Post by herosrest on Jun 4, 2012 7:51:14 GMT -6
Preface A ............
Fred,
Thank you. Your LBH resume is deja vu - sort of.
There was no valid reason for Wallace to defer to Maguire's report during the Reno Court of Inquiry. It was Benteen who arrived near the village at 2pm, on the 25th. There is no solace, vindication, or solutions in the time-lines, Graham made certain of that. They offer guide-lines. All the battle's confusion stems from Wallace's time of the place with Maguire's 2pm on the 25th. Humour follows, to be taken in that vein, (sorry ). Anyone completing the marathon below, can add a small squirrel emblem to their avatar. Of course no-one will read through, it's rather like starting W.A. Graham's master work on the Reno Court of Inquiry.
Reno for ever found fault for, and cause of disater, in others. He was insane. A very dangerous individual, to himself, those he was responsible for, and those with responsibility for him. The endevour and resolve he practiced belonged on the battlefield. His letters of July 4th 1876, advised Sheridan that Custer was responsible for defeat in the battle which Reno departed; and told that Gibbon and Terry did not have a clue how to undertake a campaign. Reno's letter to Grant of July 4th 1876, applied for Custer's job in the hope Reno could gain command of the expedition.
Custer's 'orders' to Benteen, instructed Benteen to support Reno in the valley. Reno wasn't in the valley when Benteen showed up. At least Company E were sent towards the river, and were riding towards a ford before the entire command came to a halt. Therefore, at least that company, were supporting Reno until they halted. It must have been about then that Trumpeter Martin was sent to Benteen. The Ree scout Stabbed would have caught up with Custer by then.
Terry's order's to Custer were made with belief the hostiles would evade battle. It was understood that Custer would engage if possible or neccesary, and it became neccesary. Reasons why are straight-forward and simple, and you understand them as well as did Sheridan. That disaster could have been avoided is proved by survival of the seven companies on Reno Hill. That the five with Custer were cut off and anihilated was the fault of Reno alone. He did not stand and await promised support. Getting to the bottom of what Benteen was up to, is the stuff of the Wallace disaster.
As you say, nothing seemed to really add up with always more questions, primary source is 'basically' important, but so as well, the interpretation placed upon that data. Putting aside the timing issue until later, lets look at interpretation of primary sources and Lt.W. P. Clark's map which is fundemental to study. Line of sight from the valley floor into the mouth of the coulees and horizon beyond is important to grasping what could be seen. Foolish Elk provided a rare overview of the fighting, interesting for me particularly because I have come to accept broadly that John D. Miles early account gained from Southern Cheyennes returning to their reservation from the battle, is intrinsicly accurate and truthful - but as confusing as many Cheyenne accounts are because of translation; neither author or translater knew anything about the topic. The account published in August 1876.
Name of the game is synergies, similarities and contradiction in comparable material; insight from those with professional interest, and plod, plod neigh.... through endless records and interpretation and analysis. People are earning letters after their names studying this stuff, some is rather good and gets better the more obscure and further off topic it is. This is good, i'm not dissing - the topic is far broader than 25th June. When motivated, my instincts are those of a panzer tank, definately not a worthwhile approach with Lima Bravo because of the rich environment and steep learning curve which does not decline and branches like a star burst. That's enough waffle - Custer's Last Trail (J.D. Miles) and its research. It occured to me one day that the Cheyennes camped where they did, and that changes very much of what people present as happened and had my own grasp of matters shredded and flipped, tossed aside and forgotten.
Here's why, various accounts place Custer (troops) across from the Cheyennes, and that means on terrain at the mouth of Deep Coulee or the terminus of Greasy Grass ridge, across towards Calhoun Hill. Anywhere further downriver is wrong, and misleads into confusion. I turned to the archaeology and first stop was Fox........ big problems.
The Miles account is interesting because of the maneuver and if the detail stacks up, then like it or not and regardless of vague origins and language problems inherent to Cheyenne, it is source material. The earliest historical account of Custer's fight. It was this theory of the fight that William A. Allen portrayed in his book, after viewing the ground in August 1877. Foolish Elk's detail of simultaneous fighting at diffent locations is not inconsistent with Miles, and the sequence and orientations are interesting. There is little hard and fast with tribal accounts as you know, and it is perfectly legitimate to play a little loose to get the hang of it.
What is there in the archaeology? I went to Fox who accepts the actual smaller village, but his conclusions about maneuver and the fighting ignore his understanding of the Cheyenne camp. Clark's map gives location of the Brule lodges, and there is Foolish Elk, feeling immensely wan expecting to see the village over-run by troopers at any moment. Cheyenne record left by Big Beaver indicates the location of the ford used to confront Custer. When warrior record refers to the ford, that is where minds eye must focus and the accounts become that little bit easier to digest. Fox did not make that translation, and his interpretations of the Clark map are misconstrued downriver to Deep Ravine and the National Cemetary. Put aside all that has developed with John Stands in Timber's research, the retreat from the river began from the mouth of Deep Coulee. The Cheyenne ford was there and the route taken by warriors is shown by Big Beaver. Foolish Elk knew nothing of Keogh's fight. When Big Beaver got there it was all but over.
