King's thing - (QPCOF314)

[herosrest]

Charles King (1844-1933) was amongst a number of noted late 19th & early 20th century military writers and novelists; another was Stanley Vestal or Walter Campbell. Amongst King's title's are 'Trumpeter Fred'; 'Long Distance Riding' 1870's US Cavalry riding on the Plains, 'Indian Campaigns: Sketches of Cavalry Service in Arizona and on the Northern Plains; and Campaigning with Crook, and Stories of Army Life', which details events of the Summer 1876 campaign and Fighting the Plains - of interest is Chapter IX. The Fight of the Rear Guard, how it is done, by an officer who was there doing it. His 'Custer's Last Battle' article on Little Big Horn published in the august 1890 edition of Harper's Magazine with a sketch map of the battle, and offers very interesting insight to military understanding, thought and loyalties. King was 5th Cavalry and proud of the best regiment in the army.

In 1877 he passed the battleground with a number of Sioux scouts who twelve months previous fought 7th Cavalry there. Half a dozen told their stories at different times in different places, and as to the general features of the battle, tallied with singular exactness. These fellows were mainly Brulés and Ogalallas. Afterward he got stories of the Uncapapas, most interesting of all, and it was not hard to trace Custer's every move. One could almost portray his every emotion.

This makes his take on the fighting a little less theoretical than the vast majority, and his sketch map of maneuver a compelling. What he offers must be considered seriously and realistically because no-one else studying the fight has explained its maneuver, other than in vaguely ridiculous feinting, split chicken wings and combat at locations where no bodies were found but battle relics are. The battlefield was salted with cartridge cases from Fort Custer, long after the battle, by one of the monuments superintendents. On that sour note, it is not possible to pour technical gravy, because whilst copper cartridges in use in 1876 were replaced by brass cartridges, the existing stocks of copper ammunition didn't just vanish of the plains and the archaeolgy of the battle is very much more technically complicated and unreliable than those researching it, ever will admit and offers very real problems to understanding in specfic terms, what really took place.

In that vein, there is no better starting place that Charles King's take on the way of it. It is unfortunate that no Cheyenne's who fought Custer were present with to give details of their fight with Custer. It should be noted that Sioux participants did not indicate fighting on Blummer's (Nye Cartwright) ridge. Obviously there are reasons for this, either it didn't happen or took place before Brulés, Ogalallas and Uncapapas, were present. Both can be true.

Anecdote on archaeology, from Frank Grouard's biography, ' The Indians told Grouard that when Custer's attempt to cross the "Little Big Horn had been frustrated, the command headed directly east for the high bluffs, behind which hundreds of Indians were secreted. These rose up to meet Ouster as his men advanced. Not knowing that the savages were there, Custer was taken completely by surprise, and attempted, by a charge, to force his way through the enemy to the northeast. But he met with such a withering fire that he was compelled to seek lower ground, and in doing so he met the enemy's force that, by this time, had crossed the river and filled all the draws to the north, and was compelled to feel his way west and south, which accounts for the finding of the bodies of his command lying in almost a perfect circle.

When the charge up the bluff was made, the Indians stated (and they related the story many times to the scout), that an officer on a magnificent animal, unable to check the speed of his charger, rode directly through the enemy's line, escaping the hundreds of bullets that were fired at him. Some of the young braves gave chase, but as they were afoot when the charge was made and lost some little time in getting their ponies, the officer was soon far in advance of his pursuers. They followed him for several miles, however, and watched him as he crossed Poplar creek ( due east from the Custer battlefield ).
Beyond this creek is an immense flat, and while the Indians sat upon their ponies, having given up the chase, and watched the fleeing horseman as he reached the plain, they beheld a puff of smoke, and saw the officer fall from the saddle. They then rode over to where he fell, secured his horse and trappings, and left the body lying where it fell. The officer, for some unknown cause, had ended his life at the point of his own gun.

Grouard's explanation is that the officer, being convinced that the command would perish to a man, did not wish to survive his comrades in arms, so put an end to his life when escape was within his grasp; or, that being unable to rejoin the command, and fearing that his escape would be construed into desertion and forever remain a blot upon his honor, he ended his existence within sight of the spot where the five troops of the heroic Seventh met their Waterloo.


What is interesting is officer who rode through hundreds of bullets were fired at him. Of course though, the warriors recovered each and every cartridge that expended from captured weapons, leaving only those shot off by 7th Cavalry before a carbine jammed and was discarded in the heat of battle. A horse travelling at 12mph covers 350 yards in one minute. The route indicated by E.S. Godfrey on his map of the battle, as tha followed by Custers command, was remembered by Godfrey in 1886 as a faint trail seen 10 years earlier. 220 shod cavalry horses do not leave a faint trail at the gallop.


Various reasons caveated to serious students for confusion in accounts of the battle which relate compass oriented direction and the color of horses and ponies. For example, : 'Although the geographical references have been the traditional ones, north (Last Stand), south (Calhoun Hill), east (Keogh’s slope) and west (riverside), the Indian geography is different and Indian accounts must be perused carefully to determine which is being used. To the Indian, north is Keogh’s slope; south (riverside), east (Calhoun Hill) and west (Last Stand)'.

This is not a complete reasoning of the problem.
Anecdote on Language Thunder Bear Yanktonai; 'After the fight was over and we returned to camp, I heard a bugle and saw on a hill three troops of cavalry, one with blacks, one with bays, one with white horses. They were a lot of our young fellows, dressed up in the uniforms of the soldiers and mounted on their horses. After this the young men made ready to charge Reno's men, but just then scouts came from down the river, reporting that a big lot of soldiers were coming.

In Teton and Yanktonai dialects, White is Ska and Red is Sha, Black is Sa-pa, gray is Ho-ta, ghi is brown, zi is yellow.

In Teton the term for north is 'wa zi ya ta' In Yanktonai it is 'wi yo hi ya pa ta'.
In Teton the term for South is 'I to ka gha ta' In Yanktonai it is 'Wi yo hpe ya ta'
In Teton the term for west is 'wi yo hpe ya ta'. In Yanktonai it is 'wa zi ya ta'
In Teton the term for east is 'wi yo hi ya pa ta'. In Yanktonai it is 'I to ka gha'

(Source - Edward S. Curtis)

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[herosrest]

A text file of King's article didn't attach to the post. Here it is -


CUSTER'S LAST BATTLE.
BY CAPTAIN CHARLES KING, U.S.A.
Published in Harper's Magazine, Aug, 1890
It is hard to say how many years ago the Dakotas of the upper Mississippi, after a century of warring with the Chippewa nation, began to swarm across the Missouri in search of the buffalo, and there became embroiled with other tribes claiming the country farther west. Dakota was the proper tribal name, but as they crossed this Northwestern Rubicon into the territory of unknown foemen they bore with them a title given them as far east as the banks and bluffs of the Father of Waters. The Chippewas had called them for years the Sioux (Soo), and by that strange un-Indian sounding title is known to this day the most numerous and powerful nation of red people, warriors, women, and children, to be found on our continent.

They were in strong force when they launched out on their career of conquest west of the Missouri. The Yellowstone and its beautiful and romantic tributaries all belonged to the Absarakas, or Crows; the rolling prairies of Nebraska were the homes of the Pawnees; the pine-crested heights of the Black Hills were claimed as the head-quarters of the Cheyennes and Arrapahoes; the western slopes of the Big Horn range and the broad valleys between them and the Rockies were owned by the Shoshones, or Snakes; while roving bands of Crees swarmed down along the north shore of the Missouri itself.

With each and all of these, with the Chippewas behind them, and eventually with the white invaders, the Dakotas waged relentless war. They drove the Pawnees across the Platte far into Kansas; they whipped the Cheyennes and Arrapahoes out of the Black Hills, and down to the head waters of the Kaw and the Arkansas; they fought the Shoshones back into the Wind River Valley, with orders never again to cross the "dead line" of the Big Horn River; and they sent the Crows "whirling" up the valley of the Yellowstone (which they proceeded to call the Elk); and when our great war broke out in 1861 they lent valuable aid and comfort to the rebellion by swooping down on our settlements in Minnesota without the faintest warning, and slaughtering hundreds of defenceless women and children, from whom they were begging or stealing but the day before. General Sully, with a strong command, was sent to give them a severe lesson in payment for their outrages, and he marched far into their territory, and fought them wherever they would assemble in sufficient force to block his way, but it did no lasting good. When '66 came, and our emigrants began settling up the West, they found the Sioux more hostile and determined than ever. The army was called on to protect the settlers, and to escort the surveyors of the transcontinental railways. Not a stake was driven, not an acre cleared, except under cover of the rifles of the regulars, and while the nation seemed rejoicing in unbroken peace and increasing prosperity, its little army was having anything but a placid time of it on the frontier. In the ten years that immediately preceded the centennial celebration at Philadelphia, the cavalry regiments had no rest at all; they were on the war-path winter and summer; and during those ten years of "peace" more officers of the regular army were killed or died of wounds received in action with the Indians than the British army lost in the entire Crimean war, with its bloody battles of the Alma, Balaklava, Inkerman, and the assaults on Sebastopol. The Indians were always scientific fighters, but when, in '74 and '75, they succeeded in arming themselves with breech-loaders and magazine rifles, the Sioux of the Northern plains became foemen far more to be dreaded than any European cavalry.

Treaties had been made and broken. A road had been built through the heart of the country they loved the best -- the northeastern slope and foot-hills from the Big Horn to the Yellowstone; and far up in this unsettled region, surrounded by savages, little wooden stockaded forts had been placed and garrisoned by pitifully small detachments of cavalry and infantry. >From Fort Laramie down on the Platte far up to the rich and populous Gallatin Valley of Montana only those little forts, Reno, Phil Kearny, and C. F. Smith, guarded the way. One day vast hordes of Sioux gathered in the ravines and canons around Phil Kearny.
Machpealota (Red Cloud) was their leader. They sent a small party to attack the wood-choppers from the fort, who were working with their little escort. Two companies of infantry and one of cavalry went out to the rescue. These were quickly surrounded and hemmed in, then slowly massacred. After that for ten long years the Sioux held undisputed sway in their chosen country. Our forts were burned and abandoned. The Indian allies of the Dakotas joined hands with them, and a powerful nation or confederacy of nearly 60,000 souls ruled the country from the Big Horn River on the northwest down to the Union Pacific Railway. No longer dared they go south of that. Taking with them the Cheyennes and Arrapahoes, who had intermarried with them, the Sioux fell back to the North Platte and the territory beyond. From there they sent raiding parties in every direction. One Secretary of the Interior after another had tried the experiment of feeding, clothing, bribing them to be good. Agencies and reservations were established at convenient points. Here the old chiefs, the broken- down men, and the non-combatant women and children made their permanent homes, and here the bold and vigorous young chiefs and warriors, laughing at the credulity of the Great Father, filled up their pouches and parflèches with rations and ammunition, then went whooping off on the war-path against the whites wherever found, and came back scalp-laden to the reservation when they needed more cartridges or protection from the pursuing soldiery, who could fire on them only when caught outside the lines.
Two great reservations were established southeast of the Black Hills in the valley of the White River. One of these was the bailiwick of the hero of the Phil Kearny massacre, old Red Cloud, and here were gathered most of his own tribe (the Ogalallas) and many of his chiefs: some "good" like Old-Man-Afraid-of-his-Horses and his worthy son, but most of them crafty, cunning, treacherous, and savage, like Red Dog, Little-Big-Man, American Horse, and a swarm of various kinds of Bulls and Bears and Wolves. Further down the stream, twenty miles away, were the head-quarters of the Brulés, Spotted Tail's people, and "Old Spot" was loyal to the backbone, though powerless to control the movements of the young men. Other reservations there were along the Missouri, and into these reservations the Department of the Interior strove to gather all the Sioux nation, in the vague hope of keeping them out of mischief.

But the young Indian takes to mischief of that description as the young duck to the water. The traditions of his people tell of no case where respect was accorded to him who had not killed his man. Only in deeds of blood or battle could he hope to win distinction, and the vacillating policy of the government enabled him to sally forth at any time and return at will to the reservations, exhibiting to the admiring eyes of friends and relations the dripping scalps of his white victims. The fact that the victims were shot from ambush, or that the scalps were solely those of helpless women and children, detracted in no wise from the value of the trophies. The perpetrator had won his spurs according to the aboriginal code, and was a "brave" henceforth.

But there were those who never would come in, and never signed a treaty. Herein they are entitled to far more respect than those who came, saw, and conquered -- by fraud; and one of those who persistently refused, and whose standard was a rallying-point for the disaffected and treacherous of every tribe, was a shrewd "medicine chief" of the Uncapapas, a seer, prophet, statesman, but in no sense a war chief, the now celebrated Tatonka-e-Yotanka -- Sitting Bull.
Far out in the lovely fertile valleys of the Rosebud, the Tongue, the Little Big Horn, and the Powder rivers, Sitting Bull and his devoted followers spent their days. Sheltered from storm and tempest by the high bluffs through long, hard winters, living in the midst of untold thousands of buffalo, elk, mountain sheep, antelope, and deer, rejoicing in the grandest scenery on the continent, and in a climate that despite its rigor during the midwinter months is unparalleled for life-giving qualities, it is no wonder they loved and clung to it, their "Indian story land", as they did to no other. But here flocked all the renegades from other tribes. Here came the wild and untamable Ogalalla, Brulé, Minneconjou, Sans Arc, Uncapapa, Blackfoot; here were all warriors welcomed; and from here time and again set forth the expeditions that spread terror to settler and emigrant, and checked the survey of the Northern Pacific Railroad.

Eighteen hundred and seventy-five found trouble everywhere. White settlers swarmed in the Black Hills in search of gold. Ogalallas and Brulés stole their stock and killed their herders, claiming that the land was theirs and the whites were invaders. Sitting Bull's ranks swarmed with recruits from far to the southeast. The Interior Department found it useless to temporize. Orders were given to the army to bring him in or "snuff him out." Early in March, '76, General George Crook, famous for his successes with the Indians in Oregon and Arizona, was started up into the Sioux country with a strong force of cavalry and infantry. On "Patrick's Day in the morning," long before he was anywhere near Sitting Bull himself, his advance struck a big Indian village deep in the snows of the Powder River. It was 30 deg. below zero; the troops were faultily led by the officer to whom he had intrusted the duty, and the Sioux developed splendid fighting qualities under a new and daring leader, "Choonka-Witko", Crazy Horse. Crook's advance recoiled upon the main body, practically defeated by the renegades from the Red Cloud and Spotted Tail agencies. Early in May, warned by this lesson, three great expeditions pushed forward into the "Indian story land," where by this time full six thousand warriors had rallied around Sitting Bull. From the south came General Crook, with nearly twenty-five hundred men. From the east marched General Terry, with almost as many infantry and cavalry as had Crook, and a few light pieces of artillery. Down the Yellowstone from the west General Gibbon led a little band of long- trained frontier soldiers, scouting by the way, and definitely "locating" the Indians over on the Rosebud before forming his junction with General Terry near the mouth of the Tongue. If Sitting Bull had been alive to the situation, Gibbon's small force could never have finished that perilous advance, though they might have stood and defended themselves; but Bull was not a general; his talents lay elsewhere.

