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Post by wild on May 16, 2012 17:53:30 GMT -6
Dan All good points and courage never in doubt. But the exercise was an attack.And in a moment of crisis there was no leadership.The command Reno/Benteen was allowed to fall asunder.That is bad soldiering. And there was no organised defense from either Custer or Keogh. Was there fire control on Reno Hill?Was there a reserve established?Were men taken from from less engaged sectors and sent to reinforce more threatened areas? We've had reems of stuff posted to show that they were poor horsemen and even worse shots. There is more to soldiering than digging in and holding on. Best Wishes.
Dark Cloud When within 100 feet of the summit came under a well directed fire from our front and both flanks,poured in from behind boulders and rocks. We then saw that they were armed with matinis and the bullets fell on the fort in showers. Just two of the many references describing the employment of firearms in the hands of the Zulu. You posted in reference to the Battle of Hlobane that the Zulu had no firearms.That is inaccurate.
You posted that Buller was a fool and always had been.And you lecture us on "dissing" combat vets.That's Hypocrisy. You have no credibility left.
PS was given the Victoria Cross for a rushed defeat. Gross distortion. This is what you draw our attention to on an another board.
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Post by fred on May 16, 2012 18:33:27 GMT -6
Zekesgirl, QC, and BC--
Essentially, you are all correct. Actual time means nothing... except when one is trying to understand how events unfolded and why men did as they did. By distorting "time," we can-- as Queenie says-- lay blame. We can pick favorites; and we can invent things that never occurred.
An example of this is the ludicrous notion that Reno took 40 minutes or so to cross at Ford A and re-form. What does this say about Reno as a commander or officer?
Another example is Reno spending only ten minutes fighting on the valley floor. Again, that notion impugns the man's reputation and results in things like the RCOI and possibly a ruined career.
By claiming Benteen didn't arrive on Reno Hill until 4:20 PM after separating from Custer at 12:10, means it took the man more than four hours to march 15 or 16 miles. That's not a march; that's a crime. But by claiming that we can justify Benteen's acidic and irresponsible attitude toward an over-glorified American hero, something too many people cannot tolerate. Conversely, by claiming he got to Reno Hill too early, we can say he spent two or three hours there, fiddling around while Custer perished.
The arrogant stupidity continues when certain people claim Custer "fortified" unfortifiable and indefensible terrain, unknowingly making the man out a fool to satisfy their own asinine theory of what tactics are supposed to be. It is this same stupidity that has Custer walking down Reno Creek at 3.9 MPH in the face of an implacable foe.
So time affects all of the players. It also affects the events and how we view the whole battle. By properly putting things in order; by seeing things as the participants saw them; by realizing and understanding this was a military operation carried out by professional soldiers-- warts and poor training and all-- we see men as they really were, not as how we want to view heroes and villains. We have in this country an extreme penchant for wanting to lay blame; I think it may go back to our roots, our feelings of inadequacy regarding the mother countries, a feeling of insecurity, then a perverse feeling in superiority. You see it every day in our flag waving. Everywhere I look I see American flags flying; flag stickers on cars; flags flying on cars; flag lapel pins.... If any other country did such a thing we would be up in arms screaming, "Nationalism, nationalism!" Imagine every German walking around with a flag lapel pin. Yet here we are, the most nationalistic of societies. So when something bad happens, someone must be blamed immediately.
Blame, however, doesn't teach us anything. It just results in a witch-hunt and then all is forgotten and we mosey on 'til the next time we need to blame somebody for something. "Lessons learned" are what we need; not scapegoats.
So yes, time at the LBH matters. To my way of thinking, the event started at noon and George Custer was dead four hours, forty minutes later. If you want to back it up a couple of hours, fine. Just prove it. If you want to forward the same, fine; again, just prove it. Distance covered... probably, in all, some 17 to 20 miles, peak to trough. Responsibility: George Custer's. He attacked when he shouldn't have; he let too much space between his maneuver battalions, thereby assuring piecemeal destruction; he underestimated the strength of his foe; he underestimated his enemy's intentions. Malice aforethought by anyone: none. Incompetence: none. Misunderstanding: 136 year's-worth on June 25, 2012, and most of it with us.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by benteen on May 16, 2012 18:43:03 GMT -6
Richard,
I dont know how to break down each sentence so I have to do it the old fashion way. Sorry bare with me.