Getting into Big Beaver's stuff becomes really interesting, so i'll excerpt the text, but not add or detract, - 'all Indians from the Cheyenne end went north along the river, then to the right or east, and towards Custer from the north side. BB crawled up the coulee just north and a little east of the present monument. A Sioux would raise, shoot, and crawl towards the monument when a bullet struck his forehead. (The Cheyenne Wooden Leg was present). A soldier mounted and dashed towards the east. The lone marker next to the fence east of Keogh's position. BB went and got the gun and other things and returned to the coulee - all rushed towards the monument hill, no soldiers were standing but some fired prone or sitting. The Indians rushed in and that was the end there. About fifteen troops got up over to the west, and ran for the river down the coulee. He knew nothing about the rest of the battlefield, smoke and dust were so thick. Everyone from farther back came on the field trying to get something.
Here is one of the booby traps that modern analysis has inflicted because the route Big Beaver and all those from that end of camp followed is shown on his sketch. They didn't cross the river at Deep Ravine, and went north along the river at Greasy Grass Ridge. That is no small thing. There is confusion over the numbers of troops who fled for the river - Big Beaver put the number at fifteen, the spread is six or so up to forty.
There is corroboration of Big Beaver's count from Two Eagle's in the Walter M. Camp collection. (Lakota Recollections; Hardorff, 1991, p141-152) A group of 10 to 12 made a dash to the river from Keogh's stand down on a line about half way between Calhoun Hill and Deep Ravine. They scattered some in going down. None tried to get away until Keogh's stand, when a few started for the river, their manner and progress did not indicate they were trying to run away. 8 soldiers west of Finley Finkle came down from Keogh's stand when Two Eagles was on the east side of the ridge between Finley/Finkle and Calhoun Hill. The last of the soldiers ran from Custer Hill to Deep Ravine They were all dismounted. Two Eagle's is useful for expanding detail of various maneuver across the field into a loose sequence of time. Which bunch of 10-15 was Big Beaver referring to?
The route from Keogh down on a line about half way between Calhoun Hill and Deep Ravine, is shown on Lazy White Bull's/Walter Campbell sketch; and relates well to Edward S. Godfrey's map and information locating Company E on Battle Ridge. This is a lose framework that i've been reasonably happy with for some time, and into which a lot else just snaps into place. It is the later fight and much went on earlier but I learnt from Shipley Gray, you can start in the middle or several places, to pull it all together. Gray simply slapped together something ridiculous and I assumed for a time that as a scientist he expected to be challenged and tested to destruction. Wiser now after realising how slip-shod, cursory, and focused on hiding contoversy he was, everything Lima Bravo must pass the muster of a parallel advance by Custer and Reno, avoid any of the five companies being in Cedar Coulee, and place Company E at the river with Company F at least on the divide of the two coulees. Freeman's sketch map reliably informs this much with the context of Curley's information.
Edward S. Curtis invited controvesy into his study of the battle and his research seems to trouble many people as a consequence. What a pity he didn't just publish and be damned with it all, particularly the entire set of photographs impossible to recover as a set today. Of course by the time his interests brought him to investigate, Godfrey, Edgerley, Hare, etc. were Brig. Generals, Varnum made Colonel and Hugh L. Scott was destined for Chief of Staff. By an unusual irony, Curley was handed the land of Reno's retreat and defence as his own to raise and trade ponies which grazed Custer's battleground. That he engaged in conspiracy during the last great Indian Council, on the battlefield, in the valley of the Little Horn, Montana, in September 1909, is as preposterous as Reno's enduring farce.
Company E lost 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 2 trumpeters, and 29 privates killed besides the two lieutenants commanding the platoons. According to E.S. Godfrey, Algernon E.Smith's 37 troops deployed as skirmishers, mounted, and took position on a ridge, which on Smith's left ended in Keogh's position and on Smith's right ended at the hill on which Custer took position with Yates and Tom Custer'.s troop, now known as Custer hill, and marked by the monument erected to the command. Smith's skirmishers holding their gray horses remained in groups of fours. There is no reason to doubt Godfrey's information which was provided by Gall, who led Godfrey over the terrain indicating events.
Subsequently, what is believed to have been 28 men of that Company were found dead at H a ravine believed to be deep and fatal. Posterity has yet to uncover and prove definitely the location of those dead, although the remains of all dead were eventually recovered from the field and reburied. There would have been nine horse holders for the companies mounts, leaving 28 men to fight on foot. Accepting use of Cheyenne ford and march north along Greasy Grass Ridge east of the river towards Custer's Hill, the sketch information by Capt. Henry B. Freeman gains a new focus, supported by his observation that the village relocated downriver during the evening of the 25th. What appears therefore to be a ford in the middle of the encampment, was actually at the limit of its downstream extent during the Custer fight. This was identified by E.S. Curtis, and lends weight to his credentials as a historian who understood how to get at the facts. Fine example of his abilities is presented by the volumes of his work in 'The North American Indian'. Curtis indicates accurately on his map, the village location and size when 7th Cavalry attacked; and the routes across and back over the river followed by women who fled the valley attack to discover Custer's command to the east.
With information presented above, reconsideration of Lt. Clark's map oriented to Cheyenne Ford and known march by cavalry from Greasy Grass Ridge towards Calhoun Hill, throws new light on the information conveyed. The map is mentioned by Capt. John G. Bourke, 3rd Cavalry, (On the Border with Crook, 1891, p416)
'I cannot say that much information was gained not already known to the public. The Indians appeared to believe that from the moment that Custer divided his forces in presence of such overwhelming odds, the destruction of the whole or the greater part was a foregone conclusion. A picture of the battlefield was drawn by one of the Indians present in hostility, and marked by myself under his direction. In some of the villages indicated there were portions of several bands.