Early in June Crook's command was on the northeast slope of the Big Horn, and General Sheridan, planning the whole campaign, saw with anxiety that vast numbers of Indians were daily leaving the reservations south of the Black Hills and hurrying northwestward around Crook to join Sitting Bull. The Fifth Regiment of Cavalry was then sent up by rail from Kansas to Cheyenne, and marched rapidly to the Black Hills to cut off these re-enforcements. The great mass of the Indians lay uneasily between Crook at the head waters of Tongue River and Terry and Gibbon near its mouth, watching every move, and utterly cutting off every attempt of the commanders to communicate with each other. They worried Crook's pickets and trains, and by mid-June he determined to pitch in and see what force they had. On June 17th the General grappled with the Sioux on the bluffs of the Rosebud. He had several hundred Crow allies. The stirring combat lasted much of the day; but long before it was half over Crook was fighting on the defensive and coolly withdrawing his men. He had found a hornets' nest, and knew it was no place for so small a command as his. Pulling out as best he could, he fell back to the Tongue, sent for the entire Fifth Cavalry and all his available infantry, and lay on his arms until they could reach him. He had not got within sight of the great Indian village, city it should be called, of Sitting Bull.

Meantime Terry and Gibbon sent their scouts up stream. Major Reno, with a strong battalion of the Seventh Cavalry, left camp on the Yellowstone to take a look up toward the Cheetish or Wolf Mountains. Sitting Bull and his people -- men, women, and children -- after their successful defence of the approaches to their home on the Rosebud on June 17th, seem to have bethought themselves of roomier and better quarters over in the broader valley of the Little Big Horn, the next stream to the west. Their "village" had stretched for six miles down the narrow canon of the Rosebud; their thousands of ponies had eaten off all the grass; they were victorious, but it was time to go.

Coming up the Rosebud, Major Reno was confronted by the sight of an immense trail turning suddenly west and crossing the great divide over toward the setting sun. Experienced Indian fighters in his command told him that many thousand Indians had passed there within the last few days. Like a sensible man, he turned about and trotted back to report his discovery to his commander. Then it was that the tragedy of the campaign began.

At the head of Terry's horsemen was the lieutenant-colonel commanding the Seventh Regiment of Cavalry, Brevet Major-General George A. Custer, United States Army, a daring, dashing, impetuous trooper, who had won high honors as a division commander under Sheridan during the great war of the rebellion, who had led his gallant regiment against the Kiowas and the Cheyennes on the Southern plains, and had twice penetrated the Sioux country in recent campaigns. Experience he certainly had, but there were those, superiors and subordinates both, who feared that in dealing with so wily and skilful a foe Custer lacked judgment. All had not been harmonious in his relations with his commanders in the Department of Dakota, nor was there entire unanimity of feeling toward him in the regiment itself, but all men honored his unquestioned bravery, and when General Terry decided to send his cavalry at once to "scout the trail" reported by Reno, the command of the expedition fell naturally to Custer.

Terry had promptly arrived at the conclusion that the Indians had simply moved their villages over into the valley of the Little Big Horn, and his plan was to send Custer along the trail to hold and hem them from the east, while he, with all his own and Gibbon's command, pushed up the Yellowstone and Big Horn in boats; then, disembarking at the junction of the Big and Little Big Horn, to march southward until he struck the Indians on that flank. His orders to Custer displayed an unusual mingling of anxiety and forbearance. He seems to have feared that Custer would be rash, yet shrank from issuing a word that might reflect upon the discretion or wound the high spirit of his gallant leader of horse. He warned him to "feel" well out toward his left as he rode westward from the Rosebud, in order to prevent the Indians slipping off southeastward between the column and the Big Horn Mountains. He would not hamper him with positive orders as to what he must or must not do when he came in presence of the enemy, but he named the 26th of June as the day on which he and Gibbon would reach the valley of the Little Big Horn, and it was his hope and expectation that Custer would come up from the east about the same time, and between them they would be able to soundly thrash the assembled Sioux.

But Custer disappointed him in an unusual way. He got there a day ahead of time, and had ridden night and day to do it. Men and horses were wellnigh used up when the Seventh Cavalry trotted into sight of the city on the Little Big Horn that cloudless Sunday morning of the 25th. When Terry came up the valley on the 26th, it was all over with Custer and his pet troops (companies) of the regiment.
He started on the trail with the Seventh Cavalry, and nothing but the Seventh. A battalion of the Second was with Gibbon's column; but, luckily for the Second, Custer would none of them. Two field guns, under Lieutenant Low, were with Terry, and Low begged that he and his guns might be sent, but Custer wanted only his own people. He rode sixty miles in twenty-four hours. He pushed ahead on the trail with feverish impatience, and he created an impression that it was his determination to get to the spot and have one battle royal with the Indians, in which he and the Seventh should be the sole participants on our side, and by consequence the sole heroes. The idea of defeat seems never to have occurred to him, despite his experience with old "Black Kettle's" bands down on the Washita.

Only thirty miles away on his left, as he spurred ahead with his weary men that Sunday morning, over two thousand soldiers under Crook were in bivouac on Goose Creek. Had he "felt" any great distance out there the scouts would have met, and Crook would eagerly have re-enforced him, but he wanted nothing of the kind. At daybreak his advance, under Lieutenant Varnum, had come upon the scaffold sepulchres of two or three warriors slain in the fight of the 17th, and soon thereafter sent back word that the valley of the Little Horn was in sight ahead, and there were "signs" of the village.

Then it was that Custer made the division of his column. Keeping with himself the five companies whose commanders were his chosen friends and adherents, and leaving Captain Macdougall with his troops to guard the mule pack train in rear, he divided the six remaining companies between Major Reno and Captain Benteen, sending the latter some two miles off to the extreme left, while Reno moved midway between. In this order of three little parallel columns the Seventh Cavalry swept rapidly westward over the "divide."

Unlike the Second, Third, or Fifth Regiment when on Indian campaign, Custer's men rode into action with something of the pomp and panoply of war that distinguished them around their camps. Bright guidons fluttered in the breeze; many of the officers and men wore the natty undress uniform of the cavalry. Custer himself; his brother, Captain Tom Custer; his adjutant, Lieutenant Cook; and his old Army of the Potomac comrade, Captain Myles Keogh -- were all dressed nearly alike in coats of Indian-tanned, beaver-trimmed buckskin, with broad-brimmed scouting hats of light color, and long riding-boots. Captain Yates seemed to prefer his undress uniform, as did most of the lieutenants in Custer's column. The two Custers and Captain Keogh rode their beautiful Kentucky sorrel horses, and the adjutant was mounted on his long-legged gray. The trumpeters were at the heads of columns with their chiefs, but the band of the Seventh, for once, was left behind. Custer's last charge was sounded without the accompaniment of the rollicking Irish fighting tune he loved. There was no "Garry Owen" to swell the chorus of the last cheer.

Following Custer's trail from the Rosebud, one comes in sight of the Little Big Horn, winding away northward to its junction with the broader stream. South are the bold cliffs and dark canons of the mountains, their foot-hills not twenty miles away. North, tumbling and rolling toward the Yellowstone in alternate "swale" and ridge, the treeless, upland prairie stretches to the horizon. Westward, the eye roams over what seems to be a broad flat valley beyond the stream; but the stream itself -- the fatal "Greasy Grass," as the Sioux called it -- is hidden from sight under the steep bluffs that hem it in. Coming from the mountains, it swings into sight far to the left front, comes rippling toward us in its fringe of cottonwoods and willows, and suddenly disappears under or behind the huge rolling wave of bluff that stretches right and left across the path. For nearly six miles of its tortuous course it cannot be seen from the point where Custer drew rein to get his first view of the village. Neither can its fringing willows be seen, and -- fatal and momentous fact -- neither could hundreds of the populous "lodges" that clustered along its western bank. Eagerly scanning the distant "tepees" that lay beyond the northern point where the bluff dipped to the stream, and swinging his broad-brimmed hat about his head in an ecstasy of soldierly anticipation, he shouted: "Custer's luck! The biggest Indian village on the continent!" And he could not have seen one-third of it.

But what he saw was enough to fire the blood of any soldier. Far to the northwest and west huge clouds of dust rose billowing from the broad valley. Far across the hidden stream could be seen the swarming herds of ponies in excited movement. Here, there, and everywhere tiny dots of horsemen scurrying away could be readily distinguished, and down to the right front, down along what could be seen of the village around that shoulder of bluff, all was lively turmoil and confusion; lodges were being hurriedly taken down, and their occupants were fleeing from the wrath to come. We know now that the warriors whom he saw dashing westward were mainly the young men hurrying out to "round up" the pony herds; we know now that behind those sheltering bluffs were still thousands of fierce warriors eager and ready to meet "Long Hair"; we know that the signs of panic and retreat were due mainly to the rush to get the women and little children out of the way; ponies and dogs, hastily hitched to the dust-raising travois, dragged the wondering pappooses and frightened squaws far out over the westward slopes; but seeing the scurry and panic, Custer seems to have attached only one meaning to it. They were all in full retreat. The whole community would be on the run before he could strike them. Quickly he determined on his course. Reno should push straight ahead, get down into the valley, ford the stream, and attack the southern end of the village, while he with his pet companies should turn into the long winding ravine that ran northwestward to the stream, and pitch in with wild charge from the east. To Reno these orders were promptly given. A courier was sent to Benteen, far off to the left, notifying him of the "find"; and another galloped to Macdougall with orders to hurry up with the pack trains where the extra ammunition was carried. Custer knew it would be needed.

Then the daring commander placed himself at the head of his own column, plunged down the slope, and, followed by his eager men, was soon out of sight, perhaps out of hearing of what might be taking place over in the valley behind the bluffs that rose on his left higher with every furlong trotted. The last that Reno and his people ever saw of them alive was the tail of the column disappearing in a cloud of dust; then the cloud alone was to be seen, hanging over their trail like a pall.
Pushing forward, Reno came quickly to a shallow "cooley" (frontierism for gully) that led down through the bluff to the stream. A brisk trot brought him to the ford; his troopers plunged blithely through, and began to clamber the low bank on the western shore. He expected from the tenor of his orders to find an open, unobstructed valley, down which, five miles away at least, he could see the lodges of the Indian village. It was with surprise, not unmixed with grave concern, therefore, that, as he urged his horse through the willows and up to the level of the low "bench" beyond, he suddenly rode into full view of an immense township, whose southern outskirts were not two miles away. Far as he could see, the dust cloud rose above the excited villages; herds of war ponies were being driven in from the west on a mad run; old men, squaws, children, draught ponies, and travois were scurrying off toward the Big Horn, and Reno realized that he was in front of the assembled warriors of the whole Sioux nation.

What Custer expected of Reno was, is generally believed, a bold, dashing charge into the heart of the village -- just such a charge as he, Custer, had successfully led at the Washita, though it cost the life of Captain Hamilton, and eventually of many others. But Reno had no dash to speak of, and the sight that burst upon his eyes eliminated any that might be latent. He attacked, but the attack was nevertheless spiritless and abortive. Dismounting his men, he advanced them as skirmishers across the mile or more of prairie, firing as soon as he got within range of the village. No resistance of any consequence was made as he pushed northward, for the sudden appearance of his command was a total surprise to the Uncapapas and Blackfeet, whose villages were farthest south. Their scouts had signalled Custer's column trotting down the ravine, and those who had not rushed for safety to the rear were apparently rushing toward the Brulé village in the centre as the point which Custer would be apt first to strike. Reno could have darted into the south end of the village, it is believed, before his approach could have been fairly realized. As it was, slowly and on foot, he traversed the prairie without losing a man, and was upon the lodges when a few shots were fired from the willows along the stream, and some mounted Indians could be seen swooping around his left flank. He had had no experience in Indian fighting. He simply seemed to feel that with his little command of two hundred men he could not drive the whole valley full of warriors, and in much perturbation and worry he sounded the halt, rally, and mount. Then for a few moments, that to his officers and men must have seemed hours, he paused irresolute, not knowing what to do.

The Indians settled it for him. They well interpreted his hesitation. "The White Chief was scared"; and now was their chance. Man and boy they came tearing to the spot. A few well- aimed shots knocked a luckless trooper or two out of the saddle. Reno hurriedly ordered a movement by the flank toward the high bluffs across the stream to his right rear. He never thought to dismount a few cool hands to face about and keep off the enemy. He placed himself at the new head of column, and led the backward move. Out came the Indians, with shots and triumphant yells, in pursuit. The rear of the column began to crowd on the head; Reno struck a trot; the rear struck the gallop. The Indians came dashing up on both flanks and close to the rear; and then -- then the helpless, horribly led troopers had no alternative. Discipline and order were all forgotten. In one mad rush they tore away for the stream, plunged in, sputtered through, and clambered breathlessly up the steep bluff on the eastern shore -- an ignominious, inexcusable panic, due mainly to the nerveless conduct of the major commanding.

In vain had Donald McIntosh and "Benny" Hodgson, two of the bravest and best-loved officers in the regiment, striven to rally, face about, and fight with the rear of column. The Indians were not in overpowering numbers at the moment, and a bold front would have "stood off" double their force; but with the major on the run, and foremost in the run, the lieutenants could do nothing -- but lose their own gallant lives. McIntosh was surrounded, dragged from his horse and butchered close to the brink. Hodgson, shot out of saddle, was rescued by a faithful comrade, who plunged into the stream with him; but close to the farther shore the Indians picked him off, a bullet tore through his body, and the gallant little fellow, the pet and pride of the whole regiment, rolled dead into the muddy waters. Once well up the bluffs, Reno's breathless followers faced about and took in the situation. The Indians pursued no further, and even now were rapidly withdrawing from range. The major fired his pistol at the distant foe in paroxysmal defiance of the fellows who had stampeded him. He was now up some two hundred feet above them, and it was safe -- as it was harmless. Two of his best officers lay dead down there on the banks below; so, too, lay a dozen of his men. The Indians, men and even boys, had swarmed all around his people, and slaughtered them as they ran. Many more were wounded, but, for the present at least, all seemed safe. The Indians, except a few, had mysteriously withdrawn from their front. What could that mean? And then, what could have become of Custer? Where, too, were Benteen and Macdougall with their commands?