1. You say the command of Reno/Benteen was allowed to fall asunder I have no idea what that means
2. You say were men taken from less engaged sectors and put where they were needed. Yes they were
3. You say there is more to soldiering than digging in and holding on Yes there is. But I believe that in combat when victory is out of the question and the enemy has the upper hand, it takes as much courage and leadership to dig in and hold on as anything else. And these officers and men did it as well as anyone could ask for.
Be well Dan
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Post by AZ Ranger on May 16, 2012 20:28:36 GMT -6
Welcome back Fred.
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Post by wild on May 17, 2012 0:25:45 GMT -6
You say the command of Reno/Benteen was allowed to fall asunder I have no idea what that means As with Custer individual units of the command were out of the control of the commander.As with Custer components of the command were allowed to go beyond supporting range of each other.A recall was ignored. The one area where they had an advantage over the Indians,fire control,was not employed. And as already stated there is enough circumstantial evidence to indicate that they were poorly trained.
Yes there is. But I believe that in combat when victory is out of the question and the enemy has the upper hand, it takes as much courage and leadership to dig in and hold on as anything else. And these officers and men did it as well as anyone could ask for. If there is a lethal flaw within the leadership of a command such flaw will sooner or later be the undoing of the command. The 5 troops with Custer were of the same stuff,culture,training as Reno/Benteen's 7 troops.They suffered a catastrophic failure.And that same failure occured with Benteen on the jaunt to Weir point.
Just an observation on Fred's fine offering.Blame and responsibility are first cousins. It is the nature of a discussion board to be pro and anti ,and robust examination of theories plays it's part in advancing the cause of understanding. Best Wishes
Colonel I'v just gotten around to reading Craig L Symonds THE Battle of MIDWAY. First impressions are that it is a great read.It opens with the aborted attempt to relieve Wake Island.I could not but think that history was repeating itself with echos of the LBH. Any views? Regards
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 17, 2012 4:58:59 GMT -6
I have had a look at the RCOI, and the various commands that were given involving Capt. Benteen.
Capt. Benteen thought that Maj. Reno’s men were in good order but shaken up and troopers who had lost their horses were blown.
There was no direct order from Maj. Reno to leave for Weir Peaks.
Capt. Benteen left with his Company to see what was going on. When Capt. Benteen got to Weir Peaks he organised his men.
Capt. Benteen wanted to defend the area around Weir Peaks, but Maj. Reno said that they were better of going back to Reno Hill, Capt Benteen agreed.
Capt. Benteen left one Company in Skirmish line with instructions to hold that ridge at all Hazards, he then withdrew the rest the Battalion to Reno Hill, Capt. Benteen goes on to say ‘’Mind you I was looking after things probably more than it was my business or duty to do’’.
When Capt. Benteen got back to the coral, he sees the Company he had left on the ridge for cover rapidly moving back, he then sends out K Company commanded by Lt. Godfrey to another hill to check the Indians moving up.
When asked ‘’where was Maj. Reno during that time’’ Capt. Benteen says ‘’Maj. Reno was doing the best he could, I suppose.
Capt. Benteen then starts to place the Companies in various spots to from a defence perimeter.
Maj. Reno instructs Capt. Benteen to try and build Breastworks, but Capt. Benteen sees no need to, any way the spades he requested never turned up.
The next day the fighting began at daylight, Capt. Benteen said that the Indians were so close they were throwing dirt at the soldiers.
After rousting a group of around 12 to 15 skulker’s Capt. Benteen then started build Breastworks out of boxes because the Indian fire was so intense.
