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Post by bc on Nov 9, 2011 13:31:36 GMT -6
We have been discussing the Crow Scouts alot which has me wondering about their actual knowledge and abilities. All the scouts had been recruited by Gibbon at Fort Shaw, MT which is a long ways from the LBH. The treaty of 1867 at Fort Laramie basically gave all the Crow land in eastern Montana to the Sioux and others. The Crow were basically displaced to the west. From info gathered from "Participants in the Battle of the Little BigHorn" I include the following:
Curley: born 1858 at Little Rosebud Creek, MT. He would have been an 18 year old kid at the time. This is close to the LBH but he would have been 9 years old when displaced from that area.
Goes Ahead: born 1852, or 1851, or 1859 on the Platte River. Makes him 24, 25, or 17 years old by the time of the battle. When displaced by the treaty he would have been 15, 16, or 8 years old.
Hairy Moccasin: born 1854 at Lodge Grass, MT. He was born on the LBH but would have been a 22 year old kid at the time of the battle. When displaced by the treaty he was 13 years old.
White Man Runs Him: born 1856 or 1858 basically making him 20 or 18 years old at the time of the battle. When displaced, he was a 11 or 9 year old kid.
White Swan: born in 1851 in Montana making him 25 years old at the time of the battle. 16 years old when displaced by the treaty.
Half Yellow Face: was the senior who was in his 60's at the time of the battle. He was apparently the senior Crow at the battle but little or nothing is known of his contribution to Custer at the battle.
Mitch Bouyer: Was about 38 or 39 at the time of the battle and was Custer's main scout and most trusted scout who was half french and half Santee Sioux. Married a Crow in fall of 1869. Spoke Dakota and Crow and English. Worked with Custer in the past but came with Gibbon in 76. Gibbon considered him a good guide that could give distances in miles with some degree of accuracy. Bouyer's marriage likely has him displaced by the 1867 treaty as well.
Those with Varnum at the Crow's nest on his first trip: Mitch Bouyer, Curley, Goes Ahead, Hairy Moccasin, White Man Runs Him, and White Swan. Apparently Half Yellow Face was not there.
What I draw from all this is that it is unlikely that the youngsters would have any knowledge of Davis Creek, Reno Creek, and its' confluence with the LBH. Perhaps Half Yellow Face knew the most but apparently was not involved much regarding the sighting at the Crow's nest. Bouyer probably gave the most valuable advice that Custer would have trusted. Probably MB and HYF were the only ones who had been around a large encampment of NAs.
It doesn't appear the young Crows had much if any warrior fighting experience except for minor raids (I have no direct knowledge of this) against the Sioux. I'm not sure that "Curley the Kid" (I dub thee) had any warrior experience.
However, I don't see where even Bouyer and Half Yellow Face would have been in the LBH/Reno Creek confluence area in the past 10 years or more. With half of Montana covered by coulee after coulee and the with LBH having ford after ford that can change with the last flood, I don't see any Crows having any knowledge of the Reno Creek route or the LBH area including Medicine Tail Coulee and any northern fords.
bc
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Post by rosebud on Nov 9, 2011 13:42:25 GMT -6
All the scouts had been recruited by Gibbon at Fort Shaw, MT which is a long ways from the LBH.
No, the scouts were recruited near the present day town of Absarokee and that is not that far from the LBH.
What I draw from all this is that it is unlikely that the youngsters would have any knowledge of Davis Creek, Reno Creek, and its' confluence with the LBH.
In the 1800s, Davis creek was like a major highway to the Indians. It is the major route for anyone wanting to get from Rosebud creek to the LBH river valley. This same route was used by the men of the 1874 "miners". So I would say that it would be common knowledge for all Indians regardless of age. A 10 year old Indian would be more than capable of finding his way from the Yellowstone to the LBH via Rosebud Creek.
That does not mean that they need to know every crossing on the LBH. Why would they? Follow any old Buffalo trail and you will find the crossings. Just not that big of a deal. The LBH in not known for a river with bad crossings. You can just about cross any place you need. I would say you could probably find a crossing spot within 200 yards on most areas of the river.