Over toward the villages, which they could now see stretching for five miles down the stream, all was shrill uproar and confusion; but northward the bluffs rose still higher to a point nearly opposite the middle of the villages -- a point some two miles from them -- and beyond that they could see nothing. Thither, however, had Custer gone, and suddenly, crashing through the sultry morning air, came the sound of fierce and rapid musketry -- whole volleys -- then one continuous rattle and roar. Louder, fiercer, it grew for full ten minutes. Some thought they could hear the ringing cheers of their comrades, and were ready to cheer in reply; some thought they heard the thrilling charge of the trumpets; many were eager to mount and rush to join their colonel, and with him to avenge Hodgson and McIntosh, and retrieve the dark fortunes of their own battalion. But, almost as suddenly as it began, the heavy volleying died away; the continuous rattle broke into scattering skirmish fire, then into sputtering shots, then only once in a while some distant rifle would crack feebly on the breeze, and Reno's men looked wonderingly in each other's faces. There stood the villages plain enough, and the firing had begun close under the bluffs close to the stream, and had died away far to the north. What could it mean?

Soon, with eager delight, the little commands of Benteen and Macdougall were hailed coming up the slopes from the east. "Have you seen anything of Custer?" was the first anxious inquiry. Benteen and Weir had galloped to a point of bluff a mile or more to the north, had seen swarms of Indians in the valley below, but not a sign of Custer's people. They could expect no aid from Custer, then, and there was only one thing left -- intrench themselves, and hold out as best they could till Terry and Gibbon should arrive. Reno had now seven "troops" and the pack train, abundant ammunition and supplies. The chances were in his favor. Now what had become of Custer? For him and his there was none left to tell the story except the Crow scout "Curley," who managed to slip away in a Sioux blanket during the thick of the fight, and our sources of information are solely Indian. The very next year a battalion of the Fifth Cavalry passed the battle-ground with a number of Sioux scouts who but a twelvemonth previous were fighting there the Seventh Cavalry. Half a dozen of them told their stories at different times and in different places, and as to the general features of the battle, they tallied with singular exactness. These fellows were mainly Brulés and Ogalallas. Afterward we got the stories of the Uncapapas -- most interesting of all -- and from all these sources it was not hard to trace Custer's every move. One could almost portray his every emotion.
Never realizing, as I believe, the fearful odds against him, believing that he would find the village "on the run," and that between himself and Reno he could "double them up" in short order, Custer had jauntily trotted down to his death. It was a long five- mile ride from where he sighted the northern end of the village to where he struck its centre around that bold point of bluff, and from the start to the moment his guidons whirled into view, and his troopers came galloping "front into line" down near the ford, he never fairly saw the great village -- never dreamed of its depth and extent. Rounding the bluff, he suddenly found himself face to face with thousands of the boldest and most skilful warriors of the prairies. He had hoped to charge at once into the heart of the village, to hear the cheers of Reno's men from the south. Instead he was greeted with a perfect fury of flame and hissing lead from the dense thicket of willow and cottonwood, a fire that had to be answered at once.

Quickly he dismounted his men and threw them forward on the run, each fourth man holding, cavalry fashion, the horses of the other three. The line seems to have swept in parallel very nearly with the general course of the stream, but to no purpose. The foe was ten to one in their front. Boys and squaws were shooting from the willows ("Oh, we had plenty guns!" said our story-tellers); and worse than that, hundreds of young warriors had mounted their ponies and swarmed across the stream below him, hundreds more were following and circling all about him. And then it was that Custer, the hero of a hundred daring charges, seems to have realized that he must cut his way out. "Mount!" rang the trumpets, and leaving many a poor fellow on the ground, the troopers ran for their horses. Instantly from lodge and willow Ogalallas and Brulés sprang to horse and rushed to the ford in mad pursuit.

"Make for the heights!" must have been the order, for the first rush was eastward; then more to the left, as they found their progress barred. Then, as they reached higher ground, all they could see, far as they could see, circling, swooping, yelling like demons, and all the time keeping up their furious fire, were thousands of the mounted Sioux. Hemmed in, cut off, dropping fast from their saddles, Custer's men saw that retreat was impossible. They sprang to the ground, "turned their horses loose," said the Indians, and by that time half their number had fallen. A skirmish line was thrown out down the slope, and there they dropped at five yards' interval; there their comrades found them two days after. Every instant the foe rode closer and gained in numbers; every instant some poor fellow bit the dust. At last, on a mound that stands at the northern end of a little ridge, Custer, with Cook, Yates, and gallant "Brother Tom," and some dozen soldiers, all that were left by this time, gathered in the last rally. They sold their lives dearly, brave fellows that they were; but they were as a dozen to the leaves of the forest at the end of twenty minutes, and in less than twenty-five -- all was over.

Keogh, Calhoun, Crittenden, had died along the skirmish lines; Smith, Porter, and Reily were found with their men; so were the surgeons, Lord and De Wolf; so, too, were "Boston" Custer and the Herald correspondent; but two bodies were never recognized among the slain -- those of Lieutenants Harrington and "Jack" Sturgis. Down a little "cooley" some thirty men had made a rush for their lives; the Sioux had simply thronged the banks shooting them as they ran.

One trooper -- an officer, said the Sioux -- managed to break through their circle, the only white man who did, and galloped madly eastward. Five warriors started in pursuit -- two Ogalallas, two Uncapapas, and a Brulé, all well mounted. Fear lent him wings, and his splendid horse gained on all but an Uncapapa, who hung to the chase. At last, when even this one was ready to draw rein and let him go, the hunted cavalryman glanced over his shoulder, fancied himself nearly overtaken, and placing the muzzle of his revolver at his ear, pulled the trigger, and sent his own bullet through his brain. His skeleton was pointed out to the officers of the Fifth Cavalry the following year by one of the pursuers, and so it was discovered for the first time. Was it Harrington? Was it Sturgis? Poor "Jack's" watch was restored to his father some two years after the battle, having been traded off by Sioux who escaped to the British possessions; but no mention was made by these Indians of a watch thus taken. Three years ago there came a story of a new skeleton found still further from the scene. Shreds of uniform and the heavy gilding of the cavalry buttons lying near, as well as the expensive filling of several teeth, seem to indicate that this too may have been an officer. If so, all the missing are now accounted for.

Of the twelve troops of the Seventh Cavalry, Custer led five that hot Sunday into the battle of the Little Big Horn, and of his portion of the regiment only one living thing escaped the vengeance of the Sioux. Bleeding from many wounds, weak and exhausted, with piteous appeal in his eyes, there came straggling into the lines some days after the fight Myles Keogh's splendid sorrel horse Comanche. Who can ever picture his welcome as the soldiers thronged around the gallant charger? To this day they guard and cherish him in the Seventh. No more duty does Comanche perform; no rider ever mounts him. His last great service was rendered that Sunday in '76, and now, sole living relic of Custer's last rally, he spends his days with the old regiment.

But I have said that Sitting Bull was not the inspiration of the great victory won by the Sioux. With Custer's people slaughtered, the Indians left their bodies to the plundering hands of the squaws, and once more crowded upon Reno's front. There were two nights of wild triumph and rejoicing in the villages, though not one instant was the watch on Reno relaxed. All day of the 26th they kept him penned in the rifle pits, but early on the 27th, with great commotion, the lodges were suddenly taken down, and tribe after tribe, village after village, six thousand Indians passed before his eyes, making off toward the mountains. Terry and Gibbon had come; Reno's relic of the Seventh was saved. Together they explored the field, and hastily buried the mutilated dead; then hurried back to the Yellowstone while the Sioux were hiding in the fastnesses of the Big Horn. Of the rest of the summer's campaign no extended mention is needed here. The Indians were shrewd enough to know that now at least the commands of Crook and Terry would be heavily re-enforced, and then the hunt would be relentless. Soon as their scouts reported the assembly of new and strong bodies of troops upon the Yellowstone and Platte, the great confederation quietly dissolved. Sitting Bull, with many chosen followers, made for the Yellowstone, and was driven northward by General Miles. Others took refuge across the Little Missouri, whither Crook pursued, and by dint of hard marching and fighting that fall and winter many bands and many famous chiefs were whipped into surrender. Among these, bravest, most brilliant, most victorious of all, was the hero of the Powder River fight on Patrick's Day, the warrior Crazy Horse.

The fame of his exploit had reached the Indian camps along the Rosebud before this young chief, with his followers, Ogalalla and Brule, came to swell the ranks of Sitting Bull. Again, on the 17th of June, he had been foremost in the stirring fight with Crook, and when the entire band moved over into the valley of the Little Big Horn, and the Brulés, Ogalallas, and Sans Arcs pitched their tepees in the chosen ground, the very centre of the camp, it is safe to say that among the best and experienced fighters, the tribes from the White River and their neighbors the Cheyennes, no chief was so honored and believed in as Crazy Horse.
In pitching the new camp, the Blackfeet were farthest south - up stream; next came the Uncapapas, with their renowned medicine-man, Sitting Bull; then the Ogalallas, Brulés, and Cheyennes, covering the whole "bottom" opposite the shoulder of bluff around which Custer hove in sight; farthest north were the Minneconjoux; and the great village contained at least six thousand aboriginal souls. Now up to this time Sitting Bull had no real claims as a war chief. Eleven days before the fight there was a "sun dance." His own people have since told us these particulars, and the best story-teller among them was that bright-faced squaw of Tatonka-he- gle-ska - Spotted Horn Bull - who accompanied the party on their Eastern trip. She is own cousin to Sitting Bull, and knows whereof she speaks. The chief had a trance and a vision. Solemnly he assured his people that within a few days they would be attacked by a vast force of white soldiers, but that the Sioux should triumph over them; and when the Crows and Crook's command appeared on the 17th, it was a partial redemption of his promise.

Wary scouts saw Reno's column turning back down the Rosebud after discovering the trail, and nothing, they judged, would come from that quarter. All around Crook's camp on Goose Creek the indications were that the "Gray Fox" was simply waiting for more soldiers before he would again venture forth. Sitting Bull had no thought of new attack for days to come, when, early on the morning of the 25th, two Cheyenne Indians who had started eastward at dawn came dashing back to the bluffs, and waving their blankets, signalled, "White soldiers - heaps - coming quick." Instantly all was uproar and confusion.

Of course women and children had to be hurried away, the great herds of ponies gathered in, and the warriors assembled to meet the coming foe. Even as the chiefs were hastening to the council lodge there came the crash of rapid volleys from the south. It was Reno's attack -- an attack from a new and utterly unexpected quarter -- and this, with the news that Long Hair was thundering down the ravine across the stream, was too much for Sitting Bull. Hurriedly gathering his household about him, he lashed his pony to the top of his speed, and fled westward for safety. Miles he galloped before he dare stop for breath. Behind him he could hear the roar of battle and on he would have sped but for the sudden discovery that one of his twin children was missing. Turning, he was surprised to find the firing dying away, soon ceasing altogether. In half an hour more he managed to get back to camp, where the missing child was found, but the battle had been won without him. Without him the Blackfeet and Uncapapas had repelled Reno and penned him on the bluffs. Without him the Ogalallas, Brulés, and Cheyennes had turned back Custer's daring assault, then rushed forth and completed the death-gripping circle in which he was held. Again had Crazy Horse been foremost in the fray, riding in and braining the bewildered soldiers with his heavy war club. Fully had his vision been realized, but Sitting Bull was not there.

For a long time it was claimed for him by certain sycophantic followers that from the council lodge he directed the battle; but it would not do. When the old sinner was finally starved out of her Majesty's territory, and came in to accept the terms accorded him, even his own people could not keep straight faces when questioned as to the cause of the odd names given those twins, "The-One-that-was-taken" and "The-One-that-was-left." Finally it all leaked out, and now "none so poor to do him reverence."

Of course it was his role to assume all the airs of a conqueror, to be insolent and defiant to the "High Joint Commission," sent the following winter to beg him to come home and be good; but the claims of Tatonka-e-Yotanka to the leadership in the greatest victory his people ever won are mere vaporings, to be classed with the boastings of dozens of chiefs who were scattered over the Northern reservations during the next few years. Rain-in- the-Face used to brag by the hour that he had killed Custer with his own hand, but the other Indians laughed at him. Gall, of the Uncapapas, Spotted Eagle, Kill Eagle, Lame Deer, Lone Wolf, and all the varieties of Bears and Bulls were probably leading spirits in the battle, but the man who more than all others seems to have won the admiration of his fellows for skill and daring throughout that stirring campaign, and especially on that bloody day, is he who so soon after met his death in desperate effort to escape from Crook's guards, the warrior Crazy Horse.

["Hunk" Papa]

Jun 14, 2012 4:06:08 GMT -6 herosrest said:

Charles King (1844-1933) was amongst a number of noted late 19th & early 20th century military writers and novelists; another was Stanley Vestal or Walter Campbell. Amongst King's title's are 'Trumpeter Fred'; 'Long Distance Riding' 1870's US Cavalry riding on the Plains, 'Indian Campaigns: Sketches of Cavalry Service in Arizona and on the Northern Plains; and Campaigning with Crook, and Stories of Army Life', which details events of the Summer 1876 campaign and Fighting the Plains - of interest is Chapter IX. The Fight of the Rear Guard, how it is done, by an officer who was there doing it. His 'Custer's Last Battle' article on Little Big Horn published in the august 1890 edition of Harper's Magazine with a sketch map of the battle, and offers very interesting insight to military understanding, thought and loyalties. King was 5th Cavalry and proud of the best regiment in the army.

Yep, they all wrote stuff. Yep, King wrote stuff after talking with some Lakotas. Nope, none of it adds to our knowledge of what happened. Yep, you are winning the competition for filling up most message board space with the most irrelevance.

Congratulations, though there are no other entrants.

Sincerely,

Hunk

[Yan Taylor]

Yesterday Herosrest posted this little (well enormous) ditty:

From Frank Grouard's biography, ' The Indians told Grouard that when Custer's attempt to cross the "Little Big Horn had been frustrated, the command headed directly east for the high bluffs, behind which hundreds of Indians were secreted. These rose up to meet Custer as his men advanced. Not knowing that the savages were there, Custer was taken completely by surprise, and attempted, by a charge, to force his way through the enemy to the northeast. But he met with such a withering fire that he was compelled to seek lower ground, and in doing so he met the enemy's force that, by this time, had crossed the river and filled all the draws to the north, and was compelled to feel his way west and south, which accounts for the finding of the bodies of his command lying in almost a perfect circle.