After leaving the position in command of Lt. Gibson, Capt. Benteen wanted to drive the Indians back; Maj. Reno thought that the main Indian attack would come on the other side of the line.
After receiving crossfire, Capt Benteen asks Maj. Reno if he could drive the Indians out, Maj. Reno agrees, Capt. Benteen commanding Troopers who were not under his command charge the Indian positions, Maj. Reno did not go with the attack.
So apart from asking Capt Benteen for help, suggesting that they moved back from Weir Peaks, plus ordering Breastworks to be built and giving Capt. Benteen permission to charge the Indians on Reno Hill, Maj. Reno took a back seat and left Capt. Benteen to do what he seen as prudent.
Just one last thought: when Capt. Benteen said he left one Company to hold the ridge while he and his Battalion withdrew from Weir Peaks, was it K Company under the command of Lt. Godfrey, Capt. Benteen says, when he seen the Company he left to hold the ridge rapidly moving back, he sends out K Company and Godfrey to another hill to check the Indians, I am sure there is a mix up here somewhere.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on May 17, 2012 7:08:47 GMT -6
Richard: More similar to the Alamo. Saratoga and escorts had about as much chance of relieving Wake as Houston did relieving the Alamo. The Saratoga Battle Group turned around and the commanders up and down the line were chastised for it. They used good sense, and were chastised out of frustration with a much larger set of events. Houston had better sense than to try.
Somedays you hold the cards. Somedays the other guys hold all the trumps. Military operations, like polictics are the art of the possible. Would you really risk only one of three carriers in the Pacific when Kido Butai was on the loose, you knew not where?
Richard if it is in the trying, the noble lost cause, the attempt at the impossible, is how you think soldiers should act in these circumstances, then I think you are wrong. There is no glory in dying stupidly, your just dead and while you might bring a smile, and stirring tunes of martial glory, later when your name is mentioned, your still dead and you died stupidly.
In real life these are decisions of life and death, risk and reward. These factors do not always play out well on the written work, the why the why nots, but that is what happens, and LBH, The Alamo, Wake, The Philippines, are all examples of cutting losses and not compounding errors. You make those decisions and have to live with the consequences.
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Post by fred on May 17, 2012 7:32:56 GMT -6
... when Capt. Benteen said he left one Company to hold the ridge while he and his Battalion withdrew from Weir Peaks, was it K Company under the command of Lt. Godfrey, Capt. Benteen says, when he seen the Company he left to hold the ridge rapidly moving back, he sends out K Company and Godfrey to another hill to check the Indians, I am sure there is a mix up here somewhere. Ian, Does this help: Companies “H,” “M,” and “K” arrived about 4:20, and spent the next fifteen minutes positioning themselves for a defensive stand. Edgerly described the H Company position as occupying the twin peaks in a file, while “D” was positioned at a right angle on the loaf. French’s M Company set up a little to Benteen’s rear, while Godfrey’s “K” was positioned adjacent to “D,” but on a narrow side-spur along the bluffs adjacent to the river and M Company—4:20 – 4:35 PM. Godfrey said he stopped his troops “a little below on the hillside.” He then went to the top of the hill to see what lay beyond. While he was up there—probably on the loaf—he saw Indians downriver starting back toward them, maybe three or four miles away. The troops were ordered to dismount and Godfrey formed a “skirmish line on the crest of the bluff next to the river about that high point… with M Company which was on the high point.” Years later he said,
"… our command did not appear to attract their attention, although there was some commotion observable among those near to our position. We heard occasional shots, most of which seemed to be a great distance off, beyond the large groups on the hill. While watching this group, the conclusion was arrived at that Custer had been repulsed, and the firing we heard was the parting shots of the rear guard."
Company M first sergeant, John Ryan, supported Godfrey’s contention. “We saw at a distance from a mile and a half to two miles parties, whom we supposed were Indians, riding back and forth and firing scattering shots. We thought they were disposing of Custer’s wounded men….” Private Charles Windolph of Benteen’s H Company, described the positioning: “Here we were stretched out all over the hell’s half acre, a troop on this hill knob, another in this little valley and over there a third troop. Behind, at a slow walk, came the pack trains, the wounded men and the rear guard.”