This is the exact language of "Horny Horse": "Some lodges came out from Standing Rock Agency and told us the troops were coming. The troops charged on the camp before we knew they were there. The lodges were strung out about as far as from here to the Red Cloud Agency slaughter-house (about two and a half miles). I was in the council-house with a lot of the old men, when we heard shots fired from up the river. The troops first charged from up the river. We came out of the council-house and ran to our lodges.
All the young bucks got on their horses and charged the troops. All the old bucks and squaws ran the other way. We ran the troops back. Then there was another party of troops on the other side of the river. One half of the Indians pursued the first body of troops (Reno's); the other half went after the other body (Custer's). I didn't see exactly all the fight, but by noon, all of one party (Custer's) were killed, and the others driven back into a bad place. We took no prisoners. I did not go out to see the bodies, because there were two young bucks of my band killed in the fight and we had to look after them.
Note - The total number of Indians surrendering at Red Cloud and Spotted Tail agencies was not quite four thousand five hundred, who made no secret of the fact that they had yielded because they saw that it was impossible to stand out against the coalition made by General Crook between the white soldiers and their own people ; the terrible disaster happening to the Cheyenne village (Dull Knife) had opened their ears to the counsels of their brethren still in those agencies, and the alliance between the Cheyennes and the whites proved to them that further resistance would be useless. They surrendered, and they surrendered for good; there has never been another battle with the tribes of the northern plains as such; work of a most arduous and perilous character has been from time to time performed, in which many officers and brave soldiers have laid down their lives at the behest of duty, but the statement here made cannot be gainsaid, and will never be questioned by the honest and truthful investigator, that the destruction of the village of "Dull Knife," and the subsequent enlistment of the whole of the northern Cheyennes as scouts in the military service, sounded the death-knell of Indian supremacy for Nebraska, Wyoming, both the Dakotas, and Montana.
There is little reason to disbelieve Trumpeter Martin, in fact no reason at all, and Custer initially thought he had caught them napping. An officer died early, this is known from reliable Cheyenne accounts and Grinnell. It wasn't Custer, he didn't ride to the river and sent a message away from the divide between Medicine Tale and Deep Coulees. Gray horse troop were brought to a halt as they headed for the Cheyenne Ford, and it was at that time an officer went down. Some Cheyennes had crossed the river at that time, amongst them was Yellow Nose, others including Wolf Tooth and Big Foot were already being a nuisance. Foolish Elk's account is valid to what went on, but doesn't seemingly shed significant light on John D. Miles account of things. But let's not be put off yet. There is always White Man Runs Him and Edward S. Curtis to consider.
Cedar Coulee was such an obvious red herring, that it beggars belief it ever flew, but that aside, it is a red herring and with Henry B. Freeman that reality exists. Between what is available from E.S. Curtis, routes of march given by Freeman showing where Custer divided the command, and the Two Eagles interview - let's make some sense of it all.
The command halted, Company E nearest the river, Custer and Company F on the divide between the coulees. Curtis shows a route marched across Deep coulee towards Greasy Grass Ridge, Freeman indicates troops crossed Deep Coulee towards Calhoun Hill or Finley/Finkle, which is agreed by Two Eagles; and Freeman further placed troops onto Nye Cartwright ridge fighting on foot. We have at least three bunches of soldiers east of the river. Was Trumpeter Martin then on his journey towards Benteen? It's maybe 5 miles at maximum and Benteen was near the village at 2pm. Hmmmm...... now we know why Reno was paranoid. A messenger rode to Custer from soldiers out to the east, delivered a message to Custer and met the Ree scouts on the bluffs at Weirs Hills, whilst Reno was still in the valley.
From the other end of the puddle, as Benteen approached Ford A, where Weir and Edgerly were headed, he saw Reno's retreat underway, and that was at about 2pm. Trumpeter Martin had already arrived with Custer's message ordering Benteen to support Reno in the valley. The quickest route for Benteen to the big village being across Ford A, where Reno had been told he would be supported but forgot about and never after mentioned messages sent to him by Custer. Rocket scientist struggle with the problem, but the military axiom under circumstances Custer found once he commited his command, would dictate.......would dictate that...... you get yourself and 200 men wiped out. That is what Reno wishes the world to believe.
Custer was alive when Hairy Moccasin and White Man Runs Him arrived at the mouth of Custer Creek to have a little chat about how things weren't going well in the valley. It's time for the 1919 H.L. Scott interview with White Man Runs Him.
