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Post by Dark Cloud on May 19, 2012 9:21:35 GMT -6
Miles Browning.....
Fletcher was a far better admiral than he is credited with being, and Spruance was a charisma-less gem. My impression is that our bridge admirals made errors early on and spent the rest of the war making up for it.
I look at photos of Mitscher and McCain and all those guys who look 80 years old and stutter when I realize I'm older that they were at their death in late 50's and early sixties. Competent, consistent, and smart, smart, smart.
Japan was damned by her idiot emperor worship, the feudal nonsense of going down with the ship (thus eliminating their best admirals and officers), the moronic portrait of the emperor that had to be saved, and their beloved petty officers who could hit sailors with sticks to inspire them at any given time. Ships had special bridges for officers to direct AA fire by pointing with colored battans. Weird combo of surreal and stupid, excellent ship designs poorly made, all of it.
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Post by quincannon on May 19, 2012 9:35:58 GMT -6
DC: Excellent ship designs? Have you read Shattered Sword? You might change your mind about the excellence of the carrier designs if you did. Now Kaga and Akagi were conversions like our Lex and Sara, so there might be some excuse for those two depending upon what they were given to work with in the modification process. Soryu, and Hiryu date from the same design period as the three Yorktowns and they were just horrible designs not correcting but repeation of the design flaws of the earlier two. Zuikaku anf Shokaku were from the same design period as Essex, and they too were terribly flawed.
For the most part their light cruisers were of the same vintage as our Omahas - obsolete, no good for anything except being destroyer squadron flags. The Special type destroyers - the Fubukis - were far in advance of anything we had until the Fletchers. IJN destroyers were very formidable. The rest was on par with our 1942 fleet but also rans starting in 43.
PS: In addition plane handling was a big difference, partially brought on by design flaws. Remember that Kaga and Akagi when commissioned were three deck affairs. The top one was for landing on only. The other two allowed planes to take off from the hangers. They were converted again to conventional design in the 1930's. The thing here is that the IJN did not have the expeience in this new form of deck handling and flaws, terminal flaws crept into their procedures. Langley was the best investment that we ever made in a ship designed not for war but as a trainer and doctrine developer.
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Post by Dark Cloud on May 19, 2012 10:40:01 GMT -6
Their destroyers, cruisers, and Yamatos were good designs, I've read. So were their subs, which they never knew how to use, apparently. They had construction issues all through, but their heavy cruisers knocked the hell out of our own, were faster, more guns. Good at night fighting and accuracy. Top heavy issues, I've read, and other problems, but so did our own, of course.
Shinano was probably the worst conversion ever, but they had no choice.
Like the Germans in WWI, they designed their ships for one enemy and relatively nearby battles. They did not design their navy to fight off California. They wanted control Hawaii west. We wanted ability to fight New York east to San Francisco.
They had excellent pilots at the start with us because they'd been at war for some years by then, and their planes were in many ways better for the war that was to be fought. Like England, our designs were to function everywhere in plane and ship plus the Canal issues which didn't bother Japan.
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Post by quincannon on May 19, 2012 10:57:12 GMT -6
DC: Agree on the cans. Agree on the heavy cruisers. Until the Baltimores came along anything we had out there is the way of heavies were badly overmatched. Subs were navy fighters with poor doctrine, ours were commerce raiders, that could also fight navies.
Pilots: The IJN pilots were too good. That was their undoing. They took only the very, very best, where we took the good. There are many more good then there are very very best.
One additional thing that is not often spoken about> Our air groups were seperate organizations meaning that they could go to any of our carriers and function effectively. The air groups at Midway were composites of pre-war air groups. In the IJN the air group was part of the ships company. After Coral Sea the two Shokaku class carriers were both out of action and not ready for Midway. One was badly damaged and needed a lot of yard work. The other was completely sound with a decimated air group, which put her out of action just as if she had a couple of torpedo hits on her. The Shokaku and Zuikaku air groups could have been combined to enable one to be at Midway. That was unthinkable to the IJN.