In the meantime, after a short delay with Captain Moylan to assist with the wounded, Varnum headed downstream to join the men on Weir Point. At about 4:42 PM, he reached Edgerly’s men on the loaf. “That was on the far point of a long range of high bluffs which ran along the right bank of the Little Big Horn. I went on to where his company was dismounted and firing at Indians who seemed to be coming from out on the prairie and turning back.” Varnum added:
"I went to the position of Captain Weir’s company at the far point of the ridge down-stream. At that time his men were firing at pretty long range—I should say seven or eight hundred yards—at Indians here and there. At that time I could see all over the plain where… the Custer battlefield had been, and it was just covered with Indians in all directions, coming back toward us."
Edgerly claimed this firing lasted about ¾ of an hour and if we look at Figure X – 24, we see the links to other events and how they tie in with his recollection. He deployed his command between 4:15 and 4:18 PM, ordering his men to fire at will. At 4:53, the firing eased, commensurate with Varnum’s account at the Reno court, of slow, long-distance firing; and at 5:04 PM, Edgerly began his withdrawal from the hilltop.
By 4:43 PM, the scout George Herendeen, noticing the gunfire slackening from downstream, began his move out of the valley timber, bringing with him most of the troops who could not make it out during Reno’s retreat. Herendeen’s action had to have been aided by the “watcher” Indians’ downstream move brought about by the Benteen move toward Weir. At about that same time—4:45 PM—word began to spread among the Indians on the Custer field that additional soldiers were seen on the high bluffs to the south. Indians in the vicinity of Calhoun Hill now began moving toward Weir Point, joining up with many of those who had stayed behind to monitor the troops on the southern hills—those “watchers.” By 4:50, more and more Indians were turning and making their way south toward the entrenched troops, aiming to finish the job George Custer and his Seventh Cavalry started. Many of them began at a slow gallop, but by the time they were joined by others, speeds would have reached twelve to fourteen miles per hour, especially up the easier draws and coulees (see X – 24). Seeing the burgeoning seriousness of the situation, Benteen made his way back quickly to Reno, warning the major the position atop these knolls was untenable—4:51 to 4:57 PM. Luke Hare recalled hearing Benteen tell Reno the area they had just come from—today’s Reno Hill—was the best place to make a stand. Reno agreed and dispatched Trumpeter George B. Penwell (K Company) to inform French, Godfrey, and Weir to pull back. By five PM, Herendeen and the valley stragglers would be reaching the vicinity of Weir Peaks, only to be caught up—again—with troops about to retreat. Herendeen looked back and saw not only were Indians moving toward them across the hills and coulees to the north, but many were returning up the valley as well.
At 5:03 PM, the galloping Penwell—having traversed the ¾ of a mile of open space at ten MPH—is signaling French, and has reached Godfrey’s command with the orders to move. Penwell informs Luke Hare—who Godfrey had just instructed to take ten men to occupy higher ground on the company’s right—and Hare notifies Godfrey of the change in plans. French yells over to Edgerly, instructing him to pull back. By 5:04 PM, the entire command of four companies occupying the Weir complex was on the move—a beginning gallop of eight to ten miles per hour—and the trains and rear columns are turning as Moylan reached Reno who told the captain it would not be necessary to move forward any more as, “the whole force of Indians was in front of Captain Weir’s command… and firing at us.” Benteen threw French’s company—still afoot—at right angles to the river to screen Weir’s withdrawal, as Reno arrived. Benteen instructed French to pull back slowly, but the whole operation did not work out as well as Benteen expected. French fell back much too quickly and Weir’s company was high-tailing it as well, so Benteen ordered Godfrey to serve as a blocking force somewhere between the Weir complex and Reno Hill. The fact the Indians did not make the most of their opportunity, plus a staunch defense by Godfrey (as noted by Benteen)—“carrying out his instructions more faithfully and in a more soldierly manner”—allowed Benteen enough time to get a defensive line forward as the retrograde began reaching Reno Hill.