Well Boys and Girls, we have been going over this time after time for years, and HR lays it out in front of us, the Indians were in fact hiding around Calhoun Hill just waiting to jump Custer.

Ian.

[herosrest]

If nothing else, there is endless fun to be had from the skirmish lines depicted by King and the ubiquitous - E F L I C. Capt. Henry B. Freeman's sketch comes in handy. Just how did Company C or C Troop, loose their red horses?


Charles King's assessment of Custer's fight has guidons whirling into view, and troopers galloping front into line down near the ford to charge at once into the heart of the village meeting Reno's men from the south. Instead, suddenly faced with thousands of warriors.and greeted with hissing lead from dense thicket of willow and cottonwood, he dismounted men and threw them forward on the run, each fourth man holding the horses.

The line seems to have swept in parallel very nearly with the general course of the stream. The foe was ten to one in their front. Boys and squaws were shooting from the willows ("Oh, we had plenty guns!" said our story-tellers); hundreds of warriors swarmed across the stream below him, hundreds more were following and circling all about. This is the historical record and not that developed for a hundred and thirty more years from initial assessments by Benteen in particular, and Reno, both of opinion immediately after battle that there was little or no time for the companies to form a line, being a regular buffalo hunt that not a man escaped. There was a breadth and scale of impudence to Benteen that far exceeds any understanding of arrogance.

King's views of the fighting were formed in 1877, the bodies still lay on the ground and Brulés, Ogalallas and Uncapapas who fought 7th Cavalry twle months previous, gave accounts which 'tallied with singular exactness'. Importantly, there is evidence from King of Custer's fighting line at the river, and the battle fought makes entire sense of the historical record which confounds so many of its author's.

Reno felt that the trail showed moved rapidly; Companies C and I, and perhaps part of E, crossed to the village or attempted it; at the charge and fell back followed too closely to permit any kind of line. Benteen thought nearly all companies were driven from the village, crossing two instead of the one ford by which they entered. E Company by the left and F, I, and L by the one they crossed. What became of C Company was unknown as very few of their horses were found.'

Author's note - I maintain unequivicaly that Custer's column rode directly to the mouth of Medicine Tail Creek by the most direct route. This is indicated by all ealy evidence of the battle. I do not accept in any form, machinations that stem from Godfrey's disaster by his asessment of events. Godfrey dismissed out of hand and ignored eye-witness record of his colleague Charles Varnum. That speaks for its self. Of the battlefield King saw what Godfrey did, with the benefit of accounts from those who fought. King one, Godfrey nil. By his contempt for Varnum, Godfrey's route for Custer's advance, and subsequent adoption of Cedar Coulee are disqualified as 'even' wishful thinking.

Developing King's scenario is rewarding and enlightening. Reno showed during his fight an entire lack of military ability and nous, and where King reveals a fighting retreat by detachment across and onto the west flank of Deep Coulee, Reno, Benteen, and many since, see squalid route as evinced by Benteen or a sedate march in column to a family reunion. A truly sad state of affairs aggravated ad finitum by theory after theory pushing conflict further and further down the river and away from reality. King's assessment works - he understood what warriors told him, he understood how cavalry fought, and was broadly correct as to how the fight went down. It was unfortunate he did not gain benefit of Cheyenne experience, but 5th Cavalry were really not that tribes cup of tea.

["Hunk" Papa]

Jun 15, 2012 10:24:26 GMT -6 herosrest said:

If nothing else, there is endless fun to be had from the skirmish lines depicted by King and the ubiquitous - E F L I C. Capt. Henry B. Freeman's sketch comes in handy. Just how did Company C or C Troop, loose their red horses?

Charles King's assessment of Custer's fight has guidons whirling into view, and troopers galloping front into line down near the ford to charge at once into the heart of the village meeting Reno's men from the south. Instead, suddenly faced with thousands of warriors.and greeted with hissing lead from dense thicket of willow and cottonwood, he dismounted men and threw them forward on the run, each fourth man holding the horses.

The line seems to have swept in parallel very nearly with the general course of the stream. The foe was ten to one in their front. Boys and squaws were shooting from the willows ("Oh, we had plenty guns!" said our story-tellers); hundreds of warriors swarmed across the stream below him, hundreds more were following and circling all about. This is the historical record and not that developed for a hundred and thirty more years from initial assessments by Benteen in particular, and Reno, both of opinion immediately after battle that there was little or no time for the companies to form a line, being a regular buffalo hunt that not a man escaped. There was a breadth and scale of impudence to Benteen that far exceeds any understanding of arrogance.

King's views of the fighting were formed in 1877, the bodies still lay on the ground and Brulés, Ogalallas and Uncapapas who fought 7th Cavalry twle months previous, gave accounts which 'tallied with singular exactness'. Importantly, there is evidence from King of Custer's fighting line at the river, and the battle fought makes entire sense of the historical record which confounds so many of its author's.

Reno felt that the trail showed moved rapidly; Companies C and I, and perhaps part of E, crossed to the village or attempted it; at the charge and fell back followed too closely to permit any kind of line. Benteen thought nearly all companies were driven from the village, crossing two instead of the one ford by which they entered. E Company by the left and F, I, and L by the one they crossed. What became of C Company was unknown as very few of their horses were found.'

Author's note - I maintain unequivicaly that Custer's column rode directly to the mouth of Medicine Tail Creek by the most direct route. This is indicated by all ealy evidence of the battle. I do not accept in any form, machinations that stem from Godfrey's disaster by his asessment of events. Godfrey dismissed out of hand and ignored eye-witness record of his colleague Charles Varnum. That speaks for its self. Of the battlefield King saw what Godfrey did, with the benefit of accounts from those who fought. King one, Godfrey nil. By his contempt for Varnum, Godfrey's route for Custer's advance, and subsequent adoption of Cedar Coulee are disqualified as 'even' wishful thinking.

Developing King's scenario is rewarding and enlightening. Reno showed during his fight an entire lack of military ability and nous, and where King reveals a fighting retreat by detachment across and onto the west flank of Deep Coulee, Reno, Benteen, and many since, see squalid route as evinced by Benteen or a sedate march in column to a family reunion. A truly sad state of affairs aggravated ad finitum by theory after theory pushing conflict further and further down the river and away from reality. King's assessment works - he understood what warriors told him, he understood how cavalry fought, and was broadly correct as to how the fight went down. It was unfortunate he did not gain benefit of Cheyenne experience, but 5th Cavalry were really not that tribes cup of tea.

King became a novelist of some note so his use of wording in the descriptions you mention should not be surprising.

His understanding of the LBH fighting is conjecture. He wasn't there but like the novelist he would become, he smelled a good story. What he says is not enlightening, quite the contrary and it is the likes of King who have muddied the waters of the history of the LBH simply because they are who they are, not because they have any better insight than anyone else who was not there. But, believe who you will.

Regards.

Hunk

[elkslayer]

Thanks for posting the Harper's article!

Jim

[herosrest]

Hi H,

King was a writer of note, no R.E. Howard but enjoyable boys own stuff and decent novels. He was a soldier and a fighting man, who visited the field 1n 1877, quite how is difficult to pin, but I guess it was escorting Gen. Sheridan shortly after the his brother recovered the officers bodies. Mike Sheridan had a good nose around the fords and gave testimony ar Reno's Inquiry.

King understood what he looked at and what was told by warriors who fought, of course not the whole story, no one could ever know it all - but he understood what he saw as a fighting officer. Evidence, bodies laying, horse remains and warrior accounts. He got a better idea of events than most others.

Regards,

[herosrest]

Peppermint stripes.

The concept that elements of Custer's advance east of the river, progressed early towards river crossings below (downriver) Last Stand Hill and Deep Ravine, is the stuff that whirls around cotton candy sticks. All that was ever downriver that far was thousands of ponies and I should imagine, that in that day's heat it was the last place anyone was tempted to visit. Refugees from the camps fled to the west, directly away from the river, they did not flee to downriver. Cheyennes who escaped across the stream onto Greasy Grass Ridge ran straight back into Shoulder Blade Creek and warriors stayed between them and the soldiers.

Evidence for skirmish lines at Ford B, the mouth of Medicine Tale Creek, and the mouth of Deep Coulee.

Capt. McDougall during testimony to Court during Reno's Inquiry (W.A. Graham; 1933, p476-477) went to where he presumed the skirmish line was killed on Custer's battlefield, before being ordered to take his company to the village and bury Company E. The skirmish line he spoke of was about one hundred yards from the ford where he crossed, which he identified as Ford B.

The Aricaree scout Stabbed rode a race winning horse. (O.G. Libby; ND Historical Collections, vol 6, 1920. p67)

Trumpeter Martin indicated on 'Exhibit 2', to the Reno Inquiry, where he returned from with a written note from Custer, ordering Benteen quickly to go to the Big Village with the packs or pack train.

Ford B, the mouth of Medicine Tale Creek, and that of Deep Coulee have been heavily collected, since the days of the battle and long prior to archaeolical study. From Douglas D. Scott's 2004 final technical report, 'Archeological Mitigation of the Federal Lands Highway Program Plan to Rehabilitate Tour Road, Route 10, Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument, Montana'

'The 1994 (Scott and Bleed 1997) and 2004 archeological evidence for combat at the mouth of Medicine Tail Coulee is meager, but is definitely present. The area has been heavily collected as indicated by Greene¡¯s (1986) summary of previous collecting efforts. The area has also been the subject of many other uses. Its primary use is grazing land, but at least one movie (Little Big Man, 1970) was filmed along the tour road at the coulee¡¯s mouth. Archeological evidence of the movie making was recovered in the form of 5-in-1 movie cartridge cases (a blank cartridge designed for use in .44-caliber and .45-caliber firearms) and various other caliber blank cartridge cases. The Last Stand sequence was filmed on a cutbank west of the tour road at the mouth of Deep Coulee. Ample evidence of that scene¡¯s filming was recovered there. The charge to the river was filmed at the mouth of Medicine Tail Coulee where it joins the Little Bighorn River, and movie debris was recovered there as well.

However, the 1994 investigations did recover two pieces of a broken Model 1874 army mess knife, a period butcher knife of the type that might have been carried by a soldier or a warrior as a sheath or belt knife, a lead rifle ball, the cylinder pin to a Colt revolver, and a .30-caliber Remington Smoot revolver cartridge case. Don Rickey and J. W. Vaughn (Greene 1986:20¨C25) also report finding a few .45-caliber army carbine cartridge cases, some equipment and personal items, bullets, and Indian caliber cartridge cases at or near the ford. Greene¡¯s compilation and the 1994 archeological data are entirely consistent in type and quantity. Those data are also consistent with the historical accounts that a small action with only limited firing occurred at the ford. The finds of soldier equipment indicates some items were lost at or near the ford, and are consistent with the conclusion reached by Rickey and Vaughn (Greene 1986:23) that at least one cavalry horse may have been hit, and in plunging around, scattered items attached to the saddle.'

A host of tribal authorites gave unconflicting account of the fighting. Northern Cheyenne White Bull (Ice Bear), told George B. Grinnell in 1898, 'Custer rode down to the river bank and formed a line of battle and charged, and then they stopped and fell back up the hill, but he met Indians coming from above and from all sides, and again formed a line. It was here that they were killed.

Curley is considered circumspectly over events at Medicine Tail Creek and beyond. Therefore the matter is considered by means of jumbled logic.

Exhibit No 4 of the Reno Inquiry, (W.A. Graham, 1933, p563), Maj. Reno's report of July 5th, 1876; indicates time as understood by Reno. He thought it was about 10-30am that Terry rode into his lines. This broadly and accurately 'was' the time at which that event occured. Reno's time information is reliably accurate.

Note - Exhibit 4 indicates thus, 'I had written a communication to General Terry and three volunteers were to try and reach him. The men started and were told to go as near as it was safe to determine whether the approaching column was white men, and to return at once in case they found it so; but if they were Indians to push on to Gen. Terry. In a short time we saw them returning over the high bluffs already alluded to. They were accompanied by a scout who had a note from Terry to Custer.'



The scout carrying the note from Terry to Custer was Curley, as stated in The Vanishing Race, Dixon 1913. This was the morning of June 27th, before 10.30pm.

(O.G. Libby; ND Historical Collections, Volume 6; p107-109

They could see the trees above which the smoke rose. As they watched, off past the old Dakota camp to the west was a ridge over two miles away and here they saw a band or body of people moving over the ridge and down toward the Dakota camp. They thought it was a band of Dakotas returning to camp from hunting. 1, 2

Then the party approached the five Dakota tents and they rode about among them. The commanding officer said to Young Hawk and Forked Horn: "They are the white men who were coming to help us. Saddle up and go to them." So these two scouts rode to meet them down the ridge to the west and across the Custer ford until they were quite near to the party. Then they saw that they were whites and they rode back again. 3

The soldiers in the party were busy stripping off the buckskin shirts from the bodies of the dead Dakotas there and taking their ear-rings. When the scouts got back they told the officer through the interpreter, Gerard, that the party were white men. The officer, Varnum, said that these were the white men whom they were expecting to come and help them. It was not right that Custer went ahead, he ought to have waited. The officer then said: "Now let us go and look for Custer's body. 4

Forked Horn, Red-Foolish-Bear, Goose, Young Hawk, and Gerard, Varnum, and some soldiers (the Dakotas called one of these soldiers Jack Drum Beater, probably a white drummer) went down to look for Custer's body. They went north along the ridge and followed Custer's trail across a low soft place or coulee east of the hill called Custer's last stand. On the other side of the ravine they began to find dead soldiers lying with a few dead horses. When they came to the flat-topped hill where Custer fell, the officer, through Gerard, told the scouts to go off east on the hill and watch for the Dakotas lest they come back to attack them. Lying all over the hill Young Hawk saw dead horses of the Dakotas and of the whites and also many bodies of the soldiers, lying stripped. He also saw the circle breastwork made of dead horses on top of the hill. 5

Varnum told them through the interpreter that when they found Custer's body the bugle would call and Gerard would go and tell the scouts that they had found his body. The scouts had not been long on the hill watching (a little more than half a mile away) when they heard the bugle sound the reveille and Gerard came to tell them that Custer's body had been found. When he told them this they came back to camp, the sun was near the horizon and they were very hungry. The commanding officer said: "Let's go to the village and follow along up the river through where the Sioux camped.