It's a game. The tribal record is fascinating in its confusion. Ultimately, there is only the text to work with, the actual words. With Cheyenne record there are obvious and also rather subtle errors introduced by tranlation of oral accounts and interpretation of sign. There is no substantial evidence to prove a presence by Custer's command in the valley or village, other than by an individual or two. Therefore, Custer did not cross the river and Cheyenne accounts which offer the prospect are errant in translation. James McLaughlin was not everyones cup of tea, but took his work and its importance seriously. He had problems about Sitting Bull, many people did with his intransigence and wily ability. McLaughlin's knowledge of the Sioux language made it possible to get along in conversation, with the assistance of the sign language, with most of the Indians east of the Rocky Mountains and north of Texas(See note). His wife was fluent.(see note) Of the Cheyennes he stated the language extremely difficult to master, knowing of no white man who has mastered it. Amongst problems with translations of Cheyenne, are terms for terrain and particularly river, stream, creek and ravine, etc. cardinal points can be troublesome, and horse color is absolute mayhem. An account stating Custer crossed the river is obviously not saying that, but something else. That is a can of worms but is fact. Thus if the didn't cross the river (creek) they crossed the coulee (creek), which makes a little more sense. For White Shield to see his Yellow Nose of to the south east capturing Custer's battle-flag, White Shield had to be on Greasy Grass Ridge. Two Moons told us when Black Bear was killed, Little Hawk told us how, his marker is on Battle Ridge. Lazy White Bull told of Bearded Man' death. His marker is on Battle Ridge.
In regards actual text we have to work with, sometimes being near is good enough but often it is misleading, '"For a time all the soldiers stood on a the hill near where the monument is now, ringed in by the Sioux, dying bravely one by one. as lndians poured in a hail of lead and arrows. They lay or knelt on the bare ridge, firing across the bodies of dead horses, selling their lives dearly until only a few remained.
A Cheyenne named 'Bearded Man' charged these soldiers. He rushed right in among them and was killed there. His body lay in the midst of the soldiers. When the fight was over, the Sioux found him there. They did not recognise his body. They thought he was an lndian Government scout. - to Stanley Vestal, (The Custer Reader By P.A. Hutton, R.M. Utley). Edward S. Curtis knew how to go about his work, obvious from 'The North American Indian' of which all volumes are online and fascinating.
Two Moon placed a guard over Custer's body, and new exactly where he lay. Keogh wore a scapula. Warriors with Paints Brown captured swords and guidons. Sgt. Ryan of Company M, recaptured a guidon at Reno Hill. Ammunition mules escaped from Reno Hill and were captured in the river. Custer's companies retreated alternatelyon foot, in irregular skirmish lines, as at least three simultaneous fights occured. They were done in by 3.15pm. Benteen was near the village about 2pm. Reno charged at about 2pm. Custer probably did as well. Wallace brought confusion to the Reno Inquiry. Graham delivered disater to time base analysis of the battle. Varnum heard two crashhes of gunfire, each which lasted several minutes and no more after. Mathey heard that gunfir 15 minutes before reporting to Reno on eReno Hill. Whittaker's time based analysis, the first conducted, was reasonably accurate but drew poor conclusions and he entirely missed the cause of disaster as being Reno's charge out of the battle.
____________________________________________________________
Note. McLaughlin was responsible for Gall at Standing Rock and left this anecdote:- 'WHEN CUPID CAMPS WITH THE SIOUX'
After he had passed his prime Gall fell in love. He was at that time the finest-looking Indian I had ever seen, and but a very few years previous, he need have asked no man s advice as to what he should do if he wanted a woman for a wife ; and in those days it would have made no particular difference if he had happened to be encumbered with one or more wives at the time. One morning in the year 1885, Gall had ceased to be a hostile and buried the hatchet finally in 1881, he came to the office at the agency and asked for a private interview. He was a fine, big man, showing in his attitude the pride he had in his chieftaincy and his prowess as a warrior. The finest typical picture of an Indian extant is a photograph of Gall taken about this time. He was very mysterious in his actions on this particular morning, which was the more surprising, in that he was habitually open and even impressive in his carelessness of surroundings. He looked about to see that we were alone and then said:- "Father, I have come to have a talk." (The Sioux invariably address their agent as father.)
I was ready to hear him, and told him so. He continued:- "When you came here [some four years previously] we agreed, you and I, that I should come and talk straight when I wanted advice and that we were to be friends."
"How," said I; "How" meaning good, right, well-done, or anything you like in the way of approbation, in addition to its usual use as a term of greeting and farewell.
And "How," rejoined the chief, then he continued: "I have been your friend; you are my friend. I told you that I would give up the customs of my people and live as the white men do, as nearly as I could. Have I done that?"
I assured him that I was perfectly content, and that he had been all I could ask. And he went on:- "Father, I have changed my habits; I follow the footsteps of the white man, for I know he is wiser than I am and that the Indian way is no longer the way to go. But, my friend, I cannot change my heart. We may catch a bird but we cannot make it change its tune. My heart is good, but it is sad, for I am in love."
Gall blushed. Men who know the Indian intimately will understand that this is literally true, that this big warrior, who had been ruthless in his warfare and who had lived for forty years and more in the open, whose red skin was browned by the sun, who had painted his face every winter to keep the skin from chapping and painted it again in the summer to keep it from burning, blushed like a white-skinned girl.
But he looked me straight in the eye. There was reason for his blushing, in the shape of an elderly dame who sat at home waiting for her lord to return from the agency, and Gall knew that I was thinking of her.
Where McLaughlin advises that Gall saw Custer's command for the second time thus; 'Gall said that when he reached the lower end of the village Custer was still some distance off ; that his force was advancing irregularly, but the men did not straggle far'. It should be believed, rather than the version given by Bowen. 'The process of events on the 25th of June, 1876, disposition of the forces and the actual fighting, Gall and other chiefs told the story to me (McLaughlin) with great attention to detail.'