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Post by wild on May 20, 2012 0:28:14 GMT -6
Sorry for disturbing your coffee Colonel.Many thanks for that. Following your excellent post on the Wallace thread a demonstration on "Now cut the crap and lets get down to the real business that brings us all here". First port of call this morning will be a visit to the local book shop to order the books you recommended. Last Man Off Bataan was my first acquaintance with the subject and that was 60 years ago. Bits and pieces----The Jap pilots were mostly enlisted men. The US airgunners were enlisted men and had something of an uneasy relationship with their officer pilot comrades. US torpedos were faulty and security so tight that it delayed the information getting to the designers. Just a thought--Germany had to be beaten into the ground but maybe not Japan.Maybe as you say after Pearl it was real personal. Have a nice day.
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Post by Gatewood on May 20, 2012 6:29:59 GMT -6
Just a thought--Germany had to be beaten into the ground but maybe not Japan.Maybe as you say after Pearl it was real personal
I was born in 1956, so, when I was growing up, WW2 was only about 20 years past or still a relatively recent memory for my parents, aunts and uncles, and so forth that I was around and occasionally heard speak of the it. Even though my father, several uncles, and most others that I came into contact with had fought in in Europe (many were part of the local National Guard unit that had been mobilized), I always had the impression that their real animosity was reserved for Japan. As I recall. they tended to speak of the war with Germany in matter of fact ways, almost as if it was just a regular job that they did during a period in their lives, and there were no personal feelings involved. On the other hand, their feelings toward Japan were personal, and they hated and despised all things Japanese. Of course a large part of that was a cary over of the rage that had followed Pearl Harbor, but I believe that a large part of it also resulted for the stories of how prisioners had been treated by the Japanese, etc. There are those that will say that there was a racial element to this, and there probably was, but I don't believe in the way that we might think. I believe that Fred and others on here who may have fought in Viet Namn will tell us that, despite the racial difference, they had a degree of respect for their Vietnamese adversaires and considered them to be a worth foe. I don't believe the same was true in regard to the Japanese, who were considered to be little more than serpents in the grass and fit to be exterminated. All of this is a long way of saying that, militarily, perhaps it was not necessary to totally smash Japan, but anything else would have been unacceptable from the standpoint of what the American people expected and demanded.
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Post by wild on May 20, 2012 8:23:40 GMT -6
Gatewood The first cut is the deepest and maybe Roosevelt's "day of infamy" set the tone.The Japanese/American community were all interned.Would the Italian community have been interned? Plus the first Germans the GIs met were Romel's Africa corps somewhat more sporting than Tojo's boys. The bombing campaign also reflected a difference in that Japan's cities were fire bombed while in Germany precision bombing was the tactic. Also when you consider that Japan with the exception of some balloon borne bombs never layed a glove on the US, maybe a smigin of overkill?It's not my opinion let me hastely add just an observation. My opinion is that any and all means outside of war crimes was legit if it saved the life of a single GI. But Germany was the danger not Japan.Germany was the World War and holocaust not Japan. Europe was cousins Japan was just alien.
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Post by Dark Cloud on May 20, 2012 9:06:39 GMT -6
The Japanese American community was not ALL interned. Most, though. Italy had not attacked the US, Japan had. See the difference? But there was racism at work and many Japanese lost generation held land in California, never returned. Not as bad as Asian nations that kill or sell enslaved mixed blood babies - like Japan, Korea, Vietnam, etc. did and do in remote areas even yet, along with killing mere baby girls, who are an expense - but bad.
At least by our own alleged standards, not by the perpetrators. That's the issue that fouls the claims of Native Americans about persecution, given by their standards they've been treated well (neither enslaved nor killed at whim) while by 'Euro-American', they've been shamefully handled (law and Christian compassion).
In what way were the Germans more sporting than the Japanese?