The soldiers at the camp had been placing the dead in rows in preparation for the burial. They crossed lower down than where they had first crossed, a good watering place, right below Custer's hill (probably the Custer ford) . The body of Bloody Knife lay a little back from the brush near the ford. He saw evidence of fighting from the Custer hill clear to the river by the dead horses, though he saw no bodies of soldiers.

1 The Indians set fire to the grass in the valley about 2 p.m. to screen their movements and about 7pm they were seen going toward the Big Horn Mountains. (Report of Secretary of War, 1876, I, p478)

2 Colonel Gibbon refers to an encounter with the scouts. "Our scouts brought in news that they had encountered some Indians, and given chase, had run them across the Big Horn. They had dropped articles in their flight which proved them to be Crows, assigned to duty with Lieut.-Col. Custer's command. They having discovered that their pursuers belonged to their own tribe, refused to come back, and called across the river that Custer's command had been entirely destroyed by the Sioux. (Report of Secretary of War, 1376, I, p473)

3 Gibbon and Terry with their column were arriving. Two of the Crow scouts had come to camp and told of the disaster but Terry did not believe their story. He was bringing medical assistance. (Godfrey, Custer's Last Battle, p382)

4 A detachment under Captain Benteen proceeded to the battle-ground. Lieutenant Bradley, Seventh Infantry, was the first of Terry's command to reach the field of carnage. (Report of Secretary of War, 1876, I, pp. 478, 473)

5 Godfrey, Custer's Last Battle, p375.




Capt. J.S. Payne, 5th Cavalry gave in testimony to the Reno Inquiry, that: 'That watering place (Ford B), as it is called, was not upon the line I measured. That is at the mouth of what we call Muddy Creek. That is, it is a dry wallow that evidently, at certain seasons of the year, is full of water. It breaks through the bluff, and empties in the Little Big Horn at that point. (Graham:1933, p234)

On the 27th June, Young Hawk rode with Benteen, went north along the ridge and followed Custer's trail across a low soft place or coulee east of the hill called Custer's last stand. On the other side of the ravine they began to find dead soldiers lying with a few dead horses. Young Hawk did not give evidence to the Court of Inquiry. Young Hawk saw dead soldiers, horses and ponies lying dead all over the hill, a circle breastwork of dead horses on top of the hill, and evidence of fighting from the Custer hill clear to the river by the dead horses, though he saw no bodies of soldiers.

At the Reno Inquiry Lt. Maguire indicated progress by Custer's companies as B to D to E to H. Therefore 'dead in a circle around the crest of a little hill and quite a number of empty shells', were found before reaching D from B, on the way from Ford B towards Calhoun Hill.

Before 10.30am, 27th June, a scout reached Ren a note from Terry to Custer.' The scout carrying was Curley, as stated in The Vanishing Race, Dixon 1913, p163-164; ' 'The next morning (26th June)about five or six o'clock I was at Gen. Terry's camp and reported. Terry called his officers about him. I could not speak English and there were no interpreters there, so I took the grass and piled it all up in a heap, then I took my fingers and scattered it wide apart, and attempted in this way to show that the soldiers were all killed. Then Gen.Terry gave me a dispatch. I was very tired and did not want to go, but I had to take this dispatch from General Terry, to Reno at the packtrain. Reno gave me a dispatch to take back to Terry, while they were burying the dead soldiers. Then another dispatch was given me to take to the head command at the steamboat.

The doctor with Gibbon's column, Lt. H. Offley-Paulding described Curley thus; 'What we know of Custer depends of course on the signs discovered and the statement of Curley who is a good, brave and truthful young warrior of the Crow tribe. He says they fought well and were not afraid to die.' 'The particulars in brief as we learned them from these officers and from one of our Crow scouts named Curley with Custer until the fight was over or nearly so and escaped mixing with Sioux after all the whites were killed but 5, one of whom was then wounded, were about as follows:....
..... he marched his regiment 75 miles in 36 hours, resting about 5 hours, so for 31 hours his men were in the saddle with but one interval. They were then, about 8am of the 25th,where they could see the smoke of a big Indian camp on the Little Horn and very soon after Custer, becoming satisfied that he was discovered, determined to attack at once so as to give them no chance to leave. He ordered Capt. Benteen with 4 companies to guard the pack train and proceed toward the bluffs, while he with 5 companies attacked from one end of the village, and Reno with I believe 3 companies was to charge down toward Custer from the other. Before making his final disposition he sent a scout ahead to find out where the tepees were the thickest, as there was where he would charge.
The scout returned and it is said that when he reported told Custer with perfect terror that there were lodges as thick as the grass and begged him not to fight so many. Custer merely said with a laugh that he was glad they were all there. Then giving his orders to Reno and Benteen he left them. (Field Artillery Magazine, Jul1936, p343-360)

Curley was with Terry's expedition at the battlefield from 27th June until sent with a despatch to the Far West where he arrived before Muggin's Taylor; who could not have arrived until the morning of 29th June, and carried a letter from Gibbon for Maj. Benham at Fort Ellis, written after 3pm of June 28th. (New York Times, june 29th, 1902)

As Lt. Paulding understood matters explained to him, Custer before making his final disposition sent a scout ahead who returned to report before Reno and Benteen left.

George Herendeen in July, 1876 told of viewing into the valley: 'Custer had Officer's Call blown, gave his orders, and the command was put in fighting order. The scouts were odrdered forward and the regiment moved at a walk. After three miles the scouts reportd Indians ahead, and the command took the trail. The way lay down a little creek, a branch of the Little Horn, and after going six miles we discovered an Indian lodge ahead and Custer bore down on it at a stiff trot. In coming to it we found ourselves in a freshly abandoned Indian camp, all the lodges gone except the one seen, which contained a dead Indian. From this point we could see into the Little Big Horn valley, and observed heavy clouds of dust rising five miles distant.

Oglalla He Dog "When we fought Crook, the Ogalalla village was on Sundance Creek not far from Little Bighorn. A bluff with pines on it near by. (Camp Collection, interview with William Berger on July 13, 1910)

The pine covered hill (vantage point) was at the White Buttes, near a Lone Tepee on the north side of Reno Creek some four miles from the LBH river, below the point at which the the middle and south forks meet. Observations from there by the crow scouts were reported back to Custer. The camp was large and not running away.

White Man Runs Him - 'From the vantage point of the hills where they had seen the camp Hairy Moccasin was sent still farther in advance to reconnoitre. He climbed a pine-clad hill, found the Sioux everywhere, and then he rode back and reported to General Custer the size and position of the camp. On hearing the report Custer hurried up his command.' (Dixon; 1913, p140)

"About nine miles down the Upper Fork of Ash Creek, we found a lodge with a dead Indian inside. As we passed by, some soldiers set fire to this lodge. Custer halted his command on a small flat about a mile and a quarter from the mouth of Ash Creek, and ordered Maj. Reno to swing out to the left, cross the Little Horn and attack the upper end of the Sioux village. He saw some dust rising near the mouth of the Creek and called Half Yellow Face, leader of the Crows, to him and asked what the dust was. Half Yellow Face said: "The Sioux must be running away." But Custer said: "I will throw my left wing south in case the Sioux should go that way." Then Reno moved out and crossed the Creek just below the flat." (Brig. Gen. H.L. Scott/ WMRH; 1919)

The scouts made a circle about Custer, who said; ''Well, I want to tell you this, the way I want it. We all want to charge together and after we get to the Sioux camp I want you to run off all the horses you can."

The charge began for the Dakota camp; they went three or four miles and Custer went on the high butte and came down after seeing the Dakota camp. The scouts led on with the charge and reached the lone tepee about noon. It was about as far to the Little Big Horn as it was from the high butte to the lone tepee. It was nearly 3 o 'clock when they reached the Dakota camp. They rode at full speed with Custer and Little Sioux about the middle. (O.G. Libby, 1923; North Dakota Historical Collections, Volume 6, p150-151)

At the conference scouts told Custer he would find enough Dakotas to keep him fighting two or three days. The General smiled and remarked, "I guess we will get through with them in one day." ¡ª Godfrey, Custer's Last Battle, p367.

C. T. Coggeshall (General Office of U.S. Indian Service, Washington, D.C.) succeeded Dr. W. Q. Tucker as superintendent in 1909. Dr. Walter Q. Tucker says that the creek which Godfrey calls Reno Creek is rightly named Medicine Tail and the one he marks as Benteen Cr. they call up at the Crow Agency Reno's Creek. He says that H.M. Mechling who got a medal for going down for water, piloted Doctor Tucker, Col. Grover, Mr. Burgess, the missionary at the Agecy to the field 2 years ago and pointed out where Custer camped before he came onto the Little Big Horn, & where Custer made his disposition of troops. Up about 7 miles from the mouth of Reno Creek Benteen broke off to the left; somewhat nearer down Custer broke off & went over by the neighbourhood of Custer Butte, & he says that Custer and his scouts might have gone up on Custer's lookout. - (Voices of the American West. E.S. Ricker, R.E. Jensen)

On June 9, on Tongue River Gen. Crooks command was attacked by Little Hawk, the soldiers met them with a long rain of bullets, and they gave up and returned to their camp. 'Cheyenne Little Hawk said: "Near the head of the Rosebud, where it bends to turn into the hills, we saw soldiers. There are many Indians with them. They may come right down the Rosebud." He led a party straight across Wolf Mountains. With young Two Moon's were about two hundred Sioux and Cheyennes and the sister of Chief Comes in Sight.

Stanley Vestal - It was about 25 miles as the crow flies from the Village near the forks of Reno Creek to the place where the Battle of the Rosebud was fought. The war party followed a route about ten miles longer up the south fork of Reno Creek and down Corral Creek. Nearly one thousand warriors Ogallala, Miniconjou, Sans Arc, Brul¨¦, and Hunkpapa Sioux, and the Cheyennes set out late at night, unsaddled to rest a while and at daybreak moved on. (The Fighting Cheyennes, G.B. Grinnell, p333-334)

On 25th June 1876, as Capt Benteen's column headed towards the bluffs about 5 miles away at what is called today Long Otter Creek, there was a recent heavy trail along the South Fork of Reno Creek. Benteen arrived near the village at 2pm. The retreat from the valley by Reno was chaotic, and unexpected by.............. everyone. As Reno emerged from the timber the Cheyenne Wooden Leg had arrived on the field. Indians crowded toward the timber where were the soldiers. More and more of our people kept coming. Sioux and a few Cheyennes showered arrows into the timber and bullets whistled in return as we stayed far back and extended our curved line farther and farther around the big grove of trees. Some dead soldiers had been left among the grass and sagebrush where they firstfought. It seemed to me the remainder of them would not live many hours longer. Sioux were creeping forward to set fire to the timber.

Suddenly the soldiers came tearing on horseback from the woods. I was on the side where they came out and whirled my horse and dashed to escape them. All others of my companions did the same. But soon we discovered they were not following us. They were running away from us. They were going as fast their tired horses could carry them across an open valley toward the river. We stopped, looked a moment and whipped our ponies into pursuit. A throng of Sioux also were coming after them. My distant position put me among the leaders in the chase. The soldier horses moved slowly, as if they were very tired. Ours were lively. We gained rapidly on them.

Terry's report of June 27th. General Custer, with five companies, C, E, F, I, and L, attempted to enter about three miles lower down. Reno, forded the river, charged down its left bank, and fought on foot until finally completely overwhelmed by numbers he was compelled to mount and recross the river and seek a refuge on the high bluffs which overlook its right bank. Just as he recrossed, Captain Benteen, who, with three companies, D, H, and K, was some two (2) miles to the left of Reno when the action commenced, but who had been ordered by General Custer to return, came to the river, and rightly concluding that it was useless for his force to attempt to renew the fight in the valley, he joined Reno on the bluffs. Captain McDougall with his company (B) was at first some distance in the rear with a train of pack mules. He also came up to Reno. Soon this united force was nearly surrounded by Indians, many of whom armed with rifles, occupied positions which commanded the ground held by the cavalry, ground from which there was no escape. Rifle-pits were dug, and the fight was maintained, though with heavy loss, from about half past 2 o'clock of the 25th till 6 o'clock of the 26th.

Terry, on 27th June was unaware of the movement by Reno, after Weir's company, made downriver from Reno Hill towards Custer.

Lt. Edgerley saw Reno's retreat from the valley. 18 August 1881, "We hurried forward in the direction of the ford where Reno had crossed, with intent to hurry to his support; but as we approached the ford a Crow scout, Half Yellow Face, came out upon our right and beckoned us to come up on the hill. We immediately turned to the right and went up the hill." After the last message to Benteen.

Double D wobble effects.

Lt's DeRudio, Edgerley and Gibson placed events surrounding officer's call to 10.00am. Maj. Reno placed these events before 11.00am. Capt. Benteen riding a fast walking horse at 5mph (Graham, 1933, p382) during three hours from 11.00am to 2.00pm would cover 15 miles at stedy gait looking for the valley before seeing Maj. Reno retreat, from a valley. The distance covered advancing from the officer's call to the tepee one mile from ford A is ten to eleven miles. Custer advanced a further five miles to Ford B. Reno advanced three miles to skirmish in the valley.

The opening exchanges with Custer's five companies involved a band of up to fifty Cheyennes east of the river. Relevant text is 'Sweet Medicine' by Father P.J. Powell, named by the Cheyenne as Stone Forehead.

'The soldiers were just going down toward the river and were almost out of sight. The cheyenne split into two goups and rode north and south of the divide, until they nearly reached the bottom. Some warriors chased the soldiers, others circled to cut them off.

The soldiers opened fire and the lndians moved back behind the troops, allowing them on down toward the river. They followed into the dry gulch above the head of Medicine Tail , close to the present battle monument. Cheyennes and Sioux were thus behind the cavalry, cutting off retreat to the north.

Custer followed the ridge down to a level place, near the present cemetary site. Yellow Nose and Low Dog, were first to cross the river and rode back in front of the soldiers, firing at them. This slowed down Custer's advance. More warriors joined them and the soldiers began pulling back, moving on down toward the river across from the Cheyenne camp.'

Where is the level place, near the present cemetary site. The cemetary site the battlefield, where Custer's command were buried. Crow scouts caught up to Custer after watching Maj. Reno's engagement in the valley. According to White Man Runs Him, Custer was right down by the river and everyone was shooting. This was told in 1919 during interview with Brig. Gen. H.L. Scott at the mouth of Deep Coulee. In 1907, White Man Runs Him had accompanied Edward S. Curtis over the battlefield describing events, which were noted to Curtis's map, showing Custer at the terminus of Greasy Grass Ridge near the mouth of Deep Coulee and across from the Cheyenne village in the valley across Little Big Horn river.