Be well, Fred
Fred,
Thank you. Your LBH resume is deja vu - sort of.
There was no valid reason for Wallace to defer to Maguire's report during the Reno Court of Inquiry. It was Benteen who arrived near the village at 2pm, on the 25th. There is no solace, vindication, or solutions in the time-lines, Graham made certain of that. They offer guide-lines. All the battle's confusion stems from Wallace's time of the place with Maguire's 2pm on the 25th. Humour follows, to be taken in that vein, (sorry ). Anyone completing the marathon below, can add a small squirrel emblem to their avatar. Of course no-one will read through, it's rather like starting W.A. Graham's master work on the Reno Court of Inquiry.
Reno for ever found fault for, and cause of disater, in others. He was insane. A very dangerous individual, to himself, those he was responsible for, and those with responsibility for him. The endevour and resolve he practiced belonged on the battlefield. His letters of July 4th 1876, advised Sheridan that Custer was responsible for defeat in the battle which Reno departed; and told that Gibbon and Terry did not have a clue how to undertake a campaign. Reno's letter to Grant of July 4th 1876, applied for Custer's job in the hope Reno could gain command of the expedition.
Custer's 'orders' to Benteen, instructed Benteen to support Reno in the valley. Reno wasn't in the valley when Benteen showed up. At least Company E were sent towards the river, and were riding towards a ford before the entire command came to a halt. Therefore, at least that company, were supporting Reno until they halted. It must have been about then that Trumpeter Martin was sent to Benteen. The Ree scout Stabbed would have caught up with Custer by then.
Terry's order's to Custer were made with belief the hostiles would evade battle. It was understood that Custer would engage if possible or neccesary, and it became neccesary. Reasons why are straight-forward and simple, and you understand them as well as did Sheridan. That disaster could have been avoided is proved by survival of the seven companies on Reno Hill. That the five with Custer were cut off and anihilated was the fault of Reno alone. He did not stand and await promised support. Getting to the bottom of what Benteen was up to, is the stuff of the Wallace disaster.
As you say, nothing seemed to really add up with always more questions, primary source is 'basically' important, but so as well, the interpretation placed upon that data. Putting aside the timing issue until later, lets look at interpretation of primary sources and Lt.W. P. Clark's map which is fundemental to study. Line of sight from the valley floor into the mouth of the coulees and horizon beyond is important to grasping what could be seen. Foolish Elk provided a rare overview of the fighting, interesting for me particularly because I have come to accept broadly that John D. Miles early account gained from Southern Cheyennes returning to their reservation from the battle, is intrinsicly accurate and truthful - but as confusing as many Cheyenne accounts are because of translation; neither author or translater knew anything about the topic. The account published in August 1876.
Name of the game is synergies, similarities and contradiction in comparable material; insight from those with professional interest, and plod, plod neigh.... through endless records and interpretation and analysis. People are earning letters after their names studying this stuff, some is rather good and gets better the more obscure and further off topic it is. This is good, i'm not dissing - the topic is far broader than 25th June. When motivated, my instincts are those of a panzer tank, definately not a worthwhile approach with Lima Bravo because of the rich environment and steep learning curve which does not decline and branches like a star burst. That's enough waffle - Custer's Last Trail (J.D. Miles) and its research. It occured to me one day that the Cheyennes camped where they did, and that changes very much of what people present as happened and had my own grasp of matters shredded and flipped, tossed aside and forgotten.
Here's why, various accounts place Custer (troops) across from the Cheyennes, and that means on terrain at the mouth of Deep Coulee or the terminus of Greasy Grass ridge, across towards Calhoun Hill. Anywhere further downriver is wrong, and misleads into confusion. I turned to the archaeology and first stop was Fox........ big problems.
The Miles account is interesting because of the maneuver and if the detail stacks up, then like it or not and regardless of vague origins and language problems inherent to Cheyenne, it is source material. The earliest historical account of Custer's fight. It was this theory of the fight that William A. Allen portrayed in his book, after viewing the ground in August 1877. Foolish Elk's detail of simultaneous fighting at diffent locations is not inconsistent with Miles, and the sequence and orientations are interesting. There is little hard and fast with tribal accounts as you know, and it is perfectly legitimate to play a little loose to get the hang of it.
What is there in the archaeology? I went to Fox who accepts the actual smaller village, but his conclusions about maneuver and the fighting ignore his understanding of the Cheyenne camp. Clark's map gives location of the Brule lodges, and there is Foolish Elk, feeling immensely wan expecting to see the village over-run by troopers at any moment. Cheyenne record left by Big Beaver indicates the location of the ford used to confront Custer. When warrior record refers to the ford, that is where minds eye must focus and the accounts become that little bit easier to digest. Fox did not make that translation, and his interpretations of the Clark map are misconstrued downriver to Deep Ravine and the National Cemetary. Put aside all that has developed with John Stands in Timber's research, the retreat from the river began from the mouth of Deep Coulee. The Cheyenne ford was there and the route taken by warriors is shown by Big Beaver. Foolish Elk knew nothing of Keogh's fight. When Big Beaver got there it was all but over.