Japan's cities were firebombed because they were literally made out of wood and paper. Literally. As a result, even without firebombs per se there would be fire storms in Japanese cities if any section was bombed. There was no such thing as precision bombing in WWII absent a single drop dive bomber. That was a fib, and only the ignorant pretend otherwise. Carpet bombing was the result in Germany as in Japan. Most European bombing was an 'assault on German agriculture', coming nowhere near intended targets.
The malleable and versatile definition of war crime springs to wild's mind because it can be applied to near anyone at any time. This satisfies his craving to detract attention from Irish atrocities and bombastic fiascos by holding these 'crimes' against the important, constructive nations worthy of attention. Civilians are therefore periodically posed as innocent, but they're often not remotely so. So while Ireland was perfectly willing to have Germany win if Britain lost so that they could be 'free' to slay each other over petty issues as they had for centuries - just as today new 'rogue' IRA gangs are being rounded up so they don't set off bombs at the Olympics in London or assassinate the Queen during the Jubilee - wild is on the alert for any past bombing that killed arguable innocents, forgetting that Japan attacked us at Pearl, and previously in China, where they slew millions of undeniable innocents, and is to this day the most hated nation in the world for its few years at large in Asia. That's a quite impressive feat given British Imperialism and American brutality.
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Post by quincannon on May 20, 2012 10:48:23 GMT -6
Richard: Japanese pilots were in the main enlisted men. You don't need to be an officer to fly an airplane. You need to be an officer to lead others flying airplanes. Fuchida, the air task force commander over Pearl was a back seater in a "Kate'. His job was to command, not fly the plane although he was a pilot. Sakai, I believe Japan's leading naval ace was was a CPO.
The U S Navy had a lot of enlisted piolot also, particularly in the first year of the war. I forget the squadron, maybe Fighting Three, that had a CPO's chevrons as the squadron insignia. Yes there was some difficulty with enlisted aircrews vs,. officers in the navy writ large, quarters, messing facilities, duty schedules and the like, but at the air crew level I have never seen any evidence of friction between the officer pilot and the enlisted air crew. I believe it would be counterintuative to think these people could perform as well as they did with a us vs, them attitude.
Torpedoes: U S Torpedoes were just fine. The detenators were the problem(s). A whole book could be written on this. Evidently the story goes that these fine detenators were designed, and budget tight depression area attitudes prevented them from being properly tested in the late 1920's and into the thirties. Stupidity on the part of bean counters. It is a poor time to find your torpedoes are defective when you have just shot a six tube spread at an oncoming enemy warship.
Why destroy Japan: Prevailing Japanese culture would send all of its sons to be slaughtered if need be. They would endure any conventional destructive force. They would do anything in their power to preserve the idea, and what they thought of as the superior culture of Japan and their God/Man Imperial Majesty. Once we dropped the two A Bombs and only then did they see this idea of land and culture in grave danger. Had we not done that they would still be fighting us with rocks and baseball bats.
I disagree somewhat with statements made about our thoughts toward the Japanese military. Only somewhat. In the begining I think these attitudes were prevelent. As the war went on though, we (our solidiers - sailors - marines) came to be very respectful of them as fighting men. I think the brutal -buck tooth- coke bottle eyeglass steriotype lingered and still remains among the civilian population. The brutality though enough cannot be said against.