'We went down to the Little Horn until we came to a little coulee, and were moving towards the enemy's camp. We wanted to cross the river at that place. The Sioux fired at us. We then went up the hill to the ridge. I was all along the ridge where the fight was raging. We looked over the river, and saw Reno in his engagement with the Sioux. Finally they wiped out Reno, and he retreated to the hills. Custer and all of us got off our horses here. At that time the enemy was surrounding us. They were banging away at us. We had a heavy skirmish. (The Vanishing Race; J.K. Dixon; 1913, p167)

Goes Ahead; 'Custer also opened fire just beyond the Medicine Creek where he had crossed. Soon after Reno opened fire Custer began his fire.

Did Custer and Keogh deploy to skirmish near the river at the mouth of Deep Coulee? If so, what was going on..........?

Goes Ahead said that Custer crossed the ridge, going over to the Medicine Tail Creek which runs into the Little Horn. There on the creek General Custer dismounted, and said prayers to the Heavenly Father. I wonder if he said grace? Having galloped five miles or so from watering horses for ten minutes after leaving Reno, it wuld have been neccesary to halt the horses for ten minutes or so, as mentioned by Trumpeter Martin during his testimony at the Reno Inquiry.

White Man Runs Him - 'The Indians saw him there, and all began running that way. There were thousands of them. Custer tried to cross the river at the mouth of Medicine Tail Creek, but was unable to do so.

Curley - 'We finally came out at the Creek and seeing we were a long ways away from the valley, turning left, Custer rode down Medicine Tail. He halted the command and the gray horse troop left and started down the creek, when we turned north crossing Medicine Tail Creek going on the hills north of the creek where the command halted again.

'When they neared the river the Indians, concealed in the undergrowth on the opposite side of the stream, opened fire on the troops, which checked the advance. Here a portion of the command were dismounted and thrown forward to the river, and returned the fire of the Indians.' During this time the warriors were seen riding out of the village by hundreds and deploying across Custer's front and to his left, as if with the intention of crossing the stream on his right, while the women and children were seen hastening out of the village in large numbers in the opposite direction.

Wooden Leg (Marquis) told that families fled west of the valley rather down river, and from Stanley Vestal's investigations of Sitting Bull, that the chief held a force of warriors in reserve to the west of the valley and opposite Last Stand Hill.

There were two creeks running across the valley floor where the tribes camped when Custer attacked, both were down steam of the Cheyennes, the nearest to them being Shoulder Blade Creek, which is that shown in the map of the battle obtained by Lt. Clark in 1877. Threfore the crossing place indicated 'D', is not Ford D, it is the Cheyenne Ford or Ford C, 800 yards downriver of Ford B. That is the lower ford indicated on Capt. Freeman's sketch of the battlefield, and is where Crazy Horse crossed over to the attack. This was watched by Brul¨¦ Foolish Elk from his tepee in the valley.

Theory

Custer's march was given to E.S. Curtis as arriving at Ford B, where a halt of up to ten minutes occured during which time a messenger (Stabbed) arrived, and Trumpeter Martin was then sent towards Benteen. Reno's skirmisher's were seen in the valley fighting by Martin during his ride. They were withdrawn from the vally into the timber after no more than twenty minutes fighting. There may have been an attemt to cross the river at Ford B, or simply an examintion of the banks, before Company E were sent along the river (creek) and Custer moved the command towards the divide with Deep Coulee by keeping beyond effective range of gunfire from across the river. During this time warriors such as Wolf Tooth and Big Foot skirmished and backed off as the troopers moved into and across the mouth of Deep Coulee, swinging towards the river at Greasy Grass ridge. An officer was or had been wounded during that time. It was the march across the mouth of Deep Coule towards the river that was seen by Foolish Elk, White Shield and others who crossed the river to the attack.

Custer was alive at the time the command reached Greasy Grass Ridge. Wolf Tooth's band were continuing to harrass, warriors were across the river in small parties, gunfire was increasing, and Custer still intended to attack across the river. Benteen was due in the valley and it was going to be done the hard way with every prospect warriors would break and run as before once their families, fleeing in the opposite direction, made good their escape.

Custer............ hmmm! The delay while Benteen comes up, should give time to get the familes away. We can still wreck the village. Job done! Things are working out rather well. Now, where is that crossing place? There was no way over the defended river without cover fire, several companies on foot, in skirmish order, blasting away to cover a bridgehead onto the opposite bank. It would be rather useful for Reno and Benteen to hammer through the village towards the river simulteously with my attack. Those officers and several thousand Cheyenne's and Lakotas had a slightly different idea of the game play.

I wonder who led that assault across the river?

The scenario throws Custer's attempt at a bridgehead into the crossing made by Crazy Horse, to explain the lower route indicated on Freeman's sketch which turns away from the Cheyenne Ford towards Calhoun Coulee, the trail and Battle Ridge.

Battle test[/color] - Custer's Conqueror - William J. Bordeaux (without a translater)
Brule Foolish Elk watching the battle from his lodge in the valley.

I heard the Sioux war cry ring out from the river bottom and soon afterwards a swarm of warriors appeared and began to attack the ranging column from three sides.

Crazy Horse with a mixed band of Ogalalas and Brules met the foremost van of troops head on and dividing into two streams rode on towards the rear of the column and slashed at it from both sides as they did so.

Suddenly, and at a given signal, the reformed Cheyennes rushed in and proceeded to belabor and shoot down the disconcerted members of the first group.

In the meantime another band of warriors came furiously riding in from the south.

In a short time I could see through the extending cloud of dust that almost entirely covered the raging scene that the whole column was caught in a trap and completely surrounded. In fact the leading group had been cut off by the charging warriors from the rear detachment, and these latter were being driven in the direction of another band of Indians who were coming at them from the north and who were not far from the lower end of the village.

I witnessed this encounter at close range and saw the separated group immediately disposed of in a very short time.

Follow up with Cheyennes John Two Moon, Yellow Nose & Low Dog, White Shield, Little Hawk. Ogalala Foolish Elk - early from the valley. Minnieconjou Joseph White Bull - east of the river. Two Kettle Runs the Enemy - later group from the valley. Two Moon.

Marines in space (ALIENS) fighting retreat mashed into ZULU's climax, de de deeeee fighting, de de, de de, de de, de de, de - de de..................... de de, de de, de de, de de, de - de de..................... "Game over man" meets Chard. Immediately after the battle, KYJTV asked Benteen what had taken place. 'Well, it seems Custer attempted to cross into the valley and we just cannot fathom why. It was a mission for the Marines!'

["Hunk" Papa]

Jun 17, 2012 13:18:25 GMT -6 herosrest said:

Hi H,

1) King was a writer of note, no R.E. Howard but enjoyable boys own stuff and decent novels. He was a soldier and a fighting man, who visited the field 1n 1877, quite how is difficult to pin, but I guess it was escorting Gen. Sheridan shortly after the his brother recovered the officers bodies. Mike Sheridan had a good nose around the fords and gave testimony ar Reno's Inquiry.

2) King understood what he looked at and what was told by warriors who fought, of course not the whole story, no one could ever know it all - but he understood what he saw as a fighting officer. Evidence, bodies laying, horse remains and warrior accounts. He got a better idea of events than most others.

Regards,

1) King was never at the LBH Battlefield in 1877. He was involved in the Nez Perce Campaign from June to October that year, so could not have been at LBH with Michael Sheridan in late June to early July 1877, or Phil Sheridan and George Forsyth later that July.

2) That blows your statement that he saw the position of bodies and I have found no evidence that he was ever at the LBH, or that he spoke with warriors who were. If you have such evidence I suggest you let us know what the source is, or are we dealing with another of your surmisals on the basis that as King wrote about it he must have been to see the battlefield. He also wrote about the Fetterman Fight, but he was not there either.

Over to you.

Hunk

["Hunk" Papa]

Jun 17, 2012 13:30:39 GMT -6 herosrest said:

1) The concept that elements of Custer's advance east of the river, progressed early towards river crossings below (downriver) Last Stand Hill and Deep Ravine, is the stuff that whirls around cotton candy sticks. All that was ever downriver that far was thousands of ponies and I should imagine, that in that day's heat it was the last place anyone was tempted to visit. Refugees from the camps fled to the west, directly away from the river, they did not flee to downriver. Cheyennes who escaped across the stream onto Greasy Grass Ridge ran straight back into Shoulder Blade Creek and warriors stayed between them and the soldiers.

2) Evidence for skirmish lines at Ford B, the mouth of Medicine Tale Creek, and the mouth of Deep Coulee.

Capt. McDougall during testimony to Court during Reno's Inquiry (W.A. Graham; 1933, p476-477) went to where he presumed the skirmish line was killed on Custer's battlefield, before being ordered to take his company to the village and bury Company E. The skirmish line he spoke of was about one hundred yards from the ford where he crossed, which he identified as Ford B.

As the majority of your post is sheer nonsense I will simply concentrate on one or two points to confirm that view.

1) Check out Lt. Philo Clark's map of the battlefield made after talks with warriors who were there (provable). It shows Ford D (the first time it was so titled) as the place that these warriors told Clark they first saw Custer heading toward.

There were about five horse herds around the village, but none of them were at the area of Ford D. If you have evidence to the contrary provide it.

Most of the refugees fled to a place that became know as Squaw Creek, which is north west of the Cheyenne camp circle and is shown on many of the Indian maps of the battlefield. It is more north than west.

2) Capt. MacDougall's RCOI testimony that pertains:

Q) Where was the skirmish line you speak of?
A) About a hundred yards from the ford where I crossed

Q) Can you locate the ford?
A) I think that is the place marked “B.”

Q) How far was that skirmish line from the river?
A) I can’t tell that. I can’t give even a good guess.

As can be deduced from the last question and answer, MacDougall could not say how far the skirmish line was from Ford B, because Ford B is at the river and he "can't give even a good guess." What can further be deduced is that his original answer to the skirmish line question is not meant to refer to Ford B but to Medicine Tail Coulee in toto.

If you are trying to make a case for some action at Ford B, I suggest that you stop producing random quotes and inconclusive archaeological evidence and make your own case using source material.

Sincerely,

Hunk

[herosrest]

McDougall was discussing different skirmish lines.

[herosrest]

Charles King's 1877 visit to Little Big Horn.

Excerpted from September 5, 1877, Cherokee Advocate, Custer’s Battlefield, Little Big Horn River,
M.T. July 25 - files.usgwarchives.net/ok/cherokee/newspapers/advocate/5sep1877.txt

I have just finished a ride over the battlefield and ...

Thirteen months have passed... No further attention was given the matter until the first this month, when Mike Sheridan and two companies of 7th Cavalry were sent to secure remains of all officers for removal to Leavenworth.

A few days ago Gen.s Sheridan and Crook, escorted by four companies of the 5th Cavalry and Indian scouts (last year’s hostiles) came over the mountains on a trip and obliged to pass near, took in the battlefield, and go through the ceremony of recovering the bones.
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King's understanding of the battle developed from information gathered during July 1877, and it seems there was a thorough examintion of the terrain. Remains of the officer who broke through on a splendid horse galloping eastward, were pointed out to the officers of the 5th Cavalry by one of the pursuers, and therefore realistic details of what took place place were given. There was no inkling on the part of King, of fighting or presence by elements of Custer's command at Nye Cartwright\Blummers ridge. Of course that terrain where relics existed, is hidden to view from the river at the mouth of Medicine Tail Creek and Deep Coulee at ground level.

What King understood of Little Big Horn included myths that endure to this day, Custer rode sixty miles in twenty-four hours, pushing ahead with feverish impatience and determined to have one battle royal with the Indians and by consequence the sole heroes. The idea of defeat seems never to have occurred to him and villages stretching for five miles down steam. He was not aware of the route of march ascribed to Custer's advance which developed from E.S Godfrey, whose articles and books published subsequent to 'Custer's Last Battle' by King, in Harper's New Monthly Magazine, Aug, 1890.

It was stated by Lt. Edgerley in 1879 that the village 'moved out to the left and a little down stream, so 7th Cavalry understood this in June 1876 (W.A. Graham, 1933, p402). It was from 1886 with Gall's accounts of the battle to Edward S. Godfrey that perceptions regarding maneuver and combat east of the river began, leading to the very robust improved understanding of today. King, Sheridan Crook and whoever else besides, were though in July 1877, unaware of Custer's presence towards Blummer's ridge, other than the officer who broke through galloping eastward. Detail of that ride was given to Frank Grouard. Fluent in Teton and sign, he was captured age 16 and spent 6 years with the Lakota, eventually to become Chief of US Scouts. He was hired by Crook in 1876 as a scout and interpreter. Sally Garnett, his second wife, was the half sister of William Bouyer from her mother's second marriage. Grouard's 3rd wife Eulalie Garnier was sister of Baptiste Garnier 'Little Bat' .

Joe DeBarthe's 'Life and Adventures of Frank Grouard' presented a whopper or two, as flattering biographies seem to do, Frederick Whittaker was no better or worse in that respect....... . According to Grouard, 'When the charge up the bluff was made, the Indians stated (and they related the story many times to the scout), that an officer on a magnificent animal, unable to check the speed of his charger, rode directly through the enemy's line, escaping the hundreds of bullets that were fired at him. Some of the young braves gave chase, but as they were afoot when the charge was made and lost some little time in getting their ponies, the officer was soon far in advance of his pursuers. They followed him for several miles, however, and watched him as he crossed Poplar creek (due east from the Custer battlefield). Beyond this creek is an immense flat, and while the Indians sat upon their ponies, having given up the chase, and watched the fleeing horseman as he reached the plain, they beheld a puff of smoke, and saw the officer fall from the saddle. They then rode over to where he fell, secured his horse and trappings, and left the body lying where it fell. The officer, for some unknown cause, had ended his life at the point of his own gun.'

Grouard's take on the battle - 'The Indians told Grouard that when Custer's attempt to cross the "Little Big Horn had been frustrated, the command headed directly east for the high bluffs, behind which hundreds of Indians were secreted. These rose up as his men advanced. Not knowing the savages were there, Custer was taken completely by surprise, and attempted, by a charge, to force his way
through the enemy to the northeast. But he met a withering fire that compelled him to seek lower ground, and in doing so he met the enemy's force that, by this time, had crossed the river and filled all the draws to the north, and was compelled to feel his way west and south, which accounts for the finding of the bodies of his command lying in almost a perfect circle.'