The only thing they needed the scouts for was to find the Sioux and Cheyenne camp. They had no trouble finding the camp when it was on the Tongue river about 30 miles north of the Yellowstone. Rosebud
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Post by marcabrams on Nov 9, 2011 19:48:29 GMT -6
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Post by bc on Nov 10, 2011 0:56:51 GMT -6
Thanks Marc. Here is Curtis's account of the battle he got from the scouts they interviewed. Note that the vill was plainly visible from Crow's Nest according to them and Curtis. He also has the map with the Custer/Reno separation and states that the point where Custer waved to the Reno troops was just below/south of Reno Hill which I suppose is Mathey's point. Custer and staff stayed close to the bluffs with the troops further below. And they never did really attack at Ford B as they thought there was quick sand and such. curtis.library.northwestern.edu/curtis/viewPage.cgi?showp=1&size=2&id=nai.03.book.00000080&volume=3#navbc
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Nov 10, 2011 17:12:37 GMT -6
We have been discussing the Crow Scouts alot which has me wondering about their actual knowledge and abilities. bc In his book 'Rubbing Out Longhair' Rod Thomas records that in 1872 or 1873, there was a fight at the LBH between the Crows and the Lakota, when the Crows were camped in virtually the same place as the 'hostiles' camps in 1876. It is confirmation that the Crow tribe knew that area intimately and it is possible that the older Crow scouts with Custer were in that fight. Boyer of course, had guided and traded all through that region for a number of years, so I believe it is safe to say that Custer had a wealth of local knowledge with him. Hunk
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Post by rosebud on Nov 11, 2011 18:26:00 GMT -6
It is confirmation that the Crow tribe knew that area intimately and it is possible that the older Crow scouts with Custer were in that fight. Boyer of course, had guided and traded all through that region for a number of years, so I believe it is safe to say that Custer had a wealth of local knowledge with him.
Hunk
True Hunk.....But to what extent would he be willing to use this information?
It will not be up to the scouts to tell Custer HOW to engage the Indians. They are only there to FIND the Indians.
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Post by Margaret on Nov 12, 2011 11:27:18 GMT -6
I wouldn't doubt the young Crow's knowledge of their own locality within reason, but you couldn't expect them to know it all either - such a vast area. I know that if I was parachuted blindfolded into the place I spent the first 14 years of my life, I would easily find my way around, even with today's modern roads and buildings. Children today though are not so free roaming as we used to be, I think.
However, just to confuse things a little and contradict something posted earlier, referring to the battle circa early 1870's between the Crows/Nez Perce and the Sioux , this took place on Pryor Creek and according to Thomas Leforge [''Memoirs of a White Crow Indian''], who incidentally was with Gibbon in 1876, he states that the Crows/Nez Perce went into camp at the mouth of Pryor Creek [south side of Yellowstone], as the big Sioux camp had been spotted ''on the Little BigHorn''....
The Sioux came out to meet them on Pryor Creek, a place that Leforge also writes of the Crows as being ''one of their favourite assembling places''.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 12, 2011 12:15:17 GMT -6
I want to go back to what Britt initially posted and a portion of Rosebud's response, and how both might apply here.
Britt remarked that fords have a way of changing (their viability as fording places) with each spring flood, or other variables in the weather.Rosebud said that no one could be expected to know every fording place along the LBH, and I suppose by extension any river or large stream. Both of these are completely correct as far as I can see.
Now lets put this in a modern context. If the speed of my advance, or tactical planning is dependent on one or two bridges being in existence for the successful accomplishment of my mission, and I arrive at those bridges and I find they have been destroyed, saying whoops is not good enough.
How does this apply? It only applies if Custer's reasoning for going onto the bluffs and around the right flank was done so with certain knowledge that both those fords existed and were useable. Nothing else makes sense because the usage of those fords were absolutely necessary if he had a hope of entering that village(s) and visiting destruction on them.
Now I have been beaten around the head and ears both here and on the other board for saying that I feel that Custer oversteped the bounds of calculated risk and entered the realm of foolhardy risk taking. This is certainly one of the factors I believe that should be considered in evaluating which was which. Utilizing a crossing by happenstance like Remagen, is one thing, but preplanning a movement without adequate knowledge of if you can get across is quite another.
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Post by rosebud on Nov 12, 2011 12:49:34 GMT -6
Crow Scouts. Journal of James H. Bradley
April 13, 1876 Had no interpreter with me today, and the Crows took advantage of my inability to give them orders and hung around the column instead of remaining in advance with my detachment. LeForgey, very much to my satisfaction arrived just as we went into camp. And I shall now be able to keep one interpreter with me and have the best of these slippery Crows, who are now all with me.
May 1, 1876.…….Crow scouts report that a large swarm of Sioux were coming down Tullocks Creek to attack Gibbons men………3:00 pm Capt. Ball returned from a scout near Fort C.F. Smith. OOPS no Indians. Crow scout , Little Face is sent back to the agency to try and get the 6 scouts to return….6 scouts had deserted a few days earlier.