As the last of D Company moved off the “sugarloaf” and into a small draw leading into Cedar Coulee—5:07 PM; eight to ten MPH—Edgerly began to grapple with his horse, his orderly, the old veteran Sergeant Harrison standing nearby to assist. Meanwhile, bullets were coming closer and closer and Edgerly claimed as he struggled mounting his horse, Indians got within fifteen feet of him and Harrison. The horse kept moving away from him, so Harrison moved in such a way as to prevent the animal from going any farther. Harrison kept smiling and told Edgerly the Indians were bad marksmen from so close.
At 5:09 PM, Godfrey’s company—the last to leave the hill complex—began its move toward Reno Hill. After Hare had come to him with the order to withdraw, Godfrey said,
"I had gone some distance… when, looking back, I saw French’s troop come tearing over the bluffs, and soon after Weir’s troop followed in hot haste. Edgerly was near the top of the bluff trying to mount his frantic horse… he vaulted into his saddle and then joined the troop. The Indians almost immediately followed to the top of the bluff…. They then started down the hillside in pursuit."
As D Company made its way back up Cedar Coulee, the company farrier, Vincent Charley, took at least one round in the hips and collapsed off his horse, according to Sergeant Harrison, “near a ravine to the left. Perhaps a ¼ mile or less from the two peaks” —5:11 PM. Some historians dispute the location—and Charley’s battlefield marker is out of place today—but Corporal George Washington Wylie from D Company, verified Harrison’s observation: “This was some distance south of Edgerly peaks [Weir Peaks] (and probably about opposite the ravine on east side of bluffs in which the cedar trees are growing).” In discussing the death, the historian Richard Hardorff wrote that Charley’s body was found “some two hundred fifty yards south of Weir Point.” With two hundred Indians hot on their tail, Harrison said Edgerly instructed the wounded man to crawl into a ravine and they would come back for him as soon as Edgerly could get reinforcements. As the two rode on, they glanced back and saw Indians swarming over and finishing off the wounded soldier. Edgerly regretted the incident for the rest of his life. In a July 4, 1876, letter to his wife, he wrote, “He [Capt. Weir] said orders had been given to fall back and we must obey them. That was the one thing I regretted more than any other thing that happened to me, for I had promised that wounded man I would get him out and wasn’t able to raise a [finger] for him.”
Godfrey’s skirmish line was set up—5:17 PM—just south of Sharpshooters’ Ridge and enabled the rest of the struggling command to set up in preparation for receiving K Company. Godfrey sent back his horse-holders leaving him with only twenty-two or twenty-three men, but this was enough to delay the onrush of the warriors. He complained that he dismounted his men, “for a rally of the retreating two troops [“D” and “M”]. Did they rally? Not much! But left me to hold the sack!” He was also “harassed” by Reno’s “repeated orders ‘to retire at once,’” Reno making no attempt to reinforce him.Now go out and buy the book... when it is published. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on May 17, 2012 7:49:39 GMT -6
Steve, Thank you very much! I have been reading your work on these-- and some other-- pages. As always, the very best! Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on May 17, 2012 7:52:13 GMT -6
Colonel Totally off thread but what the heck. The naval air battles of the Pacific more that any other campaigns in any era defined the military character of the United States for all time.And that status was gained not because the States was invincible but because at that time it was anything but invincible.This was big brother arriving on the scene,taking it's lumps and bumps and counter punching. The films of the battles are unique in that unlike most other war photography you see both combatants in the same frame.The sky clouded in ack ack,the lumbering carriers swatting at the incoming attackers.Gunners still blasting away at planes already doomed until they hit the water. You mentioned a priest who was decorated for his courage administering to the wounded.For me it's the iconic photograph of a naval rating without any protective gear climing up onto the wing of a blazing fighter to try to rescue the pilot that does it. The Battle of Britian boys were special but they had at least a 50/50 chance. What chance a torpedo plane flying straight and level at wave top? Regards
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 17, 2012 7:56:26 GMT -6
Thanks Fred, sounds like Lt. Godfrey and K Company could not have been the Troop left on the ridge eluded to by Capt. Benteen, that leaves, D, H & M Companies, if Benteen said he left to go back to Reno Hill with H Company, that leaves D & M Companies, I don’t think D Company held this ridge after the command moved back so it may have been M Company.