Gall's accounting of the Custer fight is useful for information relating the location of units and and giving an idea of what took place once he was upon the field, but the information was misused by many in respect the Deep route marced across Blummer's Ridge to Caloun Hill, which stemmed from Godfrey remembering during 1886, a faint trail east of the battleground. Evidence of a presence by the 7th Cavalry on Blummer's Ridge began to emerge during the 1920's, as well as horse and Soldier's remains in Deep Coulee during 1928.

Gray's roots and long yellow hair - a thoroughly unthorough assessment of assessments.

John S. Gray offered his research of little Big Horn in 1977. www.kshs.org/publicat/khq/1977/77_3_gray.htm

'Custer's walking pace up the Rosebud followed Terry's plan to the letter, covering 12 miles the first afternoon, 33 the second day, and 28 on the third, which included several short rests and a three-hour halt in the afternoon. That evening the hostile trail, suddenly remarkably fresh, unexpectedly turned west over the divide toward the valley of the Little Big Horn.

The march of June 25 began at midnight with an eight-mile ascent up the divide, followed by a six-hour rest, and then a late morning climb of five miles, interrupted by a halt of an hour and a half.

At noon Custer ordered his men forward on a steady descent of 14 miles at a slightly more rapid pace. He took the lead with his own battalion of five companies and Reno's of three. He sent Capt. Frederick W. Benteen's three companies to a high ridge about two miles to the left to see whether the village was moving away; the captain was then to hurry and join the lead, but instead he moved slowly to fall far behind. The amateur pack train lagged even farther behind, draining off soldier-packers and an escort company equivalent to the other battalions.

Benteen and the pack train eventually joined Reno on a hill top, where they lay besieged until Terry, with Gen. John Gibbon's Montana column, rescued them on June 27.

Gray accepted, work previously assembeled by W.A. Graham from the record of the Reno Inquiry, which was thoroughly flawed and biased towards Capt. Benteen in that, 'he moved slowly to fall far behind. The amateur pack train lagged even farther behind.' That is complete garbage. Benteen marched at 5mph for three hours, no further than two miles to the left of Custer's advance to meet Reno east of the river within minutes of that battalions arrival there. This is the simple fact of forensic study of the testimony of officer's of Benteen's and Reno's commands given to the Reno Inquiry.

'Alone, each (Custer & Reno) struck a hornet's nest of fired-up warriors, who dealt them a classic defeat in detail. The rest of the regiment with Benteen and the pack train arrived too late to join any attack.' Benteen marched for three hours at 5mph, and met Trumpeter Martin less than a mile from Ford A, in time to watch Reno's retreat from the valley. Reno and Custer arrived at that same point, one hour earlier. Benteen marched to the left after the divide between the Rosebud and Little Big Horn had been crossed. How far from Ford A that took place has been fudged over.

Custer did not believe his foe would stand and history proved him to be in error. The error was the failure of the command to dilgently concentrate full force quickly at the big village. The cause of the defeat was due simply to defects with the Springfield trapdoor carbine and its carried ammunition.

Scouts with the expedition, knew nothing of the civilised politics which invested study of the battle and they provided measure in 'The Arikara Narrative' of what is presented as the way of it. From the evening halt of 24th June,


At Reno's Inquiry Lt. Charles DeRudio stated that carbines were jamming after 8-10 rounds during the valley fight (W.A. Graham; 1933,p300), a disastrous percentage of failure, greater than presented by archaeology which indicates 2.8-3.4% failures from examination of recovered shell cases. Reno's troops skirmished and did not shoot by volley.

At 3.4% failure, 7 in 100 weapons will jam shooting way two rounds, and at six rounds fired that is twenty guns down. With DeRudio's actual example of the problem, skirmisher's were into a world of hurt after as little as 5 rounds volleyed and 40 weapons jammed. That is statistics for you, but jams would actually occur far more dangerously after each weapon had fired of 8-10 rounds, effectively taking down the entire gun-line. Crazy Horse was aware of the problem with the Springfield weapons, although he was known to be bullet proof. Archaeology cannot account for jammed weapons which were simply discarded from hand with round stuck in place.

Rain in the Face - (Indian fights and fighters: the soldier and the Sioux; C.T. Brady, p285). From the 'Rain in the Face' interview done by McFadden with McLaughlin interpreting - "Their guns wouldn't shoot but once - the thing wouldn't throw out the empty cartridge shells. (In this he was historically correct, as dozens of guns were picked up on the battlefield by General Gibbon's command two days after with the shells still sticking in them, showing that the ejector wouldn't."

Alfred H. Terry, 27th June 1876 - Of the movements of General Custer and the five companies under his immediate command, scarcely anything is known from those who witnessed them; for no officer or soldier who accompanied him has yet been found alive. His trail from the point where Reno crossed the stream, passes along and in the rear of the crest of the bluffs on the right bank for nearly or quite three miles; then it comes down to the bank of the river, but at once diverges from it, as if he had unsuccessfully attempted to cross; then turns upon itself, almost completing a circle, and closes. It is marked by the remains of his officers and men and the bodies of his horses, some of them strewn along the path, others heaped where halts appeared to have been made.

The distance along the bluffs direct to Ford B, is three miles. That was the route presented to Terry during his investigation of the battle on 27th June. A trail into medicine Tail Coulee via Cedar Coulee adds over a mile to the distance covered.

Red Star's Story, (O.G. Libby,North Dakota Historical Collections, Volume 6 p72-86) - At this point they could see, far ahead, the hill called ''Custer's Last Look," about twelve miles off. They marched towards these hills for they were to stop merely for supper and then push on all night. This temporary camp was on both sides of the Rosebud and it was very dark after they had eaten supper. From across the Rosebud Crooked Horn called over: 'Strikes the Lodge, you saddle up and Red Star also with Red Foolish Bear, Black Fox, and Bull." Forked Horn led this party and here Red Bear heard that Bob-tailed Bull was ahead and had been gone since noon. This was the beginning of the night march and they rode all night. At dawn they came to the stopping place for breakfast and they were tired and tumbled off their horses for a little sleep. Bull in the Water and Red Bear had charge of one mule which they were unpacking and the former said: "Let us get breakfast for if we go to the happy hunting grounds we should go with a full belly." In getting water for their breakfast they had to pass through the camp of the soldiers. The soldiers were lying in groups on the ground snoring, for they were very tired, and lay down where they had unsaddled. The scouts got water and made breakfast; Bull in the Water boiled pork, opened crackers and called the rest of the scouts. Some got up and others did not. Custer's tent was on a little knoll at the right of the scouts' camp. Bull in the Water ate his breakfast standing up and looking around and he told the rest of the scouts what he saw. Soon he gave a yell: "Look what's coming," he said; "two scouts are coming." They were Red Star and Bull. Camp broke up, the horses trotted, and the army stopped at a hill and Custer came down to join them.

His orders were to go ahead riding hard and take the Dakota horses. Stabbed rode around on horse-back, back and forth, exhorting the young men to behave well and be brave. He said: "Young men, keep up your courage, don't feel that you are children; today will be a hard battle. We have been told that there is a big Sioux camp ahead. We attack a buffalo bull and wound him, when he is this way we are afraid of him though he has no bullets to harm us with." He said these things for he saw many of us were young and inexperienced and he wished to prepare them for their first real fight.

He was at some distance when he said this and he was rubbing some clay between his hands. Then he prayed: ''My Father, I remember this day the promises you have made to me ; it is for my young men I speak to you." Then he called up the young men and had them hold up their shirt in front so that he could rub the good medicine on their bodies. They came up one by one, he spat on the clay and then rubbed it on their chests." He had carried this clay with him for this purpose. The mule train with supplies was left behind and Pretty Face was detailed on the duty of looking after it."

Custer ordered the Aricareeee scouts forward riding hard and take the Dakota horses. So, were were the Dakota horses?
The Aricaree scouts were told there was a big Sioux camp ahead. They were to attack, the big Sioux camp ahead.
Pretty Face was detailed to the mule train,was left behind.

Note - Rations consisted of square thick crackers, salt, fresh bread, flour, bacon, sugar, plug tobacco, tea, beans, peas, hominy, and square, solid strips of beans and leaves mixed (succotash), and occasionally fresh beef. They boiled the succotash, it seemed to be a mixture of cabbage leaves and beans. They were furnished with tin plates, large cups, kettles, and a camp stove or oven. For pay each man received sixteen dollars per month and for each horse twelve dollars extra. The scouts were given five mules to carry their supplies.

George Herendeen in July, 1876. 'Custer had Officer's Call blown, gave his orders, and the command was put in fighting order. The scouts were ordered forward and the regiment moved at a walk. After three miles the scouts reported Indians ahead, and the command took the trail. The way lay down a little creek, a branch of the Little Horn, and after going six miles we discovered an Indian lodge ahead and Custer bore down on it at a stiff trot. In coming to it we found ourselves in a freshly abandoned Indian camp, all the lodges gone except the one seen, which contained a dead Indian. From this point we could see into the Little Big Horn valley, and observed heavy clouds of dust rising five miles distant

The Court's findings. (W.A. Graham, 1933, p544) - Col. John H. King, Col. Wesley Merritt and Lt. Col. W.B. Royal found that, 'on the morning of 25th June 1876 the 7th Cavalry, Lt. Col. G.A. Custer commanding, operating against hostile Indians in Montana Territory, near the Little Big Horn River, was divided into four battalions, two of which were commanded by Col. Custer in person, with the exception of one company in charge of the pack train, - one by Maj. Reno and one by Capt. F.W. Benteen. This division took place between twelve and fifteen miles from the scene of the battle or battles afterwards fought.'

A ceremonial lodge lodge was found on June 24th where a Sun-dance of great importance had taken place about June 5th, many large abandoned camps were reported. Custer visited his scouts during dinner, asking; "What do you suppose will be the outcome of it all?" Stabbed jumped up and hopped about the fire, pretending to dodge the bullets; "this is a part of our tactics; we dodge this way and make it hard for the enemy to hit us. We learned from the Sioux that they shoot you down like buffalo calves. You stand in rows, erect, do not dodge about and are easy to shoot.' Custer replied: "I don't doubt you. Stabbed. What you say seems reasonable. I know your people; you are tricky like the coyote, you know how to hide, to creep up and take by surprise.'' The other officers came to the fire and stood around it. Custer said through Gerard: ''My only intention in bringing these people to battle is to have them go into battle and take many horses away from the Sioux. " (O.G. Libby; ND Collections Vol6, p82)

Capt. Benteen (W.A. Graham, 1933, p379-387) -

The officer's call by orderly was about 10am on the 25th June.
The order from Gen. Custer was received about 3 o'clock.
Benteen's column marched at 5mph.
The pack train was 7 miles back when the order carried by Trumpeter Martin was recieved.
It was 7 miles from the burning tepee to the morass.
It was 4.5 miles from the burning tepee to Reno Hill.
The advance packs came to Reno Hill one after Benteen arrived.
Trumpeter Marttin rode at a jog trot.

Trumpeter Martin indicated to Benteen, from Weir's Peak, where he returned from with the last message.
Weir's peak was indicated to be '7' by Lt. DeRudio on the Court's Exhibit '2' - (Lt. Maguire's map)
Trumpeter Martin indicated at '8', from where he returned to Benteen.
Martin met Benteen half way between the tepee and ford where Reno crossed.

Little, to nought, was known of a bunch of young Cheyennes and Sioux first to mix it up with 7th Cavalry as they marched east of the Little Big Horn river into Medcine Tail Creek. Even less is known today, which is little surprising, in the 'big' way of this battle. There was oblique reference to them by the turn of the 20th Century, George B. Grinnell knew that when John Two Moon 'first saw soldiers 'just' coming down the steep hill east of battlefield on a lope with Indians behind them. Little importance or significance was attached to that information, with focus being exploits of warriors like Yellow Nose, White Shield, Two Moon, Ice and many others who crossed the river from the valley camp to battle the soldiers.

It was not until a generation later that accounts of the early fighting emerged from work by John Stands in Timber and Stone Forehead, as shifts in perception f the battle developed after the Second World War. The were no heroes of 25th June 1876 left to query the history, and the history gained new meaning and importance. The little known of exploits by Wolf Tooth, Big Foot, and others was passed down through oral history telling of what was on the day of the battle. It is as confused and confusing as any story related by to another, and further so with Cheyenne record because the battlefield altered during long absense from Montana and Little Big Horn. Whilst Cheyennes moved on, their memories of the battle were and are those of the terrain and events on the day. In returning to Little Big Horn ten of fifteen years and more later, the entire focus of the battlefield had become the stone monument and markers. This is a simple but important point, since memory plays tricks and most certainly does in regards terrain such as that rolling across the battlefield.

A number of monuments were erected on the battlefield preceding the stone obelisk and the memories of one who fought, left Montana to return a decade or more later, would re-orientate to what they discovered upon return. Precise interpretations are fraught with difficulty and perceptions. When it comes to Cheyenne references to the cemetary at Little Big Horn, tread carefully; the cemetary known to all was that upon which the five companies under the command of Custer, and the friends and relatives of the Cheyennes, perished and laid at rest.

There were two general directions of movement agaict Custer's command, that eminated across the river opposite Deep Coulee and upriver to encircle the battlefield. Along and over Greasy Grass Ridge towards the modern monument, and a broad sweepinto, over, and around Deep Coulee towards and beyond Calhoun Hill. Large numbers of warriors moved east along the river from Reno Hill and Weir's Peak to join the fighting.

It has long been a myth of the battle that Crazy Horse and hordes of warriors swept downriver to Deep Ravine and beyond to deliver a sweeping left hook into cavalry who had moved that way looking for a croosing place over the river, and pursuing hostages. This is a myth unsupported in fact and born of romance and very complicated sillyness. Northern Cheyenne White Bull (Ice Bear), told George B. Grinnell in 1898, 'Custer rode down to the river bank and formed a line of battle and charged, and then they stopped and fell back up the hill, but he met Indians coming from above and from all sides, and again formed a line. It was here that they were killed. This is entirely consistent with all evidence and record of what took place, from those able to witness it. Many did not see that part of Custer's battle, notably the Hunkpapa Gall, who had a huge influence over understanding. It was unfortunate how Gall's accounts came to dominate presentatin of the battle, but as unfortunate as that is, it holds tiny candle to what has taken place since the generation who fought the battle passed on. A seminal reorientation of 'facts' has become the battle, and whilst this certainly is the enduring way of life and people - with Little Big Horn it has become truely pathetic.