May 3, …….Sioux Indians have stolen all of the Crow Scouts horses during the night. The Crow scouts are now on foot.
May 15
Scout to the Tongue river to find village
The Crows had said openly that we were going to certain destruction and it had been hard to get out of the whole band the requisite number for the scout, none volunteering, so that I was aware of their reluctance and timidity. I became convinced that they were purposely selecting a bad route to tire me out, waste time and induced me to abandon the undertaking; and finally I halted the column and gaave them a severe lecture. I was satisfied from their replies that I had not misjudged them, and assured them that we would go to the Tongue River if it took a month……………..skip some……………..Seeing they had nothing to gain by their subterfuge they agreed to do the best they could, and pushing on, we soon emerged into a better country.
There is plenty more Rosebud
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Post by rosebud on Nov 12, 2011 13:00:24 GMT -6
Curley: born 1858 at Little Rosebud Creek, MT. He would have been an 18 year old kid at the time. This is close to the LBH but he would have been 9 years old when displaced from that area.
Do they mean the Rosebud Creek that Custer went up, or the Rosebud Creek on the Stillwater? Near the present day town of Columbus MT. Both would have been considered to be on Crow land.
Now lets put this in a modern context. If the speed of my advance, or tactical planning is dependent on one or two bridges being in existence for the successful accomplishment of my mission, and I arrive at those bridges and I find they have been destroyed, saying whoops is not good enough. quincannon
You seem to miss the point. Even if the bridge is out, they would be able to cross the LBH. Common sense will dictate where and how you will approach the LBH to find a crossing. Using a little common sense will get you to a crossing. Finding a crossing will not be a problem. Finding a SAFE crossing with no Indians is the problem. Nothing the scouts will ever be able to do about that problem. Rosebud
Now I have been beaten around the head and ears both here and on the other board for saying that I feel that Custer oversteped the bounds of calculated risk and entered the realm of foolhardy risk taking. This is certainly one of the factors I believe that should be considered in evaluating which was which. Utilizing a crossing by happenstance like Remagen, is one thing, but preplanning a movement without adequate knowledge of if you can get across is quite another.
This is only a guess but I will make it....If Custer takes all the time to find out everything you think he should....He might be able to cross without resistance. The village might be gone, but he would be safe.
OR>>>>> Custer takes to much time near the divide and the Indians will have him pinned down as he comes down Reno Creek.
Custer has many things he can do or change. There is one thing that he does not have........TIME. The TIME is in the favor of the Indians. Not a darn thing Custer can do about it. Try and make the best of a bad situation.
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Post by bc on Nov 12, 2011 13:20:51 GMT -6
I'd concur helford that it is a vast area. Having spent a week driving/riding for the 70+- mile trip from Billings to the battlefield being in the general area of the Jellystone river, that entire part of SE Montana is just one coulee and ridge after another. I didn't have the benefit of a few old NA and buffalo trails but in that vast of an area, the regular NA trails probably weren't that many. I would suspect that the Bozeman Trail closed by the Laramie Treaty was an old NA trail.
One thing is that the LBH was not a deep or wide river like the Jellystone or some parts of the BH. It may have been a little higher than normal because of the spring rains that year. Probably any inch of the river was crossable. However steep banks create difficulties for troops wanting to cross in a hurry under fire. Reno's retreat ford was not really a regular ford at the time most likely. Many troopers had to jump the 6' to 12' to get into the river and then climb the steep banks on the other side. That accounted for many casualties as horses balked and stumbled and so on in the crossing. Reno wouldn't have known that till he got there and by then it was too late.
What isn't known is the condition of the bottom and whether it is gravelly making a good ford that can be crossed fast or have a soft muddy bottom that would work like quick sand and slow your horses down. Reno's ford A had a soft bottom in some places which slowed some horses down which some equated to quick sand.
Ford B was partly up because of a beaver dam in the area. In that area are steep banks at least 12' high right next to gradual slopes. Some NAs say Custer arrived at ford B at the steep bank area and had to abort his charge to move over and evidence of which was testified to by Girard at the RCOI depending up which ford(s) he was talking about.
The bridge analogy probably doesn't apply here regarding finding a crossing place but finding one that could be crossed fast during an attack is another story. At the Washita, Custer jumped it with his horse. When I was there this summer, the foot wide stream of water meandering through the narrow river bottom could be stepped across.
