Post by fred on Apr 16, 2012 8:33:53 GMT -6
DC,
You have been the most vociferous proponent of the smoke/dust/awful terrain/mayhem scenarios of anyone I know and by being so, I believe you are closer to the truth regarding battlefield conditions at the LBH than anyone I have read. I also think by emphasizing these conditions-- and understanding them-- you can picture better the actions of individuals and the flow of events. These factors all played a much greater role than most people realize or picture and they dampen the "glory" of the fight.
I was very surprised when I realized the almost identical heights of those various terrain features. I have been to each of them several times: 1992, 2006, 2007, and 2009, and until 2009 I never understood the significance and relationship of any of them. The Weir Peaks versus 3,411 business is something of an optical illusion, I believe, brought about by the general downward sloping of the terrain. Benteen Hill is the highest spot south of the Reno Hill monument and it is about the same height as 3,411 and Weir. The ground then begins to slope downwards until it reaches a small ridgeline that runs somewhat perpendicular to the bluffs, culminating at the edge: 3,411. This is the same ridgeline where Godfrey set up his skirmish line in the pull-back from Weir and coincidentally-- and hypothetically-- it confirms the DeRudio estimates of where he saw the three riders. From that 3,411 ridge northward toward Weir, the ground begins its downward slope and forms the head of Cedar Coulee. By the time one wanders down (or north) that far, the Weir complex sticks out like a sore thumb, but in reality is no higher than any of the other features in that area. Tricky stuff; welcome to the U. S. Army School of Advanced Map Reading!! <g>
I don't believe Custer was ever in anything we can call an "attack mode." "Attack" is not synonymous with "offensive," at least not in my mind; yet he was always on the offensive, at least until Cemetery Ridge. To me, an active reconnaissance with an intent to attack constitutes "offensive action": it is the prelude to an attack, and is manifested especially in Custer's actions at the LBH. The Indians short-circuited GAC's plans by splitting him off from Keogh, simultaneously (coincidentally!) closing off his escape route to the north and at the same time fronting him at a great range while he was on Cemetery Ridge.
Incidental... though not by design; more by adrenaline and circumstance.
Certainly not planned and certainly unwelcome. The terrain was something he had to overcome, but it was a double whammy because not only did it slow him down, it proved advantageous to the Indians.
I believe Custer met minor resistance at three points: (1) Ford B, which he didn't even bother to address, though Smith's company fended it off as they moved up the Deep Coulee flats; (2) as he was turning off the Battle Ridge extension; and (3) at Ford D. None of these were significant, though I believe the Ford B confrontation was bigger than most-- including myself-- have understood. Still not enough to cause any alarm, but larger than originally thought and large enough to trail Custer, Yates, and Smith to Calhoun Hill. That resistance abated somewhat as Indians chose to move into Deep Coulee and as Custer was re-joined by the Keogh battalion.
I think Keogh was less of a rear guard than an enclave of defense against the Ford B marauders and as a presence for Benteen. His positioning there controlled the high ground for a while and allowed Keogh a good spot to survey the entire area. Calhoun Hill is a good mile from the position Custer initially occupied on Cemetery Ridge and Custer would not know Keogh had to have extended his line as far north as he did.
Remember, as well, this was a very simple plan: determine the extent of the village; determine where the fugitives were (therefore, the attack point); drop off strong troops to keep the flies away and re-link with Benteen; meet near a crossing point; and attack. Keogh's plans and actions were localized... and then he was to proceed. GAC needed a ford, then he would back-track to a high point where he could be seen... then Crazy Horse screwed up everything by splitting the two.
Best wishes,
Fred.
You have been the most vociferous proponent of the smoke/dust/awful terrain/mayhem scenarios of anyone I know and by being so, I believe you are closer to the truth regarding battlefield conditions at the LBH than anyone I have read. I also think by emphasizing these conditions-- and understanding them-- you can picture better the actions of individuals and the flow of events. These factors all played a much greater role than most people realize or picture and they dampen the "glory" of the fight.
I'll have to read the book, Fred. I stood on the high point of Weir and recall being able to see the Reno monument but I don't recall anything as high as I was looking back. You're right, the map says it...
I was very surprised when I realized the almost identical heights of those various terrain features. I have been to each of them several times: 1992, 2006, 2007, and 2009, and until 2009 I never understood the significance and relationship of any of them. The Weir Peaks versus 3,411 business is something of an optical illusion, I believe, brought about by the general downward sloping of the terrain. Benteen Hill is the highest spot south of the Reno Hill monument and it is about the same height as 3,411 and Weir. The ground then begins to slope downwards until it reaches a small ridgeline that runs somewhat perpendicular to the bluffs, culminating at the edge: 3,411. This is the same ridgeline where Godfrey set up his skirmish line in the pull-back from Weir and coincidentally-- and hypothetically-- it confirms the DeRudio estimates of where he saw the three riders. From that 3,411 ridge northward toward Weir, the ground begins its downward slope and forms the head of Cedar Coulee. By the time one wanders down (or north) that far, the Weir complex sticks out like a sore thumb, but in reality is no higher than any of the other features in that area. Tricky stuff; welcome to the U. S. Army School of Advanced Map Reading!! <g>
Can you say at what point did Custer change from attack mode to recce mode and what triggered such a move?
I don't believe Custer was ever in anything we can call an "attack mode." "Attack" is not synonymous with "offensive," at least not in my mind; yet he was always on the offensive, at least until Cemetery Ridge. To me, an active reconnaissance with an intent to attack constitutes "offensive action": it is the prelude to an attack, and is manifested especially in Custer's actions at the LBH. The Indians short-circuited GAC's plans by splitting him off from Keogh, simultaneously (coincidentally!) closing off his escape route to the north and at the same time fronting him at a great range while he was on Cemetery Ridge.
And as always the price he paid--Reno's battalion...
Incidental... though not by design; more by adrenaline and circumstance.
... Keogh's battalion,time and the command in DC's godawful terrain.
Certainly not planned and certainly unwelcome. The terrain was something he had to overcome, but it was a double whammy because not only did it slow him down, it proved advantageous to the Indians.
And the conclusion that Custer came to grief when counter attacked while engaged in a recce?
I believe Custer met minor resistance at three points: (1) Ford B, which he didn't even bother to address, though Smith's company fended it off as they moved up the Deep Coulee flats; (2) as he was turning off the Battle Ridge extension; and (3) at Ford D. None of these were significant, though I believe the Ford B confrontation was bigger than most-- including myself-- have understood. Still not enough to cause any alarm, but larger than originally thought and large enough to trail Custer, Yates, and Smith to Calhoun Hill. That resistance abated somewhat as Indians chose to move into Deep Coulee and as Custer was re-joined by the Keogh battalion.
Further the gap between Custer's final position and Keogh's final position is just not far enough apart to suggest the rear guard scenario.Far more likely the breach occured due to Indian action.
I think Keogh was less of a rear guard than an enclave of defense against the Ford B marauders and as a presence for Benteen. His positioning there controlled the high ground for a while and allowed Keogh a good spot to survey the entire area. Calhoun Hill is a good mile from the position Custer initially occupied on Cemetery Ridge and Custer would not know Keogh had to have extended his line as far north as he did.
Remember, as well, this was a very simple plan: determine the extent of the village; determine where the fugitives were (therefore, the attack point); drop off strong troops to keep the flies away and re-link with Benteen; meet near a crossing point; and attack. Keogh's plans and actions were localized... and then he was to proceed. GAC needed a ford, then he would back-track to a high point where he could be seen... then Crazy Horse screwed up everything by splitting the two.
Best wishes,
Fred.