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Post by fred on May 20, 2012 11:02:26 GMT -6
I believe that Fred and others on here who may have fought in Viet Namn will tell us that, despite the racial difference, they had a degree of respect for their Vietnamese adversaires and considered them to be a worth foe. Gatewood, I think most of what you say here is very accurate. I have never focused on the war in the Pacific-- being more interested in the "European" campaigns, especially Africa and Russia-- but what little I have read about the Japanese military has told me they were an extremely well-trained army and their troops were top-notch. A lot of our own assessments are racially motivated-- I believe-- but precisely because of what you have alluded to. Their treatment of Americans was probably a cultural thing more than any racial bias, but that is not an argument I would get involved in. As for Vietnam, we had a very healthy respect for our foe-- you are absolutely correct-- both NVA and the VC. We had no respect for the ARVN... with some exceptions: their ranger and marine units. And their LRRP guys were vicious bastards, I'll tell you. We liked the ROK guys, but for the most part they were serious killers and many times we had to stop them because of the intel value of prisoners. They didn't want to be bothered and it seemed like they were a damn sight more racist than we ever were. If I ran convoys up highway 13 or into Cu Chi, Nui Ba Din, or infiltration missions like those up to An Loc, there was no way in hell I would accept ARVN as road security. Our DTO always acquiesced when I bitched because I told him I would take the issue to Hollingsworth or even DePuy. And believe me, he tried! My battalion CO, whether it was Smith or Ingalls, always supported me. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on May 20, 2012 11:21:10 GMT -6
Just to develope this further. War was an alternative method of doing international business. What Japan was doing was no more than Britian,France and Holland had done in Asia.Britian even fought a war against China because China tried to prevent the import of narcotics.And Italy was engaged in the same land grabbing business in Africa using mustard gas. Enter Japan new empire builders incorporated.Carving out a nice chunk of China. US says no and imposes an imbargo on oil and such like.Britian and Holland do likewise.Japan enters into negotiations to no avail with US,at the same time US announces massive naval building program.A program that will dwarf the IJN.So it's Pax Americano or war. A strike now against the American Pacific Fleet and the establishment of a defensive cordon of islands around the new land acquisions from which they will fight the US to a standstill is an option.[I'm grateful for any guidance that the Colonel can offer here] The Japanese are fighting a limited war. Unlike the Germans this is business not ideological/racist. While the Japs were engaged in "business"the Germans were engaged in ethnic engineering,at least on a continental scale with asperations to expand to a world order. Now while I would without reservation agree with the big boy rules applied to the Japanese by the US I suspect that these rules did not apply to Germany.
DC For the time being I'm abiding by the appeal of your friends and admirers.I would suggest you do the same.
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Post by quincannon on May 20, 2012 11:59:05 GMT -6
Clausewitz remarked that "War is politics by other means". If that is correct the reverse must also be true.
There were so many causes of World War II that several volumes could be written on that alone I will not try.
What I will offer is this - Roosevelt moved the US Fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor in 1940. This was agaist the advice of the Fleet Commander and he was relieved shortly thereafter. That was a move that most disturbed Japan. They looked at it as a spear pointed at their midsection. Before the US Fleet was beyond striking distance of the IJN. Now I pose to you this question. What would Japan have done in terms of territorial and resources expansion, had the US Fleet stayed in San Diego? How would they modify their plans for expansion? Would they in fact have tried to expand southward? Would they have tried to negotiate their aims?
Having the US Fleet whole and intact at San Diego and out of strike range, just might make them think twice about the Philippines and an intact base of the Philippines made further southward expansion impossible without a secure flank. Tricky business the war fighting strategy stuff.
As it was the only hope the Japanese had was to destroy the US Fleet at Pearl, run rampant for six months to a year, establish that defensive perimeter, in hopes of a negotiated settlement. That is the only way they could achieve their aims with the situation that existed after Spring 1941
Two Ocean Fleet: It is well to keep in mind that up to mid 1941 there was only one US Fleet. In the main it was stationed in the Pacific, and what little force was in the Atlantic on a perminent basis was termed the Atlantic Squadron (more appropriately a medium sized task force) of the US Fleet. Now look at the general obsolescence of the US Fleet. The BB's were all old. Even the new ones being built like the NC and SD Class' would have a tough time with Bismark. None, and I mean none of our cruisers were in a class with the Prinz Eugen-Admiral Hipper. All of our destroyers had short legs and none we produced until Fletcher could compete with the Narviks or the Fubukis. The only two fighting ships that we had up to modern standard were Enterprise and Yorktown (soon to be joined by Hornet) and in 1941 they still were flying biplane fighters (F3F's), and our bombers and torpedo bombers were Vindicators and Devastators. You might want to ask the Marines on Midway how the former worked out, and the latter, one word three numbers Torpedo 3-6-8.