Custer when he got close to the river was probably able to follow buffalo and NA travois trails but these wouldn't be known to any of the Crows when they were up at the divide or going down Reno Creek. There was a buffalo and travois trail going to ford B and likely a buffalo trail going to Thompson's ford. I have never heard anyone say there was any trails going to the D fords however.
Pryor Creek brings up something I can relate to. From my reading of travels through the Kansas Territory, it seems like NAs always preferred or did camp along small creeks. The only camps along a big river like the Arkansas was near a fort when they went for annuities. The Santa Fe Trail followed the Arkansas through central and western Kansas and eastern Colorado for a long ways since 1821 but there is a distinct lack of any mention of NAs camps along the big river. I could speculate that it is flood issue or perhaps a buffalo issue as maybe they avoided the bottom area and that grass.
Maybe rb would know, but I'm not to sure that the greasy grass was favored much by buffalo. If buffalo just passed through without hanging around long then there wouldn't be any nearby hunting or main camps. The June 76 gathering of NAs at that vill was more of a meeting for their version of Dancing with the Stars and the ghost/sun dance or whatever it was they had planned.
Regarding any risk taking by Custer by the terrain and fords, he was basically stuck because the NAs chose where to camp. Once the decided to attack a larger force with his smaller one, the die was cast and that was all done at the divide. Apparently his actions against the Sioux in 73 on the Jellystone dealt with a primarily uncrossable river, many coulees and ridges along it, and a larger force of NAs worked for him. They probably decided at the divide that they would adjust their tactics as they got closer to the river.
bc
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Post by bc on Nov 12, 2011 14:07:24 GMT -6
Interesting stuff rb. Bradley's information kinda puts things in perspective. I'd have to assume this information was passed on to Gibbon, Custer, and Terry. That may explain why Custer didn't believe them regarding the size of the village. I wonder if Curley the kid and others with Custer were part of the 6 deserters assuming the deserters came back.
bc
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Post by quincannon on Nov 12, 2011 15:46:24 GMT -6
Rosebud; The example of the bridge is generic, not applicable to any specific situation including this one. Just put it as an example of what basing plans upon incomplete knowledge could do.
You bring up time. one of the factors of METT-TC. It seems everyone, including Custer was concerned about time. Might I ask why. The normal answers are just what you said, either Custer thought the villages would scatter, or that he would be attacked before he reached the villages. Are you sure, or are you making the same assumption he did, and the same assumptions that have been made since. Are you sure that this time factor was not an artificial contrivance in Custer's mind that mitigated for and against his idea of one decisive battle? By this I don't want to argue a point one way or another. Tell the truth I just don't know, nor do I have any firm convictions on the matter. It just seems that sometime we have to stop an examine conventional wisdom, and say is thus and so really the case, or in this instance was time really as big a factor as we have been led to believe. It might very well be so, but I think it would be helpful if it were laid on the table and examined once again.
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Post by rosebud on Nov 12, 2011 17:03:32 GMT -6
Quincannon
Did Custer catch Sitting Bull in 73? Did Crook catch Sitting bull in 76? Did Gibbon catch Sitting Bull in 76? How many times have they been victorious attacking Indian villages after noon? Please don't give me a example that it worked once 50 years earlier.
I just don't see how you can come up with your concept. I see nothing that would slightly corroborate your idea. I need more than speculation to get to where you are. I would be interested in hearing why you think they would just sit and wait for Custer to ride into camp. Do you think an attack at dusk would be any good?
Now I will say that the ONLY reason I might be able to agree with any part of what you say is >>>>IF<<<<< one was to believe that the Indians know Custer is coming and they have set a trap for him to ride into. That is a story that is a bunch of bull on my opinion.
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Post by bc on Nov 12, 2011 17:58:00 GMT -6
I don't think Custer et.al would worry about being attacked up at the divide although Crook was attacked. So I suppose if he sat there all day who knows. An attack to hold him there while the vill moved south would be a likely tactic.
The main belief was that the villages would scatter and run which was known from years of prior experience. Custer also had another problem. He was supposed to patrol further south and come up the LBH which would help drive the NAs toward Terry and Gibbon. Following the large NA trails from the Rosebud and up Davis Creek would serve as an allowable deviation from his orders provided that he keeps the NAs from escaping south.
Sitting up at the divide, he had to at least move to the LBH. But to move to the LBH without an attack would have him laughed out of the cav.
Custer had no choice but to attack. Now for those that think he should have gone further south down the Rosebud and come up the LBH have to realize that they can't just ignore those large trails on Davis Creek. If he had gone down to the south and was discovered, the NAs could just as easily escape back east up Reno Creek which was something Terry didn't want.
bc
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