Getting into Big Beaver's stuff becomes really interesting, so i'll excerpt the text, but not add or detract, - 'all Indians from the Cheyenne end went north along the river, then to the right or east, and towards Custer from the north side. BB crawled up the coulee just north and a little east of the present monument. A Sioux would raise, shoot, and crawl towards the monument when a bullet struck his forehead. (The Cheyenne Wooden Leg was present). A soldier mounted and dashed towards the east. The lone marker next to the fence east of Keogh's position. BB went and got the gun and other things and returned to the coulee - all rushed towards the monument hill, no soldiers were standing but some fired prone or sitting. The Indians rushed in and that was the end there. About fifteen troops got up over to the west, and ran for the river down the coulee. He knew nothing about the rest of the battlefield, smoke and dust were so thick. Everyone from farther back came on the field trying to get something.
Here is one of the booby traps that modern analysis has inflicted because the route Big Beaver and all those from that end of camp followed is shown on his sketch. They didn't cross the river at Deep Ravine, and went north along the river at Greasy Grass Ridge. That is no small thing. There is confusion over the numbers of troops who fled for the river - Big Beaver put the number at fifteen, the spread is six or so up to forty.
There is corroboration of Big Beaver's count from Two Eagle's in the Walter M. Camp collection. (Lakota Recollections; Hardorff, 1991, p141-152) A group of 10 to 12 made a dash to the river from Keogh's stand down on a line about half way between Calhoun Hill and Deep Ravine. They scattered some in going down. None tried to get away until Keogh's stand, when a few started for the river, their manner and progress did not indicate they were trying to run away. 8 soldiers west of Finley Finkle came down from Keogh's stand when Two Eagles was on the east side of the ridge between Finley/Finkle and Calhoun Hill. The last of the soldiers ran from Custer Hill to Deep Ravine They were all dismounted. Two Eagle's is useful for expanding detail of various maneuver across the field into a loose sequence of time. Which bunch of 10-15 was Big Beaver referring to?
The route from Keogh down on a line about half way between Calhoun Hill and Deep Ravine, is shown on Lazy White Bull's/Walter Campbell sketch; and relates well to Edward S. Godfrey's map and information locating Company E on Battle Ridge. This is a lose framework that i've been reasonably happy with for some time, and into which a lot else just snaps into place. It is the later fight and much went on earlier but I learnt from Shipley Gray, you can start in the middle or several places, to pull it all together. Gray simply slapped together something ridiculous and I assumed for a time that as a scientist he expected to be challenged and tested to destruction. Wiser now after realising how slip-shod, cursory, and focused on hiding contoversy he was, everything Lima Bravo must pass the muster of a parallel advance by Custer and Reno, avoid any of the five companies being in Cedar Coulee, and place Company E at the river with Company F at least on the divide of the two coulees. Freeman's sketch map reliably informs this much with the context of Curley's information.
Edward S. Curtis invited controvesy into his study of the battle and his research seems to trouble many people as a consequence. What a pity he didn't just publish and be damned with it all, particularly the entire set of photographs impossible to recover as a set today. Of course by the time his interests brought him to investigate, Godfrey, Edgerley, Hare, etc. were Brig. Generals, Varnum made Colonel and Hugh L. Scott was destined for Chief of Staff. By an unusual irony, Curley was handed the land of Reno's retreat and defence as his own to raise and trade ponies which grazed Custer's battleground. That he engaged in conspiracy during the last great Indian Council, on the battlefield, in the valley of the Little Horn, Montana, in September 1909, is as preposterous as Reno's enduring farce.
Company E lost 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 2 trumpeters, and 29 privates killed besides the two lieutenants commanding the platoons. According to E.S. Godfrey, Algernon E.Smith's 37 troops deployed as skirmishers, mounted, and took position on a ridge, which on Smith's left ended in Keogh's position and on Smith's right ended at the hill on which Custer took position with Yates and Tom Custer'.s troop, now known as Custer hill, and marked by the monument erected to the command. Smith's skirmishers holding their gray horses remained in groups of fours. There is no reason to doubt Godfrey's information which was provided by Gall, who led Godfrey over the terrain indicating events.
Subsequently, what is believed to have been 28 men of that Company were found dead at H a ravine believed to be deep and fatal. Posterity has yet to uncover and prove definitely the location of those dead, although the remains of all dead were eventually recovered from the field and reburied. There would have been nine horse holders for the companies mounts, leaving 28 men to fight on foot. Accepting use of Cheyenne ford and march north along Greasy Grass Ridge east of the river towards Custer's Hill, the sketch information by Capt. Henry B. Freeman gains a new focus, supported by his observation that the village relocated downriver during the evening of the 25th. What appears therefore to be a ford in the middle of the encampment, was actually at the limit of its downstream extent during the Custer fight. This was identified by E.S. Curtis, and lends weight to his credentials as a historian who understood how to get at the facts. Fine example of his abilities is presented by the volumes of his work in 'The North American Indian'. Curtis indicates accurately on his map, the village location and size when 7th Cavalry attacked; and the routes across and back over the river followed by women who fled the valley attack to discover Custer's command to the east.
With information presented above, reconsideration of Lt. Clark's map oriented to Cheyenne Ford and known march by cavalry from Greasy Grass Ridge towards Calhoun Hill, throws new light on the information conveyed. The map is mentioned by Capt. John G. Bourke, 3rd Cavalry, (On the Border with Crook, 1891, p416)
'I cannot say that much information was gained not already known to the public. The Indians appeared to believe that from the moment that Custer divided his forces in presence of such overwhelming odds, the destruction of the whole or the greater part was a foregone conclusion. A picture of the battlefield was drawn by one of the Indians present in hostility, and marked by myself under his direction. In some of the villages indicated there were portions of several bands.