Capt. Benteen left one Company to hold the ridge while he and his Battalion withdrew from Weir Peaks, Capt. Benteen then said, when he seen the Company he left to hold the ridge rapidly moving back, he sends out K Company and Godfrey to another hill to check the Indians.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on May 17, 2012 8:34:52 GMT -6
Richard: Sort of agree, but not quite. The Empire of Japan lost the war about 1000 hours on 7 December 1941, before all of the aircraft had landed back aboard the carriers of Kido Butai. Japan never had any chance of victory. Never. Disregard the surprise attack, disregard the early losses. What is important is that the United States had the ships in production, the planes in production and the training underway. None of these things could be matched by Japan - none. We outproduced then 20 to 1 in thips and 40 to 1 in aircraft. We had natural resources, and for the most part they did not. Also remember that until mid 1944 the Pacific was a logistical side show for us and by that time the IJN had all but disappeared, having had the snot beaten out of them
If you want episodes of sacrifice read about the US Asiatic Fleet and the ABDA Fleet. Names like Houston, Langley, Pope, Pillsbury, Edsall, Peary, and others tell a story of great sacrifice against the odd, holding the line.
Two books you must read. No one can understand the Pacific naval war without having done so;
Midway by Prange, Goldstein, Dillon
Shattered Sword by Tully and Parchall.
In the second of these two you will find that the IJN was really not very good overall. They were much like the 60 year old movie star, trying to play the part and compete with 20 year olds by means of a face lift, dye job, and frequent trips to the gym. In the end shoddy planning, even more shoddy design and procedures show through the makeup
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Post by fred on May 17, 2012 9:35:11 GMT -6
Ian,
The whole Weir Peaks business is difficult to understand because of the terrain descriptions and our lack of good maps that can show us the undulations forming these landmarks.
From what I can figure out, M Company was to pull back slowly-- the last of the companies on the heights-- and probably through Godfrey's "K." "D" and "M" pulled back too quickly, however, so Benteen ordered Godfrey to allow everyone through, then told him to back up to a small ridge between Sharpshooters' Ridge and Reno Hill, running perpendicular to the river (probably ending at 3,411 elevation point). By setting up there, Godfrey would be screening the retreating forces and the wounded, and allowing them time to establish some sort of defensive perimeter.
So... to answer your question, I would suspect it was to be M Company originally, with "K" taking up an intermediate position, but because "M" pulled back too quickly "K" assumed both roles.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Dark Cloud on May 17, 2012 10:17:02 GMT -6
Benteen wanted to defend Weir Point? Source?
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Post by fred on May 17, 2012 17:46:42 GMT -6
Benteen wanted to defend Weir Point? Source? DC, Ian is correct essentially, at least at first. From Benteen's testimony at the RCOI: Benteen’s first sight of the village was from “that high point” [ Weir Peaks]. It was the only point from which the [ entire?] village could be seen and Benteen estimated about 1,800 tepees. [409] • He was only on that point for two or three minutes when the gorge in front was filled with Indians rushing toward them. That’s when they fell back. [409] • Benteen planted a guidon on the highest point. [423] • “Between this bluff [ Weir Peaks and its “sugarloaf”] … and the second ridge [ Sharpshooters’ Ridge or Luce Ridge?] is a canyon – like ravine [ Cedar Coulee or MTC?] going to that ford [ Ford B], which is about three miles from that high point.” Benteen wanted to defend that, but Reno thought they were better off going back to the hill area. Benteen agreed. [409] Best wishes, Fred.
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