So the expansion to a Two Ocean Fleet was a response to a world at war and not just a jab at Japan. If one ever looks at Fahey's Ships and Aircraft of the U S Fleet (1941 Two Ocean Fleet Edition) you can see the truth in this statement. We were gravely concerned at the material condition, design flaws and overall general obsolecence of the U S Navy brought on by near twenty years of total neglect.
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Post by steve1956 on May 20, 2012 13:28:18 GMT -6
Going to ask something inspired by some books I've read:In military terms,Japan could have been defeated purely by blockade and aerial bombardment.....Phillipines & CBI were seen as politically neccessary.....comments?(Pacific is not really my area)
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Post by quincannon on May 20, 2012 14:06:38 GMT -6
I don't know, but I don't think so.
I think a lot of the answer to that question must depend on the time frame. 1942-43-44 definately not. 1945 without the A bomb unlikely. 1949 maybe.
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Post by Gatewood on May 20, 2012 15:03:01 GMT -6
This is a sort of composite response to several posts. Although, as with many on this board, I have interests in a wide variety of military history, my primary interest is World War II, particularly the Pacific, particularly the naval war, and especially Pearl Harbor. I will therefore present my understanding of several issues raise and allow others to take pop shots at them.
Part 1 - Preliminaries: Shortly after the Philippines and other territories came into U.S. possession as a result of the Spanish American War, both the U.S. and Japan realized that their interests in the Pacific were diametrically opposed and would probably ultimately lead to war. As a result, as early as 1908 (if I remember correctly), the U.S. started to formulate a series of plans for the conduct of the presumed war, and Japan did likewise. Interestingly, the plans of both sides saw the war as unfolding remarkably similarly, and, although they evolved over time, one constant was that both sides perceived the Japanese ultimately seizing the resources that they needed in Southeast Asia, precipitating war with the U.S., at which time the U.S. Pacific fleet would come charging across the Pacific, like the cavalry to the rescue, with one big climatic battle being fought somewhere in the vicinity of the Philippines or the Japanese home islands.
In the late 1930's, U.S. plans began to deviate from this, partially as a result of the "Germany First" policy that was already being formulated, but largely due to evolving concepts of modern naval warfare, particularly battleships vs. carriers. Specifically, the U.S. began to realize that, given a "two front war" and the emphasis on "Germany first" there would simply not be adequate resources to dedicate to the earlier plans for engaging in early battles in the western Pacific. In particular, the U.S. had no where near sufficient logistical capabilities for projecting and sustaining significant force on the far side of the Pacific.
This, coupled with the large U.S. naval building program that would not bear significant fruit until the early 1940's, resulted in U.S. plans evolving along the lines of a holding strategy in which the fleet was tasked primarily with maintaining open lines of communication with Australia and conducting carrier (and other) raids into the Marianas and various other Japanese territories and mandates, until such time as the building program produce enough modern ships to convert to the offensive.
On the other hand, the Japanese plans did not evolve to the same degree and still foresaw a large naval confrontation early in the war. This is where Yamamoto comes in. When he became CinC of the Japanese fleet he reasoned that, rather than waiting for the U.S. fleet to come across the Pacific to engage in the one great battle, why not attack and eliminate the fleet initially - thus the attack on Pearl Harbor. That, despite what his, in my mind largely undeserved, reputation indicates, was really his only contribution - simply moving the time frame forward. In that sense most people do not realize that, rather than being the catalyst for war in the Pacific, Pearl Harbor was really a secondary, support operation intended to preclude the U.S. fleet from carrying out its previous, and what the Japanese still perceived as being, mission of interfering with the primary Japanese operations in the western Pacific. In that sense, and what is also not generally realized, the Japanese did exactly what the U.S. anticipated that they would do, with the addition that they also attacked Pearl Harbor.
---to be continued---
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