This is the exact language of "Horny Horse": "Some lodges came out from Standing Rock Agency and told us the troops were coming. The troops charged on the camp before we knew they were there. The lodges were strung out about as far as from here to the Red Cloud Agency slaughter-house (about two and a half miles). I was in the council-house with a lot of the old men, when we heard shots fired from up the river. The troops first charged from up the river. We came out of the council-house and ran to our lodges.
All the young bucks got on their horses and charged the troops. All the old bucks and squaws ran the other way. We ran the troops back. Then there was another party of troops on the other side of the river. One half of the Indians pursued the first body of troops (Reno's); the other half went after the other body (Custer's). I didn't see exactly all the fight, but by noon, all of one party (Custer's) were killed, and the others driven back into a bad place. We took no prisoners. I did not go out to see the bodies, because there were two young bucks of my band killed in the fight and we had to look after them.
Note - The total number of Indians surrendering at Red Cloud and Spotted Tail agencies was not quite four thousand five hundred, who made no secret of the fact that they had yielded because they saw that it was impossible to stand out against the coalition made by General Crook between the white soldiers and their own people ; the terrible disaster happening to the Cheyenne village (Dull Knife) had opened their ears to the counsels of their brethren still in those agencies, and the alliance between the Cheyennes and the whites proved to them that further resistance would be useless. They surrendered, and they surrendered for good; there has never been another battle with the tribes of the northern plains as such; work of a most arduous and perilous character has been from time to time performed, in which many officers and brave soldiers have laid down their lives at the behest of duty, but the statement here made cannot be gainsaid, and will never be questioned by the honest and truthful investigator, that the destruction of the village of "Dull Knife," and the subsequent enlistment of the whole of the northern Cheyennes as scouts in the military service, sounded the death-knell of Indian supremacy for Nebraska, Wyoming, both the Dakotas, and Montana.
There is little reason to disbelieve Trumpeter Martin, in fact no reason at all, and Custer initially thought he had caught them napping. An officer died early, this is known from reliable Cheyenne accounts and Grinnell. It wasn't Custer, he didn't ride to the river and sent a message away from the divide between Medicine Tale and Deep Coulees. Gray horse troop were brought to a halt as they headed for the Cheyenne Ford, and it was at that time an officer went down. Some Cheyennes had crossed the river at that time, amongst them was Yellow Nose, others including Wolf Tooth and Big Foot were already being a nuisance. Foolish Elk's account is valid to what went on, but doesn't seemingly shed significant light on John D. Miles account of things. But let's not be put off yet. There is always White Man Runs Him and Edward S. Curtis to consider.
Cedar Coulee was such an obvious red herring, that it beggars belief it ever flew, but that aside, it is a red herring and with Henry B. Freeman that reality exists. Between what is available from E.S. Curtis, routes of march given by Freeman showing where Custer divided the command, and the Two Eagles interview - let's make some sense of it all.
The command halted, Company E nearest the river, Custer and Company F on the divide between the coulees. Curtis shows a route marched across Deep coulee towards Greasy Grass Ridge, Freeman indicates troops crossed Deep Coulee towards Calhoun Hill or Finley/Finkle, which is agreed by Two Eagles; and Freeman further placed troops onto Nye Cartwright ridge fighting on foot. We have at least three bunches of soldiers east of the river. Was Trumpeter Martin then on his journey towards Benteen? It's maybe 5 miles at maximum and Benteen was near the village at 2pm. Hmmmm...... now we know why Reno was paranoid. A messenger rode to Custer from soldiers out to the east, delivered a message to Custer and met the Ree scouts on the bluffs at Weirs Hills, whilst Reno was still in the valley.
From the other end of the puddle, as Benteen approached Ford A, where Weir and Edgerly were headed, he saw Reno's retreat underway, and that was at about 2pm. Trumpeter Martin had already arrived with Custer's message ordering Benteen to support Reno in the valley. The quickest route for Benteen to the big village being across Ford A, where Reno had been told he would be supported but forgot about and never after mentioned messages sent to him by Custer. Rocket scientist struggle with the problem, but the military axiom under circumstances Custer found once he commited his command, would dictate.......would dictate that...... you get yourself and 200 men wiped out. That is what Reno wishes the world to believe.
Custer was alive when Hairy Moccasin and White Man Runs Him arrived at the mouth of Custer Creek to have a little chat about how things weren't going well in the valley. It's time for the 1919 H.L. Scott interview with White Man Runs Him.