If you desire an engaging battle author, look no further than John S. Gray's highly entertaining and skilful work. Personally I find Robert E. Howard far superior. Scratch only slightly beneath the skin however, and the entire can of worms that hijacks the battle is babbling as ferociously as ever before, evolving factual fantasy. The battle is very simple to understand, it is what happened afterwards and continues today that is difficult and thoroughly annoying, once grasped. John S. Gray conceptualised Little Big Horn, pulling together dubious past efforts to sanitise the affair. Gray played with time, perhaps he was a God or thought himself so. He certainly waved his sonic screwdriver at presentation of the battle which he started here - W.A. Graham, 1933, p290-291. The Reno Court of Inquiry and Lt. Charles DeRudio's testimony upon his recall before the court. There was no little love lost between DeRudio and Maj. Reno for some time prior to the hearings and cause of friction was commented by the Capt. Mathey - (W.A. Graham, 1933, p492).

Four or five minutes before Maj. Reno retreated, DeRudio saw Custer, Lt. Cook and another man come to the highest point of the bluff and wave their hats, it seeming they were cheering and pretty soon disappeared. That highest point was described as nearer the river than the point Capt. Weir went to, and just below where Dr. DeWolf was killed wher the river came right in under the bluff. De Rudio stated Custer was 1000 yards away from him, 5-600 yards downriver from Reno Hill, having a pretty good view of Reno' position. DeRudio believed that Custer could have galloped a mile and a half from that place after eleven minutes, and further if he galloped fast, One of those silly little items of data - (9mph). The distance from the Weir's ridge to Ford B is a slightly less than a mile and a half to the end of the bluffs, or it two and a half by Godfrey's deferentials.

Trumpeter Martin left Custer at the mouth of Medicine Tail Creek and was Reno's skirmish line deployed in the valley from Reno Hill. Custer would therefore have had to follow after Martin to reach the point from which DeRudio saw him on the bluffs. That was certainly possible in regards Martin being at Reno Hill within the six minutes or so after DeRudio's sighting, that Reno remained in the timber but Martin did not see Reno in the timber and also, when looking backwards towards Custer's battlefield from highground along his route to Benteen, Martin saw Custer's command moving rapidly towards the battlefield. Trumpeter Martin did meet Boston Custer on the bluffs, also a trooper of Company C. Boston Custer is said to have worn buckskins, it is not known if Trumpeter Martin had a long moustache and or beard - he may have done, he may not. He certainly had a bugle, or as some prefer, his trumpet. Trumpeter Martin did not meet or see Aricaree scouts who ran stolen ponies onto the bluffs.

Gray's battle times have trumpeter Martin riding past Reno Hill and away from Reno in the valley, before Custer's command arrived in Medicine Tail Creek. Gray was good, it was a damn fine yarn. The mathematical problem is difficult to to put over or explain, but the inherent stupidity is not. It is possible to suppose that Trumpeter Martin was a time Lord or warlock. Any of the assumptions underlying Gray's work, simply fall apart in the same way. It is possible to tinker timing of related events, but 5-6 minutes after DeRudio's sighting of Custer on the bluffs - and ten to twelve minutes after the skirmish line withdrew into the timber, Maj. Reno retreated from the valley and Trumpeter Martin was past Reno Hill on his way to Capt. Benteen, who rode a fast walking horse at 5mph. Trumpeter Martin rode urgently and was reported at the jog trot approaching Benteen's command when seen about a mile away. Jog trot is undefined, Martin's mount was wounded , but 6-8mph is entirely reasonable for a messenger carrying urgent orders.

Benteen and Martin were closing at a rate of 11-13mph. Benteen halted to drink, but also Custer's command and Reno's crossing the river, having no effect on average calculation. Martin's journey covered at least 5 miles back along the bluffs and upto a mile further. Being generous - six mile in half an hour. Half an hour earlier Benteen was two and a half miles further distant. Gray's entire premise was that the companies east of the river with Custer approached the river mouth of Medicine Tail Creek at Ford B, at the time Benteen's command arrived on Reno Hill. This was developed around DeRudio's sighting of Custer and Cooke. In reality, and using Gray's schedule, at 3.20 Reno deployed to skirmish, Custer's companies were at a gallop towards medicine Tail Creek and from DeRudio that took fifteen minutes to reach Ford B, during which Reno's companies were:

'When we got to the timber we rode down an embankment and dismounted. This was where the channel of the river changed and was probably several feet lower than the level of the prairie. We dismounted in haste, number four of each set of four holding the horses. We came up onto higher ground forming a skirmish line from the timber towards the bluffs on the other side of the valley and facing down stream in the direction of the Indian camp. This was our first view of the Indian camp from the skirmish line. Some of the men laid down while others knelt down. At this particular place there was a prairiedog town and we used the mounds for temporary breast e works. We got the skirmish line formed and here the Indians made their first charge. There were probably 500 of them coming from the direction of their village. They were well mounted and well armed. They tried to cut through our skirmish line. We fired volleys into them repulsing their charge and emptying a number of their saddles. Lt. Hodgson walked up and down the line encouraging the men to keep cool and fire low. Finally when they could not cut through us, they strung out in a single file, lying on the opposite side of their ponies from us, and then they commenced to circle. They overlapped our skirmish line on the left and were closing in on the rear to complete the circle. We had orders to fall back to our horses.' (R.M. Utley, 1969, p43 - Historical Handbook Series No. 1)

By 4.00pm (Gray time) Reno's battalion were retreating across the river, and at 4:20pm (Gray time) Benteen's battalion reached Reno Hill and joined Reno's battalion. Gray's prequel allowed for assignment of battalions to have taken place at 12.00pm, and therefore Benteen should have covered between 20 and 22 miles at his steady walking gate of 5mph. The line of march followed by Custer to Reno Hill was about 13 miles, an average equating to slightly less than Benteens - 18-20 miles during 4 hours to arrive at Ford B. Problem number one with Gray's mechanics is what were Custer's companies doing from 3.20pm until 4:20pm. The underlying problem was his acceptance of the scenario implemented by W.A. Graham from Lt. Wallace's incorrect testimony to the Reno Inquiry. Using official record of the 1876 Senate Inquiry into the battle, the advance from assignment of battalions occured no later than 11pm. This was done three miles at the walk, six miles on the trail plus whatever odd distance across a large camping ground to the first Lone tepee. Custer was here and there ahead, and bore down on the abandoned camp at a stiff trot, from there certainly Reno and Custer were on the jump (trot) all the way with brief halts and both watering horses not more than 10 minutes.to arrive at the second Lone tepee by 1.00pm. A maximum journey time of two hours dilated by Graham, and accepted by Gray, as actually consuming three to cover thirteen miles. That generates Pi/404 (develop the equation with pencil and paper for insight).

The two hour march puts benteen some three miles off the pace, but by 2pm he should have been where he was ordered to go. The pack train during tree hours would need a steady gait of 4.3mph to reach Reno Hill or the valley. The pack train is a somewhat misunderstoon beast, it travelled as a group of groups trailed by the rear-guard company. Stragglers were allowed to fallout the rear of the march and were assisted by the rear guard company. Advance by the pack-train was thus steady and a universally accepted 3.4mph is not that far off 4.3mph over three hours, with a difference in distance of 2.7 miles. The mules were led by bell horses, any that lagged being whipped along to make the pace, neither rate of march would cause significant problems with shed packs. The entire pack train and rear-guard were mounted, unless e had been naughty and was on punishment - there is always one, Robert Jackson a scout with the column had been stood on a bucket after shooting a snake - god forbid he fired at the enemy

Had Custer seen Reno's position in the valley, the retreat to the timber where the horses were held, what might be expected from Reno? Certinly not what took place. Distances involved make it possible for Custer to have from Medicine Tail Creek or beyond downriver, to see what had happened in the valley and return to his command with false impression that Reno was hunkering down, or heaven forbid, going to charge. No-one will ever know but despite problems with information from Trumpeter Martin and Curley, the messenger was sent back to Benteen before Custer could possibly have been seen by DeRudio.

O.G. Libby; ND Historical Collections vol6, p68, according to Aricaree Red Star, at 'Camp No. 12 on the Little Missouri, Custer forbade shooting. Robert Jackson shot his revolver at a snake in the river. The officer of the day came up and asked who had fired a shot and Jackson said, "I did it". They put him under discipline for this, a keg was turned upside down, and he stood on it on one foot. Gerard calls him Wm. Jackson. Robert Jackson is a battle mystery, stating publicly that he was not present, yet he was. In 1910, Jackson claimed Custer Committed Suicide whilst Jackson was serving on the 6th Infantry, carrying dispatches to Gen. Otis, then in command of the 22nd infantry. Jackson was with the first company to reach the battlefield after the massacre and gave in detail the scene as it presented to him. Gen. Reno had him talk with Indians after they had been subdued. Indians all loved Custer and called him The Long Haired Chief. He was the last to fall, wanted alive as a prisoner to force the government to terms.

Those would have been interesting negotiations.
"Go to a reservation!";
"No!!";
"Why not!!!";
"We have long yellow hair "

A modern view of Little Big Horn is that Custer attacked despite being told by Terry to wait for Crook and Gibbon. Had he waited the camp would have broken up, scattering into normal small groups against which the army would have had the superior numbers. Counter point is the Battle of the Big Horn, August 11th, 1873. The hostiles would not attack of fight artillery, as shown at Powder river in August 1876, that was Custer's tactical mistake, he was instead lumbered with a laggard and the fool who introduced copper ammunition to the US Cavalry, and discovered in battle that dirty rounds jammed the carbines. The failure rate disclosed by DeRudio during testimony at Chicago, was fatal error. This is what happened to Crook also, and it was a secret. No other way to handle the issue - Listen men, discuss this matter with no-one, ever, or you will be shot and made to peel potatos with a knitting kneedle all day for five years, in the guardhouse, in chains, without pay or privelages. OK?

Was Maj. Reno- Jack Drum Beater?

DeRudio - (W.A. Graham, 1933, p280) Going from Point A to where the line was deployed, was it neccesary there should be any bugling?
Usually the bugle is used. Maj. Reno gave the commands in a strong voice. He has a reputation of being a first class drill-master, and has a good voice to cammand.

Young Hawk - (O.G. Libby, NDH, Vol6, p108) The officer then said : "Now let us go and look for Custer's body." Forked Horn, Red Foolish Bear, Goose, Young Hawk, and Gerard, Varnum, and some soldiers (the Dakotas called one of these soldiers Jack Drum Beater, probably a white drummer) went down to look for Custer's body. They went north along the ridge and followed Custer's trail across a low soft place or coulee east of the hill called Custer's last stand. On the other side of the ravine they began to find dead soldiers lying with a few dead horses. When they came to the flat-topped hill where Custer fell, the officer, through Gerard, told the scouts to go off east on the hill and watch for the Dakotas lest they come back to attack them. Lying all over the hill Young Hawk saw dead horses of the Dakotas and of the whites and also many bodies of the soldiers, lying stripped. He also saw the circle breastwork made of dead horses on top of the hill.'

It is understood from archaeology that firepower, the rate of fire of Indian versus soldier’s weapons was significantly against 7th Cavalry by a rate of fire of 3-4 to 1, and by 3 or 4 to one in numbers. 7th Cavalry were out gunned. However, effective directed volley fire should have kept rapid fire winchesters beyond effective range. 7th Cavalry's carbines did not work properly. General Terry's orders were specifically crafted to prevent the flight of Sitting Bull's hostiles. What was not appreciated by Terry or Custer were the numbers encountered; Custer had no option but attack or disobey orders and allow the hostiles to escape as occured in 1873, when the fleeing Hunkpapa tribe outran 7th Cavalry, leaving them floundering to cross a river and attacked the soldiers camp at dawn next morning. Terry's orders and intentions were to prevent the hostiles scatterating. March from the Rosebud to the headwaters of the tongue river, was............ stupid, but 20-21 June, Terry expected Crook available co-operate with him. At the Reno Inquiry George Herendeen stated that his horse carried him but was lamed. According to Herendeen, Custer sent him with Charley Renolds to scout the Tullockduring the morning of June 24th - Herendeen declined.

'On the morning of the 24th we broke camp at five o'clock and continued following the trail up the stream. Soon after starting Custer, who was in advance with Boyer, called me to him and told me to get ready, saying he thought he would send me and Charlie Reynolds to the head of Tullock's Fork to take a look. I told the General it was not time yet, as we were then travelling in the direction of the head of the Tullock, and I could only follow his trail. I called Boyer, who was a little ahead, back and asked him if I was not correct in my statement to the General, and he said "Yes; further up on Rosebud we would come opposite a gap, and then we could cut across and strike the Tullock in about fifteen miles' ride." Custer said, "All right; I could wait." ' - G. Herendeen. Helena Herald

Brisbin wrote to Godfrey that scout Herendeen had been attached specifically for liason, when the 7th reached Tulloch's Creek, Herendeen was to leave and contact Gibbon. Brisbin insisted this is what the scout intended to do. Brisbin states Herendeen rode to the front of the column and said, "General, this is the Tulloch, and here is where l an to leave you and go down it to the other command". Brisbin stated Herendeen was ignored. A simple blatant lie. Brisbin got lost during the night march of 25th June, Muggins Taylor acted as guide, of the two reliable scouts available Bouyer went with Custer and Thomas H. Leforge, Terry's head scout required "a lot of brandy" as well as ten grains of quinine during return to the ambulance train after falling and breaking a collar-bone. Col. Gibbon stayed aboard the steamer 'Far West' during the advance to Fort Pease because of acute colic and set out to rejoin his command on the morning of 26th June.

["Hunk" Papa]

Jun 20, 2012 8:00:06 GMT -6 herosrest said:

McDougall was discussing different skirmish lines.

Is that so? If he was, demonstrate to us how that occurred.

Hunk

["Hunk" Papa]

Jun 20, 2012 8:00:25 GMT -6 herosrest said:

Charles King's 1877 visit to Little Big Horn.

Excerpted from September 5, 1877, Cherokee Advocate, Custer’s Battlefield, Little Big Horn River,
M.T. July 25 - files.usgwarchives.net/ok/cherokee/newspapers/advocate/5sep1877.txt

I have just finished a ride over the battlefield and ...

I repeat, Charles King did not visit the battlefield. What you have reproduced here is an article that first appeared in the New York Sun on August 21st 1877 by an anonymous correspondent.

It was later used by Ami Frank Mulford as his version of that same visit.

Two things to note. Firstly, the visit is dated as July 25 1877, when Charles King was engaged in the Nez Perce Campaign and secondly, King's ego would not have accepted an anonymous by-line.

You are wrong about this, let it go or provide proof positive.

Regards.

Hunk