the Sioux'. Read online here archive.org/details/tamingofsioux00fiskfr
Response to Custer's threat east of the river was fractured, and who knew what when  is assisted by Runs the Enemy who told in detail of the response from Sitting Bull's end of the camp. The Cheyennes were already fighting when Runs the Enemy joined the Custer fight, at which point in time a brief lull occured.
Nelson A. Miles conducted extensive investigation of the fighting in June 1878, online here archive.org/details/servingrepublicm00milerich Miles read his information as only a military bulldog could and was looking for the appliance of military science in what learnt. It is not unreasonable to expect a fractured response from the various tribal groups, their leaders and bands. There is information which stands up to scrutiny in respect who would go where, for example, Sans Arc and Brules camped nearer the threat responding urgently, where Hunkpapa tarried until certain of no further threat to their camp.
It is difficult and irational to concludeother than that Cheyennes confronted Custer first by crossing the river, followed next by Ogalala following Crazy Horse to the lower (middle) ford opposite the southern upriver terminus of Greasy Grass ridge where significant relic finds were made.
Rain in the faces last account, given shortly before his death was that he did not actually join the Reno fight, but rode to confront Custer with a band of bad boys with whom a female warrior rode. Like it or not, Rain in the Faces map shows hisroute to battle.
Lt. Varnum believed that warriors pulled away from Reno's front as soon as the charge at Reno Hill emerged from the timber. Warnings of other soldiers across from the lower villages had certainly arrived to warriors confronting Reno by then.
An important point relevant to the all important lines of sight is where Custer himself, was able to view the valley from. Itis difficult to believe other than a presence on the Grassy Knoll at the mouth of Deep Coulee and the terminus of Greasy Grass ridge. To not have made use of that observation point would have been a major failing by Custer. There is evidence from the Crow scouts that is exactly what Custer did. Whether he observed Crazy Horse and Rain in the Face and many others in the timber and racing to the fords is guess work but, the timber along the river was full and likely to shield movement through and along its fringes.
The image linked 1.2.3.11/bmi/www.green-ebook-shop.com/ebooks/2/7/6/1/27616/images/appchief.jpg shows the Little Bighorn 25 years after the battle to give, perhaps an idea of foliage and view across the water opposite the village. There is a Morrow picture of the ford, taken after the battle in winter and showing plenty of cottonwood standing.
There is today, huge confusion and miss understanding (a lovely lass) due to an acceptance of Cheyenne history which gives Custer advancing to fords far below LSH. The so called Ford D's of Deep Coulee and beyond. This version of events should be treated with considerable caution, because it has been cherry picked by researchers and historians who further the battle that Marquis presented in his book about Wooden Leg. The work Marquis presented was acknowledgeed by Wooden Leg as being unreliable.
The Cheyennes fought Custer first, both with men alraedy east of the river and others who crossed early to that fight. The modern history basically gives Custer dividing his companies and striking downriver to then halt and retrace his steps as companies nearer the villages are overwhelmed. An added twist is the slow organised fighting introduced by Marquis. The history stems from Peter Powell and John Stanfs on Timber and is perfevtly respectable bur second sourve and is confused and confusing.
One should expect history handed down by Cheyennes to conform with first hand accounts by warriors who fought, for example George B. Grinnell's work 'The Fighting Cheyennes', his interviews of warriors and the many other Cheyenne accounts.
If you plow through enough of them, there it is ~ confirmation of the Stands in Timber history from Two Moon in the interview given to Throssell BUT, that combat had nothing to do with lower fords or the terrain of the National Cemetary. There was very much more in play during the 1950's and after, than simple history of the battle and Stands in Timber's views and his work are very much more important than Custer basically, according to him, repeating his tactics at Washita. Custer's scouts were sent to clear off Sioux ponies and that tactic was in play. Did Custer go down river after the pony herds, Two Moon says no. Did Custer manage to or attempt to take hostages, no, he never crossed the river and women who were east of the river moved back into the valley before Custer could threaten them.
The Cheyenne history was a chip in the poker game of their nation and its recognition on the battlefield. Long after 1876, the Sioux and Cheyennes who died in the battle, continued to be regarded by a few, as the enemy. That battle has been long and hard fought to victory by the Cheyenne, whose dead are now honored and accepted by the entire nation.
Grinnell's Fighting Cheyenne's accounts of the battle with Crook are the best measure of how it went at LBH. Rather like John S. Gray later, and others since, Marquis basically constructed a magic battle along heroic themes and excused everyone from blame for the disaster, science fiction. It is the closing two chapters of Marquis and his map that are important to scolars of the battle. A handful of people, only, read those last chapters as such is the infatuation with swords and sorcery today.
~ |
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 26, 2013 15:28:23 GMT -6
And the point is?
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Post by herosrest on Jan 28, 2013 11:58:45 GMT -6
Visibility and line of sight, agreeing with plainsman on the matter.
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is assisted by Runs the Enemy who told in detail of the response from Sitting Bull's end of the camp. The Cheyennes were already fighting when Runs the Enemy joined the Custer fight, at which point in time a brief lull occured.