It's a game. The tribal record is fascinating in its confusion. Ultimately, there is only the text to work with, the actual words. With Cheyenne record there are obvious and also rather subtle errors introduced by tranlation of oral accounts and interpretation of sign. There is no substantial evidence to prove a presence by Custer's command in the valley or village, other than by an individual or two. Therefore, Custer did not cross the river and Cheyenne accounts which offer the prospect are errant in translation. James McLaughlin was not everyones cup of tea, but took his work and its importance seriously. He had problems about Sitting Bull, many people did with his intransigence and wily ability. McLaughlin's knowledge of the Sioux language made it possible to get along in conversation, with the assistance of the sign language, with most of the Indians east of the Rocky Mountains and north of Texas(See note). His wife was fluent.(see note) Of the Cheyennes he stated the language extremely difficult to master, knowing of no white man who has mastered it. Amongst problems with translations of Cheyenne, are terms for terrain and particularly river, stream, creek and ravine, etc. cardinal points can be troublesome, and horse color is absolute mayhem. An account stating Custer crossed the river is obviously not saying that, but something else. That is a can of worms but is fact. Thus if the didn't cross the river (creek) they crossed the coulee (creek), which makes a little more sense. For White Shield to see his Yellow Nose of to the south east capturing Custer's battle-flag, White Shield had to be on Greasy Grass Ridge. Two Moons told us when Black Bear was killed, Little Hawk told us how, his marker is on Battle Ridge. Lazy White Bull told of Bearded Man' death. His marker is on Battle Ridge.
In regards actual text we have to work with, sometimes being near is good enough but often it is misleading, '"For a time all the soldiers stood on a the hill near where the monument is now, ringed in by the Sioux, dying bravely one by one. as lndians poured in a hail of lead and arrows. They lay or knelt on the bare ridge, firing across the bodies of dead horses, selling their lives dearly until only a few remained.
A Cheyenne named 'Bearded Man' charged these soldiers. He rushed right in among them and was killed there. His body lay in the midst of the soldiers. When the fight was over, the Sioux found him there. They did not recognise his body. They thought he was an lndian Government scout. - to Stanley Vestal, (The Custer Reader By P.A. Hutton, R.M. Utley). Edward S. Curtis knew how to go about his work, obvious from 'The North American Indian' of which all volumes are online and fascinating.
Two Moon placed a guard over Custer's body, and new exactly where he lay. Keogh wore a scapula. Warriors with Paints Brown captured swords and guidons. Sgt. Ryan of Company M, recaptured a guidon at Reno Hill. Ammunition mules escaped from Reno Hill and were captured in the river. Custer's companies retreated alternatelyon foot, in irregular skirmish lines, as at least three simultaneous fights occured. They were done in by 3.15pm. Benteen was near the village about 2pm. Reno charged at about 2pm. Custer probably did as well. Wallace brought confusion to the Reno Inquiry. Graham delivered disater to time base analysis of the battle. Varnum heard two crashhes of gunfire, each which lasted several minutes and no more after. Mathey heard that gunfir 15 minutes before reporting to Reno on eReno Hill. Whittaker's time based analysis, the first conducted, was reasonably accurate but drew poor conclusions and he entirely missed the cause of disaster as being Reno's charge out of the battle.
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Note. McLaughlin was responsible for Gall at Standing Rock and left this anecdote:- 'WHEN CUPID CAMPS WITH THE SIOUX'
After he had passed his prime Gall fell in love. He was at that time the finest-looking Indian I had ever seen, and but a very few years previous, he need have asked no man s advice as to what he should do if he wanted a woman for a wife ; and in those days it would have made no particular difference if he had happened to be encumbered with one or more wives at the time. One morning in the year 1885, Gall had ceased to be a hostile and buried the hatchet finally in 1881, he came to the office at the agency and asked for a private interview. He was a fine, big man, showing in his attitude the pride he had in his chieftaincy and his prowess as a warrior. The finest typical picture of an Indian extant is a photograph of Gall taken about this time. He was very mysterious in his actions on this particular morning, which was the more surprising, in that he was habitually open and even impressive in his carelessness of surroundings. He looked about to see that we were alone and then said:- "Father, I have come to have a talk." (The Sioux invariably address their agent as father.)
I was ready to hear him, and told him so. He continued:- "When you came here [some four years previously] we agreed, you and I, that I should come and talk straight when I wanted advice and that we were to be friends."
"How," said I; "How" meaning good, right, well-done, or anything you like in the way of approbation, in addition to its usual use as a term of greeting and farewell.
And "How," rejoined the chief, then he continued: "I have been your friend; you are my friend. I told you that I would give up the customs of my people and live as the white men do, as nearly as I could. Have I done that?"
I assured him that I was perfectly content, and that he had been all I could ask. And he went on:- "Father, I have changed my habits; I follow the footsteps of the white man, for I know he is wiser than I am and that the Indian way is no longer the way to go. But, my friend, I cannot change my heart. We may catch a bird but we cannot make it change its tune. My heart is good, but it is sad, for I am in love."
Gall blushed. Men who know the Indian intimately will understand that this is literally true, that this big warrior, who had been ruthless in his warfare and who had lived for forty years and more in the open, whose red skin was browned by the sun, who had painted his face every winter to keep the skin from chapping and painted it again in the summer to keep it from burning, blushed like a white-skinned girl.
But he looked me straight in the eye. There was reason for his blushing, in the shape of an elderly dame who sat at home waiting for her lord to return from the agency, and Gall knew that I was thinking of her.
Where McLaughlin advises that Gall saw Custer's command for the second time thus; 'Gall said that when he reached the lower end of the village Custer was still some distance off ; that his force was advancing irregularly, but the men did not straggle far'. It should be believed, rather than the version given by Bowen. 'The process of events on the 25th of June, 1876, disposition of the forces and the actual fighting, Gall and other chiefs told the story to me (McLaughlin) with great attention to detail.'
Be well, Fred